


# MILITARY AFFAIRS

*Journal of the American Military Institute*

VOLUME XVI



Washington, D. C.  
1952

KRAUS REPRINT CO.  
Millwood, N.Y.  
1979

## EDITORIAL STAFF

### *Editor*

VICTOR GONDOS, JR.

### *Associates*

FRANCIS O. HOUGH  
RICHARD W. OWEN

JOHN K. MAHON  
GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

### *Members*

ROBERT W. DAVIS  
ROWLAND P. GILL  
HENRY S. MERRICK

MOREAU B. C. CHAMBERS  
RALPH W. DONNELLY  
F. W. FOSTER GLEASON

Index to Volume XVI prepared by N. J. Anthony

MILITARY AFFAIRS is published quarterly by the American Military Institute at 3110 Elm Avenue, Baltimore 11, Md. Entered as second class matter at the post office at Baltimore, Md., under the Act of August 24, 1912. Annual subscription \$3.50.

Address correspondence to the Secretary at 1529 - 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.  
Printed by Monumental Printing Company, Baltimore, Md., U. S. A.

*Reprinted with the permission of the original publishers*

KRAUS REPRINT CO.

A U.S. Division of Kraus-Thomson Organization Limited  
Printed in U.S.A.



## INDEX TO VOLUME XVI (1952)

- Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations, The (Brookings Institution), reviewed, 38
- Air Force, U. S.  
The Historian and the Nature of History: Some Reflections for Air Force Historians (Scheips), 123
- American Democracy and Military Power (Louis Smith), reviewed, 35
- American Historical Association  
Joint Meeting with AMI, 47, 205
- American Military Institute  
General Membership Meeting, 47  
Joint Meeting with AHA, 47, 205  
Library of the Institute, 47
- Anatomy of Communism, The (Andrew McK. Scott), reviewed, 88
- Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution (Willard J. Wallace), reviewed, 36
- Army Air Forces in World War II: The Pacific, Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate), reviewed, 189
- Army, U. S.  
Distribution of Regular Army Troops Before the Civil War (Prucha), 169  
War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942, 12, 97
- Arnold, Henry H., papers, 207
- Art, Battle  
Combat Paintings, 96
- Artillery  
Theoretical Evaluation of Artillery After World War I (Vigman), 115
- Bilon, George  
Review of Secret Forces (Miksche), 88
- Book Reviews, 35, 84, 136, 189
- Castelazo, A. H.  
Review of Ships for Victory (Lane), 86
- Cedar Creek, Battle of  
Sheridan and Cedar Creek—A Reappraisal (Naroll), 153
- Civil War  
Confederate Muster Rolls (Donnelly), 132  
General Hood as Logistician (Vandiver), 1  
Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War (Preston), 49  
Sheridan and Cedar Creek—A Reappraisal (Naroll), 153  
The Surrender Negotiations Between General Johnston and General Sherman, April 1865 (Pfanzen), 61
- Civil War Round Table, 48, 152, 207
- Clear the Decks (Daniel V. Gallery), reviewed, 39
- Come, Donald R.  
The French Threat to British Shores, 1793-1798, 174
- Company of Military Collectors and Historians, 48
- Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the Military in the United States, The (William R. Tansill), reviewed, 35
- Confederate Muster Rolls (Donnelly), 132
- Danger Spot of Europe (Alan H. Broderick), reviewed, 38
- Dater, Henry M.  
Review of Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1951-52, 85  
Review of The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV, 189
- Distribution of Regular Army Troops Before the Civil War (Prucha), 169
- Donnelly, Ralph W.  
Confederate Muster Rolls, 132
- East, Sherrod  
Review of Federal Records of World War II (National Archives), 84
- Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two World Wars (Yoshpe), 71
- Federal Records of World War II (National Archives), reviewed, 84
- Foreign Policy for Americans (Robert A. Taft), reviewed, 39
- France  
French Threat to British Shores, The, 1793-1798 (Come), 174
- General Hood as Logistician (Vandiver), 1
- George Washington: A Biography, Vols. III and IV (Douglas S. Freeman), reviewed, 88
- Glory Road: The Bloody Route from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg (Bruce Catton), reviewed, 137
- Grand Strategy and the American People (Robinett), 30
- Great Britain  
Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War (Preston), 49  
The French Threat to British Shores, 1793-1798 (Come), 174
- Greene, Wallace M., Jr.  
Review of Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853 (Anderson), 194
- Hammer, Kenneth M.  
Review of The Official Record of a Court of Inquiry . . . Upon the Request of Major Marcus A. Reno (Graham), reviewed, 191

- Haydon, Frederick S.  
War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942, 12, 97
- Hayes, John D.  
Review of American Democracy and Military Power (Smith), 35  
Review of Main Fleet to Singapore (Grenfell), 87  
Review of The Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the Military in the United States (Tansill), 35  
Review of The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief (Rossiter), 35  
Headquarters Gazette, 47, 95, 151, 205
- Hewett, Edward Osborne  
A Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War (Preston), 49
- Hidden History of the Korean War, The (I. F. Stone), reviewed, 195
- Historian, The, and the Nature of History: Some Reflections for Air Force Historians (Scheips), 123
- History, Military  
History of World War II for 1953, 207  
Korean Unit Histories, 206  
Marine Corps Historical Program, 95  
Military History at the AHA Meeting, 205  
The Historian and the Nature of History: Some Reflections for Air Force Historians (Scheips), 123
- Hitler Directs His War (Felix Gilbert, ed.), reviewed, 138
- Hood, John Bell  
General Hood as Logistician (Vandiver), 1
- Investigation of the Preparedness Program from September 6, 1950, Through August 28, 1952, reviewed, 142
- Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1951-52 (Leonard Bridgman, ed.), reviewed, 85
- Johnston, Joseph Eggleston  
The Surrender Negotiations Between General Johnston and General Sherman, April 1865 (Pfanzen), 61
- Keyes, Allen Lloyd, necrology, 96  
Korean Unit Histories, 206
- Legend Into History: An Analytical Study of the Battle of the Little Big Horn (Charles Kuhlman), reviewed, 141
- Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War (Preston), 49
- Lincoln and His Generals (T. Harry Williams), reviewed, 38
- Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. III (Kenneth P. Williams), reviewed, 136
- Lord, Francis A.  
Review of Glory Road (Catton), 137
- Mahon, John K.  
Review of Appeal to Arms (Wallace), 36
- Review of Rag, Tag and Bobtail (Montross), 36  
Review of Valley Forge (Bill), 36  
Main Fleet to Singapore (Russell Grenfell), reviewed, 87  
Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1951-1952 (Brookings Institution), reviewed, 39  
Man Was Meant to Be Free (Harold J. Stassen), reviewed, 39  
Marine Corps Historical Program, 95  
McNeill, Hector  
The Stormy Career of Captain McNeill, Continental Navy (Morgan), 119  
Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker (John Andrews, trans.), reviewed, 140  
Merrick, Henry S.  
Review of Legend into History (Kuhlman), 141  
Review of Lincoln and His Generals (Williams), 38  
Review of Troopers with Custer (Brininstool), 190
- Miller, John, Jr.  
Review of Under the Southern Cross (Cronin), 141
- Mobilization Planning  
Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two World Wars (Yoshpe), 71
- Moncado Award, 152
- Montross, Lynn  
Review of The Hidden History of the Korean War (Stone), 195
- Morgan, William J.  
The Stormy Career of Captain McNeill, Continental Navy, 119
- Mr. Lincoln's Army (Bruce Catton), reviewed, 137
- Napoleonic Wars  
The French Threat to British Shores, 1793-1798 (Come), 174
- Naroll, Raoul S.  
Sheridan and Cedar Creek—A Reappraisal, 195
- Naval Museum, Exhibition at, 95
- Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853 (R. C. Anderson), reviewed, 194
- Nazzarro, Joseph  
Review of Mr. Lincoln's Army (Catton), 137
- New Military and Naval Dictionary (Frank Gaynor, ed.), reviewed, 39
- Northern Railroads in the Civil War, The, 1861-1865 (Thomas Weber), 192
- Objective, Principle of  
Grand Strategy and the American People (Robinett), 30
- Office of Military History  
History of World War II for 1953, 207
- Official Record of a Court of Inquiry . . . Upon the Request of Major Marcus A. Reno (William Alexander Graham), reviewed, 191



## Organization

- War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942 (Haydon), 12, 97
- Our German Policy (Albert Norman), reviewed, 39
- Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate), reviewed, 189
- Paintings, Combat, 96
- Palsits, Victor Hugo, necrology, 95
- Pfanz, Harry W.  
The Surrender Negotiations Between General Johnston and General Sherman, April 1865, 61
- Planning  
Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two World Wars (Yoshpe), 71
- Possony, Stefan T.  
Review of Red China's Fighting Hordes (Rigg), 191
- Preble's Boys: Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power (Fletcher Pratt), reviewed, 88
- Preston, R. A.  
A Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War, 49
- Prucha, Francis Paul  
Distribution of Regular Army Troops Before the Civil War, 169
- Rag, Tag and Bobtail: The Story of the Continental Army, 1775-1783 (Lynn Montross), reviewed, 36
- Railroads of the Confederacy, The (Robert C. Black), reviewed, 192
- Red China's Fighting Hordes (Robert B. Rigg), reviewed, 191
- Regular Army  
Distribution of Regular Army Troops Before the Civil War (Prucha), 169
- Revolutionary War  
The Stormy Career of Captain McNeill, Continental Navy (Morgan), 119
- Riddle of MacArthur, The: Japan, Korea and the Far East (John Gunther), reviewed, 39
- Robinet, Paul M.  
Grand Strategy and the American People, 30
- Rosenfeld, A. H., Jr.  
Review of Hitler Directs His War (Gilbert, ed.), 138
- Scheips, Paul J.  
The Historian and the Nature of History: Some Reflections for Air Force Historians, 123
- Schmitt, Bernadotte E.  
Review of Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker, 140
- Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements (F. O. Miksche), reviewed, 88
- Sheridan and Cedar Creek—A Reappraisal (Naroll), 153

Sheridan, Philip Henry

- Sheridan and Cedar Creek—A Reappraisal (Naroll), 153
- Sherman, William Tecumseh  
The Surrender Negotiations Between General Johnston and General Sherman, April 1865 (Pfanz), 61
- Ships for Victory (Frederick C. Lane), reviewed, 86
- Smith, Albert Cowper  
Chief of Military History, 152
- Stansfield, George J., ed.  
Book Reviews, 35, 84, 136, 189
- Stormy Career of Captain McNeill, Continental Navy, The (Morgan), 119
- Strategy  
Grand Strategy and the American People (Robinet), 30
- Supreme Court, The, and the Commander in Chief (Clinton Rossiter), reviewed, 35
- Surrender Negotiations Between General Johnston and General Sherman, April 1865 (Pfanz), 61
- Theoretical Evaluation of Artillery After World War I (Vigman), 115
- Troopers with Custer (E. A. Brininstool), reviewed, 190
- Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the Americal Division (Francis D. Cronin), reviewed, 141
- Unit Histories  
Korean Unit Histories, 206
- Valley Forge (Alfred Hoyt Bill), reviewed, 36
- Vandiver, Frank E.  
General Hood as Logistician, 1
- Vigman, Fred K.  
The Theoretical Evaluation of Artillery After World War I, 115
- War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942 (Haydon), 12, 97
- Ward, Orlando, retirement, 151
- Watson, Robert Stanley  
Review of The Railroads of the Confederacy (Black), 192  
Review of The Northern Railroads in the Civil War 1861-1865 (Weber), 192
- Wiley, Bell Irvin  
Review of Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. III (Williams), 136
- World War I  
Theoretical Evaluation of Artillery After World War I (Vigman), 115
- World War II  
History of World War II for 1953, 207  
War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942 (Haydon), 12, 97
- Yoshpe, Harry B.  
Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two World Wars, 71

## CONTENTS OF VOLUME XVI

### ARTICLES

General Hood as Logistician, <i>by Frank F. Vandiver</i> .....	1
War Department Reorganization, August 1941 - March 1942, <i>by Frederick S. Haydon</i> .....	12
Grand Strategy and the American People, <i>by Paul M. Robinett</i> .....	30
A Letter from a British Military Observer of the American Civil War, <i>by R. A. Preston</i> .....	49
The Surrender Negotiations between General Johnston and General Sherman, <i>by Harry W. Pfanz</i> .....	61
Economic Mobilization Planning between the Two World Wars, Part II, <i>by Harry B. Yoshpe</i> .....	71
War Department Reorganization, August 1941 - March 1942, Part II, <i>by Frederick S. Haydon</i> .....	97
The Theoretical Evaluation of Artillery after World War I, <i>by Fred K. Vigman</i> .....	115
The Stormy Career of Captain McNeill, Continental Navy, <i>by William J. Morgan</i> .....	119
Sheridan and Cedar Creek, a Reappraisal, <i>by Raoul S. Naroll</i> .....	153
Distribution of Regular Troops before the Civil War, <i>by Francis Paul Prucha</i> .....	169
French Threat to British Shores, 1793 - 1798, <i>by Donald R. Come</i> ....	174

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE .....	47, 95, 151, and 205
----------------------------	----------------------

### THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Book Reviews.....	35, 84, 136, and 189
Military Bibliography.....	39, 89, 143, and 196

### NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

The Historian and the Nature of History: Some Reflections for Air Force Historians, <i>by Paul J. Scheips</i> .....	123
Confederate Muster Rolls, <i>by Ralph W. Donnelly</i> .....	133

EDITORIAL COMMENT .....	11, 29
-------------------------	--------



## GENERAL HOOD AS LOGISTICIAN

BY FRANK E. VANDIVER\*

GENERAL John B Hood was a fighter. This had been a major consideration influencing his appointment to succeed Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate Army of Tennessee on July 18, 1864. But aside from this attribute, what qualifications did the general have for army command? He was undeniably quick in battle, had shown a grasp of objective in action and certainly could move troops where he wanted them to fight. He had, at the beginning of his independent command good and sufficient confidence in himself and advocated the offensive. But, as time went on certain gaps appeared in his proficiency.

President Davis knew that the choice of Hood was not the most ideal he could have made, but felt that what he lacked in professional finesse he might make up in action. Davis knew, too, that General Lee was unsure of Hood's overall qualifications.<sup>1</sup>

It is not surprising that neither the President nor the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia worried about whether Hood had a keen sense of logistics. Surely this was an obvious requisite of any capable field commander, and need hardly be questioned. Hood was, after all, a graduate of West Point. But no complete analysis of his military capacity can overlook his attention to what Frederick the Great has called "the

primary duty of a general"—supply.<sup>2</sup> An examination of efforts to provide ordnance for Hood's Tennessee campaign will serve perhaps to measure him from this standpoint.

The Army of Tennessee was adequately supplied with ordnance when Hood took command. Confederate ordnance officers had pushed efforts to furnish ample ordnance stores from the outset of Johnston's campaign to retard Sherman's advance from Dalton to Atlanta, Georgia, in May, 1864. By April the Ordnance Bureau had been able to issue about 120 rounds of small arms ammunition per man in the ranks, along with adequate artillery ammunition. Even so, the Bureau seemed compelled to apologize for not being able to do better.<sup>3</sup> An apology was out of order—the Bureau had done well.


Supplying such a volume of ammunition had strained resources considerably. Cooperation among all the ordnance establishments alone made the achievement possible. Under a logistical plan set up in March, 1863, the Army of Tennessee was to be supplied by the arsenals, armories and depots nearest to

<sup>2</sup>Frederick II, *Instructions for his Generals* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1944). (Translated by Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips.)

<sup>3</sup>See Col. Julius A. de Lagnel to Col. Hypolite Olandowski, Richmond, April 4, 1864, in Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI (Mississippi Department of Archives and History). In this letter de Lagnel, assistant to the Confederate Chief of Ordnance, observed to the chief ordnance officer of the Army of Tennessee that ammunition distribution among the army's different corps was unequal. See also de Lagnel to Col. M. H. Wright, Richmond, April 4, 1864, in Personal Service File of J. A. de Lagnel (Adjutant General's Office, National Archives). This letter includes a chart of ammunition distribution in the Army of Tennessee.

\*Dr. Vandiver is the author of the recently published book, *Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952).

<sup>1</sup>For the background to Hood's appointment see John P. Dyer, *The Gallant Hood* (New York, 1950), 243-44.



it.<sup>4</sup> This threw the main distribution responsibility upon Atlanta Arsenal and its supporting installations. Columbus Arsenal provided a large portion of the small arms ammunition to Atlanta Arsenal. From here it was, in turn, sent to the army. The production capacity of the cartridge laboratory at Columbus was increased during May and June, so that by June 28, its commanding officer reported a weekly fabrication of from 100,000 to 120,000 bullets. All of these were destined for the Army of Tennessee.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Ordnance Circular, Richmond, March 31, 1863, in Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI.

<sup>5</sup>De Lagnel to Col. M. H. Wright, Columbus, Ga., June 22, 28, 1864, in Personal Service File of J. A. de Lagnel. De Lagnel to Wright, June 24, *ibid.*, advising of shipment of 190,000 cartridges.

In the emergency created by the summer campaign Atlanta Arsenal received aid from almost all of the ordnance installations in the deep South. From Savannah, for instance, as well as from Macon, came assistance in the form of cartridges.<sup>6</sup> No city contributed more toward supplying the army's needs than Macon. Here were located the Confederate States Central Laboratories for Ordnance, an arsenal, a cannon foundry and a National Armory.<sup>7</sup> The Ordnance Bureau naturally

<sup>6</sup>Col. John W. Mallet to Col. Josiah Gorgas (telegram), Macon, July 18, 1864, Confederate Archives (National Archives), Chap. IV, Vol. LII, 15; James H. Burton to Gorgas, Macon, July 26, 1864, *ibid.*, Vol. XXXI, 511.

<sup>7</sup>Frank E. Vandiver (ed.), *The Civil War Diary of General Josiah Gorgas* (University, Ala., 1947), 90, 91.



expected Macon to carry a major portion of the supply load for the Army of Tennessee.

As the army retreated closer toward Atlanta, fear increased concerning the safety of the ordnance plants in Georgia. The loss of Atlanta Arsenal would be a severe blow to the Ordnance Bureau. But, in addition, the presence of Sherman beyond Atlanta meant danger to all deep South installations. Although generally not mentioned probably for security reasons, the retention of Atlanta was almost essential to the Bureau. This should have been obvious to even the most unmilitary onlooker.

With this tactical necessity as a spur, all possible measures were taken to sustain the army backing into Atlanta's entrenchments. In mid-July, after the army had occupied the city's defense lines, the percussion cap factory there was hastily moved to Macon.<sup>8</sup> Colonel Josiah Gorgas, the Confederate Chief of Ordnance, had decided to concentrate his Bureau's resources in Macon to sustain the army now under Hood's charge. Atlanta Arsenal was too exposed to rely on for other than distribution functions. Macon, Columbus, and Augusta arsenals were picked to provide Hood's wants, though the latter arsenal was all but isolated from army by rail. The ammunition laboratory in Atlanta was united with that in Macon and put under the command of Colonel John W. Mallet, the Confederacy's Superintendent of Laboratories. Gorgas directed Mallet to organize the workers of the two laboratories into a single force and rush production—"time is chief consideration."<sup>9</sup>

Macon Armory was sorely taxed to repair arms for Hood, but by July 26 it was able to

return 200 arms a day to the army.<sup>10</sup> The Ordnance Bureau encountered many hindrances in keeping up Hood's ordnance supply. Negro labor was an essential part of the working force at all Macon ordnance plants. As the war moved into Georgia it became increasingly difficult to persuade slaveowners to rent their slaves to the various installations close to the theater of war. In late June Mallet and James H. Burton, at Macon Armory, had been forced to seek authority to impress slavelabor in order to keep going.<sup>11</sup>

The little relief this expedient offered was short lived. On July 1, Burton complained to Gorgas that an armed guard had appeared at the armory and laboratories with instructions to impress one-third of the Negro labor for work on fortifications.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately this was to be the first of several similar interruptions.

Realizing that confusion might result from the changed logistical plan forced by Atlanta's situation, Gorgas sought to keep matters in hand. In an attempt to prevent decentralization from degenerating into chaos, he sent Colonel Moses H. Wright, trusted commander of Atlanta Arsenal, to Macon on August 4 to take charge of supplying Hood's needs. Wright was soon moved to the command of Columbus Arsenal when it became apparent that no confusion would develop.<sup>13</sup>

Hood received all kinds of cooperation from ordnance officers. Arms came to him from Richmond, even though General Lee needed almost all on hand in that city;<sup>14</sup> gun-

<sup>8</sup>Mallet to Gorgas, Macon, July 19, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. LII, 16.

<sup>9</sup>Gorgas to Mallet (telegram), Richmond, July 22, 1864, in Personal Service File of John W. Mallett. Mallet was instructed to suspend all other work in favor of ammunition production.

<sup>10</sup>Burton to Gorgas, Macon, July 26, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXXI, 511.

<sup>11</sup>Burton to Gorgas, Macon, June 24, 1864, *ibid.*, 460.

<sup>12</sup>Burton to Gorgas, Macon, July 1, 1864, *ibid.*, 471. The Negroes were returned on July 2 by order of Brig. Gen. Marcus J. Wright, commanding the Post of Atlanta. See *ibid.*, 476.

<sup>13</sup>Wright to de Lagnel (telegram), Macon, August 4, 1864, *ibid.*, Vol. CI, 309. For Wright's leaving Macon see "Circular Order," Macon, August 19, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXXVII, 60.

<sup>14</sup>Gorgas to Bragg (telegram), Richmond, July 29, 1864, *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. LII, Pt. 2, p. 715.



stocks came with difficulty to Macon for him from North Carolina.<sup>15</sup> Charleston Arsenal, basking in a period of rare quiet, was called upon to supply everything possible.<sup>16</sup> Percussion caps, a basic need, were in urgent demand by late August. Mallet, doing all he could with the combined Atlanta and Macon machinery, asked Gorgas if an additional supply could be brought through the blockade. This despite the fact that a million pistol caps and a million and a quarter musket caps had come through during June and July. Two million were sent to Macon from Richmond.<sup>17</sup>

Apparently unaware of all that was being done to keep his troops supplied with ammunition and ordnance, Hood settled down to the siege of Atlanta. He made his first sally into the realm of ordnance logistics on August 1. On that day he telegraphed Colonel Richard M. Cuyler and Mallet, in Macon: "General Bragg directs that you send me at once all the negroes employed on public buildings at your post." Two days later James H. Burton got substantially the same message.<sup>18</sup>

This maneuver crippled operations at Macon, but Hood had not yet learned his lesson. On August 31–September 1, during General William J. Hardee's desperate action at Jonesboro on the Central railroad, all of the skilled and unskilled workers in the numerous ordnance works at Augusta were

sent to reinforce him. Badly as they were needed at Jonesboro, the move was unwise. George W. Rains, commanding the Augusta works, complained that as a consequence "all the works here were stopped for some days . . ." He wrote Colonel James M. Kennard, chief ordnance officer of Hood's Army, that "I think it would be well for the General to give directions that the employees of the *Small Arm Cartridge Laboratory* . . . and Powder Works at this place should be exempted from the local duties, or in other words that they should remain under my control at all times: I think this very important for the public interests."<sup>19</sup>

As Hood's position in Atlanta became obviously insecure, uncertainty gripped ordnance officials. No one had any sound knowledge of what place would be safe. Burton did not wait for instructions; he assumed the Macon machinery would have to be moved and had several flat boats constructed—60 feet long and 14 feet wide—to transport it down the Ocmulgee River to an undetermined point in Georgia. Burton was excited and his action premature. Gorgas calmed him down and later suggested Columbia, South Carolina, as the place to send his machinery, if, indeed, it must be moved at all.<sup>20</sup>

Ordnance Bureau officers at Augusta, Columbus and Macon—indeed everywhere in the south, anticipated bad news from Atlanta. But they could hardly have conceived how bad that news would be. Mallet was the first to realize what had happened, and on September 5 expressed it to Gorgas in stark words: "Gen. Hood has blown up his reserve Ordnance train. Can any cartridges of calibre fifty-four and fifty-eight or rifle shell—three inch, ten pounder Parrott, and two and

<sup>15</sup>Burton to Gorgas, Macon, August 12, 1864. Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXXI, 528.

<sup>16</sup>Gorgas to Maj. Nathaniel R. Chambliss, Richmond, August 31, 1864, Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI.

<sup>17</sup>Mallet to Gorgas (telegram), Macon, August 26, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. LII, 20; Col. W. L. Broun to Mallet (telegram), Richmond, August 26, 1864, *ibid.*, Vol. XXXVII, 97; Maj. J. T. Trezevant to Mallet, Richmond, July 25, 1864, *ibid.*, 53. The last reference is a list of "leading" ordnance stores received at Columbia, S. C., Arsenal from Wilmington, N. C., in June and July, 1864.

<sup>18</sup>Hood to Cuyler and Mallet, *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. 5, p. 939; Burton to Gorgas, Macon, August 3, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXXI, 520.

<sup>19</sup>In Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI.

<sup>20</sup>Burton to Gorgas, Macon, August 29, September 5, 10, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXIX, 27; 36-37; 41.



half inch Blakely—be had from North of Augusta?”<sup>21</sup>

There it was. Atlanta fell on September 2, and with it the arsenal, shops, railroad connection and the reserve ammunition of the Army of Tennessee. The ordnance was destroyed at about two o'clock that morning.

Reports were confused. All seemed to agree that some eighty-one cars and from three to five engines had been blown up, and it was generally assumed that all of the cars contained ordnance stores.<sup>22</sup> This was not quite true, but the truth was sickening enough. Twenty-eight of the eighty-one cars did contain ordnance supplies. This constituted all of the available reserve, particularly of artillery ammunition.<sup>23</sup>

The repercussions of Hood's explosive withdrawal from Atlanta were immediately felt in the Ordnance Bureau. Hood could hardly have picked a more inopportune time to retreat, from an ordnance standpoint. Initial provision of his reserve ammunition had required every exertion, and now that Atlanta Arsenal was gone, replacement was doubly difficult.

<sup>21</sup>Mallet to Gorgas (telegram), Macon, September 5, 1864, in Personal Service File of John W. Mallet. Another, slightly different version, is in Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. LII, 21.

<sup>22</sup>This idea seemed to grow with time. See Dyer, *The Gallant Hood*, 270. Contemporary reports of the disaster reflected uncertainty by equivocation. The Chief of Ordnance apparently was aware that all the cars did not contain ordnance. See Vandiver (ed.), *The Civil War Diary of General Josiah Gorgas*, 140. The southern press made the distinction also. See Mobile (Ala.) *Advertiser and Register*, September 21, 1864. General Hood probably contributed to this distortion in his memoirs. He wrote that on the night of September 2 his chief quartermaster “grossly neglected to send off a train of ordnance stores and five engines. . . . This . . . entailed the unnecessary loss of these stores, engines and about eighty cars.” See Hood's article, excerpted from his memoirs, in R. U. Johnson and C. C. Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York, 1884-1888), Vol. IV, Pt. 1, p. 344.

<sup>23</sup>*Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. 3, p. 992. For a partial list of the stores lost at Atlanta, see *ibid.*, 685-86. Hood's regular ordnance train was under Hardee's care at Jonesboro. See *ibid.*, 701.

George Rains at Augusta, unruffled by events, asked ladies in Augusta and nearby communities to volunteer for work in his cartridge factory. With these patriotic assistants, he was able to reach a daily production of 75,000 cartridges during the critical days following the loss of Hood's ordnance.<sup>24</sup> But Rains' enterprise accounted for only one deficiency.

Suddenly, as if at a given signal, all kinds of shortages appeared. Colonel Wright, at Columbus, summed up their general nature in a telegram to his friend Mallet on September 6: “I need beeswax, twine, thread, gum arabic, sulphur, mealed powder, woolen yarn, lead & percussion caps as well as powder.”<sup>25</sup> Mallet, whose wary eye surveyed the whole ordnance scene, told Gorgas of an even more serious need a few days later. Rains' supply of lead was running out, he said, and since all the other southern arsenals depended upon him for it a general shortage was in sight.<sup>26</sup>

Once out of Atlanta Hood came face to face with his own supply problems. Concentrating near Lovejoy's Station, on the Central railroad, he thought in terms of grand strategy. On September 6 he voiced an idea to President Davis. He felt that as soon as his army had rested, and after the Federal prisoners at Andersonville, Georgia, had been moved, he should strike Sherman's attenuated line of communications. This might force Sherman to follow him toward Chattanooga and might offer a favorable chance for battle.

Considering the disparity in size of the op-

<sup>24</sup>See Frank E. Vandiver, *Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance* (Austin, 1952), 216.

<sup>25</sup>In Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXVII, 137.

<sup>26</sup>Mallet to Gorgas (telegram), Macon, September 12, 1864, *ibid.*, Vol. LII, 23. Rains had only enough lead to satisfy Augusta's wants for five weeks. See also Rains to Kennard, Augusta, September 27, 1864, Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI.

posing armies, Hood's strategy was probably sound. To put this plan into effect, Hood realized, he had to shift his position from the Macon railroad and he informed Davis of his intention to draw supplies from the West Point and Montgomery railroad after he had changed his location. Hood described his move:

Causing the iron to be removed from the several railroads out of Atlanta for distances of forty miles, and directing railroad stock to be restored to the West Point railroad, the movement to the left toward that road began on the 18th of September. Arriving at that road the army took position with the left touching the Chattahoochee River and covering that road, where it remained several days to allow the accumulation of supplies at Blue Mountain and a sufficiency with which to continue the movement.<sup>27</sup>

Hood's chief of staff, Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup, recorded the change in position in his daily journal of the army's movements. He noted that army headquarters were at Palmetto, on the West Point railroad on September 19. On the 20th he observed that Hood's orders concerning the removal of track were being executed:

The telegraph wire and railroad iron between Lovejoy's and Griffin, on Macon railroad, and the iron above Newnan on West Point railroad, also on the Georgia railroad between Oconee River and Stone Mountain, have been ordered to be taken up at once and saved for future use.<sup>28</sup>

Ensnared at Palmetto, Hood proceeded to demand supplies. On September 20 he suggested to General Bragg that powder mills for his use be established at Cahaba, Alabama, or somewhere else in that state. This suggestion was the first indication that he was aware of any difficulties involved in providing ordnance to his army. Even in this instance he was uninformed, perhaps excusa-

bly so. A new powder mill was almost ready to begin operation at Selma, and would produce enough for Hood's needs—if niter production in Alabama was not interrupted by conscription.<sup>29</sup>

Having paid lip service to basic logistics, Hood's attention focused on more obvious matters. Arms were badly needed to refurbish the army and supply returning troops. Where could they be found? Colonel Kennard, possessed of commendable directness, suggested that since the Georgia militia had recently become inactive, their arms be taken for the Army of Tennessee. The Chief of Ordnance, in giving approval to this scheme, pointed out that the militia could soon be resupplied from the stock of arms being repaired at Macon. And he told the harassed Kennard: 'Every exertion will be made to assist you, but the drain is simultaneous and difficult to meet.'<sup>30</sup> Negotiations with Georgia began.

Meantime, Kennard tried other sources which he hoped might provide faster assistance. He queried Colonel Hypolite Oladowski, now commanding Columbus Arsenal, about how many arms could be drawn from there. The answer was discouraging. Oladowski had not a single rifle or musket to send. He thought, though, that Captain W.D. Humphries, at Hood's intermediate base, West Point, could send some 2,000 arms. With authorization for Gorgas another 600 could be had from Columbia Arsenal.<sup>31</sup>

Kennard's anxious search for harness and saddles for artillery horses brought Gorgas to his rescue. The Chief of Ordnance ordered saddles sent him from the arsenal at

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 2, pp. 847-48. Also indorsements by Bragg, James A. Seddon, Gorgas, and Col. I. M. St. John.

<sup>30</sup>De Lagnel to Kennard, Richmond, September 21, 1864, Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series L, Vol. CXI; Gorgas to Kennard (telegram), Richmond, September 22, 1864, *ibid.*, Series E, Vol. LXIV.

<sup>31</sup>Oladowski to Kennard, Columbus, September 22, 1864, *ibid.*, Series E, Vol. LXIV.

<sup>27</sup>Hood to Gen. S. Cooper, Richmond, February 15, 1865, *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 801. See also Dyer, *The Gallant Hood*, 271-72.

<sup>28</sup>*Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, p. 805. For accounts of Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook's raid against the Atlanta and West Point railroad, see *ibid.*, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. 3, pp. 688, 689, 955, 962-63, 972-73.



Mount Vernon, Alabama, along with 1,000 sets of harness from Richmond.<sup>32</sup>

Hood himself telegraphed Gorgas for ammunition. Envisioning the need for a change of base, he asked that future supplies be sent in quantity to Selma. Gorgas telegraphed Kennard immediately, asking what stores he needed and where he wished them sent.<sup>33</sup> Colonel Rains, instructed to aid Kennard, started shipping stores to Selma on September 26—4,000 rounds of fixed ammunition (mostly for 12-pounder Napoleon guns) and 500,000 rounds of .54 and .57 caliber small arms ammunition. He told Kennard that he could probably ship him 350,000 cartridges and 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition a week. These figures could be raised considerably, given the proper conditions. Rains thought Hood should be told of the interruptions occurring in the operations at Augusta. The forcible removal of bullet moulders and wood agents had to stop, since such interruptions are likely to be disastrous. I write you these facts in order that General Hood may see to what interruptions I am liable to continually in preparing supplies, and hence cannot say as to the amount of stores I can send him but presume it will be as above stated.<sup>34</sup>

Finally Hood's negotiations for the Georgia militia rifles produced an answer. General Gustavus W. Smith, commanding the militia would not surrender the arms without authority from Governor Joseph E. Brown. Colonel Cuyler, at Macon, through whom Hood was negotiating, found himself caught between Hood and Smith. He appealed to Brown on September 27, for a release of the arms. Brown said no, as certainly the arsenal commander must have expected. Hood asked that Cuyler seize the arms, stored at Macon Arsenal, and send them to him im-

mediately. Cuyler's position was awkward, to say the least. Faced with an order from a general in the field he was almost duty bound to comply. But apparently he was more forcefully aware than was Hood of the wrath such an action could produce in Milledgeville.

He had to telegraph Kennard on the 28th: "Governor Brown will not give up the arms. I cannot undertake to take them . . ." Later that same day, anguished in his dilemma, Cuyler again telegraphed Kennard: "Governor Brown has refused to give up the arms. —I must have high authority before I conflict with him. If Col. Gorgas my immediate superior, or the President order me, I will take them."

Brown again was told that Hood needed 1,000 of the militia rifles for the defense of Georgia, and the colonel hoped he would reconsider. Again, no. Cuyler gave up, and the matter was headed for court decision on October 1, when General Howell Cobb managed to persuade Brown to release the arms if they were later replaced. But this came a little late, since Hood had already started operations without the rifles.<sup>35</sup>

Gorgas did not wait to hear of the outcome of the Brown-Hood altercation. On September 28 he directed Major John T. Trezevant, at Columbia Arsenal, to send Kennard 1,000 Enfield rifles and 1,500 accoutrements. Captain Humphries, at West Point, told Kennard on the same day that he would ship arms and accoutrements on the 29th, but he had received no ammunition to send forward. The delay was in rail transportation, frequently monopolized by Commissary officials. Ammunition shipments

<sup>32</sup>Gorgas to Kennard (telegram), Richmond, September 23, 1864, *ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>Gorgas to Kennard, Richmond, September 26, 1864, *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup>Rains to Kennard, August, September 27, 1864, *ibid.*, Series L, Vol. CXI.

<sup>35</sup>Cuyler to Brown (telegrams), Macon, September 27, 28, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. CI, 363, 368; Cuyler to Kennard (telegrams), Macon, September 27, 28, 1864, *ibid.*, 364, 365, 366; Cuyler to Gorgas (telegrams), Macon, September 28, October 3, 1864, *ibid.*, 367, 369; Vandiver, *Ploughshares into Swords*, 219-20.

could be made only when cars were released.<sup>36</sup>

Hood had at least one bit of good luck. On September 28, the day he moved his army out of camp at Palmetto, General Robert C. Tyler telegraphed him from West Point: "Have just found four hundred thousand percussion caps shall hold them subject to your order."<sup>37</sup>

Supplying Hood's needs at Palmetto had not been easy. He still used Jonesboro as his main depot, which involved somewhat complicated rail connection with his army.<sup>38</sup> Now that he was moving, he decided, after talking with General Beauregard, commanding the geographical department in which Hood operated, to change his base, as he had anticipated doing. The new base would be Jacksonville, Alabama, the railhead of the Meridian to Blue Mountain road. Ordnance was to be accumulated at Selma Arsenal for shipment to the army. As his plans developed, Jacksonville became progressively less attractive as a base.

Hood's itinerary took him north to Dalton and then southwest to Gadsden, which was reached on October 20. Here a day was consumed in issuing the supplies received from Selma and Jacksonville. These supplies had had to be transported from the railroad at Jacksonville to Gadsden by wagon, a distance of some eighteen to twenty miles.<sup>39</sup>

Having distributed his supplies, Hood appeared ready to cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, Alabama. At any rate, this is what Beauregard had been led to believe in a conference with Hood at Gadsden on October 21. As a result, Beauregard began logis-

tical preparations to sustain an offensive. Since Sherman's pursuing forces had come within fifteen miles of Gadsden and were thus all too close to Jacksonville, Beauregard made hurried plans to change Hood's base.

Hood himself had attempted to anticipate such a possible shift. As early as October 8 he had requested that the Memphis and Charleston railroad be put in working condition from Corinth to Decatur. He and Beauregard together decided that Tuscumbia would be the best base, and it was so designated. Much trouble was encountered in getting supplies there. From Selma, the main assembly point, supplies went to Meridian, Mississippi, then up to Mobile and Ohio as far as Corinth; were there transferred to the Memphis and Charleston, and sent to Tuscumbia. Despite the fact that these lines ought to have been in working shape, they were not. The Memphis and Charleston was not put in running order until November 21, and Hood, who moved his army to Tuscumbia on October 30, had to wait. His movement from Gadsden to Tuscumbia consumed most of what he had obtained at Gadsden—there was no alternative but to wait for stores.<sup>40</sup>

He was able to accumulate enough supplies by this route before the rail line was repaired, and despite muddy roads, to move across the Tennessee on November 21.

Rations and shoes were Hood's concern at Tuscumbia.<sup>41</sup> His main supplies of ordnance had already been sent to him at Newnan and Jacksonville. Reserves would come from Selma. After he had obtained supplies at Gadsden on October 20-21, the Ordnance Bureau could feel reasonably sure that it had done its best by him.

Hood's campaign was a failure—costly

<sup>36</sup>Trezevant to Kennard (telegram), Columbia, September 28, 1864, Mississippi Manuscripts Collection, Series E, Vol. LXIV; Humphries to Kennard, West Point, September 28, 1864, *ibid.*; Cuyler to Humphries (telegram), Macon, September 28, 1864, *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>In *ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>See *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 796, 801, 805; *ibid.*, Vol. XLV, Pt. 1, p. 659.

<sup>39</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 802, 807; *ibid.*, Vol. XLV, Pt. 1, p. 659.

<sup>40</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 796-97; *ibid.*, Vol. XLV, Pt. 1, p. 651; Thomas R. Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign* (New York, 1929), 59, 60, 61, 62.

<sup>41</sup>Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign*, 61, 62, 64.



and bloody. His only chance of success lay in a speedy movement into Tennessee. And his fateful delay at Tuscumbia allowed the enemy ample time to prepare for his coming. Although want of cavalry and anxiety over Sherman's movements have been adduced as reasons for the delay,<sup>42</sup> Hood's logistical problems certainly loom large as a cause.

What of Hood's part in these logistical problems? Was he a victim of circumstances?

He blundered in August, 1864, by requisitioning the Negroes employed in the Macon ordnance plants. This mistake might well be excused on the grounds of ignorance, but the assignment of skilled ordnance technicians as reinforcements for Hardee at Jonesboro merits no such charity. He had been told of the havoc created in Macon and other ordnance cities by such interruptions.

Confusion might be offered as a reason for the loss of the Army of Tennessee's reserve ordnance at Atlanta. Nevertheless, this is no excuse. Hood, writing long after the event, placed the responsibility on his chief quartermaster.<sup>43</sup> This scapegoat had been provided by a Court of Inquiry appointed to assess blame for the loss of stores at Atlanta. After sifting the evidence, this body, Colonel M. B. McMicken, Hood's chief quartermaster, and Kennard, exonerated Kennard completely. The principal guilt was dumped in McMicken's lap—he failed “to comply with the specific and repeated instructions from the chief of staff . . . had at his disposal sufficient cars and engines to move all trains as ordered, and they were not so moved because proper instructions were not given by him to the railroad agents.” The Court slightly censured Shoup for failing to see that his instructions to move the stores, issued on August 30, were carried out. Hood exonerated him in an indorsement to the

Court's findings.<sup>44</sup> Hood was not mentioned in the proceedings. He is not blameless. Perhaps he was too busy with pressing matters to pay specific attention to the removal of the stores, but this hardly seems a legitimate excuse. Granted he trusted his chief of staff to carry out this operation, still it would not seem unreasonable to expect the army commander to inquire specifically about such an important detail. A recent biographer of Hood observes that the loss of these stores was “another example of the poor staff work in evidence throughout the Atlanta campaign.”<sup>45</sup> Agreed, but it must be added that Hood's apparent indifference contributed to this situation. Closer supervision from him would have insured at least a bit more energy in his staff.

Once having committed himself to the Tennessee venture, Hood does not appear to have grasped the overwhelming difficulties involved in supplying his needs for this campaign. The shift of the army from Jonesboro to Palmetto was perhaps tactically correct. Logistically it was awkward. Hood did not change his base immediately; consequently his line of communication ran from Jonesboro to Macon, thence to Columbus, Georgia, and Opelika, Alabama. The West Point and Montgomery railroad ran through the latter town, which connected, in turn, with the Atlanta and West Point at West Point, Georgia. Here was established Hood's intermediate base after the move to Palmetto. Ordinarily this would have been ideal, since the Atlanta and West Point ran through Palmetto. But Hood ordered the track torn up for a distance of forty miles from Atlanta. As a result his railhead was Newnan, fourteen miles southwest of Palmetto. The gap was bridged by wagon trains.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup>*Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXVIII, Pt. 3, p. 992.

<sup>45</sup>Dyer, *The Gallant Hood*, 270.

<sup>46</sup>*Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 801, 805.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 65.

<sup>43</sup>See *supra*, note 22.

When Hood did change his base he chose Jacksonville, Alabama. This seemed the proper place if he contemplated operating on Sherman's communications as far as Chattanooga, or if he planned a swift thrust across the Tennessee River at Gunter'sville. Jacksonville, as the head of the Meridian to Blue Mountain line, was the nearest railhead, but it was far from ideal. A decision to rely on this railroad involved the transfer of the depot supplies from Jonesboro, as well as transportation of future supplies from the Georgia arsenals. This would not have been too difficult had the rail connections from Georgia been continuous to Selma. Such was not the case. Selma, which must serve as the new assembly base for the army, was connected to Montgomery by a steamboat on the Alabama River. This gap, of course, necessitated breaking bulk and reshipping—and delay. Montgomery was connected with Georgia by rail well enough, but available rolling stock really was inadequate for rapid transportation, even had there been no break in the route.<sup>47</sup>

Hood came no nearer Jacksonville than Gadsden. The eighteen to twenty miles between towns were bridged again by the army's overworked wagons. Jacksonville became unprofitable as a base after Hood decided to move west toward Decatur and Tuscumbia. A new base was located at the latter town. This could only be stocked by devious rail connections. The plan was to collect supplies at several places along the Mobile and Ohio railroad in Mississippi and Alabama. They were to be transported to Corinth in north Mississippi, put on the Memphis and Charleston road and sent east to Tuscumbia. Even under the most ideal conditions a poor arrangement, particularly since the arsenals at Selma and Demopolis lay to the east of Meridian, on the Meridian

to Blue Mountain, and not on the Mobile and Ohio. Conditions, moreover, were not ideal. Hood had, on October 8, asked that the railroad from Corinth be repaired to Decatur, anticipating his possible needs, and as an alternative route should it become necessary. And though Forrest was able to protect the line as far east as Cherokee Station, its serviceability ended there. A fifteen mile expanse of wrecked track lay between Cherokee Station and Tuscumbia, which was not fully replaced until November 21. "It was thus necessary to transfer all shipments to wagons, which then had to be hauled over a country road, which in clear weather was none too good and which became a quagmire as soon as the rains began."<sup>48</sup>

In fairness to Hood it should be stressed that he had given indication of a need to use the Memphis and Charleston road and he cannot be blamed for the repairs not being completed in time.

But Hood is perhaps guilty of an even greater misjudgement. Beauregard conferred with him at Decatur in late October and hoped he would move immediately into Tennessee, not far from there.<sup>49</sup> But he went on to Tuscumbia, pleading that he had not supplies enough to go into Middle Tennessee. These he must accumulate at his base.<sup>50</sup>

This seems indeed a valid reason for delay, but Hood was not thus making his problem easier. Although it is generally considered advantageous for an army to operate close to its base, Hood's position was peculiar in that this was untrue in his situation. The longer he remained at Tuscumbia, the more taxing it was on the Confederate supply bureaus to keep him equipped. His

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. 1, pp. 797, 802; Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign*, 61, 62.

<sup>49</sup>The Decatur crossing of the Tennessee was too well defended and Hood hoped to cross at Lamb's Ferry or Bainbridge—these failing, then at Tuscumbia. *Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XLV, Pt. 1, p. 648; Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign*, 61.

<sup>50</sup>Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign*, 61.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, Ser. IV, Vol. III, 733-34.



attenuated line of communications to his sources of supplies was unequal to a prolonged effort, and certainly to a rapid and efficient effort.<sup>51</sup>

An authority on Hood's Tennessee campaign has observed that his delay at Tusculumbia is militarily puzzling; it was "not due so much to lack of supplies, to the absence of Forrest, and to the necessity for repairing the railroad, as it was to anxiety concerning what Sherman would do." Without this anxiety to hold him back, he "would have advanced sooner than he did, at least by the 7th of November."<sup>52</sup> It is equally true that had he been thoroughly conscious of his logistical position there can be scarcely any doubt that he would have advanced sooner. Sherman had returned to Atlanta, and the Jacksonville line of communication would have been relatively safe. Hood might well have risked advancing at some point east of Tusculumbia to relieve the strain on the railroads.

Perhaps politically and tactically Hood's march into Tennessee was the best possible maneuver. But from a supply standpoint it left the heart of the Confederate Ordnance

Bureau brutally exposed while imposing unnatural strain on the arteries carrying equipment to the army. The laboratories at Macon suspended operations in the face of Sherman's troops and were evacuated by November 17;<sup>53</sup> by December Columbus Arsenal was closed down,<sup>54</sup> and Savannah was lost, with all its ordnance and stores. Columbia Arsenal was destroyed in February, 1865, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, Arsenal and Armory followed in March. A relatively unopposed Sherman had wrecked the Ordnance Bureau.

From a logistical standpoint the Tennessee campaign was a catastrophe. It would have been infinitely better to keep the Confederate Army between Sherman and the arsenals and close to its supplies. Yet, militarily this appeared impossible.

Hood cannot be censured alone for the decision to invade Tennessee. Others in higher places shared that decision. In carrying out the plan, however, it must be concluded that although determined and reckless in battle, he was, sadly enough, an irresponsible logistician.

<sup>51</sup>Hood's ordnance replacements were being drawn from Georgia as late as mid-November. See Wright to Mallet, Columbus, November 15, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. XXXVIII, 328.

<sup>52</sup>Hay, *Hood's Tennessee Campaign*, 65.

<sup>53</sup>Mallet to Gorgas (telegrams), Macon, November 17, 21, 1864, Confederate Archives, Chap. IV, Vol. LII, 30, 31. Some of the Macon Armory machinery was sent away at the same time. See Burton to Gorgas, December 7, 1864, *ibid.*, Vol. XXIX, 165.

<sup>54</sup>*Official Records*, Ser. I, Vol. XLV, Pt. 2, p. 704.

## EDITORIAL NOTE

The Joint Session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association is scheduled for 30 December 1952, at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.; and a social meeting of A.M.I. members is being arranged for 29 December 1952, at the Army-Navy Club of Washington. For further details see page 29 of this issue.

## WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION, AUGUST 1941 - MARCH 1942

BY FREDERICK S. HAYDON\*

(PART I)

THE OUTBREAK of hostilities in December 1941 crystallized the serious problem of evolving adequate organization to direct and administer from the top the far-flung Military Establishment that was to be engaged in combating powerful enemies in a global war. The tasks faced by the United States Army had been heavy enough in the period of emergency and quasi-mobilization during 1939 and 1940. Those confronting the War Department after the Japanese attack and the declarations of war by Germany and Italy exceeded those of all past experience. Their accomplishment depended ultimately on effective strategic planning and direction of the war as a whole; on the rapid marshalling of fighting and supporting manpower on an unprecedented scale; on efficiently administering the vastly expanding Military Establishment; and on the all-important provision of satisfactory logistical support of the Army and its varied installations in every quarter of the globe. To provide these essentials, a top-level organization had to be developed that could meet the new and greater needs now created by war on a scale hitherto never experienced in the Na-

tion's history. This organization had to be a structure adjusted to the necessities of the domestic and world situations, and capable of planning, executing, and following up with speed and effect, operations on six continents and on islands scattered throughout the seven seas. For the Chief of Staff, who commanded the entire Army establishment and on whom rested the burden of full responsibility, the development of such an organization was of compelling importance.

The organization of the War Department at the outbreak of hostilities followed a time-honored pattern, dating from the reorganization of the Army at the close of World War I. It had undergone few really marked changes since 1921.<sup>1</sup> Although well suited to the missions of directing and administering the Army during the lean and leisurely years of peace, it was found, even in the period of emergency before Pearl Harbor, to be inadequate in several respects for the effective and speedy execution of the multifarious

\*Colonel Haydon prepared this article in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

<sup>1</sup>The most significant development had been the granting of virtual autonomy to the Air Corps, formerly one of the combatant arms and on equal footing with the others, by the creation of the Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941, with an Air Staff. AR 95-5, "Army Air Forces." The Chief of the former Air Corps besides being designated Chief of the Army Air Forces held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Air as well.



tasks now necessitated by a new World War.<sup>2</sup> The defects were largely the result of unforeseen conditions and events that took place in the emergency period of 1939-1941, to which the organization of the War Department and plans for its expansion and operations in case of war had not been adjusted in advance.

Basic plans, developed as early as 1921 and implemented in embryo form in 1932,<sup>3</sup> had been designed to place the planning and direction of active operations in any future war under a General Headquarters, United States Army (GHQ), which was to be headed by the Chief of Staff in his capacity of Commanding General of the Field Forces, or by another commander with the same title to be specifically designated by the President. GHQ was to be separate from the War Department General Staff; and in the event of mobilization it was to assume fully the actual operational responsibility, with all the functions and authority that such responsibility implied and necessitated, for the armies in the field. At the same time, the War Department and its General Staff were to continue the functions of general over-all

policy making, and the direction, administration, and supervision of all activities in the Zone of the Interior. For the carrying out of its mission, GHQ was to be staffed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, which was to be transferred from the War Department for this purpose.<sup>4</sup> It was also planned to supplement and reinforce the GHQ staff with selected staff officers as might be required. This plan had been based on World War I experience, and was predicated on the concept of the outbreak of formally declared war in which American armies would fight in a one-front major theater of operations overseas, such as had taken place in 1917-1918. It did not envisage the vastly different development of events that occurred in 1939 and 1940, which did not follow the pattern of World War I, and into which the basic scheme conceived in 1921 and implemented on paper in 1932 failed to fit as intended by the staff planners of the early period.<sup>5</sup>

Nevertheless, the GHQ plan as originally conceived was partially put into effect, and effort was made to make it work. Naturally, modifications were required to adapt the plan to the conditions and circumstances that prevailed in the period of emergency in 1939-1940. GHQ was activated in skeletal form in July 1940. Rather than the original mission of planning and directing the operations of field forces in an actual theater of operations, GHQ was assigned the primary task of

<sup>2</sup>For detailed discussions of this problem, see Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, 1946), Ch. VII; and Ray S. Cline, *THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The War Department, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, 1951), Chs. I and II.

<sup>3</sup>The original GHQ plan was based on the findings of the Harbord Board, which studied and digested the lessons of World War I, and on which the Reorganization of 1921 was based. In 1932 General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, initially implemented the plan by the creation of four field armies which were to be the chief agencies of GHQ in its eventual mission. Ltr, CofS to CG's Corps Areas and Departments, 9 Aug 32, sub: Establishment of Field Armies, OCS 20696. See *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1933*, "The Four Army Organizations," and *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1935*, "Higher Tactical Organization of the Army of the United States." In 1935 a GHQ Air Force was created, with a skeleton headquarters under which practically all combat elements of the Air Corps were placed for tactical control, operation, and training. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1935*, p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>This part of the original plan was later modified to provide that one half of the War Plans Division staff would go to GHQ. The remainder was to continue as part of a smaller War Plans Division of the General Staff. This modification was incorporated into the Mobilization Plan of 1933.

<sup>5</sup>The standard authority for the development, rise, activities, decline and dissolution of GHQ is Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942," in *THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The Army Ground Forces, Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, 1947). See also Nelson, *op. cit.*, Ch. VII; and Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-34.

directing and supervising the training of the units of the rapidly expanding field forces.<sup>6</sup> No portion of the War Plans Division was transferred from the War Department General Staff and assigned as the initial GHQ staff; the Division remained as the chief planning agency of the War Department, and a new staff was selected and assigned for the conduct of GHQ activities. The concept that the Chief of Staff, as Commanding General, Field Forces, or another specially designated officer, would eventually assume field command with GHQ as his command post, was retained. Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, assigned to head GHQ, was designated as Chief of Staff, GHQ, rather than as Commanding General.<sup>7</sup> It is clear that the intent was ultimately to carry out the original plan for GHQ to assume the functions initially conceived for it, when actual hostilities should make this necessary and expedient.<sup>8</sup>

So far as the carrying out of its training mission was concerned, GHQ functioned well under the modification of the original plan. It relieved the already heavily burdened Chief of Staff and his G-3 from much of the detail and close supervision that the great training mission of the Army imposed. Its

development and application of sound training policy, its direction of the training of the tactical units of the field forces, and its conduct and supervision of large-scale maneuvers and field exercises were highly successful and made a vital contribution in preparing the Army for its ultimate tasks.<sup>9</sup>

As time went on, the increasing gravity of the world situation and its impact on the United States and its expanding Military Establishment necessitated the enlargement of the functions and authority of GHQ to include activities and responsibilities more consonant with those originally contemplated in the plan of 1921. Grave concern for the effective protection of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal led the War Department in the spring of 1941 to create Defense Commands for the Panama and Caribbean area and for the continental United States. The possibility of actual military operations in the near future was foreseen as a probable consequence of the acute world situation and of American policy which was now firmly committed to aid to Great Britain and to the establishment of a cordon of protective bases in the Atlantic. Although the War Department General Staff, especially the War Plans Division, did not anticipate the early development of a major theater of operations, it did have to contemplate the necessity of undertaking various operations on short notice in a number of widely separated areas. In a study of this situation for General Marshall prepared after the middle of June 1941 by Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, it was stated that "the effective coordination, conduct, and control of such operations is an extremely difficult task and requires an executive organization capable of

<sup>6</sup>TAG ltr to CG's Corps Areas, Armies, and Departments, Chiefs of Arms and Services, and CO's of Exempted Stations, 26 Jul 40, sub: GHQ, AG 320.2 (7-25-40). The initial training mission of GHQ was defined in this directive as the direction and supervision of the training of "all harbor defense and mobile troops, including GHQ aviation and the Armored Force, but excluding the overseas garrisons."

<sup>7</sup>Par. 3, TAG ltr, 26 Jul 40, cited in preceding footnote.

<sup>8</sup>On 12 August 1940, the Acting ACofS, War Plans Division, stated to General Marshall in a study of the respective responsibilities of GQH and WPD that "on and after M-Day, GHQ will be responsible for the strategic employment of all units of the Field Forces, including reinforcement of the several theaters of operations and use of the strategic reserves either in defense of continental United States or in employment elsewhere." Memo, Acting ACofS, WPD (Col. F.S. Clark), for CofS, 12 Aug 40, sub: Allocation of Responsibilities between War Plans Division and GHQ, WPD 3209-5.

<sup>9</sup>The solid and lasting work of GHQ in the execution of its training missions, and in its significant contributions to the training of the wartime Army are clearly described in detail in Greenfield and Palmer, "General Headquarters, United States Army," *loc. cit.*



prompt decision and expeditious action." General Gerow added significantly that "there is no agency of the War Department organized to meet this requirement."<sup>10</sup>

In consequence, the War Plans Division recommended that the functions and responsibilities of GHQ be enlarged to include, in addition to its training activities, the planning, initiation, and control of such military operations as the War Department might deem expedient to order. It was further recommended that GHQ be directed to supervise the planning of operations in the four Defense Commands within the continental United States and those in the Caribbean Defense Command, as soon as its own organizational situation would permit. General Marshall approved these recommendations on 24 June 1941, thus reinforcing a policy decision made one week earlier when he approved the transfer of responsibility for the organization and control of task forces from the War Plans Division to GHQ.<sup>11</sup> On 3 July, a formal directive was issued to General McNair, charging GHQ with these enlarged functions, and the commanders of all major commands and the heads of superior agencies of the War Department were accordingly informed.<sup>12</sup>

The directive of 3 July 1941 appeared to lay the foundations for the development of an organizational structure similar to that envisaged in the original plans, but modified to meet 1941 conditions. Specifically, GHQ was charged with the preparation of theater

of operations plans prescribed in the current Army Strategic Plans, and such other plans as might be ordered by the War Department. It was directed to control and co-ordinate military operations in such theaters as were assigned to its command, including overseas bases and departments. It was given command over such task forces as might be assigned to it by the War Department for prospective operations, and command over such reserve units, both ground and air, in the continental United States as the War Department might designate. To carry out these enlarged missions, GHQ was given direct control of such credits in supplies, ammunition, and equipment as the War Department might specifically allocate to it. Finally, the directive provided that GHQ should

... have full authority for the employment of the means available to it, including designated reserves, in the execution of the task in each of the theaters of operations assigned to it for command, and authority for the transfer of units and means between theaters under its control, so long as such transfer falls within the framework of the strategic directive issued by the War Department.<sup>13</sup>

Although by the terms of this directive, it would seem that GHQ was now to assume the role of command over field operations and theaters, in reality the actual authority it received was theoretical rather than real or complete. In each instance the limitations imposed and the conditional authority conferred greatly restricted the command and control functions essential to efficient operations. The effects of these limitations were to be felt in a matter of weeks after the promulgation of the directive of 3 July.

During the remainder of 1941 the War Department, more heavily immersed than ever in strategic, logistical, administrative, and other details, assigned to GHQ a number of operational responsibilities in accordance

<sup>10</sup>Memo, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 19 June 41, sub: Enlargement of the Functions of GHQ, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>11</sup>WPD informal memorandum for record, stating that "GHQ now supercedes War Plans Division in the organization and control of task forces and operations." A further note for record signed by General Gerow recorded that "the above policy was approved by General Marshall 9 a.m., June 17, 1941." Both on same sheet in WPD 3209-11.

<sup>12</sup>TAG ltr to Chief of Staff, GHQ, 3 Jul 41, sub: Enlargement of the Functions of GHQ, AG 320.2 (6-19-41).

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*

with the announced 3 July policy. In the period July-September, GHQ was given the task of organizing, dispatching, and controlling the task force sent to garrison Iceland. In July, the recently established Bermuda and Newfoundland Base Commands were transferred from First Army to GHQ control. American forces in Greenland were placed under GHQ's tactical command on 19 July. In December 1941 the continental theaters of operations and the highly important Caribbean Defense Command passed to GHQ's control.<sup>14</sup> In carrying out its responsibilities in connection with these assignments, GHQ almost immediately encountered serious difficulties as a result of the limitations contained in the 3 July directive. The main problem lay in the failure to clothe GHQ with the necessary control of supply for the fulfillment of these enlarged command responsibilities. Moreover, because of the retention of authority by the War Department, and the delegation of authority to other agencies than GHQ, the latter found itself faced with the situation in which several agencies exercised partial command over installations and areas theoretically under its control, and for which, according to the 3 July policy, GHQ was operationally and tactically responsible.<sup>15</sup>

The issue was raised formally on 25 July 1941, three weeks after the enlargement of GHQ functions. On that date, General McNair addressed a memorandum to General Marshall, in which he outlined the situation as it had developed with respect to a number of the recently established bases, and discussed the broad questions of their command, operation, and administration. His conclusions were that the existing system (or lack of it) had resulted in inefficiency and multiplicity of command and authority. With few exceptions, General McNair pointed out,

the new overseas base commands were actually under the partial command of three different agencies, one for tactical command, another for supply, and still another for construction. No adequate system for the coordination of contiguous bases had been established, and each base command at this time had practically the status of a separate station. As a result of this situation, General McNair declared that there was then no agency which could, "with satisfactory promptness, coordinate the defense of contiguous bases, operate economic supply, replacement, transportation, and evacuation systems, and effect efficient administration." Although the problem was intimately related to the general command difficulties GHQ was experiencing, General McNair confined his recommendations to measures designed to rectify the unsatisfactory system then prevailing with respect to particular bases. He recommended that a North Atlantic Defense Command, embracing Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland be activated under a centralized headquarters at St. Johns, and that the Defense Commander be given unrestricted control of the means necessary for the exercise of all the functions of command, including transportation, supply, replacement, and hospitalization, in addition to his normal tactical requirements. He also recommended the activation of an Alaskan Defense Command, under a commander with similar authority. He likewise made similar proposals for the Caribbean Defense Command.<sup>16</sup>

General McNair's memorandum did far more than raise the question of command and administration of certain bases. It came on top of the recent drive of the Air Forces for fuller autonomy, the broader difficulties of command relationships and incomplete authority experienced by GHQ, the complex

<sup>14</sup>Greenfield and Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 132-41.

<sup>16</sup>Memo, CofS, GHQ, for CofS, WD, 25 Jul 41, sub: Defense Commands, WPD 4558.



relationships of the Chiefs of Arms and Services to GHQ, to the War Department General Staff, and to other agencies, and the expanding burden of detail imposed by the increasingly complex military and strategic situation on the Chief of Staff and his principal assistants. The spark touched off by General McNair's memorandum lighted a slow match that after some months was to produce decisions which led to the reorganization of March 1942.

The implications contained in General McNair's representations were at once recognized when the document was studied in the War Plans Division, to which General Marshall referred it for recommendation. Since the problems of supply and construction were prominent in General McNair's discussion, the War Plans Division on 30 July, first asked for the remarks and recommendations of G-4, particularly from the over-all logistical viewpoint, before proceeding further.<sup>17</sup> On 5 August, Brig. Gen. Eugene Reybold, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, replied that the Supply Division was in general agreement with General McNair's proposal for placing "supply activities under the control of Defense Commanders," but held that the War Department (i.e., G-4) should continue to exercise control over construction in the various bases, "unless or until it is decided to provide 'theater of operations' type of construction for them."<sup>18</sup>

With G-4's approval in hand, the War Plans Division drafted an analysis of the GHQ proposals and a recommendation that they be carried out. Observing that "in time of war, it is anticipated that GHQ will coordinate and supervise operations in all thea-

ters and in all overseas departments and bases," the War Plans Division study concluded that GHQ and the overseas garrisons ought to be organized as soon as possible "on a sound, permanent basis for the conduct of war." This analysis expressed agreement with GHQ that the control of supply was an essential element of command, and advanced the opinion that GHQ and G-4 could work out a satisfactory logistical system under the plan proposed for GHQ. These observations and specific recommendations as to ways and means of executing them were sent to GHQ for comment prior to their intended presentation to General Marshall.<sup>19</sup>

After studying this War Plans Division proposal, General McNair agreed that it presented a correct interpretation and proposed implementation of the GHQ concept. Nevertheless, he now wondered whether a high command organization could and should be carried out along these lines. He observed:

It is noted . . . that such a conception makes the War Department little more than the head of the zone of the interior. The War Department apparently contemplates abrogating its present control of operations. Is such a step advisable? Would the President, Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff of the Army be content with such an arrangement in war? Would it not be better to delegate zone of interior functions to a single commander, in order to streamline the War Department, and to retain direction of active operations in the War Department?<sup>20</sup>

On the same day that General McNair submitted these comments to his deputy, General Gerow of the War Plans Division presented the problem to the Chief of Staff and called his attention to its far-reaching implications:

The proposal contained in the . . . memorandum for the Chief of Staff from the Chief of

<sup>17</sup>Memo, ACofS, WPD, for ACofS, G4, 30 Jul 41, sub: Activation of Alaskan and Caribbean Defense Commands and North Atlantic Defense Command, WPD 4558.

<sup>18</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-4, for ACofS, WPD, 5 Aug 41, sub: Activation of Alaskan and Caribbean Defense Commands and North Atlantic Defense Command, WPD 4558.

<sup>19</sup>Draft of "Memo for CofS GHQ, sub: Functions and Authority of GHQ," undated, but composed and forwarded to GHQ between 5 and 8 Aug 41, AG 320.2 GHQ.

<sup>20</sup>Memo, CofS, GHQ, for DCofS, GHQ, 11 Aug 41, sub: Functions and Authority of GHQ, AG 320.2 GHQ.

Staff, GHQ, dated July 25, 1941, if adopted, will affect both the peace and war activities of almost every agency of the War Department—personnel, intelligence, organization, training, supply, planning, and the responsibilities of the Air Force. Action should be deferred pending further study of this subject by all Divisions of the War Department General Staff, GHQ, and the Chief of the Army Air Forces.<sup>21</sup>

General Gerow therefore recommended that the original GHQ defense command proposal be referred to a board of officers comprising representatives of the five General Staff divisions and also representatives of the Army Air Forces and GHQ, for study and the preparation of detailed recommendations to the Chief of Staff.<sup>22</sup>

In accordance with this recommendation, the Chief of Staff's office on 12 August directed that the War Plans Division, assisted by an officer from each of the other divisions of the Staff and one each from the office of the Air Forces and GHQ, make further study of the proposal to activate the defense commands in question, and submit recommendations within ten days.<sup>23</sup> Hardly had the officers charged with this task begun their work when a new directive required them to make a study and submit specific recommendations covering the broader question of the "proper functions, responsibilities, and the authority of GHQ," and to complete it

within the time limit set by the preceding directive.<sup>24</sup>

As directed, a board of officers (referred to hereinafter as the WPD committee) assembled on the afternoon of 14 August, and met intermittently thereafter during August. After the meeting Lt. Col. George P. Hays, the GHQ representative on the committee, prepared the draft of a directive delineating specifically the "command duties, planning functions, and training responsibilities of GHQ," and had it approved by General McNair and other members of the GHQ staff. On 15 August Colonel Hays presented it to the WPD committee for discussion.<sup>25</sup>

At the outset, this draft directive reaffirmed that "GHQ is the agency through which the Chief of Staff (as Commander of the Field Forces) will exercise command over the Field Forces in an emergency." In other words, GHQ was to become General Marshall's command post for operations. With respect to GHQ's command duties and authority, the draft removed all doubts as to the position of GHQ in this capacity. On the assumption that the initial command assignments of GHQ would be first limited to overseas theaters and bases which were considered probable active theaters of operation and to task forces and reserves required for such theaters, and that eventually GHQ command assignments would include all the field forces, the draft directive charged GHQ

<sup>21</sup>Memo, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 11 Aug 41, sub: Activation of Alaskan and Caribbean Defense Commands and North Atlantic Defense Command, WPD 4558. Available records do not disclose whether or not there was any more than a coincidental relationship between these observations and those contained in General McNair's memorandum of the same date, cited in the preceding footnote.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>Memo, Brig. Gen. Orlando Ward, SGS, for WPD, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Chief of AAF, and CofS, GHQ, 12 Aug 41, sub: Activation of Caribbean, Alaskan, and North Atlantic Defense Commands, WPD 4558. General Marshall at this time was attending the Atlantic Conference at Argentia, Newfoundland. He returned to Washington on 15 August.

<sup>24</sup>Memo, Brig. Gen. Orlando Ward, SGS, for WPD, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Chief of AAF, and CofS, GHQ, 14 Aug 41, sub: Responsibility and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558. This memo directed that the study and recommendations include (a) Organization of overseas departments and bases into defense commands; (b) Functions, responsibilities and authority of defense commands; and (c) Relationship of GHQ to defense commands. The time limit on the study was set for 22 August, or "as soon thereafter as practicable."

<sup>25</sup>Draft directive, 15 Aug 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558. This draft in effect was an elaboration and implementation of the observations and recommendations contained in the War Plans Division study prepared about a week earlier. Its authorship is explained in Notes on GHQ Staff Conference, 15 Aug 41, GHQ 337 Staff Confs, Binder 1.



with preparations for the prompt exercise of such command functions in the orthodox manner prescribed in current field service regulations for theaters of operations.<sup>26</sup> The specific arrangements that GHQ was to complete for the exercise of such command duties included: the completion of theater and Defense Command plans, including those for the means required and the priorities to be established in the execution of such plans; recommendations to the War Department as to theater and Defense Command boundaries; reports to the War Department covering the means to be provided for each theater or Defense Command in tactical requirements, transportation, supply, hospitalization, and replacement; reports to the War Department on construction to be undertaken; and recommendations to the War Department as to the systems to be employed in the transfer of personnel and supplies from the Zone of the Interior to theaters of operation and Defense Commands. This draft recommended that the command authority of GHQ be extended immediately to include the Caribbean and Alaskan Defense Commands, and the Philippine Department; and that upon the assumption of command by GHQ over departments and bases, the staff personnel of the War Plans Division who had been exclusively engaged in connection with defense projects of such areas be transferred with their records to GHQ.<sup>27</sup>

In order to remove the existing obstacle imposed by GHQ's lack of control of supply for executing its missions, the draft directive specifically provided that "the War Department will authorize GHQ to issue instructions direct to War Department agencies in connection with the employment of the means assigned." The draft directive further stated that GHQ "will assume command

over such air forces as are assigned to theaters, task forces, and Defense Commands (under GHQ)," and in connection with this responsibility, GHQ was to prepare the plans for the employment of such air forces. These plans were to be referred to the Chief of the Army Air Forces for co-ordination. It was provided that requests from theater or Defense Commanders for air reinforcements would be made directly to GHQ, which was charged with the provision of such additional air support as the individual and general situations should warrant. A final instruction inserted in the draft directive embodied, in almost identical language, the recommendation of General McNair in his previous proposal to General Marshall on 25 July:

GHQ will organize Defense Commands and theaters so as to place at the disposal of each commander and under his command, the means necessary to exercise all the Functions of Command, which include the tactical requirements to accomplish the assigned mission, and in addition, facilities for transportation, supply, hospitalization, and replacement.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to delineating these specific command duties of GHQ, the draft directive also prescribed in detail the planning activities to be undertaken by that Headquarters. By its terms, GHQ was charged with the preparation of "theater of operations and subsidiary plans for those operations prescribed in the Army Strategic Plans" as ordered by the War Department, including the Color Plans and operations plans for the Defense Commands within and without the continental United States. In the instructions for carrying out these planning activities the draft directive provided for a degree of GHQ supervision over air planning that almost inevitably would bring it into conflict with the views and convictions of the Air Forces and the Air Staff. The directive provided that "the following concept of responsibility for

<sup>26</sup>The field service regulation referred to was FM 100-10, *Administration*.

<sup>27</sup>Draft directive, 15 Aug 41, cited in footnote 25.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

air plans and air operations" would guide GHQ:

a. That during combat operations, the Chief of the Army Air Force will be a member of the Staff of the Commander of the Field Forces and will, as such, operate as a member of the GHQ staff.

b. That in the preparation of plans for air operations the Chief of the Army Air Forces will submit to GHQ plans for the employment of the Combat Air Forces in support of the various Defense Commands and Theaters.

c. That the Chief of the Army Air Forces will submit to GHQ the plans for the employment of the Combat Air Force on independent missions. These plans will include the local facilities required to carry out these operations.

d. That plans submitted by the Chief of the Army Air Forces will in each instance specify who exercises command over air operations conducted by the Combat Air Force.

e. That upon receipt of the above plans from the Chief of the Army Air Forces, GHQ will forward these plans with a directive to the commander of each Defense Command or theater. The directive will require Defense Commanders to prepare and forward to GHQ the appropriate local air plans to implement the plans of the Chief of the Army Air Forces.

f. GHQ will forward local air plans to the Chief of the Army Air Forces for approval or comment.<sup>29</sup>

Neither this concept of GHQ's responsibility for air plans and operations nor the proposal to place the Chief of the Army Air Forces in the position of a member of the GHQ staff were likely to be palatable to the Army Air Forces or to its Chief, who was also Deputy Chief of Staff of the War Department. The growing pressure for full autonomy on the part of the Air Forces had gathered increasing momentum during the summer of 1941, and the above measures, if approved, would naturally strike a serious blow to the Air Forces' ambitions for virtual independence within the framework of the War Department.

With respect to the training responsibili-

ties of GHQ, the draft directive was broad and inclusive in its terms, covering the subject in a single sentence which would have instructed GHQ to "direct and supervise the training of the Field Forces within the continental limits of the United States."<sup>30</sup>

The draft directive as presented on 15 August was twice redrafted as a result of discussion in the WPD committee.<sup>31</sup> As General McNair subsequently observed, it was "discussed in conference, and many exceptions were taken to it."<sup>32</sup> The failure to come to any agreement along the lines of the GHQ draft directive led the committee "off on a new track" that "boiled down" (so the GHQ representative reported) to the "War Department not wanting to give up any authority."<sup>33</sup> What the committee turned to was a proposal that embodied the basic principles that were later to be incorporated in the War Department and Army reorganization of March 1942.

This new proposal was put forward by Lt. Col. William K. Harrison, Jr., the War Plans Division representative on the WPD committee. The exact origins of his proposal are somewhat obscure. He had drafted a paper along similar lines in late 1940 or early 1941.<sup>34</sup> When the committee reached

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup>A second version was drafted at the WPD committee meeting on 19 August; and Colonel Hays prepared a third version after committee discussion on 21 August, though apparently this version was not considered by the committee after Colonel Harrison presented his alternative and radically different proposal. Notes on GHQ Staff Conferences, 20 and 23 Aug 41, GHQ 337 Staff Confs, Binder 1.

<sup>32</sup>Memo, General McNair for General Bryden, 21 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>33</sup>Notes on GHQ Staff Conference, 22 Aug 41, GHQ 337 Staff Confs, Binder 1.

<sup>34</sup>Memo, unsigned and undated, for the Chief of Staff, sub: Organization of the Army High Command, WPD 4618. As to its origins: In an interview on 16 April 1947, General Harrison recollected that he had first drafted his reorganization scheme "early in 1941" (Interview File, Strategy Section, OCMH). Subsequently, in a letter of 7 July 1950 to Col. Thomas J. Sands, Acting Chief of Military History, General Harrison

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*



an impasse over the terms of a new GHQ directive, Colonel Harrison redrafted his earlier proposal and presented it for consideration of the WPD committee, probably at the committee meeting on 22 August. Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Chief of the Air Staff, asserted later that Colonel Harrison's move was abetted by the Air representative on the committee, who "had raised objections to the present situation"—i.e., the faulty organizational and command relationships among GHQ, the War Department General Staff, and the Army Air Forces—"and had proposed alternatives." Thereupon, according to General Spaatz, the War Plans Division representative "prepared a draft of a memorandum for the Chief of Staff which was in harmony with the proposals of the Army Air Forces representative."<sup>35</sup>

Colonel Harrison's memorandum, whatever its origins or inspiration, is of peculiar interest, since it contained all the basic features of the reorganization to come. At the outset, it recited briefly certain fundamental principles of organization and command essential to efficient operations and administration. It referred to the doctrine of unity of control at the top, exercised by proper delegation of responsibility to functionally organized subordinate commanders. It held that such decentralization by delegation of authority must be governed by the following principles: that the top commander should deal directly with a minimum practicable number of subordinates; that the subordinate commander must be given the means necessary to accomplish his mission; that no re-

sponsibility should be imposed on a commander unless he is given the means and authority to carry it out; and that all organization should follow functional or task lines. With these basic principles in view, Colonel Harrison then outlined the major tasks and functions that confronted the Military Establishment, applicable to existing conditions and to those of war, and sought to determine the best type of high-echelon structure that would execute them most efficiently. "The forces in the United States engaged in preparation for and in maintenance of operations," he wrote, "fall into three obvious groups, viz., air forces, ground forces, and service, or Zone of the Interior functions." The organization of the Army Air Forces, he continued, had been accomplished by Army Regulations 95-5. Therefore, it remained to create commands for the two other categories.<sup>36</sup> Colonel Harrison proposed that a "Commanding General, Services," be appointed, who would execute under centralized control for the Chief of Staff all the supply and service functions<sup>37</sup> necessary for the ground forces and certain of those for the Air Forces. This Service Commander would be given a staff taken in part from the War Department General Staff and in part from the staffs of the Corps Areas. The Chiefs of Arms and Services and the Corps Area commanders would be placed under him. In addition to the Air and Service Commanders, the Harrison memorandum further proposed that there be appointed a Commanding General, Ground Forces, to control all the ground elements of the field forces in

stated that he had drafted his original proposal in 1940. In Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 336, there is an abstract of a reorganization study drafted in the fall of 1940. A comparison between this abstract and the text of the August 1941 Harrison memorandum makes it virtually certain that Nelson has described the earlier Harrison draft; but this draft can not now be found in Army records.

<sup>35</sup>Memo, Chief of the Air Staff for ACoS, WPD, 24 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>36</sup>Unsigned and undated memorandum for the Chief of Staff, cited in footnote 34.

<sup>37</sup>The supply and service functions enumerated in the memorandum included: Procurement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; hospitalization; construction of housing and storage; operation of arsenals and depots; replacement centers; West Point and officer candidate schools; general and special service schools; arms and service boards; civilian component training and administration; air raid precautions; domestic disturbances; rail and water transportation; and similar activities.

the Continental United States. Under his command would be the Army Commanders or the Defense Commanders, but not both. He would be primarily responsible for training, and within a limited degree, for supply and administration of the mobile ground forces and harbor defense troops.<sup>38</sup>

For actual combat and other active operations, Colonel Harrison re-affirmed the principle that the control of all operations, air and ground, in the overseas theaters, defense commands, and bases, and in the continental United States, was the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. But how to decentralize and delegate supervision over actual operations in all these areas, so as to relieve the already heavily burdened Chief of Staff of the welter of detail that his supreme responsibility imposed? Decentralization and delegation by the appointment of a single commander of all overseas theaters, departments, and bases, comparable to the air, ground, and service commanders for the continental United States, was impracticable for a number of reasons. Therefore, Colonel Harrison concluded, "the superior coordination of overseas garrisons should be provided by an Operations or Command Section within the War Department." Thus, Colonel Harrison envisaged a high command organizational structure in which the War Department General Staff would continue to be the policy and planning agency for the Chief of Staff; its supervision of the execution of plans and policies within the Zone of the Interior would be delegated to the Commanding Generals of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Services. An Operations or Command Section of the General Staff would assist the Chief of Staff—become his "command post"—for the execution of his command functions over overseas departments, bases, Defense Commands, task forces, and theaters

of operations. GHQ would be eliminated. Logically and by implication, it would seem that the intent was for GHQ to become the staff of the Commanding General, Ground Forces.<sup>39</sup> Here, in its original form, was the basic structure that was adopted, with some modification, some seven months later, after the country had been plunged into full participation in World War II: the three major commands and the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.

The Harrison memorandum on reorganization was discussed in the WPD committee and approved in principle by all but one of its members. The committee immediately concluded "that a major reorganization of the War Department was in order," and that it was necessary to appoint "an executive group . . . to execute with a sufficient promptness and coordination the decisions agreed upon."<sup>40</sup> Subsequently General Spaatz recorded his understanding that the Harrison plan was to be submitted to the heads of the General Staff Divisions, to the Chief of the Army Air Forces, and to the Chief of Staff, GHQ, for final concurrences before being submitted to the Chief of Staff.<sup>41</sup> It does not appear that the memorandum was ever circulated or that it was even seen by General Marshall, although it was seen by his Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, who discussed it with Lt. Col. George P. Hays, the GHQ representative on the WPD committee. General McNair stated in October that it was suppressed in the War Plans Division. "The draft contemplating the reorganization of the War Department," he wrote, "apparently was killed in WPD, and an entirely

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Memo, Colonel Hays, G-3, GHQ, for CofS, GHQ, 23 Aug 41, sub: Functions and Responsibilities of GHQ, AG 320.2 GHQ.

<sup>41</sup>Memo, Chief of the Air Staff for ACofS, WPD, 24 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>38</sup>Unsigned and undated memorandum for the Chief of Staff cited in footnote 34.



new memorandum was prepared in that Division."<sup>42</sup>

The reasons for the War Plans Division's rejection of the Harrison memorandum and its plan of reorganization are not fully clear in the records. After the war General Gerow, Chief of the Division, explained that he had reason to believe that the Chief of Staff was not yet ready to resort to an upheaval of the top-level organization as a solution to the problem, and had decided for the time being to continue the effort to make the existing organization a success.<sup>43</sup> As late as the latter part of October General McNair stated that it was his understanding that the Chief of Staff had "decided to continue on the present lines."<sup>44</sup> And in early November, General Marshall himself referred to the proposed reorganization during a conference in his office, and expressed doubt that such a step would fully solve the problem.<sup>45</sup> Presumably because he was aware of General Marshall's current desire to continue the existing organization and to make it work, General Gerow decided not to press the Harrison memorandum. Instead, he set his staff to work on a new memorandum in compliance with the Chief of Staff's 14 August directive.

This new memorandum was completed in final form on 30 August. Its substance and conclusions fully reversed the line of policy and action recommended in the draft of 15 August.<sup>46</sup> It recited in detail the discussion and proposals presented by General McNair

on 25 July. The conclusion now drawn was that the functions of GHQ and the authority delegated to it<sup>47</sup> appeared to be "clear and comprehensive, and no amplification thereof appears necessary or desired at the present time." The difficulties encountered by GHQ in its practical operations were held to be partially the result of scarcity of the means made available to that headquarters, a condition occasioned by shortages of critical items of supplies and by the demands of the Lend-Lease program. This situation of shortages, the War Plans Division held, made necessary a rigid control of supply by the War Department. Defense Commanders were being supplied as rapidly as possible in accordance with priorities established by the War Department. GHQ could not be made an agency superior to the War Department. Therefore, it was inadvisable and impracticable to delegate to GHQ authority to issue orders to the supply agencies of the War Department, such as the Chief of Arms and Services, especially the Supply Services. Consequently GHQ could exercise control over supplies, equipment, and transportation only after they were delivered into the hands of a commander under GHQ.<sup>48</sup>

With respect to General McNair's previous recommendations regarding bases and the establishment of the Alaskan and North Atlantic Defense Commands, the War Plans Division now registered unqualified opposition. An Alaskan Defense Command had already been created under the Commanding General of the Fourth Army. To place it under GHQ would merely add another headquarters layer and the only result would be delays, since the most important operations in Alaska at the time involved activities of the Chiefs of Arms and Services, and not GHQ. As to the proposed North Atlantic

<sup>42</sup>Memo, General McNair for General Bryden, 21 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>43</sup>Cline, *The Operations Division*, pp. 70-71, especially notes on interview with General Gerow, 15 October 1946, contained in footnotes 77 and 79.

<sup>44</sup>McNair memorandum cited in footnote 42.

<sup>45</sup>Notes on Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff, 3 Nov 41. Copy in WPD File, Conference Notes, OCS, in collections of the Strategy Section, OCMH.

<sup>46</sup>Memorandum, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 30 Aug 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>47</sup>By the directives of 26 Jul 40 and 3 Jul 41. See footnotes 6 and 12, *Supra*.

<sup>48</sup>WPD memorandum cited in footnote 46.

Defense Command, the existing tactical situation and the principal activities in the areas intended to comprise it, made its establishment undesirable at the time. With respect to other bases, the War Plans Division pointed out that although GHQ recently had been given control of Newfoundland, Bermuda, and troops stationed in Greenland, the major activities in these areas consisted mainly of construction under the Chief of Engineers and the projected ferrying and air operations under the command of the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Therefore, the War Plans Division reasoned, co-ordination of present activities and future developments in these bases would be better carried out by the War Department than by GHQ. In the case of Iceland, the War Plans Division took a different view. The proximity of Axis operations and Iceland's exposure to them made the area virtually a theater of operations. Therefore GHQ in its proper role should retain control of Iceland, and other outlying areas should also pass to GHQ when the threat of actual attack should become imminent.<sup>49</sup>

Summing up, the War Plans Division declared that GHQ as an agency of the Chief of Staff could perform valuable service to the War Department through its direction and supervision of the training of all ground combat forces except those assigned to the Air Forces,<sup>50</sup> and in preparing theater of operations plans for projected active theaters. Also, its detailed studies of outlying areas from the viewpoint of possible future operations therein would be highly useful. When a theater should become active and actual operations were to be expected, GHQ could effectively become the agency for the Chief of Staff's field command functions. Con-

versely, the War Plans Division argued, the placing of GHQ in the chain of command between the War Department and overseas departments and bases would "serve no useful purpose," but would involve the GHQ Staff in details that were "primarily the function of the War Department."<sup>51</sup> Based on the preceding reasoning, the War Plans Division now recommended action diametrically opposed to that contained in the draft directive of 15 August: that no further enlargement of the function, responsibilities, and authority of GHQ be authorized at the present time; that the command of all overseas departments, overseas Defense Commands, and bases, with the exception of Iceland, remain in, or revert to the control of the War Department; and that the North Atlantic Defense Command not be created at this time.<sup>52</sup>

A critical examination of the War Plans Division's memorandum of 30 August almost at once suggests that it failed to come to grips with the core of the main issue, basic top-echelon organization. Nor did it fulfil the requirements of the Chief of Staff's directive of 14 August. These deficiencies in the study are surprising, since the War Plans Division, in its memorandum of 11 August to General Marshall had emphatically pointed out the far-reaching organizational implications of the McNair memorandum of 25 July, which had raised the issue in the beginning. Further, the Harrison memorandum had so clearly illuminated the roots of the problem being studied, that the discussion and proposed solution presented in the new memorandum seem somewhat superficial in contrast.

The memorandum of 30 August was circulated among the other General Staff Divisions, and to GHQ and the Chief of the Army Air Forces for concurrence before

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup>This training supervision was to include also all air-ground training except training for defense against air attack in the United States.

<sup>51</sup>WPD memorandum cited in footnote 46.  
<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*



presentation to the Chief of Staff. The comments and recommendations that resulted were to quicken the incipient movement toward reorganization.

The Assistant Chiefs of Staffs, G-3, and G-4, were in agreement with the War Plans Division's discussion and recommendations, and after some delay returned their concurrences without comment.<sup>53</sup> The Intelligence Division was non-committal. The G-2, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, declared that the issues were "entirely matters of difference of opinion on the subject of command and its correlaries, supply and training, as affected by relation between the War Department and GHQ,"<sup>54</sup> and no definite conclusions could be drawn that bore upon intelligence problems. Therefore he withheld any expression of opinion, and advised that "any solution acceptable to the divisions primarily concerned will be satisfactory to G-2."<sup>54</sup>

From the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, the War Plans Division received a memorandum expressing non-concurrence in its proposals in very emphatic terms. The War Plans Division's study of 30 August and its recommendations, he observed, neither answered the questions raised in the Chief of Staff's directive of 14 August, nor properly considered the "fundamental problems involved," nor proposed any workable solution to those problems. Furthermore, he objected strongly to the conclusions the War Plans Division had reached in its consideration of GHQ functions and the recommendations presented. General Haislip believed that control of units in the Zone of the Interior and their training was a proper function of the existing Corps Areas. The transfer to GHQ of the responsibility for training such units, he held, had produced a

great disadvantage by throwing out of mesh the mobilization machinery of the Army as a whole, and served "no useful purpose except to give GHQ a job." General Haislip also attacked the concept of GHQ as the instrument for the Chief of Staff's command functions as Commander of the Field Forces. He asserted that the "idea that GHQ . . . should interpose itself between the Chief of Staff and the War Department proper is a completely untenable attitude"; and although he conceded that the Chief of Staff's dual capacity established by regulations made it feasible and proper for him to occupy positions of both head of the War Department and Commander of the Field Forces, "this unusual situation should not," he declared, "operate to permit GHQ to insinuate itself between the Chief of Staff in his capacity of Commander of the Field Forces and the rest of the War Department." From the G-1 point of view, the main issues raised by General Marshall's 14 August directive involved two fundamental problems: preparations for the mobilization of a war Army; and the control of theaters of operation (and probable theaters of operation) and the relationships of GHQ and the War Department with respect to them. Concerning the first of these, the G-1 emphatically held that this function was, under existing Mobilization Regulations, a proper responsibility of the Corps Area commanders, and its carrying out should be "administered under the immediate direction and supervision of the War Department." The policy adopted in July 1940 which gave GHQ the direction of training the field force units had, in General Haislip's opinion, "seriously weakened our organization for mobilization," since it took from the responsible Corps Area commanders "complete control of all means necessary for an orderly mobilization." Therefore, G-1 believed that such policy should be revoked at once, and that GHQ should be separated from control of

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, Part III, Concurrences of G-3 (27 Sep 41) and G-4 (2 Oct 41).

<sup>54</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-2, for ACofS, WPD, 18 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

field force units. General Haislip then proposed a new set of policies which he declared would answer satisfactorily the questions and problems raised in the 14 August instructions. The primary function of GHQ should be detailed planning for overseas departments, defense commands, and theaters of operations. When directed by the War Department, GHQ should be given control of *minor* theaters of operation, but such control should remain in the War Department until adequate means to operate such theaters could be made available to GHQ. Also, GHQ should be "relieved of all control of field force units, including training control, in the Zone of the Interior," except with respect to those specifically earmarked by the War Department for immediate future employment in theaters or probable theaters of operations. Finally, G-1 recommended the adoption of a policy similar to one of the principal features of Colonel Harrison's reorganization plan: that *major* theaters of operations should be operated by a GHQ within each theater (i.e., a theater commander and staff) under the direct control of the War Department, and not under GHQ in Washington.<sup>55</sup> In retrospect, this proposal of policy clearly contained, in inchoate form, the concept of the Operations Division—Theater commander combination, that was a prominent part of the Harrison plan and was later to be incorporated in the reorganization of March 1942.

Within GHQ itself, the effect of the War Plans Division memorandum of 30 August was apparently to convince General McNair that a workable solution to the command problem under the existing frame of organization was not to be expected. Although he advised General Gerow that the War Plans Division's recommendations, if approved by

the War Department, would be acceptable to his headquarters and that "GHQ should and does seek only to assist the War Department and to facilitate operations," nevertheless he pointed out that a number of statements in the 30 August memorandum not only served to confuse still further an already unsatisfactory situation, but also produced serious doubt as to "the soundness and feasibility of the present set-up of GHQ." Citing examples from the War Plans Division paper, he declared that in several places this document inferred that GHQ had no useful command functions at all. This being the case, General McNair questioned the War Plans Division's reasoning that the only area currently exposed to actual threatened Axis attack should be the one specifically left under GHQ command. "It is difficult to understand," he tartly declared, "how a headquarters which serves no useful purpose in the absence of a hostile threat can be rendered essential by enemy action." It was also apparent from the War Plans Division paper, he continued, that the whole War Department "entered largely into the operations" supposedly charged to GHQ. Again, this being the case, here was another illustration of GHQ having no useful command functions. At the same time, however, the problems of confused complexity and multiplicity of command went on apace in the overseas bases and defense commands. As an outstanding illustration, General McNair referred briefly to the Newfoundland Base Command, which afforded "an interesting example of superior command." This installation was nominally under the command of GHQ; but in reality, no less than seven different agencies shared in its control and commanded individually part or parts of the activities currently carried on in its operation. In conclusion, General McNair asserted that the issue must be faced realistically. Superior command of operations by GHQ could be ef-

<sup>55</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, WPD, 15 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.



fectively exercised only if GHQ were "freed from the complications of War Department organization." Otherwise, he freely admitted that there was "little advantage and some disadvantages in having a GHQ." On the other hand, a solution to the problem could be found in reorganizing the War Department—by streamlining certain of its top echelons in a way comparable to the General Headquarters established by General Pershing in France in 1918. This would entail the creation of an S.O.S., (another term for Colonel Harrison's proposed Commanding General, Services). If this were done, the War Department could then exercise complete superior command directly. In conclusion, General McNair advised that serious consideration be given to the latter course—War Department reorganization—"despite the upheaval involved."<sup>56</sup>

It is clear that by early September General McNair was leaning toward a reorganization of the War Department as a solution to the command and functioning problems of his headquarters, but he pressed no formal recommendations for such action in his communication to the War Plans Division on 2 September. It remained for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, in his reply to the War Plans Division's memorandum of 30 August, to propose formally this line of policy. On 24 October the Chief of the Air Staff, General Spaatz, writing for General Arnold, addressed a long and detailed memorandum to the War Plans Division in which the views and convictions of the Air Staff on the various aspects of the issue were presented, in strong opposition to the action proposed by the War Plans Division. General Spaatz pointed to the increasing possibility that the country might soon become engaged in a major war of huge proportions. This serious

possibility made it imperative that "all matters pertaining to responsibility for training, organization, war planning, control and command of theaters of operations, defense commands, and related matters" be clarified at once. The War Plans Division proposals of 30 August had failed to do so. General Spaatz concluded that the GHQ experiment so far was not conducive to proper direction of active operations and was also an obstacle to effective air operations. On this point he declared:

Careful and considered study . . . by the Chief of the Army Air Forces, since the organization of the Army Air Forces, has resulted in the conclusion that the functioning of GHQ as now contemplated is not in consonance with the proper operation and control of theatres of operation, and is restrictive of the responsibilities charged to the Army Air Forces with respect to planning for air operations pertaining to theatres of operations and task forces.<sup>57</sup>

Air War planning, General Spaatz held, was a proper function of the Chief of the Army Air Forces. The Air Staff, composed of fully qualified air officers, was already constituted to carry out that function, and was the proper top agency for the preparation of basic air plans. Since the detailed plans for operations in a theater were the responsibility of the theater commander, the only justifiable function GHQ would have in air war planning would be to "monitor" the detailed plans of the theater commanders. Such monitoring, General Spaatz declared, could be done far better by the Air Staff, which had not only the special qualifications required, but also prepared the basic plans on which the theater plans were predicated. "The injection of GHQ into air war planning," he concluded, was "unnecessary and cannot be accomplished without an air staff of considerable numbers" in GHQ. This would result only

<sup>56</sup>Memo, CofS, GHQ, for ACofS, WPD, 2 Sep 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>57</sup>Memo, Chief of the Air Staff for ACofS, WPD, 24 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD, 4558.

in useless duplication of personnel and effort.<sup>58</sup>

With respect to the question of GHQ control of actual operations in theaters of war, General Spatz concluded that if GHQ were to function as the controlling agency for overseas departments, bases, and theaters, it would have to obtain control and authority to co-ordinate all the logistical agencies, including those for air, for the supply and movement of forces in such areas. This was again the oft-repeated statement that GHQ could not function as a command agency unless it were given complete control of all the agencies essential to such command. In substance, this would require GHQ control of various War Department agencies, such as the Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, and others. This would be tantamount to establishing GHQ over the War Department itself. This issue was even more serious in connection with actual air operations during hostilities. General Spaatz proposed that in actual war "air theaters of operations" should be recognized, in which the primary function of the Army Air Forces would be to prosecute air warfare. The existing concept of organization implied that such air theaters would be placed under GHQ. If the previous reasoning concerning the necessity of GHQ control over War Department supply agencies were logical and valid, then GHQ would also have to control the Army Air Forces, if air supplies, and combat and maintenance units for air reinforcement were to be provided and employed as needed. Such control of the Air Forces by GHQ, General Spatz reasoned, would result in delay, confusion, and conflicts with the Army Air Forces—unless GHQ were in fact made superior to the War Department. The same general problems would also exist with respect to the air defense of the United States in time of

war. In such defense, control of air operations properly belonged to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, directly under the Chief of the Army Air Forces, who should have full authority to make dispositions and order movements for the conduct of air defense. Unity of command required that such operations and their logistical support be controlled under a single head. Therefore it was logical that in the air defense of the United States, the Army Air Forces should function directly under the Chief of Staff (who was responsible for the entire military defense of the country), acting through the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Again, the injection of GHQ into the chain of command would serve no useful purpose.<sup>59</sup>

The answer to all this, General Spaatz declared, was a "reorganization of the War Department to meet anticipated needs." The control of all theaters of operations and their support was the responsibility of the Chief of Staff. He, however, could not be burdened with the full mass of detail involved in all the operational functions of the War Department. Therefore, the Department should be so organized that detailed responsibilities could be delegated effectively to subordinate commanders. For the solution to this, General Spaatz drew upon Colonel Harrison's plan, which he stated was in harmony with previous proposals made by the Air Forces representative on the WPD committee that had studied the GHQ problem. Accordingly, he proposed the same pattern of organization advanced by Colonel Harrison: the appointment of a Commanding General, Ground Forces, and a Commanding General, Service Command, on equal terms with the existing Chief (Commanding General) of the Air Forces. The staffs of these major commanders would be drawn

---

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

---

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*



from the War Department General Staff and supplemented from the GHQ and subordinate staffs as required. Above these three major commanders, the Chief of Staff would control the entire Establishment, assisted by a small, compact General Staff, which would be organized to carry out the following functions: preparation of strategic war plans and the directives on which the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and the Service Command would base their detailed plans in conformity with the basic plans of the General Staff; control of theaters of opera-

tion, bases, and overseas departments; co-ordination of the operations of the Air, Ground, and Service forces; co-ordination of all budgetary requirements. Such a staff, General Spaatz observed, "could then become truly a War Department General Staff, confining its duties to those of the broad nature indicated above." In conclusion, General Spaatz, acting for the Chief of the Army Air Force formally recommended that the War Department be reorganized as outlined, and that GHQ be eliminated.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*

(To be continued)

---

## ANNUAL JOINT MEETING WITH THE AHA

The American Military Institute's Joint Session with the American Historical Association, at the latter's annual meeting, will be held in the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., on 30 December 1952, at 10:00 A.M. Chairman Henry M. Dater will conduct the meeting devoted to "The Role of the Reserves in the Military Services and in American Life." In view of the international situation this is a most timely subject.

In connection with the Joint Session, the Institute's Social Committee is arranging a subscription cocktail party for A.M.I. members, to be held prior to the business meeting, at the Army-Navy Club of Washington, on 29 December 1952, from 6:00 to 8:00 P.M. Depending on the number attending, the cost per person will be between two and three dollars. Please notify the Institute Secretary that you intend to be present. Address the American Military Institute, 1529 - 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

# GRAND STRATEGY AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

BY PAUL M. ROBINETT<sup>1</sup>

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The American Military Institute, within the space limitations of its journal, welcomes varying views of professionals, scholars, and laymen, but assumes no responsibility for statements of fact or of opinion made by contributors.*

IN ALL THE great wars of modern times the aggressor dictated grand strategy in the pursuit of political objectives as long as he had liberty of decision and action. Once he lost liberty of decision and action the aggressor was thrown back on the defensive, and his ability to determine grand strategy passed to adversaries. From that time on the original aggressor could only counter the strategy of opponents who frequently were satisfied to merely thwart his political designs. It can, therefore, be concluded that grand strategy is a military activity reserved for the chiefs of state of unengaged major powers and those involved in war who are still capable of the offensive.

By way of historical illustration one must turn to the great wars of history, particularly those of recent times. The best examples are the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon of France, and of Kaiser William II and Hitler of Germany. In the two earlier wars France was attempting to dominate Europe, the seat of world power, as Germany was in the latter two wars.

<sup>1</sup>Brig. Gen. Robinett is Chief of Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. He was a member of the secretariat at the Arcadia Conference.

Before Louis XIV became the aggressor, France had been unified and strengthened largely through the influence of two capable ministers, Richelieu and Mazarin. It was a homogeneous whole unequaled in Europe. On the death of Mazarin in 1661, Louis XIV took over the direction of the government himself. Taking advantage of the great power and wealth that accrued to him in pursuit of his own and dynastic ambitions, he became the aggressor and fought three wars against coalitions, sometimes with and at other times without allies; until, in the end, he was contained, even though he had acquired numerous continental advantages. While the aggressor, Louis XIV had made the strategic moves against which the others had to react. He left an impoverished country and a diminished empire across the seas. The consequence was a bloody revolution inherited by one of his successors. Although France was impoverished and the people savagely divided, the vision of Louis XIV did not die. Neither had the physical unity of France been lost.

With advantages inherent in France and in stronger leadership, Bonaparte, took up the torch. By dazzling victories he caught the imagination of the French people which enabled him to restore unity where chaos had prevailed. Having achieved this success he was prepared to undertake the task left unfinished by Louis XIV. He attempted to



unify all Europe under French domination by a succession of wars. He fought against coalitions, at first with allies and, at the end, without them. Finally, he was decisively defeated and France, bled white and in poverty, was returned to its original frontiers. As long as Napoleon was able to take the offensive he dictated the course of events and others had to conform.

On the German side a divided people finally achieved unity under the guidance of a Prussian king with the help of a great chancellor, Bismark. When the process of unification had been completed the stage was set for great internal improvements which made it possible for an aggressive sovereign to undertake external adventure. In World War I Kaiser William II initially had the advantage of a united and prosperous country. Germany fought against a great coalition with allies and ultimately lost the war under the sheer weight of numbers and materiel. The Kaiser lost his throne and Germany was weakened and impoverished and stripped of overseas possessions and of a limited amount of territory in Europe. In this war as in the previous examples the course of events was dictated by the side that was capable of the offensive.

Again we have an example of another picking up the torch determined to carry out the vision of his predecessor. As Hitler was gaining power, Germany was internally weak and divided. After gaining political control, he soon created unity and the military forces that permitted resumption of the struggle. In time Germany was involved in a full-scale war against a great coalition but with allies. After winning victories, eclipsing even the greatest of Napoleon, Hitler failed. But at this point the parallel ceases because the successful coalition fought until Germany was occupied and its armed forces destroyed. Germany lost all possibilities of action. During the conflict, Hitler was able to determine

the course of events or the grand strategy until the initiative or power of the offensive passed to his enemies. From then on he could only react to their decisions.

But the passing of Hitler and his allies has only marked the rise of a new aggressor—the tyranny of Communism with its dictatorial centralization of power in the chief of a one-party state. This is of transcendent interest to every adult American citizen who collectively are responsible for the selection of a President or Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces every four years. It is this individual who must decide the grand strategy which will guide the ship of state through the rough waters of world politics during his term of office. If a selection should prove to be an unfortunate one, the Republic may be destroyed by the counter strategy of enemies that lay in wait or founder under the weight of domestic barnacles accumulated through inaction. A consideration of the American role in allied strategy, particularly Anglo-American strategy, in World War II will throw some light on the current problem.

The plain facts are that in spite of America's good but oftentimes misguided intentions, the strategy of the present and of the immediate past has failed to produce the peace so sincerely desired. Therefore, we can only conclude that there has been some deficiency in the strategical leadership of our presidents or commanders in chief. It is to this level that we must look because modern communications and means of transportation have completely restricted grand strategy to the chiefs of state, even in republics. Among the chiefs of state it is largely limited to those who are capable of offensive action. The others must conform to the strategy imposed upon them or, in a suicidal manner, adopt a role obviously beyond their means.

The American people who know only what they read in the newspapers or hear and see over the air have been given the impression

that the top military and naval figures of our time have been great strategists. This is hardly exact because American military men had only a minor role in strategical matters in World War II. The Anglo-American side of the war was directed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, a dual command with the inefficiency that usually accompanies divided responsibility. It is, therefore, impossible to say that there was an American strategy in World War II. It is only possible to determine the degree and quality of American contributions in the strategy that was adopted as compared with the extent and quality of British contributions.

Of the chiefs of state, Churchill was more experienced in war and had more than two years' current practice before Roosevelt openly assumed the role of war lord. The latter, however, played the role before Pearl Harbor and shifted commanders, particularly admirals, when their views of strategy did not agree with his own. The best illustration of this is Roosevelt's employment of the fleet. Having initiated an anti-submarine campaign against the Germans in the Atlantic as early as mid-June 1941, he left the capital ships in the Pacific in a precarious situation because of a lack of destroyer escorts, carriers, and other auxiliary ships and naval aviation. Mahan's principle of concentration which had dominated the professional thinking of naval men for some time was abandoned by an amateur who, at the time, was being proclaimed, by at least one columnist, as a profound student of naval strategy and more capable in that field than the admirals themselves. Protesting the decision, Admiral Richardson was relieved and a more tractable Admiral Kimmel appointed in his stead. Richardson lived up to Lord Nelson's dictum that "An officer should have political courage." To his undying credit, he incurred pro-

fessional oblivion but not unenviable association with a military disaster.

With the ready acquiescence of Roosevelt, Churchill succeeded in tapping the American treasury, in raiding the very limited reserve of arms available in the United States, in employing certain elements of the United States Navy in the Atlantic in actual operations against the German Navy, and in drawing the United States into military planning at the General Staff level before America officially entered the war. To compensate for these very practical advantages Roosevelt got access to certain overseas bases and British concurrence for the nebulous Atlantic Charter which includes the basis of the very unrealistic political objectives of Roosevelt. To these unrealistic political objectives can be traced the beginning of much postwar uncertainty.

The Pearl Harbor disaster can now be classified as a political victory for Roosevelt. It united a peace-minded country behind the man who had already initiated war against Germany. But it also had profound repercussions upon the conduct of the war, drawing United States forces into the Pacific regardless of the over-riding aim of Roosevelt, in agreement with Churchill, of making the defeat of Germany the first military objective. The war in the Pacific thus became secondary to the European conflict and largely an American undertaking.

Churchill entered the Arcadia Conference in Washington, December 1941-January 1942, with a definite idea of world strategy which had apparently been developed in consultation with his chiefs of staff. On the other hand, Roosevelt had developed his ideas from conversations with numerous advisers and without serious co-ordinated consultation with his chiefs of staff. To make matters worse Churchill lived at the White House during the Conference and was able, therefore, to have his professional military assist-



ants there from time to time. This contributed to the preponderance of British influence in that initial Conference which oriented Anglo-American strategy, not only against Germany but through the Mediterranean. About the only important American contributions in the Arcadia Conference were the ideas of unity of command in theaters of operations and of the designation of China as a theater of operations, which were advanced by General Marshall and accepted by Roosevelt and eventually by Churchill.

The Arcadia Conference was hardly concluded before General Marshall urged the abandonment of the Mediterranean approach in favor of a direct assault upon Western Europe. The lack of logistical preparation, particularly in shipping precluded the early undertaking of such an ambitious project. If it had been adopted United States troops would have continued in idleness, waiting for adequate landing craft, or would have suffered needless losses in piecemeal action. Churchill was largely responsible for the retention of the Mediterranean strategy and the opening campaign in North Africa which appear to have been correct.

Actual operations in Africa were sloth-like and conducted without strategical imagination. The main effort was made by the British Eighth Army from a base in Egypt, about 24,000 turn-around miles from New York, an effort which might well have been shifted to re-enforce operations against Tunisia and Sicily, the turn-around distance to which was only 6,000 miles from New York and 3,500 from London. Unity of command should have been established in Africa from the beginning but was not. By an offensive known as the Kasserine Affair, the Germans were able to disrupt the situation and bring about a crisis before unity of command was established. But the crowning strategical mistake emerging from the area, one that haunts the world today, was Roosevelt's unilateral

announcement of "Unconditional Surrender" following the Casablanca Conference. That pronouncement prolonged the war, increased American losses and eventually advanced Soviet interests in the world.

Churchill's operational ideas continued to prevail for a time and brought on the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. In the end, however, his efforts to extend operations into South-eastern Europe were rejected by Roosevelt. From this time to the close of operations, the strategy of the Anglo-American war effort more closely paralleled American ideas than British.

Strategical imagination was rarely demonstrated during the invasion and conquest of "Fortress Europe." It was evidenced in the deceptive measures adopted to conceal the main point of invasion and in logistical arrangements for the operational support of the armies in Europe. Possibilities of a greater and more crushing blitz than the Germans themselves had been able to accomplish were forfeited in conventional ground attacks on a broad front and in piecemeal airborne operations. The possibility of a great mobile sweep into Germany was beyond the comprehension of either Roosevelt or Churchill.

Military victory found the Anglo-American forces established in Germany amidst a desolation brought about by promiscuous air bombing and the collapse of every element of political and military strength in the country. Germany became at once something more than a liability. The utter destruction of all balance of power on the continent in the face of overwhelming Soviet military strength at a time when Europe could not reconstitute the balance and the political leaders of the United States and Great Britain could not understand the necessity of filling the void was the height of strategical stupidity. This culminating mistake in the European theater was more of American doing than British.

The Soviet Union was granted exorbitant concessions to bring it into the war against a tottering Japan. Encouraging Soviet Russia's entry into this conflict was a strategical mistake. Thanks to General MacArthur, there came out of the conflict a partial political victory when "unconditional surrender" was not insisted upon and the Japanese people were allowed to choose their own type of government.

Military victory over the Axis powers made possible the transformation of the nebulous objectives of the Atlantic Charter into the United Nations Organization. To the fighting men in the far flung battle line the words United Nations sounded unfamiliar. They thought of them only as a novel way of speaking of allies. Many were shocked when they learned that the name had far reaching implications worked out in their absence. When the United Nations Organization was accepted by the Congress, Roosevelt achieved the political objective which he himself laid down as the war aims of the United States. Apparently, Great Britain also adopted the United Nations as its political objective. But time has shown this organization to be almost useless as an instrument of peace. In fact it may even be argued that the instrument has increased friction and conflict in the world, and served as a propaganda agency for communist world revolution. An institution that breeds confusion and unrest is a detriment to civilization regardless of its aims.

A false political objective led both the United States and Great Britain to squander the military victory won over the Axis at such an enormous expenditure. Political leadership in both lands demonstrated a lack of historical understanding which teaches that *coalitions are bound together by common interest and fall apart when those interests have been served*. New combinations invariably follow.

The minimum Anglo-American precaution should have been the retention of sufficient armed forces to insure a proper peace in a broken world. Instead there was a rapid demobilization in defiance of the lessons of history so well illustrated following the initial downfall of Napoleon when Great Britain and Prussia held their field forces together and were thus in a position to crush the Emperor's attempt to regain power. In the United States this was a deliberately planned demobilization. There were no sound reasons justifying the administration's faith in the good intentions of the imperialistic Soviet dictatorship.

An enlightened American people should insist upon a re-examination of the political objectives of the United States by practical men who are grounded in world history. The bad old world needs to proceed from what is practical and possible at the moment towards a brighter goal in the future. Otherwise, the Korean War will lead to no sound political objective. This is of the greatest importance in the United States where the people themselves must select their director of grand strategy every four years. If they continue to elect impatient, impractical men, who are improperly grounded in history, the United States will sooner or later be led to ruin and western civilization with it. Collectively the adult citizens of the United States are responsible for their own fate. Other republics have existed in the past only to fail and disappear. Many are the reasons for their failure, but none are more important than the apathy and ignorance of the citizens of those republics. They either elevated to power the leaders who led them to ruin or, through negligence and folly, allowed leadership to slip into untrustworthy hands. *The price which must be paid for freedom under republican institutions is eternal and wise collective vigilance.*



---

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

# THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

---

## REVIEWS

***American Democracy and Military Power,***

A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States. by Louis Smith. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 385. \$5.00.)

***The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief,*** by Clinton Rossiter. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 145. \$2.50.)

***The Concept of Civil Supremacy over the Military in the United States,*** by William R. Tansill. (Washington: The Library of Congress Reference Service, 1951. \$0.40.)

These books are indicative of the growing concern of American scholars in the predicament of equating our concepts of individual freedom with the authoritarianism that goes with military strength. The professional military man is caught in this predicament and his growing importance in the American scene requires that he recognize it whether he wants to or not. His countrymen no longer allow him to remain on the outskirts of our national life but nevertheless they still keep wondering if military power and democracy can really mix.

Doctor Smith who is presently Dean of Berea College in Kentucky does not provide us with the answer to this problem but he does a fine job of outlining it. He did not have to go to the official records for source material. Others have done that and a comprehensive literature on the government in wartime has been built up. Dr. Smith has catalogued, summarized and evaluated this literature and has thereby given us a useful synthesis of this critical subject. One serious flaw is his omission of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt's report on the postwar reorganization for national security, prepared at the request of Mr. Forres-

tal when he was Secretary of the Navy. The organization proposed in this little known classic was incorporated to a large extent in the National Security Act of 1947.

The major portion of Dr. Smith's book deals with the power needed by the Presidency in wartime and with the efforts of the Congress to control it. The chapters on "Powers of the President" and "The President and National Defense" analyze the problem that faced Lincoln in the War between the States and which has been so much in the forefront since 1917. The chapters on "Congressional Committees on the Conduct of War" deal with the relations of Congress and the President rather than with the shortcomings of the military or the abuse of its power. However, the first congressional committee resulted from General St. Clair's defeat by the Indians in 1791. Since then there have been more than three hundred such committees, one third of them devoted to the action of the armed services. The chapter on "Military Influences in Congress" should have been one of the best in the book, but it is weak, probably because there is so little critical literature in this field. The short treatment of the judicial control of military power indicates the small influence that the Supreme Court has had either on the military or on the war powers of the President.

This work originally was a Ph.D. dissertation and for the lay reader it has too many quotations and footnotes. Such annoyances are minor compared to the penetrating insight which the author displays. He defines with concise clarity such abstractions as economic mobilization and the "military mind." His appraisal of us military fellows on pages 110 to 114 is both illuminating and fair

and should be a good tonic for all of us.

In his work, *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief*, Doctor Rossiter, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University, offers a short, painless but instructive legal commentary. One reading it is reminded of the statement of colorful General William T. Sherman, "I had thought that the War of Secession was settled by the armed forces of the nation, but at a recent public dinner of lawyers I have learned that it was done by the Courts." Dr. Rossiter points out that the Supreme Court has been as loath to get into the military sphere as into the political. Military readers will find comfort in a passage from a dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson in a Japanese-American displacement case during the late war:

"It would be impractical and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each military command in an area of probable operations will conform to the conventional tests of constitutionality. When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be successful rather than legal . . . No court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting. Perhaps he should be."

The author of the third of this series of studies, *The Concept of Civil Supremacy over the Military in the United States* is an alumnus of American National government at the Library of Congress. Mr. Tansill's work supplements the others in several respects. He shows that Congress no longer is concerned with actually protecting the country from militarism. What it wants is security without waste. He warns that Congress must improve its appropriation process if it is to keep pace with the imposing growth of the peacetime military establishment. Even if it does the Armed Services will still enjoy a sizable measure of autonomy, especially in the matter of allocating funds.

Mr. Tansill points out that the military emerged from its traditional isolation after World War I. It now takes a prominent part in the life of the country and has considerable influence. There is a notable trend toward the assumption of leadership by the military in government and industry. In political and diplomatic affairs this is due in a large measure to the vacuum of capable civilian leadership for our new position in world affairs. Industry which already has adopted

many military principles of organization for its own use, has found that military people have considerable administrative experience which it can use.

In these books, as in so many discussions on the subject, the theme is always the impact of the military on the civilian aspects of our national life. No one seems so much concerned with what effect this new role may have on the military themselves. No professional military group has been as proficient and unselfishly devoted since the days of the Roman centurions. American military men achieved these virtues in professional isolation under and perhaps because of the Anglo-Saxon heritage of suspicion. Will they be able to retain this proficiency? Can they continue to be competent military professionals and be expected to be jack-of-all trades at the same time? This is a question for serious thought by civilian students of this problem in these critical days.

JOHN D. HAYES  
Captain, USN  
Industrial College of  
the Armed Forces  
Washington, D. C.

*Rag, Tag and Bobtail, The Story of the Continental Army, 1775-1783*, by Lynn Montross. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. Pp. 519. \$5.00.)

*Appeal to Arms, A Military History of the American Revolution*, by Willard J. Wallace. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951. Pp. 308. \$4.50.)

*Valley Forge*, by Alfred Hoyt Bill. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952. Pp. 271. \$3.50.)

The appearance of these interesting one-volume histories of the military aspects of the American Revolution within the last twelve months, and the earlier work of John C. Miller and others, make it seem that the War for Independence may be about to enjoy its greatest revival since the post-Civil War period.

*Appeal to Arms* is a tightly written, too-short account of operations and what lay behind them. Its author has digested most of the studies of other scholars and has used some manuscript materials available in the United States, chiefly the papers of top British commanders. His product is a good, solid narrative that is better organized, particularly in the opening chapters, than *Rag, Tag and Bobtail*. Because it is so short, it



has to omit the details which put blood and bone into war narratives. In consequence, the battle accounts read like reports of chess matches, with pieces and not men involved. Emphasis is upon the doings of generals and their results. This is common to most battle-histories; so *Appeal to Arms* reads like most others. There is very little of the feeling of war in it.

Lynn Montross, on the other hand, has written the most human account of the Revolutionary War that this reviewer has seen. The greater length of his book accounts for this in part, but more important is the nature of his source material. He has relied chiefly on the printed letters and diaries of soldiers of all ranks on both sides. This material makes the war appear as the ragged, irregular effort it was, and the battles as struggles of men rather than contests between blocks of different colors.

The bibliography of *Rag, Tag and Bobtail* does not include some basic studies, for example those of Allen French; neither does it list any manuscript materials whatever. These omissions cost the book useful data but, at the same time, they have freed the author from interpreting the diaries and letters according to standard patterns. As a result, one of the striking points about the volume is the revaluations it contains of Benedict Arnold, Daniel Morgan and Horatio Gates. Montross sets out to return Arnold to the infamy from which he has only recently seemed to escape. He attempts to show that the traitor's reputation as one of the ablest generals of the war rests less on fact than on Arnold's own self-pushing and on his incessant maligning of Morgan, Gates and others. He does this plausibly, but the opinion of many an earlier scholar is on the other side.

The two authors cover the major campaigns in about the same order and the same way. Wallace gives fuller accounts of the actions in 1775 and of the campaigns in the south after 1778, but Montross' narratives of the war in Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey are far more interesting. The two diverge farthest in their treatments of the campaign against General Burgoyne in 1777. It is the role of Benedict Arnold that splits them. Wallace takes the usual view that Arnold dominated the battles at Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights, while Montross gives credit to the planning of Horatio Gates and the modern skirmish-tactics of Daniel Morgan.

Montross has a broad general knowledge of the history of warfare, and this enables him to give

the American Revolution a recognizable place in military affairs. For example, he is able to refer to the transportation of British and German soldiers to America as the largest effort of its kind up to that time. This gives the reader a point of comparison and makes him search through his own memory to check the accuracy of it. In the same vein, the author helps the reader when he refers to Brandywine as the second pitched battle of the war. This reminds the latter that battles of European style were uncommon and that new methods were in the making.

Montross goes farther than Wallace to understand and explain the weaknesses of some of the Revolutionary figures. He makes clearer than common the difficulties under which the Continental Congress labored and absolves it of much of the weakness often ascribed to it. He takes pains also to show the mass of organizational detail with which Washington wrestled and to point out that this necessarily hampered his generalship. He even presents well the problems of the British generals and gives them some credit. This has brought down on him the wrath (expressed in a recent review) of at least one inveterate Anglophobe.

There is more about the use of the Hessians in *Rag, Tag and Bobtail* than in *Appeal to Arms*. Also there is a better account of the Indian fights which made up the war effort on the frontiers. There is a good deal more on the treatment of prisoners of war on both sides. There are revaluations of minor actions such as that at Pell's Point, 18 October 1776, which have been generally passed over. Finally, the maps and charts are more complete and there is a bibliography where there is none in *Appeal to Arms*.

Bill's slender volume deals with more than the title indicates. It surveys the twenty-one months of the American Revolution that ended with August 1778. The author took this odd bite out of the Revolutionary whole because he believes that the Continental Army was a different instrument after Valley Forge than before.

The narrative is very interesting to read. Its mission—well discharged—appears to be to acquaint more people with an important segment of the American heritage. In addition, it presents many details, adding human interest, not encountered elsewhere. As it was not directed at professional historians, and as it is an accurate account, there is nothing to be gained by applying the sternest historical standards to it. Moreover, since

there are no footnotes, such a standard cannot be applied. It is enough to say that all who are not familiar with the years 1777 and 1778 in the American Revolution would profit by reading *Valley Forge*, while students of the period, if they can spare the time from the documents, would enjoy reading it.

DR. JOHN K. MAHON  
Office of the Chief of Military  
History, Washington, D. C.

*Lincoln and His Generals*, by T. Harry Williams. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1952. Pp. 363. \$4.00.)

This is in no sense a biography of Lincoln or any of his Generals. There is little biography, but rather an analysis of the character of the leading Federal Generals; with emphasis on their strong points and weaknesses, principally the latter. It might better be entitled "Lincoln and his Prima Donnas," most of whom evidently considered the pen mightier than the sword and spent their time writing letters filled with complaints, excuses, bickerings and criticisms of, and advice for, others, instead of fighting.

There is little, if any, new data, but nowhere is there a volume so replete with evidence of Lincoln's Christ-like humility, patience, and forbearance with the weak vessels who headed his forces, especially during the early years of the war. Many were Lincoln's own appointees, selected in an effort to unite all factions of the North behind the Federal effort. Few, if any, ever became competent generals, but the story is the same, regardless of their sources, until Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Thomas and leaders of their caliber emerged in the latter months of the war.

The volume stresses the weaknesses of the

leading Generals and demonstrates how Lincoln had to assume functions in strategy and even tactics, with which he should never have been burdened. It shows how he developed as a strategist and how a more modern staff system was gradually formed. It is appalling how Lincoln dealt directly with the Army Commanders, ignoring Halleck, his General in Chief, who should, at least, have been kept fully informed, but he was another weak vessel who shirked responsibility and refused or was unable to function as he should. Little is said about the successful generals, except Grant, particularly in the final campaigns, and some officers are barely mentioned, and others not at all.

The author does attempt the dangerous task of comparing Grant and Lee, although he rates Grant more highly than do most presumably unbiased authors. He says: "As a theatre strategist, Lee often demonstrated more brilliance and apparent originality than Grant, but his most audacious plans were as much the product of the Confederacy's inferior military position as his own fine mind. Fundamentally Grant was superior to Lee because in a modern total war he had a modern mind and Lee did not. Lee looked to the past in war as the Confederacy did in spirit. . . . Lee was the last of the great old-fashioned generals, Grant the first of the great moderns."

The format and typography are excellent. The references to sources are numerous but those to quotations are not, so that one often wonders who said or wrote what. This Book of the Month Club selection is a readable contribution to the literature on higher command problems of the Civil War.

HENRY S. MERRICK  
Lt. Col., USA, *ret.*  
Washington, D. C.

## SHORTER REVIEWS

The following books have been received for review by MILITARY AFFAIRS. Space does not permit more detailed examination of their value to readers. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the especial attention of all members.

*Danger Spot of Europe*, by Alan H. Broderick. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 192. \$3.75.)

An English traveller describes present day Western Germany based upon his earlier pre-war visits.

*The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations*, by the Brookings Institution. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 380. \$1.00 paper.)

This report prepared for The Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, is must-reading for anyone interested in the continuing problem. Military readers will be concerned with Chapter V, "The Department of Defense and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs." The student's



attention is called to the contents and to the excellent index. The Mutual Security Agency was created after this report was made.

*Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1951-1952*, by International Studies Group, The Brookings Institution. (Washington: Brookings, 1951. Pp. 479. \$1.50, paper.)

This particular year's annual is especially valuable for members in its presentation of the U.S.'s present position in world affairs from July 1950 to July 1951; its survey of world areas present problems and the problem paper on "Collective Security Action under the General Assembly."

The bibliography is always especially valuable and this year's compilation in particular provides an annotated checklist for the historian of the period from World War to 1951.

*Clear the Decks*, by Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1951. Pp. 242. \$3.50.)

A vivid narrative of the author's World War II experiences, primarily against German submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic.

*New Military and Naval Dictionary*, edited by Frank Gaynor. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 295. \$6.00.)

Seven Thousand (7,000) contemporary definitions of terms used in all services are brought together in this compilation.

*The Riddle of MacArthur; Japan, Korea and the Far East*, by John Gunther. (New York: Harper, 1951. Pp. 240. \$2.75.)

This book presents a well-known contemporary reporter's appraisal of General MacArthur

in Japan based upon his visit to Tokyo shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War. It is one of the books which should be read before a final appraisal of the General's place in history can be made.

*Our German Policy; propaganda and culture*, by Albert Norman. (New York: The Vantage Press, 1951. Pp. 85. \$2.50.)

The author, a member of the Historical Section of the Information Control Division of the American Army in Germany, describes succinctly our efforts to disseminate democratic ideas through press, radio, book publications, motion pictures, the theatres and music. Of value to military historians concerned with Germany.

*Man Was Meant to Be Free*, by Harold J. Stassen, edited and with a foreword by Amos J. Peaslee. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1951. Pp. 460. \$3.50.)

This volume contains the selected statements of the former Governor, now the University of Pennsylvania's President and leading liberal Republican leader for the period 1940 to 1951.

*Foreign Policy for Americans*, by Robert A. Taft. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1951. Pp. 127. \$2.00.)

This short book by the Ohio Senator will remain permanently valuable as an expression of an outstanding Republican's views. His criticism of the administration's foreign policy shows his growing concern with external affairs. It gives much cause for thought to the average citizen as well as the military historian and foreign relations specialist.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### I. Institutions and Cultures—Asia

DEJAEGER, RAYMOND J. AND KUHN, MRS. IRENE CORBALLY: *The Enemy Within*; an eyewitness account of the Communist conquest of China. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 314. \$3.75.)

KAHN, ELY J.: *The Peculiar War*; impressions of a reporter in Korea. (New York: Random House, 1951. Pp. 220. \$2.75.)

MITCHELL, C. CLYDE: *Land Reform in Asia*; a case study. (Washington: National Planning Association, 1952. Pp. 34. 50c.) [Planning pamphlets No. 78—contains chapter on early land reform by U. S. Army in Korea.]

MONROE, LT. CLARK C.: *The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951*. n.p. 1952.

### II. Institutions and Cultures—Europe, etc.

BRODERICK, ALAN H.: *Danger Spot of Europe*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 192. \$3.75.)

GLUCKSTEIN, Y. GAEL: *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 333. \$4.50; London: Allen and Unwin, 1952. Pp. 333. 21 shillings.)

LENS, SIDNEY: *The Counterfeit Revolution*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 272. \$3.50.)

MAYER, HERBERT C.: *New Footprints of the Trojan Horse*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952. Pp. 117. \$1.75.)

PHILBRICK, HERBERT A.: *I Led Three Lives; Citizen, Communist, Counterspy*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. \$3.50.)

SALVADORE, MASSEIMO: *The Rise of Modern Communism; a brief history of the Communist Movement in the Twentieth Century*. (New York: Holt, 1952. Pp. 128. Pp. 4, bibl. \$2.00.)

ZAVALINI, TAJAR: *How Strong Is Russia?* (New York: Praegar, 1952. Pp. 244, Pp. 2 bibl. \$4.00.)

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

ALLEN, GWENFREAD AND LEE, LLOYD L.: *Notes and References to Hawaii's War Years, 1941-1945*, with a complete bibliography revised and enlarged edition by Aldyth V. Morris. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1952. Pp. none (bibl.) \$2.50.)

ARMENIAN GENERAL BENEVOLENT UNION OF AMERICA, Ed.: *Our Boys*. (New York: Armenian General Benevolent Union of America, 1951. Pp. 509. \$7.50.)

CHURCHILL, WINSTON L. S.: *Closing the Ring*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951. Pp. 765. \$6.00.) (June '43-June '44)

COLVIN, IAN G.: *Master Spy*; the incredible story of Admiral Wilhelm Canarias, who, while Hitler's Chief of Intelligence, was a secret ally of the British. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951. Pp. 294. Pp. 2 bibl. \$3.50.)

GOLDBERG, SAMUEL: *Army Training of Illiterates in World War II*. (New York: Teachers' College, 1951. Pp. 302. Pp. 7 bibl. \$4.00.)

HARR, BILL: *Combat Boots*; tales of fighting men including the Anzio Derby. (New York: Exposition Press, 1952. Pp. 232. \$3.00.)

HILLS, R. J. T.: *Phantom Was There*. (New York: Longmans, 1952. Pp. 344. \$5.00.) British Army information unit.

"*The Kensingtons*," Princess Louise's Kensington Regiment in the Second World War. (London: Regimental Old Comrades Association, 1952. Pp. 392.)

LAUER, WALTER E.: *Battle Babies*; the history of the 99th Infantry Division in World War II. (Baton Rouge, La.: Military Press of Florida, Inc., 1951. Pp. 352. \$6.00.)

MACKIEWICZ, JOSEPH: *The Katyn Wood Murders*, forward by Arthur B. Lane. (New York: British Book Centers, 1952. Pp. 258. \$3.00.)

MAULDIN, BILL: *Bill Mauldin's Army*. (New York: William Sloan, 1951. Pp. 384. \$5.00.)

MERLE, ROBERT: *Week end at Dunkirk*. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1951. Pp. 240. \$3.00.)

MURPHY, FRANCIS: *Fighting Admiral*; the story of Dan Callaghan. (New York: Vantage Press, 1952. Pp. 223. Pp. 2, bibl. notes. \$3.00.) Biography of Rear Admiral, U.S.N., killed off Guadalcanal in 1942.

SALVATORE, MASSIMO: *Resistenza id Azione*. (Bari: Laterza. L 1,400.) Throws light on British and American policies toward Italy between 1940-1943.

SHERROD, ROBERT L.: *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*. (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. Pp. 510. \$6.50.)

DE LA VIGERIE, GENERAL D'ASTER: *Le Ciel n'était pas vide* (1940). (Paris: Julliard, 1952. Pp. 264.)

WHITNEY, COL. CORNELIUS V.: *Lone and Level Sands*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951. Pp. 314. \$4.00.)

WILMOT, CHESTER: *The Struggle for Europe*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 766. Pps. 4 bibl. \$5.00.)

### IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

DECASTRO, JOSUE: *The Geography of Hunger*; foreword by Lord Boyd-Orr. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952. Pp. 349. Pp. 13 bibl. \$4.50.)

DENNETT, RAYMOND: *Negotiating with the Russians*. (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951. Pp. 321. \$3.50.)

EALY, LAWRENCE O.: *Panama in World Affairs*. (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. Pp. 207. \$4.00.)

EASUM, CHESTER V.: *Half-Century of Conflict*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 948. Pp. 15 bibl. \$6.00.)

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: *What Eisenhower Thinks*; ed. and interpreted by Allen Taylor. (New York: Crowell, 1952. Pp. 186.. \$2.75.) Selections from speeches and writings.

FISHEL, WESLEY R.: *The End of Extraterritoriality in China*. (Berkley: Univ. of California Press, 1952. Pp. 329. Pp. 8 bibl. \$4.50. Based on Dept. of State Records to 1933, emphasizing the years 1919-1943.)

GUNTHER, JOHN: *Eisenhower, the Man and the Symbol*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 187. \$2.50.)

HALT, PAUL K., ed.: *World Population and Future Resources*; the proceedings of the Second



- Centennial, Academic Conference of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 1951. (New York: American Book Co., 1952. Pp. 280. \$3.50.)
- LANGER, WILLIAM L. AND GLEASON, SARELL E.: *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940; the World Crisis and American Foreign Policy.* (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 809. \$7.50.) A Council on Foreign Relation Pubn.
- LANGER, WILLIAM L.: *The Diplomacy of Imperialism; 1890-1902.* (New York: Knopf, 1951. Pp. 841. \$8.50.)
- LEESTON, ALFRED M.: *Magic Oil, Servant of the World.* (Dallas: Juan Pablos Books, 1951. Pp. 237. Pp. 7 bibl. \$3.75.)
- MOLEY, RAYMOND: *How to Keep Our Liberty; a program for political action.* (New York: Knopf, 1952. Pp. 371. \$4.00.)
- SCHWEBEL, STEPHEN M.: *The Secretary-General of the United Nations; his political powers and practice.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 331 Pp. 1 bibl. \$4.75.)
- SEYMOUR, CHARLES: *Geography, Justice and Politics at the Paris Conference of 1919.* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1952. Pp. 28. \$1.50.) (Bowman memorial lecture series 1.)
- SHULIM, JOSEPH I.: *The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte, a study in American opinion.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. Pp. 332. Pp. 24. bibl. \$4.50.)
- SUMMERS, ROBERT E., ed.: *America's Weapons of Psychological Warfare.* (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1951. Pp. 206. Pp. 9 bibl. \$1.75.) (Reference Shelf—V. 23, No. 4.)
- VAN ALSTYNE, RICHARD W.: *American Crisis Diplomacy; the quest for collective security, 1918-1952.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952. Pp. 178. Pp. 16 bibl notes. \$3.50.)
- WALTERS, FRANCIS P.: *A History of the League of Nations.* (New York: Oxford, 1952. 2 vol. Pp. 856. \$11.50.) (Royal Institute of International Affairs Publication.)
- V. National Warfare — U. S.  
(non-fiction)
- ADAMS, GEORGE W.: *Doctors in Blue, the medical history of the Union Army in the Civil War.* (New York: Schuman, 1952. Pp. 265. Pp. 8 bibl. \$4.00.)
- ALTER, J. CECIL: *James Bridger, trapper, frontiersman, scout and guide; an historical narrative.* (Columbus: Longs College Book Co., 1951, 1925. Pp. 601. \$10.00.)
- BAKER, MRS. NINA BROWN: *Cyclone in Calico, the story of Many Ann Beckerdyke. Life of Civil War hospital organizer.* (Boston: Little Brown, 1952. Pp. 278. Pp. 4 bibl. \$3.50.)
- BALLARD, BRIGADIER GENERAL COLON R.: *The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln; an essay.* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952. Pp. 254. \$5.00.)
- BROWN, DEE AND SCHMITT, MARTIN F.: *Trail Driving Days.* (New York: Scribner, 1952. Pp. 286. Pp. 10 bibl. \$7.50.)
- CARLSON, THEODORE L.: *The Illinois Military Tract.* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1951. Pp. 218. \$2.50, \$3.50.)
- CATTON, BRUCE: *Glory Road; the bloody route from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg.* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 416. Pp. 7 bibl. \$4.50.)
- DARGAN, MARION: *Guide to American Biography, Part 2, 1815-1933.* (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1952. Pp. 403. \$3.50.)
- DUPUY, COLONEL RICHARD E.: *Men of West Point; the first one hundred and fifty years of the United States Military Academy.* (New York: Sloane, 1951. Pp. 503. \$5.00.)
- HAMILTON, MILTON W., ed.: *Sir William Johnson Papers Vol. X. The seven years' war and Indian uprisings on the frontier.* (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1951. Pp. 998. \$5.00.)
- HEMINGWAY, ERNEST, ed.: *Men at War.* (New York: Avon Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 652. 50c.)
- JEFFERSON, THOMAS: *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, V. 5, 25 February 1781 to 20 May 1781, ed. by Julian P. Boyd and others.* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 740. \$10.00.)
- KORN, BERTRAM W.: *American Jewry and the Civil War.* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1951. Pp. 331. \$4.00.)
- LEE, CLARK G. AND HENSCHEL, RICHARD: *Douglas MacArthur.* (New York: Henry Holt, 1952. Pp. 379. \$6.00.)
- MCCARTHY, SENATOR JOSEPH R.: *America's Retreat from Victory; the story of George Catlett Marshall.* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951. Pp. 187. \$1.00 paper.)
- MONTROSS, LYNN: *Rag, Tag and Bobtail; the story of the Continental Army, 1775-1783.* (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 519. Pp. 15 bibl. \$5.00.)
- Newsweek's History of Our Times Covering the Events of 1951, by the editors of Newsweek,*

- Vol. 3. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1952. Pp. 640. \$6.00.)
- PLUMMER, ALFRED: *International Combines in Modern Industry*; 3rd ed. New York: Pitman, 1952. Pp. 318. Pp. 4 bibl. \$6.00.)
- PRATT, FLETCHER: *A Short History of the Civil War (Ordeal by Fire)*. (New York: Pocket Books, 1951. Pp. 429. 35c.)
- SCHACHTNER, NATHAN: *Thomas Jefferson*. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951. 2 vols. \$12.00.)
- U. S. OFFICE OF MILITARY HISTORY, ed.: *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919, The Armistice Agreement and related documents*. (Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 1240. \$6.00.)
- VANDIVER, FRANK E.: *Ploughshares into Swords*; Josiah Gorgas and Confederate Ordnance. (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1952. Pp. 303. Pp. 7 bibl. \$5.00.)
- WALLACE, DONALD H.: *Economic Mobilization and Stabilization*. (New York: Holt, 1951. Pp. 610. \$4.50.)
- YOUNG, OTIS E.: *The First Military Escort on the Sante Fe Trail—1829*. (California: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1264 South Central Avenue, Glendale 4, California; 1952. Pp. 225. \$7.50.)
- VI. National Warfare — U. S.  
(fiction)
- DAVIS, BURKE: *The Ragged Ones*. (New York: Rinehart, 1951. Pp. 336. \$3.50.) Outstanding fictional portrayal of 1780-1781 Guerilla Warfare in the South based upon use of documents.
- GERSON, NOEL: *The Mohawk Ladder*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 276. \$3.00.) An historical novel of an American with Marlborough's Army.
- JONES, JAMES: *From Here to Eternity*. (New York: Scribner, 1951. Pp. 861. \$4.50.) Long, best selling novel of Army Life in 1941.
- MARQUAND, JOHN P.: *Melville Goodwin, U.S.A.* (Boston: Little Brown, 1951. Pp. 596. \$3.75.) A modern American major general as seen by a great novelist.
- MASON, F. VAN WYCK: *Proud New Flags*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott Co., 1951 Pp. 493. \$4.00.) Excellent novel portraying the rise of the Confederate navy as the first of a planned four volume fictional history of that Navy. In April 1951 he spoke on this subject before the New-York Historical Society to indicate some of the facts found in his research for the book.
- ORR, MYRON D.: *Citadel of the Lakes*. (New York: Dodd Mead, 1952. Pp. 287. \$3.00.) Novel laid in Michigan in War of 1812.
- ROBERTSON, CONSTANCE: *The Golden Circle*. (New York: Random House, 1951. Pp. 245. \$3.00.) Documented novel of Vallandigham and the "Copperheads" of the Civil War.
- SLAUGHTER, FRANK B.: *Fort Everglades*. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 340. \$3.00.) (Fictional account of a surgeon in the Seminole War in Florida in 1840.)
- ZARA, LOUIS: *Rebel Run*. (New York: Crown, 1951. Pp. 272. \$3.00.)
- VII — National Warfare
- ANDERSON, R. C.: *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1571-1853*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 600. \$7.50.)
- BOWEN, FRANK C.: *Wooden Walls in Action*. (New York: Staples Press, 1952. Pp. 152 \$4.25.)
- How to Survive on Land and Sea*, Individual Survival, rev. ed. by the V Five Association of America. (Annapolis: U, S, Naval Institute, 1952. Pp. 340. \$4.00.)
- HAY, FAN: *The Royal Company of Archers, 1676-1951*. (London: Blackwood, 1952. Pp. 299. 42 shillings.)
- LAMB, HAROLD: *Suliman, the Magnificent, Sultan of the East*. (New York: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 370. \$5.00.)
- NEWMAN, BERNARD: *Epics of Espionage*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 270. \$4.50.)
- PURYEAR, VERNON J.: *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1951. Pp. 437. \$5.00.)
- PARKER, BARRETT, ed.: *Famous British Generals*, contributions by Sir John Fortesque and others. (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1952. Pp. 242, 12 shillings, 6 pence.)
- PERROY, EDOUARD: *The Hundred Years War*. (New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 376. Pps. 3 bibl. notes. \$6.00.)
- THOMPSON, J. M.: *Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and Fall*. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1952. Pp. 411. 35 shillings.)
- WALTER, GERARD: *Caesar*; a biography translated from the French by Emma Craufurd. (New York: Scribners, 1952. Pp. 646. Pp. 14 bibl. \$5.00.)
- WOODHOUSE, CHRISTOPHER M.: *The Greek War*



of *Independence*; its historical setting. (New York: Longmans. 1952. Pp. 167. \$2.25, 1.80.)

### VIII. Weapons

BLACKMAN, RAYMOND V. B., ed.: *Jane's Fighting Ships*, 1951-52. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. Pp. 566. \$22.50.)

DEPPERMAN, W. H.: *Shooter's Choice*. (Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 189. \$3.95.)

HAMLIN, FRED A. AND OTHERS, eds.: *The Aircraft Year Book*, 1951; 33rd annual ed. (Washington: Lincoln Press, 1951. Pp. 464. \$6.00.) (Aircraft Industries Association of America, Publication.)

JACOBS, CHARLES R., ed.: *The New Official Gun Book*, 3rd edition. (New York: Crown, 1952. Pp. 178. \$2.50, \$1.50.)

KAUFFMAN, HENRY J.: *Early American Gunsmiths, 1650-1850*. (Harrisburg: Stockpole, 1952. Pp. 94. \$5.00.) This book is a directory of about 800 gunsmiths, compiled from documentary sources.

RYWELL, MERTIN: *United States Military Muskets, Rifles, Carbines and Their Current Prices*. (Harriman, Tennessee, Author, 1951. Pp. 46. \$1.00 paper.)

### PERIODICALS

#### I. Institutions and Culture—Asia

*The First Days in Korea* by Brigadier General George B. Barth in *Combat Forces Journal*. (Washington, March 1952.)

*Red China's Three Top Field Commanders* by Gene Z. Hanrahan in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, February 1952.)

*Buttoning Up the Offensive—The Marines in Operation Killer* by Lynn Montross in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, February 1952.)

*Advance to the 38th Parallel* by Lynn Montross in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, March 1952.)

*Medical Marvels in Korea* by James A. Tobey in *Technology Review* (Cambridge, Mass., December 1951.)

#### II. Institutions and Culture — Europe

*A Slanted Guide to Library Selections* by Oliver Carlson in *The Freeman*. (New York, January 14, 1952.)

*The Politbureau through Western Eyes* by Nathan Leites in *World Politics*. (Princeton, New Jersey, January 1952.)

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

*Tobrouk* by Commandant Andre in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*. (Paris, Juin, 1951.)

*La defeat de L'Axe en Tunisie* by General Audet in *Revue Historique d'armee*. (Paris, Juin 1951.)

*Hitler at Dunkirk and His Preparations for the Invasion of England* by Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)

*Bastogne et la 3eme Armée Americaine, Decembre 1944-Janvier 1945* by Colonel R. Fox in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*. (Paris, Septembre, 1951.)

*Japanese Defense of Iwo Jima* by Y. Herie, former major, Imperial Japanese Army in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, February 1952.)

*The Conquest of Sicily* by Historical Section, Army H. O., July-August 1943 in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, November 1951.)

*Supply Reorganization for World War II* by Lieutenant General LeRoy Lutes in *Anti-aircraft Journal*. (Washington, March-April 1952.)

*The First Canadian Parachute Battalion in Normandy, June-August 1944* by Lt. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, November 1951.)

*The Holding Attack in the Mediterranean* by Lt. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, February 1952.)

*La Campagne de Tunisie* by Commandant Petitjean in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*. (Paris, Juin 1951.)

*The Great Cross Channel Attack* reviewed by Col. C. P. Stacey in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, February 1952.)

*The Autobiography of a Kamikaze Pilot* by Yuki-hisa Suzuki in *Bluebook*. (New York, December 1951, January 1952.)

*The Artillery Defense of Malta* by Lt. Col. H. E. C. Weldon in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*. (Woolwich, January 1952.)

*Allies Handed Stalin His Victory* by Chester Wilmot in *Life*. (New York, March 10, 1952.)

#### IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

*American and the Partnership with Britain*, *Saturday Review of Literature*. (New York, entire issue, October 13, 1951.)

*Our Military Role in the U.N.* by Lt. Gen'l W. D. Crittenger in *Army Information Digest*. (Ft. Slocum, N. Y., January 1952.)

- The Black Silence of Fear* by William O. Douglas in *New York Times Magazine*. (New York, January 13, 1952.)
- The Strategy of Freedom* by Harold H. Fisher in *Michigan Alumni's Quarterly Review*. (Ann Arbor, Autumn 1951.)
- The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy* by Frank J. Klingberg in *World Politics*. (Princeton, N. J., January 1952.)
- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization* by Lt. Col. W. G. A. Lambe in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, December 1951.)
- Communism and Cold War Policies* by Commander S. Lombard-Hobson, R. N. in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*. (London, November 1951.)
- Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreement* by Stephen C. Y. Pan in *American Journal of International Law*. (Washington, January 1952.)
- The Language Problem in Relation to Western Defense* by Captain K. Scott Simpson in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- Toward Atlantic Security* by Charles M. Spofford in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*. (London, February 1952.)
- International Armed Forces and the Rules of War* by Howard J. Taukenfeld in *American Journal of International Law*. (Washington, October 1951.)
- The New Japan and the United States* by Robert E. Ward in *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review*. (Ann Arbor, Autumn 1951.)
- American Reactions to British Far Eastern Policy* by Brig. Gen'l. I. L. Wight in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- International Law and Global Ideological Conflict: Reflections on the universality of international law* by Hurt Wills in *The American Journal of International Law*. (Washington, October 1951.)
- V. National Warfare—U. S.
- The Civil War Diary of C. F. Boyd, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry*, edited by Mildred Throne in *Iowa Journal of History*. (Iowa City, January, April 1952.) Especially valuable for graphic descriptions of Shiloh.
- The Idea of the Soldier* by David L. Cohn in *Saturday Review of Literature*. (New York, February 9, 1952.)
- Suprise, Part 2* by Major E. A. Coolen in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, August 1951.)
- Le Souvenir de la France en Amerique, Le Fort Carillon* (Ticonderoga by Marc Andre Fabre in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*. (Paris, Septembre 1951.)
- The First School of Engineering* by Sidney Foreman in *The Military Engineer*. (Washington, March-April 1952.)
- The U. S. Naval Research Laboratory* by Captain F. R. Furth, U.S.N. in *Signal*. (Washington, January-February, 1952.)
- Business Sentiment and the Mexican War with Particular Emphasis on the New York Businessman* by Gurston Golden in *New York History*. (Cooperstown, January 1952.)
- The Addison Blockhouse* by John W. Griffen in *The Florida Historical Quarterly*. (Gainesville, January 1952.)
- Sir William Phip's Attack on Quebec, October 1690*, by The Historical Section, Army H.Q. in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, September 1951.)
- General Porter Makes History* by Jerome Kearful in *Anti-Aircraft Journal*. (Washington, March-April 1952.)
- Revival at Old Fort Randale* (S.D.) by Merrill J. Mathes in *The Military Engineer*. (Washington, March-April 1952.)
- The San Patricio Deserters in the Mexican War* by Richard B. McCormack in *the Americas*. (Washington, October 1951.)
- The Five Great Indian Nations: Cherokee, Chickasaw, Seminole and Creek: The part they played in behalf of the Confederacy in the War between the States*, by Jessie Randolph Moore in *The Chronicles of Oklahoma*. (Oklahoma City, Autumn, 1951.)
- The American Attack on Kingston Harbor, November 10, 1812* by Colonel C. P. Stacy in *Canadian Army Journal*. (August 1951.)
- The Saga of "Whistling Dick"* by Major John B. B. Trussell, Jr. in *Anti-Aircraft Journal*. (Washington, March-April 1952.)
- The U. S. Military Mind in the Government of the U.S.A.* issue of *Fortune*. (New York, February 1952.)
- United States Military Academy, 1802-1952* in *Army Information Digest*, March 1952.
- New York's Role in Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713* by G. M. Waller in *New York History*. (Cooperstown, January 1952.)
- Manpower Economy* by Col. Richard E. Weber, Jr. in *Military Review*. (Ft. Leavenworth, February 1952.)
- VI. National Warfare
- The Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, 1951., No. 10, published in Roma 1952 is de-



voted to Italian Military History and contains 255 pages. The English Titles of the most important articles are:

- The Historical Office of the Army Chief of Staff and its Historical Archive and the Central Military Library*, by Colonel Vincenzo Longo, Director of the Library.
- The Historical Office of the Military Navy*, by Admiral Guiseppe Fioravanzo, its head.
- The Historical Office of the Military Air Force*, by Colonel Vincenzo Lioy, its head.
- The National Museum (Military and Artistic) Castel S. Angelo*, by General Ugo Baldalucchi, its Vice-Director.
- The Italian Navy in the Second Half of the XIX Century* by Commander Alberto Ceccacci.
- The Duke of Marlborough and the Anglo Dutch Coalition (1702)*, by Dr. J. W. Wijn.
- The Decembre Issue of *Revue Historique de l'Armée* (Paris) is a special issue devoted to Paris itself. Among the articles are *Paris, Militaire a travers les ages*, by M. Pierre Paul; *Tour du Bois* (Vincennes) by General Jean Cartier.
- L'Ecole Militaire, 1751-1951*, by Robert Laulon, and *La Bibliotheque du Ministere de la Guerre* by M. A. Fabre.
- The January 1952 issue of *La Revue Francaise* (Paris) is devoted to "Les Etats Associes d'Indo Chine; among the articles are:
- L'Armée de l'Union Francaise en Indochine* by . . . and
- L'Armée Nationale Vietnamiennne* by General X
- The Battle Group* by Norman Archer in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- The Changing Pattern of War* by Aquila in *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (London, October 1951.)
- Conflict of Command in the Red Army, 1918-1942* by Dr. Littleton B. Atkinson in *Military Review*. (Ft. Leavenworth, March 1952.)
- The Bertrand Stewart Prize Essay, 1951*, (Logistics) by Colonel M. W. Boggs in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- Armor In Pursuit* by Colonel John K. Boles, Jr. in *Military Review*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, February 1952.)
- Le Corps Franc d'Afrique Marche sur Bizerte, 22 Avril-9 Mai, 1943* by Col. Georges Bouvet in *Revue Historique de l'Armée*. (Paris, Juin 1951.)
- The History of Early British Military Aeronautics* by Brigadier P. W. L. Broke-Smith in *The Royal Engineers Journal*. (Chatham-Kent, March 1952.)

*Prisoners of Napoleon* by Lt. Col. P. R. Butler in *Army Quarterly Review*, (London, January 1952.)

*The Case for a Royal United Service* by Wing Commander T. D. Calnan in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, January 1951.)

*Know Your Ally*, The French Air Force by General L. M. Chassin in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, January 1951.)

*Les Apothecaires aux Armees de l'ancien Regime* by Medecin General Jean des Cilleuls in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*. (Paris, Septembre 1951.)

*We Need More Infantry* by Col. Fairfax Deason. *Combat Forces Journal*, (Washington, March 1952.)

*Frederick the Great*, by C. F. Eldredge in *The Quartermaster Review*. (Washington, January-February 1952.)

*War—Professional or Amateur?*, by Major Reginald Hargreaves in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*. (London, November 1951.)

*The Capture of Vimy Ridge 1917*, by Historical Section, Army H.Q. in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, October 1951.)

*Life in an Aircraft Carrier*, by Rear Admiral H. E. Horan in *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (London, January 1951.)

*Indo-China: A Military-Political Appreciation*, by Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. in *World Politics*. (Princeton, N. J., January 1952.)

*The Royal Artillery at Louisburg, 1758*, by Lt. Col. M. E. S. Laws retired, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*. (Woolwich, January 1952.)

*The Royal Artillery in the Expedition against L'Orient in 1746*, by Lt. Col. M. E. S. Laws, retired, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*. (Woolwich, October 1951.)

*Les Tirailleurs Tunisiens* by Commandant Lugand in *Revue Historique de l'Armee* (Paris, Juin 1951.)

*Armored Warfare* by Lt. Gen'l Sir Giffard Le Q. Martel in *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (London, April 1952.)

*1745: The Last Campaign on English Soil* by T. H. McGuffie in *History Today* (London, January 1952.)

*The Effect of Air Power on Sea Communications* by Thomas Milne in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, April 1951.)

*Soviet Armor Tactics* by Oskar Munzel, in *Armor*. (Washington, January-February 1952.)

*Command of Native Troops* by Lt. Col. Harold L. Oppenheimer in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, October 1951.)

- Seeking Submarines and Economy* by Sqd. Ldr. B. W. Parsons in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, January 1951.)
- Some of our Supply Problems* by H. M. Patel in *Military Digest*. (New Delhi, India, January 1952.)
- Le General Paul Azan* by Pierre Paul in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*. (Paris, Septembre 1951.)
- "*Learning Ruleth Both War and Peace*" by Professor R. A. Preston in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, September 1951.)
- Une Lecon du feu et de la manoeuvre, campagne d'Espagne 1809-1814* by General Jean Regnault in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*. (Paris, September 1951.)
- Sea Power Base of American Policy* by Col. G. C. Reinhardt, U.S.A. and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, U.S.A. in *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Quantico, October 1951.)
- The Principles of War and The Quartermaster* by Lt. Col. William Roberts, QMC, in the *Quartermaster Review*. (Washington, January-February 1952.)
- The Geopolitics of Portugal* by Joseph S. Roucek in *World Affairs Interpreter*. (Los Angeles, Spring 1952.)
- British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The effect of American Conditions* by Eric Robson in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- Re-equipping the Royal Air Force*. A survey of present trends by "Roundel" in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, July 1951.)
- "*The Jolly Roger*" (1919) by "Salt Horse" in *Journal of the Royal Artillery* (Woolwich, October 1951.) Allied operations in Russia.
- The Military Correspondent* by Major E. W. Sheppard in *Army Quarterly*. (London, January 1952.)
- Morale as Objective* by J. M. Spaight in *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. (London, October 1951.)
- Canadian Voyageurs in the Sudan, 1884-1885* by Col. C. P. Stacy and E. Pye in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, October 1951, November 1951, December 1951.)
- A Soldier's Story of the Seven Years War*—Journal of William Todd, Part II ed. by C. T. Atkinson in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*. (London, Winter 1951.)
- Reichswehr and Republic* by Lt. O. W. Traber, Jr. in *Armor*. (Washington, January-February, 1952.)
- Regimental Routine and Army Administration in North America in 1759*. Extracts from Company order books of the 42nd Royal Highland Regiment. Ed. by Colonel R. F. H. Wallace in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*. (London, Spring 1952.)
- Firepower and the Amphibious Assault*, Part I. by Col. Donald M. Weller. *Marine Corps Gazette*. (Washington, March 1952.)
- Military History of the Kremlin* by Oliver Whittill Wilson in *The Military Engineer*. (Washington, November-December 1951.)
- The Yeomen of the Guard* by E. R. Yarham in *Journal Royal United Service Institution* (London, November 1951.)

## VII. Weapons

- Cary Tests the New British Rifle* by Lucian Cary in *True*. (New York: January 1952.)
- The Significance of Strategic Bombing* by Harry C. Carver in *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review*. (Ann Arbor, Autumn 1951.)
- The NATO Rifle* by Brig. Gen'l C. Aubrey Dixon, rtd., in the *American Rifleman*. (Washington, January 1952.)
- Firepower of the Soviet Army*, Part I. by Army H.Q. in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, January 1952.)
- Accuracy in Rifle Firearms* by Major J. W. Houlden in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, December 1951.) Contains table of effectiveness of various weapons from slings to rifles.
- Notes on the Early Origin of Guns* by Major J. Houlden in *Canadian Army Journal*. (Ottawa, January 1952.)
- The Whitworth Rifle* by Cleves H. Howell, Jr., in *The American Rifleman*, January 1952.
- The Strategic Bomber Force in the Near Future* by Lt. E. Jacobson in *Royal Air Force Quarterly* (London, January 1951.)
- The Evolution of the Ground Support Aeroplane* by Alexander Johnston in *Army Quarterly* (London, January 1952.)
- Arms of the Chinese Communist Forces* by Roger Marsh in *American Rifleman*. (Washington, January 1952.)
- The Significance of the Helicopter* by L. Welch Pogue in *The Technology Review*. (Cambridge, February and March 1952.)
- The New Light Rifle in Ordnance*. (Washington, March, April 1952.)



---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

# HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE<sup>1</sup>

---

## GENERAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING

A meeting of the American Military Institute took place in the National Archives at 8 P.M., 19 September 1952. The basic purpose was to elect five trustees of the Institute to replace Dr. Gordon A. Craig, Dr. Harvey A. DeWeerd, Dr. Wayne C. Grover, Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan, whose terms had expired 31 December 1951, and Major General Edgar E. Hume, deceased. The following new trustees were selected from a panel of nominees offered by a nominating committee, and from names offered by members at the meeting: Dr. Grover, Archivist of the United States, was reelected; Dr. DeWeerd, of the University of Missouri, and former editor of *Military Affairs*, was reelected; Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, U.S.A., Retired, Chief, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History; Lieutenant Colonel Francis O. Hough, Historical Section, U. S. Marine Corps, and Captain Victor Gondos, Jr., Editor of *Military Affairs*. The new trustees will serve until 31 December 1954.

Colonel Joseph I. Greene, the President of the Institute, presided. Moreau B. C. Chambers reported at length on his activities as Secretary, and called upon his two assistants to present a summary of their own departments. Ralph W. Donnelly gave statistics on membership and Robert S. Watson data on subscribers. Their reports indicated that the total of members and subscribers was, in round figures, 1,060. This figure is at least 300 higher than a year ago and is significant when one remembers that *Military Affairs*, has been close to a year behind in publication.

## LIBRARY OF THE INSTITUTE

The Institute has a library of several thousand volumes on military affairs. Many of the books are early drill manuals, rare treatises on warfare, and files of military magazines long since out of print. These are source material of great use to students of military history. A small number of them are on loan to the Office of the Chief of Military History, but most, it is to be regretted, are not accessible to scholars.

The reason for this unfortunate situation is that the Institute has no facilities for displaying the volumes. It has no room to use as a library and no free funds with which to rent one, except at a very low figure. Anyone who has a workable idea on how to utilize the books of the Institute is urged to contact Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, U.S.A., Retired, 2230 California St., Washington, D. C. General Armstrong is chairman of a committee on the matter.

## JOINT MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The American Historical Association will hold its annual meeting this year in Washington, D. C., on December 28, 29 and 30. The Institute will, as usual, meet in conjunction with it. The Institute meeting will take place on the 30th at a place and a time to be announced later in this quarterly.

The topic to be considered is "The Role of Reserves in the Military Services and in American Life." The Department of De-

---

<sup>1</sup>Items presented as of actual publication date November 1952.

fense has agreed to assign three qualified officers, one each from the Air Force, the Army and the Navy, to present papers on the reserve program as it has related to their respective branches. Colonel Arthur Roth, G3, General Staff, will present the paper for the Army, and the other participants will be announced in the next issue of this Gazette. Dr. Henry M. Dater is in charge of the program arrangements.

In addition, a committee is at work on the possibility of having a social gathering of the Institute during the AHA convention.

#### COMPANY OF MILITARY COLLECTORS AND HISTORIANS

At a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Company, held 20 September 1952 at Alexandria, Virginia, Colonel Harry C. Larter, Jr., U.S.A., Retired, was elected President. Colonel Larter, a charter member and Vice-President of the Company, served as Deputy Chief of the Historical Division, European Command, U.S. Army, just prior to his retirement. He is known to many military historians through his colorful military paintings which hang in the museum at Fort Ticonderoga, and in many an officer's club in the Fourth Army area.

Colonel Larter succeeds Colonel Frederick P. Todd of the Office of Military History, a Trustee and one-time editor of *Military Affairs*. The latter was elected to move on into the position of Editor-in-Chief of all the Company's publications. In this position, he replaces Harold L. Peterson, Chief of the Historical Investigation Branch of the National Park Service, who has been compelled to resign because of ill health. Mr. Peterson's loss to the Company is a serious one, but in this Tinkers-to-Evers-to-Chance play, he remains as Governor and Consulting Editor.

The Board of Governors formally approved plans for the meeting of the Company in 1953. It will be held at Philadelphia in

mid-January at the Armory of the First City Troop. The theme will be the American Colonial Wars and the Revolution, and as usual there will be an exhibit of relevant pictures, objects, model figures and dioramas. Among the speakers invited is Mr. Cecil C. P. Lawson, of London, author of *A History of the Uniforms of the British Army*. The traditional after-dinner movie will be shown and the members attending will be honored by a full dress review of the cadets of the Valley Forge Military Academy to which they have been invited by Major General Milton G. Boaker.

Among the Company-projects discussed and approved was a detailed and heavily illustrated work on the uniforms, arms, equipment, insignia, colors and other panoply of the Union and Confederate Armies. It will be a cooperative project to be launched at once in order to be ready for the centennial of the outbreak of that war.

#### CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE

The Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia has been characteristically very active. In conjunction with the Lincoln Group it sponsored a program at the cemetery of the Veterans' Home, Saturday afternoon, 13 September 1952, commemorating the ninetieth anniversary of the Battle of Antietam.

On 4 October, the Round Table conducted an excursion over the route followed ninety years ago by the armies of McClellan and Lee. En route they visited Crampton's Gap and its monument to War Correspondents; Fox's Gap, where Generals Garland and Reno died in a savage struggle, and Turner's Gap which was forced by Gibbon, Hooker and Meade in a brilliant offensive, possibly the most creditable of McClellan's controversial career. Finally, they visited the Antietam battlefield. The trip was conducted throughout by expert guides from the National Park Service.



## A LETTER FROM A BRITISH MILITARY OBSERVER OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

By R. A. PRESTON\*

IN NOVEMBER 1862, when Britain, as a result of the *Trent* incident, felt obliged to rush troops to Canada, Captain Edward Osborne Hewett, R.E.,<sup>1</sup> was serving as an instructor at the Royal Academy, Woolwich. He immediately sought an appointment to command the first company of Engineers ready to be sent overseas, and he was soon on his way to Canada with the 18th Royal Engineers and the Scots Guards. The British transports were to have proceeded to Rivière du Loup, the terminus of the Grand Trunk Railway on the St. Lawrence River, but owing to the lateness of the season the St. Lawrence route was dangerous. Some British troops were, therefore, diverted to Boston, whence, with the permission of the United States government (the *Trent* affair having blown over), they travelled to Canada

by rail. Hewett and his men, on the other hand, landed at St. Johns, New Brunswick, and then marched overland with sleighs to Rivière du Loup. From there they went by rail to London, Ontario where Captain Hewett became Commandant of the Royal Engineers in the Military Area west of Toronto.

Shortly after his arrival in Canada, Captain Hewett visited the scene of the war in the United States.<sup>2</sup> Official reports which Hewett is known to have made on his return to Canada cannot now be located. However, he wrote a long letter to tell his mother the story of his experiences; and this letter (strangely enough for one written to entertain a bed-ridden old lady) contains interesting military information.<sup>3</sup> Mrs. Hewett must have been of tough breed. Her son also sent

\*Dr. Preston is professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario.

<sup>1</sup>Edward Osborne Hewett was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1854. His father was Colonel John Hewitt [sic] (see note 20 below) of the Royal Marines who had served with the British Ontario fleet at Oswego in 1814. A picture of the action, executed by the elder Hewitt shows a figure at the top of the fort's masthead, tearing down the American flag which had been nailed to the mast, Public Archives of Canada; see also Ed. William Wood, *Select British Documents of the War of 1812* (Toronto, the Champlain Society, 1926) III, Pt. I, p. 56, Yeo's despatch from Oswego. E. O. Hewett served in the West Indies and South America as well as Britain and Canada. In 1875 he was appointed Commandant of the proposed Military College of Canada which was opened in 1876. He was eventually retired from the army as a Lieutenant-General.

<sup>2</sup>From internal evidence it appears likely that he was with the Northern armies on the Potomac and in Maryland in October, travelled in the West in November, and returned to Canada by the end of the month. See also a statement of Colonel Hewett's military experience, Public Archives of Canada, *MacDonald Papers* CC, XVIII, 37.

<sup>3</sup>A copy of Captain Hewett's letter describing this visit was sent by his son, Colonel E. V. O. Hewett, to the Commandant of the Royal Military College in 1939. This copy was in typescript and errors in transcription made by the typist had been corrected in Colonel Hewett's own hand. In 1950, when permission to publish all or part of the letter was sought and obtained it was discovered that the original had been mislaid during wartime moves of the Hewett family. All efforts to trace its whereabouts have so far failed. The present version has had to be made from Colonel Hewett's corrected typescript which is now in the Library of the Royal Military College of Canada.

her a most gruesome description of a military field hospital. In the absence of the official reports, this letter is a valuable source of information about a foreign soldier's reaction to the American Civil War. The letter does not indicate clearly whether Captain Hewett visited the war zone as an official observer, or went at his own expense and whilst on leave, but he was under fire on several occasions and had one horse shot under him.

With regard to Captain Hewett's attitude to the war and the soldiers whom he met it is clear that, like many members of the British upper class, he was prejudiced in favor of the South. He found Southern girls more beautiful than those of the North, Southern officers more gentlemanly, and Southern troops better disciplined and thoroughly in earnest, in fact trying to drive a hated and really cruel enemy from their own homes and country. Among Northerners he greatly preferred West Pointers over volunteer officers because the former were, as a result of their training, "gentlemen." But in his relations with Americans everywhere he was careful to conceal his opinion and feelings in order to obtain the fullest freedom for his observations. And in his letter he was critical of what he regarded as faults on both sides.

London, Cp.

3rd December, 1862

My Dearest Mother,

First and foremost, I sold off everything in the hope [way?] of live or dead stock, as if ever I returned, the winter would require a new establishment; got two months leave, took a Companion, Dr. Jameson, M.D. a Staff Surgeon, and started upon the following tour on the main line, but from which we made expedition in any directions in which we could hear of anything interesting. . . .

If an American dies whether in service or otherwise, his body is almost always em-

balmed and sent to his friends. With the Army there are regular Government Doctors, who stick up their rival advertisements on a tree or cottage near a battlefield, warranted to keep at so much per body. I do not like it, and would prefer being shuffled under the green turf and left in peace, to having a ruffian pickling me and packing me off this side uppermost. . . .

West Point is the Woolwich Academy of the U.S. and is I think as good a school as any in Europe—the establishment is placed amid wild wooded hills overlooking the Hudson and is about as beautiful a spot by nature as could be found in the States. Their cadets join about 17 or 15 knowing little or nothing as the democratic feeling of the nation will not allow a high test examination in entrance lest the poor should be excluded by the expense of previous education. The States Governor nominates the Cadets, but the general government then takes the whole expense of education. The young men are worked very hard, too much so I think for five years,<sup>4</sup> and those who do get through are more highly educated than perhaps any other body of men in the world. The school provided the officers for the whole army, the first getting [into the] engineers, next ordnance, next artillery, next cavalry, next infantry. The southern States have hitherto given the greatest number of educated officers than the North. The South will soon begin to feel the want of trained young officers to supply losses, while the Northern monopolize entering West Point. If the War continues very much longer this will be a serious matter for the South, as it will just be reversing what has told so forcibly up to the present time. The regular officer on both sides can be detected in a moment, as the education has made gentle-

<sup>4</sup>The West Point Course had been raised to five years by Superintendent Robert E. Lee and Secretary of State Jefferson Davis in order to include more "cultural subjects." In 1861, i.e. before Hewett's visit, it had been reduced to four years by Lincoln.



men to a very great extent, or most, (whether born so or not) and their soldier-like manner and bearing towards officers of other armies who they meet, and the less prejudiced and more enlarged views about every subject and people is very striking in comparison with that of the volunteer-officers. The regular army was however such a drop in the ocean compared with the rest that it is now entirely absorbed and overwhelmed and the lever [leaven?] was too little in number to lead the whole mass. The system of admitting young men to West Point, without a preliminary examination is not approved of or found to work well, though they dare not change it yet. All their best men argue that our system of a pretty trying competitive examination on entrance is preferable and really better for the parents and boys themselves. Hundreds are turned adrift for their inability either physically or mentally to bear the amount compressed into a few comparatively later years of life. This too with an incomplete special education, (their examination is more special than ours) which unfits them for other professions. A good many I believe, used to enlist in the ranks (they came from that class in either military or civil life) and [a] few by that means got in and obtained commissions. . . .

. . . New York is at present covered with flags and huge placards notifying the recruits officer of different Regiments of Volunteers, but with the exception of this no one would guess that the country was passing through the fearful ordeal of civil war. It is most remarkable throughout the States that excepting within a few miles of the actual battlefield no notice appears to be taken, of anything or anybody, to be affected by the rebellion; whether this is nervousness, selfishness, or only the excess of vanity which will not believe or ever care that anything can go contrary to their wishes; I am unable to say,

but it is very remarkable and makes them hard to beat. The War has done a great deal of good to New York in killing off some 25,000 men of her most "rowdy" population, a population of the most lawless and dangerous classes in the world, having all the bad and more of the good qualities of the old parisian sans-culottes. . . .

I wind up with my personal adventures with the armies. First I went to General Wadsworth who was the governor of Washington<sup>5</sup> and showed him my credentials. He was remarkably civil and gave me passes and a letter to take me over the fortification[s], [and] camp around Washington. The city is surrounded at a radius of some 3 to 5 miles with a series of detached forts and earth works making in all about 35 to 40 miles. These works are not particularly well placed nor is the design of much good. Many are too small to be of any real service, and although manned by some 80,000 men, I believe good troops would very shortly force them. The Confederates are not, however, good enough for this, and consequently the works render Washington impregnable for the time, which is all that is required of them. Even if the Confederates did take the Forts on the south side of the river, Washington itself being on the North would still be safe from everything except shelling, at moderately long range—Cincinnati is fortified in a similar manner but the general plan considerably worse, indeed several portions of their lines could be taken not only by good infan-

<sup>5</sup>General James Samuel Wadsworth (1807-1864) was left in command of the defences of Washington when the Army of the Potomac invaded the Peninsula early in 1862. On August 29 he was still military governor of Washington. When General Wadsworth accepted the Republican nomination for Governor of New York and McClellan was called back to protect Washington (September 2, 1862), the command of Washington's defenses was entrusted to General Banks. In December 1862, Wadsworth was given the command of a division in the field.

try, but by a sudden dash of *well mounted cavalry*. However, there is good excuse for this for a great portion of the works were hurriedly thrown up by civilians—I could not help pointing this out to the chief of the staff, and at last he acknowledged I was right especially after I had ridden one of his own cavalry man's horses (I think the worst saddle for any real riding)<sup>6</sup> clear over the ditch, and parapet charged in amongst his men who were absolutely aghast at the idea of cavalry charging even the slightest obstacle. The Southern cavalry are the better than the Northern but still as cavalry they are poor enough. The cavalry on both sides, but more especially the Northerners, are merely mounted infantry. They are not taught to use the sword at all, and indeed several regiments can muster but few swords anyway. They are armed with rifles and revolvers, the consequence is that they never charge or get well amongst the infantry, (the only chance for cavalry) but dismount and skirmish, and of course get beaten as all cavalry must, in that sort of work against Infantry. Now and then a regiment may charge upon a sleeping picquet or a solitary company when they can come upon them unawares and unsupported, or on the march. This is then set down as a billiards [*sic*] charge, although really not a shot has been fired on either side or a man killed.<sup>7</sup>

I next went to General Banks for passes to the army of Potomac.<sup>8</sup> The room was full of high officials, military and civil, and Banks who was governor of some state and is a gen-

eral, and desperate politician, could not resist the chance of a grand speech and set to work and abuse England, and the English in the most outrageous way, finally declaring that there was no nation in the world like his own [in] power and grandeur, that its destiny was to rule the world, that shortly she would sweep England from the seas and Canada from the map, and that if all Europe banded together with the rebels to make war on the great United States "not a feather of the Eagle would moult." I need not tell you that I had not and did not, say one word relative to England, America or any other subject, and I was perfectly astonished to see the frantic little Yankee suddenly and without the slightest cause burst forth into this extraordinary torrent of strong language; I then became a little impatient and annoyed but did not even answer, and was soon rewarded by being as much amused as at any farce or burlesque I have ever seen. The little man finally became exhausted and stopped, nevertheless, the eagle's feathers had choked him, and as he had, to the amusement of his speech, given me all I had asked for, I took this opportunity before a fresh burst could occur again, of making a bolt and said good-bye with the remark that I thanked him for what he had done but not for what he had said. These were the only words I had spoken for about half an hour, and the poor little man himself seemed a little foolish, and expressed his pleasure at having made my acquaintance and that if he could any time do anything for me, he would be most happy to

<sup>6</sup>This was the saddle designed by General McClellan which was to be used by the U.S. Cavalry for the next fifty years.

<sup>7</sup>Captain Hewett's demonstration of how to charge earthworks shows that he had failed to understand the effect of increased fire-power from precision small-arms. His contempt for American cavalry as "merely mounted infantry" shows he had not realised that cavalry armed with rifles was something different from the mounted infantry who had previously been always inferior to cavalry armed with sabres or lances.

<sup>8</sup>In April, 1862, General Nathaniel P. Banks was given command of the newly formed military department of the Valley of the Shenandoah. At Cedar Mountain, in August, 1862, Banks was defeated by Jackson and Hunt. Hence he was given a stop-gap job under McClellan. When McClellan was called back by Lincoln to protect Washington on September 2 he appointed General Banks to command it. Banks took up his appointment somewhere between September 5 and September 7.



do so. Some of the regular officers in the room were evidently ashamed of such uncalled for and untrue abuse of an unfortunate stranger's country and countrymen; but generally speaking Yankees have not the sufficient tact or the gentlemanly feeling to see that a man can be excessively rude, and insulting, although he may be perfectly civil, indeed kind to an individual personally.

This I find throughout the States. General Banks himself had just been badly "whipped" by the rebels<sup>9</sup> which perhaps made him consider it the more necessary to impress upon me the gallantry and power of his nation. The Yankees are such a boasting and advertising nation, that they really think that they can frighten any individual foreigner by big words, but also that he will at once report it everywhere, and this goes to the whole nation to which it belongs. Trouble—I find everywhere personal civility and public insult, but that men [who] apparently, and some really ready to shoot or bowie knife me, would lend their horses, and leave their duty or business, to take me anywhere or help me in any way they could. . . .

The northern soldiers are well armed, well clothed, and shod, and fed, but have little or no discipline, and if they could only get the money, are well paid; but although their pay is nearly three times our own men's, it is only given to them in peace time, once in two months (English soldiers are paid every day, without fail) and when I was with their army not a man had received a penny for 9 months, and now over 5 months pay is due to them, although printing presses actually travel with the army which are kept hard at work manufacturing paper money. This money when paid, is reduced full one third by the depre-

ciation of value of paper money, so the soldier after all gets little. I met several English soldiers in the North and some deserters, some not. All blasted it and wished themselves back. Many were promised commissions, but when once caught were passed over. Money, and still more political influence, go further in the American army than in any service of ours. The system of officers being selected for appointment and formation had to be stopped long ago, as it was too painfully incompatible with efficiency for even a Yankee army to bear; but the present plan of the Governor of the States, appointing and promoting officers is very little better, and has already failed so signally as to be upon the point of being altered, although the political existence of the present government and also of the State Government depends assuredly upon it.<sup>10</sup>

The Yankee officers although they drink, associate, sleep and fight with their men, do not take the *slightest* interest of care for their men, and every-one looks out for himself, no one for the public good or his men's welfare. The officers just march with the men and on parade give a few words of command, which are sometimes understood, sometimes not, frequently because the word is incorrect. At the end of a day's march the officers look out for themselves; never see that their men are properly and completely encamped, or fed, much less that the poor horses are fed or looked after; that the men's arms, accoutrements, or artillery or cavalry harness is cleaned or repaired, or in fact anything at all till the general order to fall in for the next day's march; the consequence is that all the arms, clothing material and harness, and guns of these insane armies will be unserviceable in a year or so, and will have to be re-sup-

<sup>9</sup>I.e. at the battle of Cedar Mountain a little more than a month before this interview. Kenneth P. Williams credits Banks with superior initiative in undertaking this battle and with checking Jackson's advance *Lincoln Finds a General*, I, 266-269.

<sup>10</sup>Because of the inefficiency of officers Congress had given unlimited powers of dismissal to Lincoln in July. One hundred and thirty-one were dismissed in 1862. Williams, *Lincoln Finds a General*, II, pp. 544-5.

plied, while in the meantime everything is less sufficient.—The northern uniform is a dark blue long coat, light trousers, light blue great coat; the headress either the French kepi, or a calabrian tall wide awalfe with tassels and feather at pleasure. The cloth is better than ours, but the men wear pretty much what they like, and put it on as they like, especially head costumes, and the consequence is that a Regiment presents a very poor figure to me accustomed to English and French troops. The officers dare not interfere with these sort of things, nor in fact with anything, even if they cared or knew how to do so; but still I never saw a man murmur or refuse when told by an officer to take any absolute guard or duty in the field. The men are splendid looking and intelligent fellows far more so than ours, in the latter respect, and consequently their system or rather want of system is not quite so bad as it would be for the Englishman; but both officers and men admit that it does not answer, but cannot attempt a cure. Nothing but the hard school of manoeuvres, wars and reverses will create the spirit of order and discipline in the people and Government of America which will at last work its own cure and gradually reform the army. The Southerners are equally well armed but short of ammunition and war material, badly shod, and almost without clothing; indeed uniform of *any sort* is the exception, it is supposed to be grey with blue trousers, but 7 out of 10 wear a suit made of a sort of country cotton cloth stained brown by a berry (butternut) which grows in the woods. This is all the poor fellows can get, and on the top of it they put hats and caps of all sorts and sizes, a very considerable number are now clothed in Northern uniform or rather portions of it, which they have either captured or taken off the dead. The officers as a whole are certainly of a better class, and the discipline far more strict, shoot-

ing being with them a frequent punishment, and invariably for robbery; this the Northerners dare not enforce, indeed hardly attempt to check pillage and brutality of the worst description. It must however, be remembered that the Northerners are in an enemy's country; whereas it is the object of the Southerners to conciliate the population of the Border States. I suspect if the Rebels had got into Pennsylvania they would have been allowed considerable licence.

Hearing that General Stuart (Southern) was threatening Harrisburg,<sup>11</sup> I started off at once from Washington for that place, travelling all night and for the last 50 miles with a Railway Battery in front, being a sort of iron carriage with guns in it, all but useless I expect. When we arrived at Harrisburg, Stuart was within 30 miles, and had destroyed the railway lines, and Clark's<sup>12</sup> railway officials and scouts kept pouring into the town saying that Stuart was arriving rapidly. There was a general skedaddle amongst the civilians and great terror amongst the military—I, thinking that I should like to see Stuart and the fun, let the train go on without me, and remained in the town for the night; but Stuart had no support and was obliged to hurry back to his own main army as rapidly as possible, which he just and only just succeeded in doing. Stuart took a great many prisoners, towns, and stores, to an immense amount and would have taken Harrisburg like the rest if he had had 6 hours to spare.

<sup>11</sup>Major General J. E. B. Stuart crossed the Potomac on October 9, 1862, with 1800 cavalry men and 4 guns and advanced across Maryland and into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, 50 miles southwest of Harrisburg, where he destroyed \$250,000 worth of supplies but was unable to destroy an iron bridge across the Conococheague river. He then swung to the east and returned to Virginia by making a complete circuit around McClellan's army, *Dictionary of American Biography*, (New York, 1936), XVIII, 170-2; W. W. Blackford, *War Years with Jeb Stuart*, (New York, 1946), pp. 164-188.

<sup>12</sup>Probably William Smith-Clark, 1826-86. He was promoted to colonel by Burnside in May, 1862.



I went over all the Battlefields in Maryland, and Virginia, and also to Fredericksburg the scene of the last great Yankee thrashing. Antietam was really a drawn battle, though as the Southerners wanted to win a battle in Maryland, and did not succeed in doing it, it may fairly be considered that they got the worst of it. It was a battle, the hardest of the war. The scene afterwards was terrible, the whole country for miles around near the line of retreat of the Rebel army absolutely stank.<sup>13</sup> The heat was intense and the surrounding country especially about Harpers Ferry, beautiful in the extreme—this place Harpers Ferry ought never to have been taken, it is an everlasting disgrace to the Northerners who not only suffered the place to fall but surrendered 12,000 men, when at least 11,000 might have been marched out without any difficulty and but little fighting, and joined McClellan's army—I cannot help thinking there was treachery in the loss of this place. They might be volunteers, and perhaps not of the best sort or well commanded; but the Maryland Heights (which command Harpers Ferry) could have been held by [the] force they had there for days, and even after they were taken the 12,000 men in Harpers Ferry which is the other side of the river could have cut through with a loss of certainly not more than 100 men. The Southern were not absolutely beaten but they were out manoeuvred at "South Mountain," nor can I quite see why General Lee preferred this position to one about three miles off which is by nature far stronger, indeed almost impregnable. The only reason I can guess is that he was retreating rapidly, that the men had not time to occupy any position until he had placed the first and strongest range of hills between his army and the enemy, and held him in check there, for an hour or so,

until he could deploy on to the next South Mountain range.<sup>14</sup>

I was travelling with a Doctor whose chief interest of course is the hospitals—I always think it as well to see everything, and so having a half a day to spare I agreed to go with him over the main field hospital camp at Smokestown<sup>15</sup>—I am glad now that I did so, but I'd never care to attempt the same a second time. There were some 3,000 wretched creatures (not sick but all brought for operations) laying under the trees with a space of say 300 yards square, most had straw to lie on but not all, and there were a few tents. There were about 60 surgeons without coats (chiefly French, German, and Irish) covered with blood and dirt, chatting, arguing, and laughing and swearing, and cutting and sawing more like the devils and machines than human beings. Large heaps of legs, and arms were piled here and there, all sizes, and stages of decomposition; the odour was fearful and the whole air felt thick and putrid while myriads of flies buzzed and darted rapidly about—I saw about 50 limbs taken off during the 2 hours I remained there—The Yankees have creatures they call Medical Cadets and these fiends, the moment a limb was off would pounce on it from behind trees, and fight for it, and in a few minutes it would be cut into little bits for practise—I thought I could stand a good deal but the stench, heat and flies were so fearful that it made me feel rather queer, and when I saw one of these Cadets seize a leg almost before it was off and holding it by the toe run away with it, still quivering and bleeding, and dragging and bumping it along the ground, while the other devils chased him, it made me feel for a little time so sick that I felt myself grow

<sup>13</sup>The Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) was fought by Lee and McClellan on September 17, 1862.

<sup>14</sup>At the Battle of South Mountain, fought on September 14, 1862, McClellan forced Turner's Gap and compelled D. H. Hill, commanding the rear guard of the Confederate army, to retreat.

<sup>15</sup>"Smokestown" may be a typographical error. It has not been identified.

pale and dared not speak for a few minutes; however, I was determined to conquer it, and did, and though I could hardly help hitting some of the surgeons and Cadets, I could talk and help the poor fellows themselves. War certainly has two sides to it, though happily it is seldom or never that such repulsive scenes as this take place.

It was doubly sad too, as all the men spoke our language, and looked like Englishmen—The Yankees are a queer people; they have no delicacy in taste of feeling, we always keep the actual operations (where practicable, as in this instance) a little apart from the sight of the sufferers or hidden a little; but the Yankees do not attempt it—one thing is that most of their surgeons are Irish and German adventurers who know nothing and care little for the Americans themselves, but still to me do not appear to care, whereas it would not do with our men. The Yankees are bearing the pain marvellously, and are most patient and cheerful, poor fellows, it was grievous to see such splendid men, wrecks for life, and sometimes you would see an old man, or a young boy amongst the equally shattered but equally calm.

I stayed with McClellan's army and went about every day with the different generals, Burnside amongst them—McClellan is out and out the best man, indeed the only man they have to control a mass of 300,000 men, for it was the number he had—The only man in 50,000 who can command any real army of 100,000 men properly; but not one in a million is fit to lead to victory 300,000 men who have little discipline and less experience, where the whole care of, and for everything falls entirely upon himself—Officers, non-commissioned officers and men knowing nothing of their profession, hurried together, arrived and marched at once into the field, not depending on or assisting upon one another but leaving all, even trifling details to the

General, and chance, and above all disliking the object of the war, and since Antietam candidly admitting that the knocks are becoming too hard.<sup>16</sup>

With the Southerners it is difficult; they are fewer in numbers, far stricter disciplined, better officered and thoroughly in earnest, in fact trying to drive a hated and really cruel enemy from their own homes and country—You must not think that there is any want of courage on either side; for there is not, nor must you think that the Southern soldiers are much better than the Northern, for they are not, only the courage of them is better directed and applied in earnest, whereas the other is only called out on special occasions, when perhaps they have been best handled, or where they either cannot or for some reason or other do not care to run. Neither side can be manoeuvred under fire, and this is about the secret of the whole present American War, the men on either side can be brought under fire, and when there will stand well; but they are not good enough either in morale or field movements to advance, change position, or retire—The moment they have to manoeuvre, they get into confusion and break, this their own officers admit and also that the charges either of Cavalry or Infantry are purely imaginary; they may and have occasionally made a rush; but never get within 300 yards of one another; but normally wavered, halted, and fired irregularly and when one side or the other gets tired first bolts, led by their officers almost invariably on the Northern side.

I have seen some of their brilliant charges, and victories, and enormous losses to the army, after a hard contest of 8 to 10 hours—

<sup>16</sup>McClellan was superseded by Burnside on November 5. Captain Hewett meant that he had met Burnside when he was one of McClellan's staff. He here indicates his belief that McClellan was superior to Burnside and draws attention to the difficulties faced by Northern generals in the early years of the war, difficulties that modern writers frequently forget.



For 9 days in Kentucky I saw them at work and I really do not consider I was then in any danger, to speak of—It consisted of “shelling the wood,” where sometimes an enemy was, and more frequently where an enemy was not, the army would then advance and occupy the next wood and so on, but I never saw above 3 or more killed. It is only here and there at their great fights like “Antietam”, “Perryville”, and “Fredericksburg”, and so on that they get to work in earnest. The real ambition is avowedly to get parallel, and the consequence is that if only the enemy can manage to get close up to a town or detached party of any sort, they never fire a shot in defence but give up at once.

The McClellan camp was around Harper’s Ferry and was a magnificent sight, and one which few soldiers if ever had seen before. This army consists of 800,000<sup>17</sup> men of all arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and as they rarely remained in the same position for several weeks, were close to Washington in an apparently friendly country, with a big river between them and the rebels, the camps were all regular, and outwardly they appeared in admirable order; well clothed, well fed, and well armed; the artillery material (guns etc;) enormous and really magnificent, and all these thousands of white tents situated in rich valleys surrounded by bold and deeply wooded hills. At night the effect of the thousands of camp fires, of perhaps 20 miles long by 6 or 8 deep twinkling throughout the country, was very striking—All this together with the rebel tents or fires in the distance, could be taken in at one view from the Maryland Heights, 300,000 men and some (cavalry, artillery, and luggage and commissariat trains) 100,000 horses and goods [*sic*] carriages swung in every direction along the roads and amongst the white

tents—McClellan’s army was certainly splendidly equipped, but it was weak and almost immovable from its enormous numbers, and the defects I have pointed out.

Seeing that there was no chance of another general engagement in Virginia, I left McClellan’s army and went to Kentucky when fighting was going on, and indeed always is going on (far more than in Virginia). This army was in a very different condition. I noticed it with a march of 150 miles in our enemy’s country, [*sic*] General Buell and about 5 or 6 of his staff possessing the *only tents* with the army consisting of about 180,000 men well clothed and armed, but 100,000 of their men were mere recruits that had just joined, and, it is a positive fact that 2 regiments went into action at Perryville while the recruits for these regiments were actually being mustered for the 1st time and arms being put into their hands.<sup>18</sup> No wonder they were beaten, and can anyone in their senses who know[s] the real facts, blame Buell (who is not only a good officer, but a very nice old gentleman) for not fighting with such troops. Buell with the 50,000 veterans (comparative) he had with him had just made one of the most rapid and successful marches on record and saved Cincinnati and Louisville, and had never shirked or lost a fight hitherto. All these recruits were given him and he very wisely would not risk an action with such men, but was making his army, and without bringing on an engagement was forcing back the enemy by sheer force of numbers. Well the army howled at him and some of his volunteer generals did bring on an action, got thrashed, and Buell

<sup>18</sup>Perryville had been fought on October 8, two days before Stuart had crossed the Potomac on his Maryland raid. Although the result of the battle itself was indecisive, Hewett apparently regarded it as a tactical defeat for the North even though he knew that strategically it was a victory since the Confederates were driven from Kentucky. For not catching and defeating Bragg, Buell was relieved of his command.

<sup>17</sup>*cf* above where the army was given as 300,000. This may be an error in transcription.

was wounded; and now Kentucky and Tennessee are falling, I am glad to say into the rebel hands again. The young regiments at Perryville did certainly behave infamously, many of them ran at once, but a few young ones on the other hand fought hardly enough to win but could not, some as I have shown having arms only for the first day and hardly any had ever learned more than simply to load and fire—A confederate and Federal regiment made a rush for a low dry stone wall between two woods; both got there at the same time, but neither dared attempt to get over, and there they stayed for some 8 hours, firing, through and into trees, and sticking at one another with knives, bayonets, between the stones, and over the wall. There were young regiments as you may suppose but they fought till they were nearly killed.

When with the armies, I stayed at Headquarters and everyone was very civil, giving me horses escorts wherever I wanted to go, and sharing all they had with me, but it was a very different story finding my way to the army and back again, and when I was passing round the lines to see the Southerners more closely. You must know that Kentucky, Missouri, and part of Tennessee have been so fought over and won alternatively by one side or the other, that they are in a state of anarchy, life and property are only safe for the strongest and greatest robbers. Horses are not to be got for love or money; soup and salt almost unknown, at some places not a thing to be got to eat, and not a blanket, boots or clothing of any sort to be had—Gold and silver is altogether unknown, nothing but dollar (4s) notes and *postage* stamps for smaller change. These notes are of no value out of this particular state of which it is issued, and some will not take Federal, while others will not take Confederate notes—I consider the Confederate notes worth almost 6d a bushel more than the northern

notes—The north are sure to repudiate, the South almost equally sure—

Well, it was into this interesting country I launched myself, in search of the two armies, and of adventure, and wandered about for about 10 days without a home of any sort—Of course I left all my baggage except what I could carry, behind me and started off with a big stock of as much food as I could stuff into my pockets—Every road swarming with *thousands* of Northern stragglers who are without exception the most fearless and greatest blackguards in the world; armed and in bands of from 3 to 50 they wander everywhere murdering, and robbing wherever there is anything to excite their dislike or cupidity. These men are far worse than the Southern guerrillas who are to a certain extent under control and only shoot officers when they caught them as prisoners, but not soldiers or civilians, the former being paroled and the latter uninjured. I used to be in a terrible funk at times especially when I met these gentry at night, but although they abused and threatened me often, and more than once they or the outlying pickets would spring upon me with clubbed muskets or bayonets at my throat, they never really hurt me, and only deliberately shot at me twice. It was however very hard work day after day and although very hot in the day, equally cold at night, the floor with a rug over me, was an absolute luxury. One day I walked 48 miles which is the longest walk I have ever done or certainly ever will do if I can help it.

The things I saw will give you an idea of the Northern soldiers in some places. It occurred in a little village in Kentucky called Davyville,<sup>19</sup> occupied by the Northerners and there was no enemy within 40 miles of the place at the time, well, a regiment was stationed somewhere on the outskirts of the

<sup>19</sup>Davyville may be either Daysville in Todd County, Kentucky, or, more probably, Danville, eleven miles east of the battlefield of Perryville.



village and as usual lying about anywhere. Two poor men one leaning against a railway and the other walking about 60 and 100 yards off respectively; when a bloodthirsty fit takes these confounded soldiers and literally out for fun? they shot and killed these two poor men, (civilians) who were both as it happens starved Northerners and who to my certain knowledge had not said one word or even looked towards the Southern [Northern?] soldiers, and who were as unconscious of danger as of the offense. No notice at all was taken by any of the officers, military or civil; the former would not, the latter dared not, but all these things are rapidly turning the feeling of Kentucky, (which is a lone state but for the union) against the North and for the South, and bitter and deep are the cries I have heard by the civilians against these volunteer soldiers—I could not have stopped it, for it was all done quite suddenly, and unexpectedly, and all the brutes said with a laugh “Oh, I guess if he isn’t, he might be a butternut,” which means a Southerner in feeling—Now as this word used to be constantly muttered with curses as I passed, simply because my shooting shirt unfortunately happened to be brown (something like the prevailing colour of the Southern States country cloth), you may imagine, I felt a little uncomfortable at times and steered clear of struggles when I could.

You have heard of the famous Guerrilla, General Morgan, well, I was most anxious to see him and knowing (the Southerners as well as Northerners trust me) that he was going to attack a certain district, I started off on foot, to get myself into the way of him and his men, and see some little revenge. Presently the Yankees got scent of the proposed attack, and I myself saw 900 Yankee cavalry start in pursuit from the camp where I had been sleeping. I was stopped, and insulted and roughly treated by about 30 dif-

ferent outlying pickets, and sentries as I approached a town called “Salvoise,”<sup>20</sup> (I was always provided with passes, letters and vouchers from everybody to everybody; only the muts often either could not or would not read them, and bullied me accordingly,) and when I did get into the place tired, and angry, the commandant stopped me and asked me all kinds of impertinent questions, and said I should not go on and ordered a man to sleep in the same room with me at the Tavern place. I told him I was an officer and had been staying with McClellan and was going to General Buell to stay with him and showed him my letters, that I knew what was necessary to be questioned about and to answer for military precautions, that I had answered that and would not speak any more (I was angry at the time with fatigue and annoyance) that I am unarmed and could not blow up his little town, that I had been stopped some thirty times in the last 3 miles, and that I believed Morgan would not have half the trouble getting in that I had—Wherever I went I found a Northern soldier following me; and as a good many men (one in particular) tried hard to make me quarrel by slighting England and the English most outrageously—I saw that the place was getting too hot to hold me, and in spite of the prohibition determined to leave town and still carry out my original intention of seeing Morgan, who I knew was near. Well, I got off clear enough for a ½ mile or so, and was walking quietly along about 80 yards from a Northern Cavalry picket who I saw and who saw me plainly enough; when one of the devils as usual without any challenge dismounted and deliberately shot at me and a very fine shot too. With an English civilized picket I should have gone straight up to them, and hailed them “friend” and said who I was, although not challenged, but they

<sup>20</sup>Salvisa, Kentucky, seventy miles south of Frankfort.

would have shot me to a certainty just the same before I got to them, and ran, and if they missed me again I should be taken to "Salvoisie", so knowing the Yankee Cavalry pretty well and that 3 foot high of paling would stop the best of them, I hopped over the nearest bit of low snake fence and made tracks for the wood, down came my friends the Cavalry but as I thought, dare not ride at the fence, (if they had they would have caught me before I got across the field), pulled up and gave me another round, at about 200 yards, which was not by any means as near as the first to my great relief, and I never saw my friends again, for I am happy to say that within 20 minutes of this time Morgan came and took the town just as I had predicted without firing a shot, and made prisoners of the whole garrison, Infantry, and Cavalry, and my impertinent commandant, who I presume was shot as Morgan shoots most of the officers, taken that evening, as they had killed three of his men some days previously—If I had known that Morgan was so close, I should have stayed in the town, and been taken prisoner too, for he is a gentleman though a Ruffian and would have been civil as possible though you cannot trust his followers, many of them are mutineers, one side sometimes, and another others, but always robbers—I heard afterwards that I had a more narrow escape than I was aware of at the time, for it seems that Morgan (who is always in disguise for fear of being shot)

sometimes come into a place to reconnoitre, previous to attacking it; and knowing him to be in the neighbourhood several thought I was him, as I believe I am about his height, and they said that I wore "side whiskers," like Morgan. The reason why they did not hang me right off the reel, was that the population of "Salvoisie", is secesh in spirits, and was only kept there by the Yankee Garrison, and only being a stranger and fighting with the commandant attacked a crowd and amongst them several Southern prisoners, officers, and men and had the Northerners done anything to me even if they were sure I was the real Morgan which they were not, or only a Southerner or English gentleman, either the populace would have told Morgan or Morgan's men when he attacked the place which it was known he was going to do in a few days, and he would have shot every Yankee man, woman, and child in the place to a certainty. It is strange and terrible to think of; but I have heard the word extermination used frequently latterly in the Border States, by both sides and if the War goes on, so clearly bitter are the feelings of those who are ruined, or have suffered are becoming, that extermination it will be. And the town with a great portion of my baggage was taken by Morgan's men, when I was away with General Buell. Who got my baggage I don't know, but it is gone and the horse with it. Of course I left the more valuable portion of my baggage at Louisville, in safety.



## THE SURRENDER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL JOHNSTON AND GENERAL SHERMAN, APRIL 1865

BY HARRY W. PFANZ\*

IN April, 1865, Sherman's victorious army was pushing its way through North Carolina. It had battled through Tennessee and Georgia to Atlanta, but after Atlanta it had encountered only sporadic resistance and had moved almost at will. The remnants of Joseph E. Johnston's army, which opposed it, were too small and too poorly equipped to do more than skirmish. Sherman's army, however, was growing stronger for, after reaching Savannah, he had reopened his supply lines and by maintaining contact with the sea was able to obtain replacements of personnel and materiel at all times.

Johnston fell back to the north before Sherman in the hope that he might strengthen his command in North Carolina and join Lee's army in Virginia, but, with the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, these plans were doomed to failure. The only other active Confederate forces of consequence remaining were under Forrest, Taylor and Smith in the West and these were isolated from Johnston's army and of no practical value to it.

Meanwhile the Confederate cabinet, which had moved out of Richmond, took up tem-

porary residence in Goldsborough, North Carolina. It was here on April 11, that a conference was held by President Davis with Generals Johnston and Beauregard concerning the condition of the Army. They reported that they could not oppose Sherman successfully with their forces, and that further retreat would necessitate the abandonment of much of their artillery and would bring much desolation to the country. A meeting of the cabinet was then held and the situation discussed. It was found that all cabinet members except Judah P. Benjamin favored a cessation of hostilities. The views concerning the peace terms as presented by Postmaster General Reagan were adopted, and he was appointed to draft them for Johnston to be given to Sherman. They stated in substance that:

1. The Confederate Army would be disbanded.
2. The Constitution and authority of the United States would be recognized on condition that:
3. The existing governments in the states would be continued and preserved.
4. The political rights and rights of persons and property would be secured by the Constitution of the United States and the several states.

---

\*This article was written by Mr. Pfanz as part of his graduate studies in history at The Ohio State University.

5. There would be freedom from future prosecution or penalties from participation in the war.
6. There would be a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

It was with this authorization that General Johnston addressed a letter to General Sherman dated April 14, 1865, asking for an armistice with him and suggesting that General Grant take similar action in regard to other armies so that civil authorities could make arrangements terminating the war.<sup>2</sup> General Sherman replied immediately that he was impowered to arrange any terms with General Johnston for the suspension of hostilities between the armies commanded by the two men. As a basis of action he proposed the terms granted to Lee by Grant at Appomattox. He stated that he would halt the movements of General Stoneman and would obtain an order from Grant suspending troop movements in Virginia.<sup>3</sup>

Before going further it would be well to recall the movements toward peace made by Federal officials that Sherman used for precedent in this negotiation. Abraham Lincoln had met with Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter at City Point, Virginia. Here, according to Grant, Lincoln had told the Confederate commissioners that they could have peace upon almost any terms if they would agree to two points: the Union should be preserved and slavery should be abolished.<sup>4</sup>

In his account of an interview there between Lincoln and Sherman, Admiral Porter asserted that, although Sherman had said that Johnston's surrender could be had on

any terms desired, Lincoln insisted that it be obtained on any terms. At this time Sherman, Grant, and Lincoln were unanimous in their views on the war.<sup>5</sup>

With regard to civil activity on the part of military commanders, Sherman used two precedents from his own experience. In two letters to civil authorities in Atlanta and Savannah, Sherman asserted that he had stated his belief that when people laid down their arms and accepted the authority of the United States the war was over for them; and, when states conformed to the Constitution, they could elect congressmen and would become part of the Union again. He had not been rebuked for either letter although each was published and known by the War Department. Stanton himself had been present during part of Sherman's negotiations with civil officials in Savannah and had approved of them. Stanton there, according to Sherman, impressed upon him the idea of the necessity of bringing the war to an early close for financial reasons.<sup>6</sup>

In regard to the final stages of the war, Sherman had two more examples before him. The first was Grant's terms to Lee. These were, of course, primarily of a military nature. It seems, too, that General Weitzel's convening of the Virginia legislature was considered by Sherman as precedent for military participation in civil affairs. With these views in mind and unaware of the sudden changes that were to occur in government policy, Sherman began the peace negotiations.

<sup>5</sup>General W. T. Sherman, *Memoirs*. Vol. II. "He (Lincoln) distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and the people of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel army laid down its arms, and resumed civil pursuits, they would at once be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a common country; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then in existence, with their civil functionaries would be reorganized by him as the government *de facto* until Congress could provide others."

<sup>6</sup>*Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War at the Second Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress*. Vol. III, p. 9. Hereafter designated C.C.W.

<sup>1</sup>John H. Reagan, *Memoirs with Special Reference to Secession and the Civil War*. pp 199-200.

<sup>2</sup>*The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Volume XLVII, Part 3, pp. 206-207. Hereafter designated O.R.

<sup>3</sup>O.R., p. 207.

<sup>4</sup>U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*. Vol. II, pp. 513-514.



It might be said at this time that Governor Vance of North Carolina also tried to communicate with Sherman on April 14 concerning a meeting between the two men. Sherman had every wish to see the governor and had sent a reply, but Vance, fearing arrest, had fled Raleigh. Couriers with promises of safe conduct were sent out in search of him, but he was not found in time to enable him to participate in the negotiations that followed.<sup>7</sup>

On April 15 the copies of the two letters opening the negotiations, were sent to Grant and the Secretary of War. In the accompanying letter General Sherman was optimistic about the fact of a forthcoming capitulation and stated that he would accept the same terms that Grant had given to Lee and that he would be careful not to complicate points of civil policy.<sup>8</sup>

A meeting was arranged for April 16 between the two generals at Durham Station, North Carolina. Here Johnston stated that it was his desire to keep the Confederate army from breaking up and that, if possible, he would like to surrender all of the Confederate armies. He thought that if he could find General Breckinridge, the Secretary of War, he could obtain the authority necessary to do this. Sherman approved of this idea for he felt that the higher officials would be pleased if the war could be ended "by one single stroke of the pen."<sup>9</sup> A report of these negotiations was sent to General Grant on April 17 and on the same day Lincoln's death became known to him.

Twenty-four hours later the two Generals met once again. This time, however, Breckinridge attended the conference as a Major General on Johnston's staff. During the course of the negotiations a packet arrived containing the terms as drawn up by Reagan. Sherman rejected them at once. He in-

formed the Confederates that he did not know the views of the administration, but that he would write up some terms and from them determine its policies. At any event he was of the opinion that all parties participating in the negotiations believed the war to be over. He then drew up his terms. These were signed by both Johnston and himself and were forwarded to Washington in a letter dated April 18.<sup>10</sup>

As an interesting sidelight to these negotiations of April 18, it is well to notice that Sherman advised that both Breckinridge and Davis leave the country as soon as possible because of the political situation. This idea presumably originated with Lincoln.<sup>11</sup> According to Reagan, Johnston had reported to Davis that a United States vessel would take the Confederate president and his party to a point outside the country. Davis, however, refused this offer fearing that it would place him under obligation to the Federal Government.<sup>12</sup>

On rejecting the Confederate terms, Sherman proceeded to write his own which were in most ways quite similar to those proposed by the Confederate officers. Sherman's terms were more verbose and included such phrases as "the Constitution of the United States," "Executive authority" and "Supreme Court" but in content seem to have been the same as those above. It must be noted, however, that whereas the Confederate terms mentioned a mere disbanding of their army, presumably at its surrender site, Sherman would have had its units proceed to their State capitols where they would store their arms and be mustered out by their State governments seemingly in a manner similar to that of the Northern units. The State governments, of course, were to have taken

<sup>7</sup>*O.R.*, p. 207.

<sup>8</sup>*O.R.*, p. 221.

<sup>9</sup>*C.C.W.*, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-354.

<sup>12</sup>*O.R.*, pp. 243-244.

again the oaths provided by the Constitution before they became legitimate. Sherman's terms closed with a statement to the effect that they necessitated the approval of higher authority before they could be carried out. These terms were signed by both Commanding Generals and forwarded to Washington for approval.<sup>13</sup>

General Sherman seems to have been well pleased with this work, and it seems evident that he entertained little doubt of its immediate approval. On April 19 a Special Field Order 58 was issued from his headquarters announcing the suspension of hostilities and an agreement which, when formally ratified, would "make peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande." Further orders were issued governing troop movements and activity in the army during the waiting period. Reviews were scheduled and the army settled back in peaceful waiting.<sup>14</sup>

But along the Potomac things were far from peaceful. The dispatches were received by Grant on April 21 and, after noting their importance, he notified Stanton of them and suggested that a cabinet meeting be held to consider them that evening.<sup>15</sup> Grant said that it was held amid great consternation but does not describe it further.<sup>16</sup> Stanton's biographer states that Grant himself was the first to declare the terms inadmissible, that he was prompt in alarming Stanton, that he was energetic in pushing aside the agreement and that he lost no time in heading South.<sup>17</sup> Gideon Welles seems to hold a different view of this matter for he asserts that it was Stanton who was emphatic in his condemnation while Grant, though opposed to the agreement, refrained from any censure of Sher-

man. The opinion of the Cabinet, however, was united in the view that the terms were to be rejected, and Grant was sent down to Sherman's army to supervise matters.<sup>18</sup>

From April 21 to April 24, while Sherman awaited news from Washington, routine matters were dealt with, reviews were held, there was a reshuffling of troops and the XV Corps was ordered inspected for unauthorized civilian property!<sup>19</sup> Letters were exchanged between Sherman and Johnston concerning the terms, the activities of General Wilson in Georgia, the future of the negro in the South and the latest news concerning Lincoln's assassination.<sup>20</sup> In the latter Sherman expressed fears that the assassination would jeopardize his terms, especially those concerning the establishment of local governments, for he had just learned that the authorization supposedly held by the Virginia legislature had been withdrawn.

In the meantime, Grant was hurrying toward Sherman and reporting his progress back to Washington. Halleck, recently appointed Commanding General of the Division of the James, was ordered to move Sheridan to Greensborough, North Carolina. Halleck and Stanton were both worried about the Confederate gold and Stanton was denouncing Sherman.

On April 24 Grant arrived in Raleigh. Sherman had known of the approach of his courier, but Grant's presence in North Carolina was not generally known. Grant discussed the rejection of Sherman's terms with that General and reported the interview to Stanton.

In his communication, Grant stated that Sherman had not been surprised at the rejection of his conditions and the tone of the letter in its explanation of why Sherman had

<sup>13</sup>O.R., pp. 243-244.

<sup>14</sup>O.R., p. 250.

<sup>15</sup>O.R., p. 263.

<sup>16</sup>Grant, *op cit.*, p. 516.

<sup>17</sup>George C. Gorham, *Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton*. pp. 182-184.

<sup>18</sup>Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles*. pp. 294-295.

<sup>19</sup>O.R., p. 281.

<sup>20</sup>O.R., p. 286, 287.



concluded those terms seems sympathetic with Sherman's position.<sup>21</sup> Grant, according to Stanton's orders of April 21, had been ordered to Sherman's headquarters to direct the operations against the enemy.<sup>22</sup> Grant, however, remained in the background and Sherman was given the honor of conducting and concluding the peace negotiations.

There was again much activity within the army. Sherman notified Johnston that Washington had disapproved of their agreement and had limited him to military negotiations with Johnston's command. He concluded this short notification by writing, "I therefore demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given General Lee at Appomatox of April 9, instant, purely and simply."<sup>23</sup> Marching orders were then sent out to his units and the army began to ready itself for more war.

It is quite probable that the army was disheartened by the prospect of the renewal of hostilities for most of the soldiers of both armies were farmers and a new growing season was upon them. The Confederate soldiers, we are told, were deserting in "frightful" numbers each night and, though sad over their defeat, were looking forward eagerly to peace. Concerning the end of the truce, a Confederate officer wrote that "... the suddenness of a proposed continuation of the struggle is more saddening than the news of the first surrender."<sup>24</sup>

On receiving Sherman's demand for a surrender, Johnston proposed a further armistice during which a modification of the terms of April 18 could be discussed. The General wanted his men to be retained in their units until they returned home in order to prevent depredation of the country by bands of dis-

charged soldiers.<sup>25</sup> Sherman accepted the proposal for the convention, but Johnston's hope that his army would not be disbanded on the spot was doomed to failure.

On the twenty-sixth day of April at Bennett's house near Durham Station, final terms were drawn up and signed by the two generals. These terms were based upon those given to General Lee and stated in essence that

1. All acts of war would cease.
2. All Confederate arms and public property would be handed over to the Ordnance Officer of the United States Army at Greensborough.
3. Rolls were to be made out and each man would promise in writing not to take up arms against the government of the United States.
4. Officers would retain side arms, private horses and baggage.
5. After the above terms were complied with, the officers and men would be permitted to return to their homes not to be disturbed by United States authorities so long as they obeyed the laws.

These conditions were approved by General Grant.<sup>26</sup>

After the terms were signed they were modified somewhat in favor of the vanquished army. On April 27 Special Order 65 was issued by Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, and in it the practice of foraging was prohibited except in cases of necessity at which time some type of spot settlement had to be made with the owner of the property commandeered. Army commanders were encouraged to lend to the inhabitants of their areas all captured draft animals and wagons that could be spared and to issue rations to those who were in

<sup>21</sup>O.R., p. 293.

<sup>22</sup>O.R., p. 293.

<sup>23</sup>O.R., p. 294.

<sup>24</sup>R. S. Henry, *The Story of the Confederacy*, pp. 468-468.

<sup>25</sup>O.R., p. 304.

<sup>26</sup>O.R., p. 313.

want. Further supplementary terms were given to Johnston's army which allowed it to retain its organic transportation and which furnished transportation by sea from Mobile to those men who lived in Texas or Arkansas. Each unit was allowed to keep one-fifth of its arms which were to be stored as public property on its arrival home.<sup>27</sup>

Aside from minor modifications adjusted between Generals Johnston and Schofield, these terms remained in effect. General Johnston addressed a letter to General Sherman in which he expressed his gratitude for Sherman's humane conduct during the negotiations and with it the military negotiations of the two men came to an end.<sup>28</sup>

But such an important event could not have been expected to have passed unnoticed in the victorious North, especially since the victors had been divided throughout the war over the Southern policy and continued to disagree now that peace was at hand. With Lincoln gone the radicals gathered the reigns of government into their own hands as rapidly as possible and sought to solidify their positions. The Army should not have been involved but, unfortunately, then as now a good military record was a political asset and it behooved the radicals to see that the military was in accord with their wishes. To achieve this end they had set up the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War under the leadership of the radical Republican from Ohio, Senator Benjamin Wade. This committee, supposedly established to aid the war effort, seems to have sought mainly to control the political thinking of the army's commanders. Since military men, in general, are inclined to be conservative and since the South had always exercised a great amount of influence over the army, the committee found that it had much to do. It had al-

ready closed the careers of McClellan and Stone and had sought to tarnish Meade. The Committee found a ready ally in Secretary Stanton, and it was with him that Sherman became most heavily involved. The cease fire in Durham Station, thus, was a signal for action along the Potomac.<sup>29</sup>

Sherman held a conservative point-of-view with regard to the freedmen. He had evidently caused much comment in high circles in Washington because of his treatment of slaves encountered during his campaigns. While his army was resting at Savannah he had received a friendly letter from Halleck marked private and confidential in which that strange general had warned him that people in high places were condemning him for his attitude toward negroes. He suggested that Sherman might rectify his position by allowing the slaves encountered to come under the protection of his army. Sherman was distrusted also by the radicals because he was known to have opposed the use of colored soldiers and because he approved of Lincoln's theories of reconstruction.<sup>30</sup> On May 10, 1865, he expressed his views when he wrote his wife that

Stanton wants to kill me because I do not favor the scheme of declaring the negroes of the South, now free, to be loyal voters whereby politicians may manufacture just so much more pliable electioneering material. The negroes don't want to vote. They want to work and enjoy property and they are no friends of the negro who seeks to corrupt him with new prejudices.<sup>31</sup>

Sherman, then, was fair game for the radical hunters and Halleck too seems to have un-

<sup>29</sup>T. H. Williams' *Lincoln and the Radicals* presents an account of radical activity in connection with the army throughout the war.

<sup>30</sup>T. H. Williams, *Lincoln and the Radicals*, pp. 376-378.

<sup>31</sup>M. A. Howe, ed., *Home Letters of General Sherman*, p. 353.

<sup>27</sup>O.R., pp. 320-322.

<sup>28</sup>O.R., pp. 336-337.



wittingly entered the field against him.

Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, describes in his diary the days immediately following Sherman's announcement of his first terms as days of excitement. Although Sherman's communication was to have been secret, Welles detected leaks and on April 22, suspected Stanton of having talked indiscriminately. By April 23, he reported the whole thing as having been in the paper and stated that Stanton and Attorney General Speed were frantic with fear that Sherman might lead his army on to Washington. In a cabinet meeting of that day, Speed denounced Sherman as having been seduced by Breckenridge.<sup>32</sup> This fear, which had seized Stanton and Speed, became public then through a press notice issued by Stanton through General Dix at New York City.

This bulletin was released on April 22 and on April 23 its contents appeared in the New York papers. The *New York Times* carried the news and outcome of the cabinet meeting held at the receipt of Sherman's terms. Along with this was printed the text and context of the telegram sent by Lincoln to Grant on March 3 after Grant had notified the President that Lee had offered to discuss terms. Lincoln at that time had informed Grant that he was to confer only upon military matters and was not to discuss or decide political questions. Political matters were reserved for the President, and he would not give them over to the military. Meanwhile Grant was ordered to press his military advantages.

In addition to the above the communication stated that Sherman's action in ordering Stoneman to Salisbury on April 18 had worked so as to allow Jefferson Davis and his party, with the Confederate gold, to escape into Mexico. It then said that Davis would make terms with Sherman or some other high

ranking officer which would permit him to escape the country with his booty.<sup>33</sup>

The terms of the surrender were then discussed and we may assume that their reception varied with the political complexion of the paper. It is evident, however, that the bulletin, as issued, gave the radical press license to criticize, and in the *Times* of April 24 Sherman's terms were entitled the "Magna Charta of Slavery," his actions were termed dangerous insubordination because he had supposedly known of Lincoln's instructions to Grant, and he was criticized for having concluded an armistice.

The bulletin, according to Welles, was issued without the knowledge of the President and most of the members of the cabinet.<sup>34</sup> Stanton's biographer stated that it was issued to allay public feeling and disturbance in the army which might have resulted from the rejection of the peace terms without explanation or warning.<sup>35</sup>

In the meantime further military action was being taken by the busy War Department. Halleck, who had not known of the negotiations, was ordered by Grant to send Sheridan's cavalry to Goldsborough and one corps of infantry to Danville. He was told by Stanton that Stoneman's movements were allowing Davis to escape. These orders were issued on April 22 while the truce was yet in effect.<sup>36</sup> On April 26, the day of the final negotiations, Halleck informed Washington that he had ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan and Wright to pay no attention to any truce orders of Sherman and to cut off Johnston's retreat. He stated that he had announced to his troops at Danville that they were to disregard Sherman's truce and push forward and suggested that orders be telegraphed to Wilson and Thomas, Sheridan's

<sup>33</sup>*New York Times*, April 25, 1865.

<sup>34</sup>Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

<sup>35</sup>Gorham, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

<sup>36</sup>*O.R.*, p. 277.

<sup>32</sup>Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-296.

subordinates, not to obey Sherman's orders. Stanton replied to him that he had already issued the suggested orders to General Thomas.<sup>37</sup> In this way both Sherman's armistice and the channels of communication were ignored.

Sometime after Grant's departure, Sherman was informed of Stanton's bulletin in the New York papers. His temper had already become aroused on Grant's arrival with orders to take charge of the negotiations. In answer to this he had addressed a letter to the Secretary of War stating his position in brief and his opinion to the effect that, after four years' service with it, he could conduct affairs in his army without interference from Stanton.<sup>38</sup> The letter to Grant is longer and more detailed and is obviously one of a hurt and angry man. He complained of the publication of his confidential communications and stated that he had known nothing of Lincoln's order to Grant which he had supposedly disregarded. He denied that Stoneman was rendered ineffectual by his orders and stated that, as yet, he had received no orders regarding Jefferson Davis. Sherman further defended his policy toward the South as one based upon experience and closed by demanding that this letter be published in defense of his position.<sup>39</sup>

This letter was sent along with another to General Rawlins of Grant's staff in which he defended his treatment of Johnston's army as the humane thing to do after it had asked for quarter. Sherman further derided the idea of Davis' carrying tons of gold around with him and stated that if Stanton wanted politicians hunted down he should use sheriffs for the job and not columns of infantry. His temper continued to flare as he accused the politicians of suspecting him of political am-

bition, which he denied, and he asked that his defense be placed into the hands of John Sherman and Grant if the latter was not embarrassed by his actions. Both letters were forwarded to the Secretary of War.<sup>40</sup> The letter to General Rawlins was sent by mistake and Grant asked that it be returned but Stanton, having seen it, placed it on file.<sup>41</sup> Stanton endorsed the letter to Grant as approved for publication but evidently Grant's counsel prevailed and, being eager to pour oil on the troubled waters, he had sympathized with Sherman and advised him to take no further action until they had talked with one another.

Sherman received his last major shock on May 4 when, for the first time, he learned of Halleck's letter recommending that Sherman's subordinates be advised to ignore his orders. Sherman's anger at this knew no bounds, and the suggestion was labeled by him as both perfidious and infamous.<sup>42</sup> Halleck's military aggressiveness was scorned as he wrote his wife "How terribly energetic all at once Halleck became, to break my truce, cut off Johnston's retreat when he knew that Johnston was halted, anxious to surrender and was only making excuses to keep his men from scattering."<sup>43</sup>

This scorn burst forth again during the course of the march to Washington. On May 8 as he approached Richmond, Halleck's headquarters, he received an invitation to visit with that general while he was in the city. Sherman replied that because of Halleck's dispatch to the Secretary of War, April 26, he wanted no friendly intercourse with him and preferred that they not meet. Halleck, avoiding channels again, had ordered a review of some of Sherman's troops who were passing through the city. Sherman

<sup>37</sup>O.R., pp. 311-312, 321.

<sup>38</sup>O.R., p. 302.

<sup>39</sup>O.R., pp. 334-335.

<sup>40</sup>O.R., pp. 345-346.

<sup>41</sup>O.R., p. 530.

<sup>42</sup>O.R., p. 399.

<sup>43</sup>Howe, *op. cit.*, p. 351.



forbade this.<sup>44</sup> Halleck attempted a reconciliation and protested that any offense that he had committed against Sherman was unintentional, but Sherman refused these protests.<sup>45</sup> Halleck was told that Sherman's army would march through Richmond "quietly and in good order," but, in so many words, Halleck was told that he had best remain out of the way lest one of Sherman's subordinates get out of hand and take revenge upon him.<sup>46</sup> He wrote to Mrs. Sherman that Halleck ". . . will think twice before he again undertakes to stand between me and my subordinates. Unless Grant interposes from his yielding and good nature, I shall get some equally good opportunity to insult Stanton . . .".<sup>47</sup>

Sherman and his army moved to Washington where it was to participate in the Grand Review before being split again into small State units and sent home for mustering out. While in Washington, a place that he would have avoided as a pest house, he spoke with the President and the cabinet but would not allow Grant to effect a reconciliation between himself and Stanton. He found the President cordial and supposedly blameless for offending bulletins in the New York papers.<sup>48</sup> On May 22 he testified before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. His testimony was brief and consisted mainly of the presentation of documents, already cited in this paper, with but little questioning. In spite of the character of his testimony, it was thought by some radicals to have been another victory for themselves, and Stanton is supposed to have emerged with greater prestige than before.<sup>49</sup> In the light of the spirit that may have existed after Lincoln's

assassination, this may have been true, but viewed from the present, it is difficult to see how Stanton could have profited by the Committee's investigation.

Sherman's army passed in review on May 23 with the General himself riding at the head of the long column. After he had passed the reviewing stand, he returned to it in order to review the remainder of his troops in the company of the President and other dignitaries. On taking his place upon the platform, he was greeted cordially and returned the greetings in a like manner with one exception: As Stanton approached him with arm outstretched, he pointedly turned away snubbing the Secretary publicly. He had thus taken the desired opportunity to insult Stanton.

It is difficult to assess the attitudes of the people involved in the negotiations. Johnston, of course, had to surrender for reasons that are obvious. He was accused by the Stanton faction of attempting, with Breckinridge's assistance, to hoodwink Sherman who, dazzled by the prospect of his role, fell easy prey to this flattery. Be this true or not, Johnston cannot be condemned for attempting to obtain the best possible terms.<sup>50</sup>

Halleck's position is past understanding. On the surface at least it would seem that he was guilty of blundering. His actions seem eager almost beyond meaning, but it must be remembered that he was not unaccustomed to field service and was at the same time accustomed to making decisions for other generals from his former post in Washington. From the point of view of military etiquette, he was not justified in issuing orders to the subordinates of another general, especially when this involved the cancellation of the

<sup>44</sup>O.R., p. 495.

<sup>45</sup>O.R., p. 446.

<sup>46</sup>O.R., p. 555.

<sup>47</sup>Howe, *op. cit.*, pp. 375-376.

<sup>48</sup>Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 380-381.

<sup>49</sup>Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 380-381.

<sup>50</sup>In addition to the criticism of the peace in Stanton's bulletin, some discussion of the Confederate efforts to trick Sherman may be found in Whitelaw Reid's *Ohio in the War*, Vol. I, pp. 480-487.

legitimate commander's orders. Halleck should have been aware of this.

Stanton evidently was afraid of successful generals and overly fond of taking the initiative. As Secretary of War, it would seem that he had the legal right to call Sherman to account when the two disagreed. The wisdom of his actions is less easily excused and it cannot be denied that the public release of official communications and the implications against Sherman, if nothing more, violated good taste.

Grant stands out as mediator in a passive roll. Certainly he might have wielded great influence to the benefit of either Sherman or Stanton as he chose. The tact he displayed in dealing with his fiery subordinate, as well as his political overlords, stands forth as one of the more creditable aspects to the whole series of events and undoubtedly adds to his stature.

Finally, what must be said of General Sherman? No one can doubt his sincerity and generosity. Unfortunately, he was out of step with the times as interpreted by the radi-

cal Republicans at least. What would have happened had Lincoln lived, is subject to conjecture. Sherman was a proud man who appreciated the value of his efforts to the Union victory. As a field soldier, he seems to have had a feeling of superiority over his Washington brethren which, when irritated, became uncontrollable. That he received provocation from both Stanton and Halleck is obvious. At a time when military careers were being smeared by politicians, he stands forth as an example of courage, an example that few generals could afford to have followed. Yet it is doubtful whether or not a person having such great responsibility can afford to allow himself to be governed by his personal feelings.

In spite of the wranglings of their superiors, the soldiers' work was over. Both Sherman and Johnston had conducted themselves creditably as soldiers in this final act of the war. It was unfortunate that their example was not followed by some of their country's other leaders.

## COMMENT AT THE CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE

While speaking of the Civil War, it is worth while to mention an item recently published in the *Iowa Journal of History*. It is the "Civil War Diary of C. F. Boyd, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry," edited by Mildred Throne. This document began in the issue of January 1952, has continued in the April and July numbers, and will go on into October. It is the most absorbing personal account by an enlisted soldier that this writer has seen, at least as relates to the armies of the west. No student of the Civil War can afford to miss it!



# ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION PLANNING BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

BY HARRY B. YOSHPE\*

## PART II

4. *Central Programming of the Production Effort.* The keystone of economic mobilization is central programming—an aggregate of processes by which a master plan of production goals is devised and resources are directed toward the attainment of these goals. The processes involved in devising this grand strategy of production are extremely complex. The areas of essentiality to which resources are to be allotted must be marked out, and agencies designated as claimants for each area. These claimants must provide estimated delivery schedules for selected products for each program, and the amount of basic resources needed to carry out the proposed levels of production. These program proposals must be evaluated in relation to available resources. Since, on a long-range basis, whole programs will seldom be more urgent than other whole programs, gradations of urgency must be established within, as well as among, these programs. With proper regard for the needs of all areas of essentiality and for the relative urgency of competing programs in particular periods, conflicts must be resolved and a balanced consideration of claimant agency interests assured. In the course of matching requirements against availabilities, deficiencies in supply must be

identified, and programs developed for the expansion or more efficient utilization of existing resources. From all this must emerge determinations as to feasible, balanced program objectives in given periods, and the apportionment of total available resources to support approved programs. The high-level considerations and decisions involved in programming require that this basic function be centered in the civilian mobilization agency charged with the over-all direction of the war production effort.

The concept of a synchronized mobilization effort runs through the entire work of the planners. They placed with the War Resources Administration the responsibility for devising the total pattern of war production, deciding on the volume of resources that should be allowed to flow into specified production channels, and directing the use of priorities and other controls to meet the established goals. They failed, however, to spell out these responsibilities to the point of practical implementation. Like all their proposals for the control of the various elements of mobilization, their plans for central programming left much to be desired in the necessary precision and detail, or in the way of analysis of the problems in determining policy and operations, techniques, internal organization, and functional relationships with other agencies concerned.

Thus, while the possibility of conflicts be-

---

\*This is the concluding part of the paper presented by Dr. Yoshpe at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, in New York City, December 1951.

tween military and other requirements was foreseen, the resolution of such conflicts was left to the administration of priorities—a mechanism that was to prove hopelessly inadequate for the task even in the early stages of World War II. To prevent the curtailment of supplies and services vital to the civilian population, the planners reserved for civilian use 50 percent of the normal capacity of plants allocated for military production; and they proposed to leave to the War Resources Administration the coordination of demands on facilities in which the military interest was not substantial, and in certain cases, to expand facilities engaged in essential commercial production “to the full extent of the capacity needed to carry the military load.” Nothing was done, however, to gather data on levels of civilian consumption or determine bedrock civilian requirements.

The outbreak of the emergency thus found us without adequate machinery for programming war and essential civilian requirements. Much time was consumed in the development of this mechanism, and analysts of World War II experience are agreed that its absence early in the mobilization period was one of the major causes of interagency conflicts. In the initial stages of our preparedness program, the military themselves were dragging their feet. To be sure, there were those in the civilian control agencies who reflected the general inclination to hold on to both ends: national defense and business-as-usual. But there were others who urged the military to formulate an adequately comprehensive program of requirements, and the civilian supply groups urged the curbing of civilian production in order to make room for a more extensive war production program.

By the fall of 1941 and the spring of the following year, however, the pendulum swung the other way. As far as military programs were concerned, the main task of the civilian

control agencies was to urge upon the military the need of avoiding excessive demands on the nation's resources and of expressing their programs more precisely in terms of quantities, timing and degree of urgency. As for essential civilian and war-supporting requirements, the task became not so much to urge further curtailment of civilian production, but rather to formulate definite programs as a basis for judging whether or not the military “take” would injure the civilian economy and, as a consequence, impair the mobilization effort itself.

Only after much wrangling and costly delays did we come to appreciate the importance of setting production objectives that were high enough to elicit a maximum effort and yet not so high as to be beyond the potentialities of industry. The Armed Services, not fully realizing that military strategy must be related to the strategy of production, tended to shroud in secrecy certain decisions concerning their requirements. At the same time, delay in planning civilian requirements made for friction with the military and was a major factor in undermining public confidence in, and Congressional support of, the War Production Board. The relative urgencies given to programs were rarely based on standards of any real objective value. On the contrary, the major determinations on relative urgency were based largely on subjective judgments and on pressures of claimant agencies to put over their particular programs without proper regard for balance within their programs or within the over-all pattern of war production. Even during the period when the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion held the reins, it proved impossible to lift the bulk of the top coordination work above the level of dealing with day-to-day conflicts as they arose.

On the controls side, the planners had put their faith in the priority mechanism, taking the forms of classification ratings, facility



allocations, licenses, embargoes, permits and warrants, by which precedence would be established in the utilization of resources. Recognizing that no one of these forms of priority application "may be considered as a panacea for all the problems which may arise in war," they stressed the need for coordinating these control techniques "to assure a united, effective program."

They failed to realize, however, that such coordination can be effected only when the controls grow out of and support the central programming process. With the correlation of resources and requirements and the programming of the production effort in accordance with urgency standing, determination can be made as to the types of control required at any given time to achieve established goals. In the absence of an over-all production strategy, control devices can prove little more than stop-gap arrangements, and it is impossible to develop a properly integrated approach to the mobilization effort.

This is borne out by our experience with industrial production controls in World War II. During the first two years, the rating patterns progressively evolved in the administration of priorities sought to express the relative need for military programs or items of procurement in accordance with their strategic importance or production difficulties. Entire programs, however, were placed in single priority bands without time or quantitative limitations on the use of such ratings, with resultant imbalance among broad categories of weapons and complementary items. With an underlying master plan of production lacking, procurement programs were developed with little regard for feasibility, and confusion and failure resulted from insufficient thought or knowledge of the effect of one program upon another. Progressive up-ratings, in the inevitable scramble for scarce materials and facilities, made for confusion in, and impotence of, the top rating bands.

In the summer of 1942 the priorities system was modified to give greater recognition to the programming concept. Programs were distributed among various priority bands in accordance with their relative importance, and quantitative and time limitations were set on the use of ratings in order to obtain necessary balance. Even under this pattern and philosophy of ratings, however, there were excessive top-rated demands for critical materials. Ratings still served as "hunting licenses," and required materials didn't flow in balanced quantities so as to maintain an even flow of production. Increasing tightness in the supply of basic materials, particularly the underlying metals, resulted in continued inflation of the rating structure and prevented the proper integration and scheduling of production programs.

In the case of these underlying metals—steel, copper and aluminum—only mandatory allocation (first under the "horizontal" Production Requirements Plan and later under the "vertical" Controlled Materials Plan) made it possible to achieve a substantial measure of balanced production. Such mandatory allocation, particularly under the Controlled Materials Plan, brought the necessary appreciation of the importance of sound program formulation as the foundation for the apportionment of these basic metals among competing claimants. Such program formulation, however, was largely in terms of the three controlled materials; and while their distribution did serve as a brake on the rest of the program, the Controlled Materials Plan was never fully effective in securing balanced production for war purposes.

5. *Guiding and Coordinating Government Procurement.* Though the programming function is the heart of the mobilization process, it cannot of itself insure effective results. It needs firm support from the various controls which it generates. Of these controls none perhaps is more important than the con-

trol of Government procurement. Government procurement starts streams of action that have long-term consequences, and that cannot easily be retraced. It brings with it decisions with reference to the use of existing capacity, the building of new facilities, the flow of materials, tools, components and manpower. If uncoordinated and badly managed, Government procurement can not only increase costs, but have disruptive effects on the national economy; and the burden on supporting control measures would be all the greater. It is essential, therefore, that Government procurement be so planned and carried out as to help get the most out of the nation's resources, minimize the strain on the economy, and reduce the burden on supporting stabilization and industrial production controls.

One cannot find fault with the basic precepts which the planners laid down for guidance in the procurement planning area. Army and Navy procurement planning, they asserted, must be coordinated, and the plans should strive to reduce to a minimum "competitive procurement efforts between Government purchasing agencies for commodities or the output of facilities." These plans should be revised frequently on the basis of constant study if they were to remain in conformity with changing strategic plans and current industrial conditions." The war load should be equitably distributed so that available capacity might be utilized most effectively, the normal economic life of the country be disturbed as little as possible, the overburdening of individual facilities and congestion of local areas be avoided, and contract action in the highly industrialized sections within easy reach of the enemy be minimized. In establishing their production base and earmarking facilities for particular programs, the policy of the planners was to avoid the placement of contract schedules that would require capacity in ad-

dition to that already available. In the case of munitions production requiring additions to existing capacity, they sought to minimize expansion and to locate necessary plants in areas that were not congested.

On the substantive side, however, actual accomplishments in planning fell far short of expressed objectives. Inadequate thought was given to the mechanisms needed within and outside the military establishment to achieve effective control of wartime procurement. The planners contemplated no basic changes in the organization or responsibility for military procurement. Without violating the cardinal tenets set forth for procurement planning, the plans of the two departments, it was believed, "must make due allowances for differences in organization and administration of procurement functions." Coordination of military procurement would, of course, be effected by or through the ANMB, but the latter was expected to leave to the Army and Navy purchasing agencies "the greatest freedom of action and initiative consistent with necessary interdepartmental coordination." The role to be exercised by the civilian mobilization agencies in the procurement area was to be one of facilitation rather than direction or control. The various coordinating divisions in the War Resources Administration, the key super-agency proposed for the direction of the war economy, it was thought, "should in general be concerned primarily with the administration of approved policies and priorities within the respective divisions and with the conduct of research for definite means whereby requirements would be supplied." They were expected to "recognize the responsibility of established procuring agencies and allow the latter the greatest possible freedom of action in the discharge of procurement responsibilities." Experience was to prove, however, not only the need for substantial improvements in the organization for procurement within the mili-



tary establishment, but also the need for a much broader and more intimate concern by the civilian mobilization agencies with military procurement than the planners were prepared to recommend.

Confusion and disagreement existed, however, in respect to the policies and procedures whereby emergency procurement would be undertaken. For the purpose of planning and executing war procurement, the planners had divided the country into geographical districts. The planning work was decentralized to these districts. Taking the lists of requirements furnished by the supply chiefs, the district organizations surveyed the productive capacity of their respective areas, matched supply against demand, and had allocated to them the manufacturing capacity they needed. It was intended that each district staff, though small in peacetime, would form the nucleus around which the war procurement organization would be built. In wartime, procurement would be decentralized in these districts, each of which would be called upon to bear a fair share of the load. While it was expected that for non-commercial items authority would be granted to scrap the formal advertising method and negotiate contracts with allocated facilities, apparently it was thought that both formal and informal bids might profitably be solicited on commercial articles. The Army Quartermaster Corps, however, was definitely planning on negotiation while the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts protested against the proposed use of negotiated contracts. Though the Industrial Mobilization Plan bore the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, the Navy material bureaus had taken slight part in its preparation and had some reservations not only as to the soundness of the allocation system, but also as to the practicability of some of the proposals on procurement organization and procedures.

The validity of the facility allocation pro-

gram and the reliability of the procurement plans and accepted schedules of production thereunder were also open to question. Facility allocations were viewed as the core of the war planning program. Principles and policies to guide the allocation program were carefully worked out, and emphasis was placed on the periodic review of resultant procurement plans and production schedules with a view to keeping them current, conservative and dependable. After many years' delay, agreement was reached regarding division between the Army and Navy of capacity in the aeronautic, automotive, optical, and precision instrument industries. Considerable progress was also made toward solution of allocation problems pertaining to machine tools, airplane bombs, chemical warfare appliances, wire and cable, rubber goods, duck and webbing, blankets, woolen cloth, and other bottleneck items, although definite decisions on allocations had not been reached in all cases when the emergency came.

Despite periodic review of procurement plans, rechecking of facilities and revision of production schedules in light of changing situations, there were doubts as to the dependability of the data gathered. Much depended on the competency of the officers surveying plant capacity in the planning districts, and they did not always have the requisite manufacturing and engineering background. As was indicated above, the program was too restricted in its coverage. Nor was adequate consideration given to techniques for adjusting the allocation system to the needs of a limited emergency, when demands would be made on industry but no authority would exist to negotiate contracts with the firms and in the quantities agreed upon under the system. Moreover, there was uncertainty within both the Army and Navy as to the practicability of implementing the allocation program. Because negotiation with allocated facilities would narrow the possibilities of con-

tracts for firms left out of the system, there was fear of adverse public opinion and political repercussions. Yet the fate of the allocation system was dependent on authorization and use of the informal negotiating method in contracting. If the formal advertising and competitive bidding method were to be used, all suppliers, including those allocated to other services, would have to be circularized as a matter of right, and awards would go to the lowest responsible bidders regardless of plans and commitments under the allocation system.

Despite the unparalleled magnitude of the production effort in World War II at no time was Government procurement properly synchronized with the broader task of resources mobilization. In launching the defense program, procurement officers disregarded the basic planning tenet that the load should be equitably distributed so that available capacity might be utilized most effectively and the overloading of individual facilities and congestion of local areas might be avoided. With the notable exception of the Ordnance Department, which activated its district procurement plans, the military services took on the increased procurement load by merely expanding and streamlining their current, generally centralized procurement organizations. Persistence of the formal advertising method in contracting wrecked the planners' facility allocation program, with resultant intense inter-agency competition for key facilities. Though one of the basic objectives of the planning was to avoid competition between the services, a survey made late in 1944 indicated the need for greater procurement coordination in 10 of 13 major material fields.

In their emphasis on getting out the contracts, loading up industry, and getting started on the job of expanding capacity and tooling for production in large quantities, the procuring agencies rapidly erected the founda-

tions of a vast munitions industry. This was accomplished, however, without proper regard for the need for a broad production base and reducing the impact of the defense program on the civilian economy. Large firms employing over 500 workers, which in 1939 constituted 1.3 percent of the nation's industrial establishments and accounted for 38.4 percent of the total industrial output, produced somewhere in the neighborhood of 70 percent of the total munitions production. On the other hand, the smaller plants, which made up 98.7 percent of the 184,230 industrial enterprises in the country and produced approximately 61.6 percent of the 56.8 billion dollars output in 1939, obtained somewhat less than 30 percent of the total munitions production, including both prime contracts and subcontracts at all levels. What portion of the capacity of small firms could have been converted to munitions production has never been determined, but it is generally conceded that small concerns were not utilized to their fullest possibilities. The disproportionate emphasis on large plants was accompanied by unnecessary plant expansions, delays and bottlenecks in production, heavy migration of labor from non-defense areas, serious congestion and community problems in centers of defense concentration, needless strains and distortions on the economic front, an accelerated trend toward economic concentration, and a threat to the free enterprise system in the post-war period.

The power to control Government procurement was placed in the hands of the civilian mobilization agencies from the outset of the defense program in 1940. The control techniques employed, however, proved ineffective in meshing defense procurement into the national economy. Little was accomplished under the aegis of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, the agency initially charged with the direction of the defense effort. Largely advisory in char-



acter and administratively unworkable, the Commission made a feeble effort to control procurement through the review of major contracts and through the formulation of general principles for guidance in contract placement. Nor was Donald Nelson, as Coordinator of National Defense Purchases, more effective in fulfilling his general responsibilities for insuring coordination, economy and efficiency in Government procurement. Later, as Director of Purchases in the Office of Production Management, Nelson, with the backing of the President, established his authority over military procurement. In implementing his authority, however, he found himself in no stronger position than he was earlier as Coordinator of National Defense Purchases. The military remained for all practical purposes autonomous in their procurement operations.

The unprecedented breadth of Nelson's authority as Chairman of the War Production Board afforded him the opportunity to assume a more aggressive role in the procurement area. He decided, however, to confine his efforts in this field to the prescription of general principles for guidance in contract placement and to making available to the procuring agencies the services of commodity specialists. Experience was to prove, however, that these devices were not adequate to prevent Nelson's control of procurement from slipping from his grasp. Consequently, WPB was obliged to exercise its power over the flow of materials and component scheduling in its effort to influence or control Government procurement. It is doubtful, however, that these efforts at control following contract placement were an adequate substitute for control on purchases yet to be made.

6. *Flexibility in Planning Wartime Administration of Controls.* It is impossible to anticipate in the planning stage the political, economic and other considerations that are bound to shape the decisions and actions

taken in an emergency. Certain basic assumptions are needed, of course, to give direction to the planning process. It is futile, however, to provide a precise blueprint that will meet the many unforeseeable developments prior to or during war. Planning must provide, therefore, for sufficient flexibility to adjust to whatever realities exist at the time in which the various elements of mobilization must be put into effect. Rather than blueprinting the organization and operation of the wartime economy, the emphasis in planning should be on identifying and analyzing the problems that are likely to be encountered in mobilization, and developing alternative techniques for their resolution under varying circumstances. With such analyses before them, the President and those whom he calls in for assistance in the emergency management of the national economy can have some basis for intelligent judgment as to the actions needed and practicable under existing circumstances.

The military planners stressed the need for flexibility in the application of various controls. Here and there, as in the case of price control techniques, they presented alternative proposals and outlined the merits and limitations of each alternative. By and large, however, they followed the blueprint rather than the problem-analysis approach to planning. For virtually every element of the economy in every stage of transition from peace to war, the planners laid down precise lines of organization, policy and procedures which, in their judgment, might be effective in attaining the basic objectives of resources mobilization.

Their recommendations on over-all wartime organization illustrate their blueprinting approach to planning and its futility. From their review of World War I experience, the planners developed the firm conviction that a high degree of central direction and control is essential in the mobilization of

the nation's resources. They felt, too, that the mechanism for such coordination and direction "should be initiated immediately" on the imminence of war "without waiting for serious economic problems to develop." One cannot argue with this concept in principle. But to have pinned their entire planning for war organization and administration on this one concept was absurd. It demonstrates a failure to realize the dynamic nature of the administrative problems involved in the integration of controls and the underlying political-economic forces and conflicts that require harnessing and direction in time of war.

While recognizing the advantages of utilizing existing Government agencies to the fullest extent possible, the planners were opposed to the granting of emergency powers to them "unless the functions to be used are peacetime as well as wartime responsibilities." The existing agencies, in the judgment of the planners, were not geared for emergency operations because their functions usually "are defined by law and custom and are designed to serve only a social structure based upon a peacetime economy." Difficulties were anticipated in obtaining the surrender of such powers upon the termination of war. Furthermore, experience had demonstrated that intelligent coordinated action demanded the creation of a superagency to supervise and be responsible for the accomplishment of war policies.

Accordingly, it was proposed to establish a number of emergency agencies which were to be superimposed upon all other existing departments in pursuance of the war effort and to operate directly under the President in conformance with national policies prescribed by him. Existing agencies would continue to perform "normal functions," and would administer any assigned war tasks for which they were "naturally adapted."

Recognizing the interrelationship and interdependence of all wartime economic func-

tions, the planners deemed it "highly important that one major emergency agency be created to coordinate the performance of these functions." The War Resources Administration was visualized as the key superagency having the greatest responsibilities and around which would center much of the activity of other superagencies set up to function in special fields where coordination might be deemed desirable. As "the pivot around which wartime industrial mobilization will turn," WRA, it was felt, "must be charged with the responsibility and clothed with adequate authority to make and enforce decisions," though it was emphasized that actual administration "should be the function of the agencies best fitted for the purpose."

To ease the way from peace to war and permit the application of the plans designed to prevent the disruption of the national economy, the planners stressed the need for establishing WRA "in skeleton form . . . as early as practicable when an emergency is envisioned." In the organization of WRA, there was to be a Liaison Division with sections which might be regarded as embryo superagencies for the coordination of war trade, war finance, war labor, and price control. With the establishment of WRA, these sections would be utilized pending creation of corresponding superagencies as required by the exigencies of the emergency. After the creation of these superagencies, WRA would exercise coordinating authority over them. In the event the establishment of WRA was delayed, the ANMB, the planners suggested, "should assume the responsibility for guidance during the transition period," and direct its operations so as to facilitate the assumption by WRA of its responsibility for industrial coordination. Upon creation of WRA, personnel and records of the ANMB "should be used to assist in forming the nucleus of the new body."

The functioning of the four superagencies



that were bracketed under WRA—the War Trade Administration, War Finance Administration, War Labor Administration, and Price Control Authority—was left unclear by reason of uncertainty as to the line of authority and extent of control which might be exercised. Two types of organization were visualized in connection with the establishment of these superagencies. Should the President prefer the strict line type of organization, authority would flow from him to the Administrator of War Resources and thence to the four superagencies. The designation of officers could be made either by the President or the Administrator of War Resources. This type of organization was believed the most satisfactory method of combining authority with responsibility. On the other hand, the President may not wish to delegate all these powers to one individual. In such case, the line and staff type of organization might be utilized to provide a somewhat similar measure of control. This type of organization would place WRA in a staff capacity insofar as the other superagencies were concerned and with no jurisdiction other than the enunciation of guiding policies for the accomplishment of its war mission. The directorates of such independent superagencies would be selected by the President. Adoption of the line and staff type of organization would also indicate the delegation of comparable authority to the Administrator of each superagency. The weakness of this type of organization was seen in the fact that “it places too great dependence on the degree of cooperation which established agencies are expected to accord to the Administrator of War Resources.” Nevertheless, regardless of the category in which they might be placed, these superagencies were expected to “support the guiding policies of the War Resources Administration” and be “limited to the exercise of such authority as is delegated by the President,

either directly or indirectly.”

Neither of the suggested alternatives, however, proved acceptable to the President. Because of the strong isolationist sentiment in the country in the summer of 1939, and perhaps also because of his reluctance to relinquish immediate control of national defense, President Roosevelt made clear his opposition to a superagency structure such as that proposed in the IMP. At an early meeting with the War Resources Board, constituted in August 1939 for the purpose of advising the ANMB on policies pertaining to economic mobilization and reviewing the plans under preparation by that agency, the President sketched out his idea of a suitable defense organization, with advisers for various areas of mobilization reporting directly to himself. Following a subsequent meeting with Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Chairman, the Board agreed “to work further on an organization plan that would be more in line with the ideas of the President” than that contemplated by the IMP.

In its report, the Board complimented the military on their foresight and systematic planning for industrial mobilization. Though it pointed to numerous problems requiring further attention, the Board felt that the current IMP “represents not only an awareness of industrial problems arising in modern war but also a decided advance in the field of national preparedness for defense.” It took sharp issue with the planners, however, on the question of organization and lines of authority of the superagencies. In place of having the War Resources Administration as the pivotal superagency which would control and coordinate the activities of other superagencies, the Board recommended that all but the War Trade Administration should be “independent” of WRA and that coordination be achieved “by having a representative of WRA on each agency.” In other words, instead of

centralized control by a key superagency placed between other superagencies and the President for purposes of coordination, the War Resources Board's proposal was to have individual coordination by the various agencies exercises delegated war powers and leave to the President the problem of decision when they failed to agree. It was the Board's "considered judgment" that such "coordination of separate controls" rather than "centralization of control" in one agency offered "the only effective means of converting American industry to the purposes of war."

The President's proclamation of a "limited emergency" on September 8, 1939, a week after the outbreak of war in Europe, was not accompanied by any steps to invoke the organizational proposals of the IMP. At his press conference announcing this proclamation, the President said that "there is no thought, in any shape, manner or form, of putting the nation, either in its defenses or in its internal economy, on a war basis." With his reactivation of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense in the spring of 1940, it became evident that the President was determined to proceed in a manner radically different from that charted by the planners in building up the machinery for the national defense.

In retrospect, one might wish it had been possible to follow the advice of the planners, or, at least, of the War Resources Board, in establishing the organization for the over-all direction of the mobilization effort. For altogether too long a period the civilian mobilization agencies lacked the cohesive force and potency required for the overall administration of the defense program. Creation of WPB followed some 20 months of ineffective coordination of the defense program by a headless NDAC, a dual-headed OPM, and a hybrid Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. Even the authority of WPB was dissipated by the establishment of agencies out-

side of its jurisdiction and by the frittering away of some of the basic powers with which it had been entrusted for the central direction of the war production effort. The establishment of the Office of War Mobilization in May 1943 met the problem only in part, for this agency, like WPB, was reluctant to assume an aggressive role. Coming into the picture at an advanced stage of the mobilization effort, OWM for the most part acted as a "trouble shooter" for the President, refereeing and adjudicating disputes that came up between various agencies, and not as an active source of general policy and supervision to prevent the emergence of such conflicts.

The record abounds in evidence of such conflicts. An analysis of the relations between the production and stabilization agencies, for example, will show a failure to appreciate the interdependence of wartime production controls and stabilization measures. The relation of the rationing administration to the underlying supply agencies, including the so-called "commodity czars," was a source of difficulty in the case of food, rubber, oil, tires, in fact virtually all commodities that were subject to rationing. Similarly, an analysis of the activities of the War Manpower Commission will indicate that the procurement, production, wage and agricultural labor policies of other agencies were not adequately coordinated with manpower needs. The wide diffusion of responsibility for the various aspects of economic mobilization and the failure to solve effectively the problem of over-all coordination were major weaknesses in our wartime organization.

It is possible that some of these problems would have been mitigated had the President designated from the outset an agency, like the proposed War Resources Administration, to serve as the apex of coordination and integration of the various elements of economic mobilization into a comprehensive defense



program. Such a course, however, was out of the question in 1939-40. The planners failed to bear in mind that flexibility is as essential in organizational planning as in all the substantive aspects of the program. It is necessary to recognize the fluid nature of organizational arrangements. It is too much to expect organizations to develop simply in terms of what is logical. Rather, they have to be worked out in terms of what is possible and attainable in light of the political and international situation, public opinion, the personalities and capabilities of key men, the relative urgency of problems in different stages of mobilization, and the pressures of numerous interest groups that are part and parcel of our democracy. Ideal solutions of organizational problems are useful as objectives to aim at, but it is unrealistic to expect rigid conformance to them.

7. *Current Readiness Measures.* Preparedness in the resources mobilization area must include not only paper plans to guide policy and operations in an emergency, but also specific readiness measures needed to put such plans into effect. In the absence of an initial base adequate to support the operations required for national security, plans cannot be implemented in an emergency. Nor will such implementation take place if preparedness measures are not closely synchronized with the objectives and program proposed for all-out war.

The planners gave too little thought to the measures that must be taken in peacetime to achieve an adequate state of readiness against the contingency of war. Only superficial consideration was given to the measures that must be taken in the various phases of transition from peace to war. Their rosters of key personnel for wartime tasks were largely confined to the commodities area. On the organizational side, only the component units of the ANMB were groomed as the nuclei of the war mobilization structure. Such con-

crete and potentially useful readiness measures as were initiated in respect to stockpiling, educational orders, production studies, arsenal rehabilitation, and the establishment of reserves of special machinery and equipment came only at the very end of the planning period and were pitifully inadequate in their scope and coverage.

As a consequence, the launching of the rearmament program in the summer of 1940 found us without a readiness base adequate to the need. The preparedness measures subsequently taken followed a course different from that charted by the planners. Yet, instead of taking steps to revise their M-Day plans, the planners clung tenaciously to their concept of an M-Day as the basis for their program. By the time war actually came with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the economy was already well on the way toward mobilization, and it would have been impossible to change the pattern of relationships and experience developed in the period of preparedness. Having thus failed to modify their M-Day plans and tie them in with current operations, the planning organization found itself outside the stream of things and largely ignored in the subsequent course of events.

8. *Active Participation by Other Departments and Agencies of the Government.* Planning for economic mobilization cannot be thought of as the responsibility, or even the primary concern, of one agency alone. Comprehending as it does all of the nation's resources, it must be the coordinated effort of all the Government departments and agencies responsible for the many inter-related segments of the economy. Through their participation in the planning program, moreover, the agencies can become familiar with the many responsibilities which they must be called upon to discharge in an emergency. In that way we may be able to avoid the unnecessary creation of emergency agencies and

the resultant delay, confusion, jealousies, and duplicate, overlapping and competitive activities.

Though existing agencies were called upon for data and assistance in some instances, the planners did not develop systematic, Government-wide participation in their planning program. For the detailed administration of controls over power and fuel, transportation, war finance, price control and war trade, it was proposed to utilize the various Government departments and regulatory bodies concerned with related problems in peacetime. For the most part, however, as was indicated earlier in this paper, the planners had written off the old-line agencies as unsuited for direct and major responsibilities in the organization and management of a war economy.

The failure to bring more intimately into the planning the various interested Government departments and agencies and the proposal to relegate them to a subordinate position in wartime had unfortunate consequences. It provided further grounds for opposition to the IMP. It resulted in planning that did not contemplate adequately enough programs other than those related to military procurement and production. Furthermore, it resulted in a widespread lack of knowledge of their responsibilities on the part of a number of agencies whose active participation in the early stages of World War II mobilization was essential.

9. *Active Citizen Participation.* Policy determinations in economic mobilization have direct, immediate and personal effects on every citizen. If economic mobilization plans are to gain wide acceptance, leaders of all segments of our national life—labor, agriculture, and the professions, as well as industry—must be encouraged to participate in their formulation. In this country any planning that lacks the cooperation of these groups and their members is doomed to probable failure. If plans for economic mobilization are to be

carried out effectively, they must have the understanding and support of the majority of our citizenry.

The military recognized the need for public appreciation and support of the economic mobilization program. The Introduction to the 1939 Plan is prefaced by the following statement of Woodrow Wilson: "*The highest and best form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation of a free people.*" In their Foreword to the Plan, they disclaimed any intent to modify our constitutional processes. "Indeed," they asserted, "the prime purpose of procurement planning and of the Industrial Mobilization Plan is the preservation of these processes for the people of the United States." Speaking of the necessary legal authority elsewhere in the document, they stressed that even more important to the execution of emergency functions was "the support of public opinion."

Yet the planners did a poor job of "selling" their program to the general public; and they underestimated the task of obtaining public acceptance of mobilization measures, particularly in the period of transition from the declaration of an emergency to the actual outbreak of hostilities. While industry was brought in contact with the facility allocation program and other aspects of mobilization planning, the general public appears to have been uninformed of the preparatory work under way.

In the first decade of planning, with the nation in a state of complacency, little effort was made to elicit public support, a situation that was soon recognized as a major defect in the program. When the plans were publicized in the 'thirties—a decade characterized by a severe depression, disillusionment and cynicism—the planners found the public hostile to war preparations. With a view to keeping out of war rather than developing means for waging it effectively, public and Congressional attention was focused on neutrality



legislation and on measures that would make war less attractive by equalizing its burdens and removing the prospect of profiteering.

With the increasing tension in Europe at the close of the 'thirties, public interest in the preparedness program was stimulated. An active publicity campaign was launched with the hope that the public would thereby obtain a clear understanding of the objectives and policies of the IMP. The latter, however, met with sensational and alarmist publicity. It was described as a blueprint for dictatorship, and much was made of the alleged secrecy of the preparations, the completeness of the controls, and the readiness for immediate operation under the Plan.

The political forces bent on avoiding embroilment in war were much stronger than the planners had anticipated. The President's declaration of a "limited" emergency on September 8, 1939, found the public reluctant to consider strong mobilization steps, as evidenced by the bitter Congressional fight over the revision of the Neutrality Act. Nor was this anti-war sentiment substantially changed even after the President's declaration of an "unlimited" emergency on May 27, 1941.

In the face of this strong resistance to involvement in the European war, it would have been impossible to obtain popular and Congressional support of the IMP, even if the President's reaction to it had been favorable. The President had no choice but to proceed with the utmost caution. The measures taken for the nation's preparedness may have been in flagrant violation of some of the cardinal principles and policies developed by the planners, but they were more in line with the realities of the existing political situation.

### CONCLUSION

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy for us to put the spotlight on these deficiencies in the pre-war planning. Yet, when it is considered that twenty years' effort had gone into the planning, it is surprising, indeed, that many of these shortcomings had not been noted and corrected.

It should not be inferred from what has been said, however, that the pre-war planning was entirely without beneficial influence on the mobilization effort. The planning activities had a definite educational significance within the armed services and industry, and to a limited extent within other agencies of the Government and with the public. In the field of procurement, the facility surveys, the program of arsenal rehabilitation, the establishment of reserves of special machinery and equipment, the educational orders and production studies, and the stockpile accumulations, however inadequate, were helpful in launching the nation's rearmament program. While their participation in the industrial mobilization program was hardly as direct or as effective as had been anticipated, the planning organization at all levels maintained liaison with the current operating and civilian control agencies, made available to them their plans and studies, and provided counsel in coping with the intricate organizational and operating problems that emerged. In these efforts the planners contributed to the successful prosecution of the war. Yet there can be no question that the dividends on the Government's long-term investment in planning could have been much richer had those responsible for the launching and prosecution of the program thought through its implications and developed sounder principles to guide the planning process.

---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

# THE MILITARY LIBRARY

*Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD*

---

## REVIEWS

***Federal Records of World War II, Volume I, Civilian Agencies, Volume II, Military Agencies***, prepared by the National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 1073, 1061. \$2.50 each)

This over-all guide to Federal Records of World War II, 1939-45, is a monumental achievement. Numerous, and at times seemingly insuperable, difficulties attended its preparation and publication.

In spite of the existence of an agency, The National Archives, whose leadership was fully cognizant of the need for creating immediately, intellectual controls on the vast documented experience of the Federal Government in World War II, the President's proposal to the Archivist of the United States of June 4, 1946, that he "would like to see prepared and published such guides to the records of our wartime experience as will make the pertinent materials known and usable," has yet to be fully realized. The present guide was only the first part of the publication program intended to achieve this objective, but for which the Congress has still not seen fit to make specific appropriation. Accordingly what has been accomplished by the National Archives with this publication was made possible through the cooperative effort of several agencies including the military departments.

Fortunately there was some precedent for the preparation of a guide to wartime records. The War Department published the *Handbook of Economic Agencies of The War of 1917*, in 1919, and this publication served as the model for the more comprehensive *Handbook of Federal World War Agencies and their Records 1917-1921*, pub-

lished by the National Archives in 1943. The World War II guide, however, reflects great improvement in style, format and technique of records description. It is qualitatively and physically a superior work, quite comparable with the best Federal publications.

Some might ask, "Was this work necessary?" It is quite true that much information about the organization and functions of Federal wartime agencies at any particular time is available from numerous other printed sources and that more information about the extant records of any agency or group of agencies is available from the present custodians of the records whether they be in the originating offices, agency records centers, GSA records centers or the National Archives. However, to one only casually aware of the fluidity, complexity and scope of Federal administrative organization and operation in World War II and the effects of these characteristics on record making and record keeping under wartime pressures, the answers to the questions, "For Whom?" and "Why?" are obvious. Nowhere else is this information summarized and correlated.

For the military historians engaged during and since the war on official historical projects both administrative and operational, the World War II Guide serves to codify and to place in overall perspective a tremendous amount of organizational, functional, and records data, parts of which each of them has had to ferret out slowly and laboriously. Even though the guide had been published much earlier it could not have obviated, nor was such intended, the meticulous examination of numerous records series frequently scattered and always more or less inadequately organized—that is, from the point of view of an individual writer with a particular or specialized subject matter approach.



It is the opinion of this reviewer that this compendium of wartime Federal organizational, functional, and related records data is most useful to the Federal administrator, his general reference and research staff, and to his records administration personnel. Private researchers and historians will find it useful on occasion to lead them to the records of Federal agencies concerned with their particular research subject matter. Private research agencies and institutions under contract with the Federal government to conduct broad-gauge human resources, as well as physical science research projects, utilizing large staffs and covering vast quantities of original records will find the guide indispensable.

While each of the volumes has an ingeniously logical pattern of arrangement with separate entries consecutively numbered, the more than 200 pages of Index to these two volumes will be found to be most helpful. Here is guidance for all who need to know the sources of information about our Government and our people in World War II.

SHERROD EAST  
*The Adjutant General's Office*  
*Department of the Army*  
*Washington, D. C.*

***Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1951-52.***

Compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgeman.  
(New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951. \$22.50.)

Since its inception in 1909, *Jane's All The World's Aircraft* has been regarded as the authoritative compilation of data not only on aircraft but also on the organization of military air forces and the state of civil aviation. That it can continue to present year after year a large body of authentic information is a tribute to the perspicacity and industry of the editor and his staff. Even though security considerations cause the withholding of much information, three of the four leading producers of aircraft—the United States, Britain, and France—follow a relatively liberal policy. The fourth, Soviet Russia, of course, allows no detail of its aircraft either civil or military to be published. The strict editorial standards of *Jane's* editor, Mr. Bridgeman, permits the insertion of no data which “does not have the backing of authority, or at any rate, the ring of authority.” As a result, much material of reasonable authenticity on Soviet aircraft has been excluded. Despite all the restrictions and difficulties faced by the editor, *All the World's Aircraft* remains an indispensable

reference work for all those interested in the current state of aviation.

The organization of the 1951-52 volume follows the pattern long since established. It is divided into five sections covering military aviation, civil aviation, all the world's aeroplanes, all the world's engines (divided into subsections for gas turbine and piston engines), and the world's airships. This pattern leads to one of the few faults to be found with the volume. In the section on military aviation, the type of aircraft employed in most of the various air forces are given, but, because the section on aeroplanes lists only those currently in production, it is impossible to find descriptions of many models still in use. A number of small errors occur as, for example, failure to mention naval participation in the Military Air Transport Service, retention of Dan Kimball in the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air two years after he had gone on to higher posts in the department, and captions which refer to the B-29 and B-50 as heavy bombers, although they are correctly designated as mediums in the text. There are others but, while unfortunate, they do not detract from the value of the publication.

While it is not customary to read through a reference work, a thorough examination of *All the World's Aircraft* and a comparison with volumes for earlier years is rewarding. The overwhelming quantitative superiority of the United States in production, military strength, and plenitude of civil aviation becomes immediately apparent, as does its leadership in helicopters and airships. British preeminence in jet and turbo-prop development is equally marked in its way and bears testimony to the wise decision which led the British to concentrate in these fields their limited development funds. Germany and Japan, which before World War II were large producers, have practically disappeared from *Jane's* and Italy does not account for much. Revealing, however, is the revival of France which, after reestablishing its industry largely by manufacturing British designs, engines, and accessories on license, has launched out with some innovations of its own. It is apparent that no country has a monopoly of technical ingenuity and that, while the United States has the industrial resources to outproduce all others, its designers may learn some fruitful lessons from others among its allies.

HENRY M. DATER  
*Department of the Navy*  
*Washington, D. C.*

*Ships for Victory*, by Frederick C. Lane. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951. Pp. 881. \$12.50.)

Sea power comprises the ability of a nation to use the sea lanes of communications for its maximum benefit in peacetime or wartime, for both military and commercial purposes. Two of the most important components of sea power are a merchant fleet capable of adequately transporting personnel and cargo, and a strong Navy for the protection of sea lanes.

*Ships for Victory* is an exhaustive historical account of the shipbuilding activities of the United States Maritime Commission during World War II. The author, Frederick C. Lane, Professor of History at the Johns Hopkins University, was Historical Officer of the Maritime Commission during 1946 and 1947. Working closely with three associates, Blanche D. Coll, Gerald J. Fischer, and David B. Taylor, and having complete access to all the files of the Commission, Mr. Lane was able to fit together the many pieces of this complicated picture of wartime shipbuilding. Due to a sharp reduction in funds in July, 1947, this project was discontinued as an official activity of the Commission. However, through the co-operation of the Johns Hopkins University, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Commission, the author was able to complete this most interesting and valuable history as a private individual.

Merchant shipbuilding had come to a low ebb when the boom after World War I collapsed, and made very little gains until World War II began in Europe. The tremendous demands for new ships during World War II at rates fast enough to supply the wartime needs of the Allied Powers, and to compensate for the shipping losses due to sinkings by enemy submarines, required an unprecedented expansion of the industry.

Under the leadership of its Chairman, Vice Admiral E. S. Land, USN (Ret), the U. S. Maritime Commission undertook a program of shipbuilding which produced over 56 million deadweight tons amounting to 5777 large cargo carriers, tankers and military vessels during the years 1939-1945. This construction consumed 25 million tons of carbon steel and engaged 640,300 workers at peak employment. The program had a rather modest beginning in 1939 as a ship replacement program, but it increased by leaps and bounds as world tension became greater and greater. Just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the Maritime Commission had scheduled 5 million deadweight

tons for delivery in 1942 and 7 million tons for 1943. With the United States at war, the requirements for new ships skyrocketed and the demands were for more and more ships at faster and faster rates.

The shipbuilding industry of the United States traditionally has been in the hands of a small number of private companies with a moderate capacity for production of large ships. The rapid expansion of the industry from 51 building berths in 1940 to a maximum of 267 berths produced many complex problems. Included in these problems were financing, procurement, construction of new facilities, selection of new sites, new organizations and management personnel. Manpower and material problems were encountered as well as serious community problems, strikes and other labor difficulties. The continual demand for more and more speed, increased the urgency of delivery of steel, engines, and other components. The shipbuilding program of the U. S. Navy was also urgent. As a result many acute material and labor problems arose in which the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, War Production Board, War Manpower Commission and other agencies were involved. The Battle for Steel, Speed and Productivity in Multiple Production, and Managing Managements, are a few of the chapters of the book which cover these problems in a very interesting and detailed manner.

The reader is impressed with the importance of the role of Vice Admiral Howard L. Vickery, USN, a member of the Commission. It was largely through his professional ability, personality, aggressiveness, courage, skillful managing of managements, and his untiring efforts that the program was so successful. Other personalities such as Henry J. Kaiser and Andrew J. Higgins play important roles in this critical phase of American history. Admiral Land's contacts with President Roosevelt, through various interviews, memorandums, and official letters are appropriately described throughout the book showing the great interest taken by the President in the shipbuilding program.

*Ships for Victory* is a voluminous account of high speed shipbuilding under pressure of war, describing all aspects of the program from its inception to the renegotiation and cost analysis phase after V-J Day. The book is easy and interesting reading, well documented, and illustrated with tables, charts and pictures. For one studying the effects of all-out mobilization on a vital industry,



*Ships for Victory* should be "essential reading."

COMDR. A. H. CASTELAZO  
CEC, USN,  
Industrial College of the  
Armed Forces  
Washington, D. C.

*Main Fleet to Singapore*, by Captain Russell Grenfell, R.N. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. Pp. 238 pages. \$3.75.)

Captain Grenfell seems to have done it again. In this volume and *The Bismarck Episode*, this retired British naval officer has given us an intense and moving word picture of the efforts of a hand-capped British Navy to save a slipping empire, something which Morison and Karig have not succeeded in doing with the brilliant accomplishments of the U. S. Navy. Grenfell stands as an indictment of the lack of a tradition of historical writing among U. S. naval officers. This lack has been filled only inadequately from outside the profession. In these days of our zenith we are in need of successors to Mahan and Frost.

The title of this book is in itself significant. It summarizes Britain's plan for defense of its Far eastern possessions following the Washington Conference of 1922. The sad lesson of the book is the failure to put such a plan into any sort of realistic execution. A prevalent peacetime illusion is that a plan and its future execution are one and the same thing, that staff studies will mean future movement orders. After World War I Jellicoe recommended basing fifteen battleships at Sydney. That many ships were not available after 1922 and the Admiralty did not relish the possibility of its loss of control of a force permanently based in Australia. The alternative plan adopted was a wartime base at Singapore (a fleet could not be based there permanently) and a fleet on the home station and in the Mediterranean plus frequent exercises at the Staff College for its quick movement to the Far East, always based on the assumption that no simultaneous complications in Europe would prevent such a movement. The result of 20 years of such planning was a base inadequately protected and never completed and a Far East Fleet of one modern battleship, one battle cruiser and one carrier—except that the carrier never arrived due to a grounding on its shakedown cruise.

Why wasn't there a sizable fleet adequately based in the Far East in 1941? Grenfell's villains over the long period are the officials of the British

Treasury and for the period immediately proceeding the catastrophe, Churchill. Grenfell does not like the British system of service officers, who have the final responsibility for national security, justifying budget requests to civil servants behind closed doors. He prefers our system whereby military officers appear directly before committees of the Congress where the records are open for all to see. He even suggests that active officers sit in Parliament rather than retired officers who do not have the standing or the first hand information on which to base demands for adequate national security.

Singapore was not ready in 1939. What about 1941? Grenfell points a finger at the one man who held the posts of Prime Minister and Defense Minister. With respect for Churchill's attitude toward Russia and his statement that he had to be loyal to that country, Grenfell makes a scathing interjection, "To use the word 'loyal' in relation to Russia was a misuse of the English language, a language of which Mr. Churchill is an acknowledged master." At any rate General Percival and Air Marshall Pulford could have found a good use for some of the tanks and Hurricane fighters that Mr. Churchill supposedly lavished on Russia.

Characteristic of British writers, Grenfell loses no opportunity to criticize American attitudes and actions. He does go a bit too far in concluding that Roosevelt maneuvered the Japanese into war, since to document this he uses the doubtful authority of Charles A. Beard.

One would be more prone to attribute objectivity to Grenfell if he could be more critical of British naval officers. Together with their American brethren they were criminally ignorant of the strength and capabilities of the Japanese Navy in 1941. But there is also a catalogue of naval shortcomings which are distinctly British. To list a few, there were mutinies at Invergordon in 1931, the inability to fuel at sea (which almost lost the *Bismarck*) and the pitiful performance of their naval aviation. Had British naval officers a generation earlier been willing to go through the purgatory that U. S. naval officers did in 1946-1947 to save naval aviation, the sunset of the British Empire might not have been so rapid.

Another fault that one could attribute to Captain Grenfell is that his research is never too extensive. As in the *Bismarck Episode* he uses only British sources except for the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway for which Morison has furnished him the information on Japanese plans and action.

Grenfell evidently did not know when he wrote his book that the Japanese decision to stress the Midway attack at the expense of the fruitful Indian Ocean campaign was influenced by Doolittle's Tokyo raid.

Grenfell devotes most of his book to strategy and statesmanship or their lack with respect to national security. When he does treat of naval tactics we might well pay him heed. He holds that the way to conduct carrier warfare is not in the manner that both the Japanese and Americans did at Midway and Coral Sea, but as Admiral Spruance did at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Destroying aircraft is easier and as effective and less subject to chance than endeavoring to destroy the enemy carrier. Conversely ones' own carriers are better protected. Since future carrier action undoubtedly will be against land based air, this is sage advice.

Above all, the great lesson of this book in these times is to beware of both invalid and comforting assumptions.

CAPTAIN JOHN D. HAYES, USN  
*Industrial College of the  
Armed Forces  
Washington, D. C.*

*Anatomy of Communism*, by Andrew McK. Scott.  
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 197. \$3.00.)

Excellent analysis of Marxian ideology and its contemporary application. Part One describes the "Marxian Background" in four chapters, while the eight chapters of Part II describe the theory and practices of "Contemporary Communism."

*George Washington, a Biography; V. 3, Planter and Patriot; V. 4, Leader of the Revolution*; by Douglas S. Freeman. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. 600, 736. \$15.00.)

The period covered by these volumes is from 1759 to the French alliance in the Spring of 1778. The author's detailed scholarship and easily readable style are again in evidence in these latest volumes of a definitive biography. Two thirds of the material relates to Washington's trials during this period of the Revolution. Dr. Freeman includes suggestions of topics for further research as supplemented by his general bibliographic notes; which will be a stimulus to further investigations in this period of history.

GJS

*Secret Forces—The Technique of Underground Movements* by F. O. Miksche. (London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1951. Pp. 181. Fifteen shillings.)

Shortly after the outbreak of wars in Korea, Malaya and Indo-China, the Soviet War Minister, Marshal Bulganin declared that the Far Eastern wars possess an entirely novel doctrine of strategy, that is to say, a Moscow instigated, formulated, and led war without the use of her own troops. But the father of this new doctrine is, paradoxically, a student of Clausewitz, Lenin, who stated that "war for a Communist state is the continuation of the revolution by other means." The author, formerly Operations Planning head of Gen. de Gaulle's Secret Service, clarifies Bulganin's and Lenin's statements, since underground movements have become as much a part of modern warfare as have armored divisions and tactical air power.

The book consists of four chapters: The first gives a rather brilliant analysis of Marxist theory in the conduct of a People's War, answering the question of the art of war: "Why does guerrilla warfare play such an important part today?" The second deals with the strategic elements of partisan warfare, i.e., coordination with the regular army, terrain, etc. The third covers the techniques and tactics of underground movements; while the last chapter deals with a theoretical defense against guerrilla warfare.

The chief shortcoming of this otherwise excellent book is Col. Miksche's limited knowledge of underground warfare carried on behind Soviet lines during World War II, since the author places major emphasis on partisan warfare *vis-a-vis* the West and the USSR.

GEORGE BILON  
*Washington, D. C.*

*Preble's Boys: Commodore Preble and the Birth of American Sea Power*, by Fletcher Pratt. (New York: Sloane, 1950. Pp. 419, with one chart, and various pen-and-ink tactical plans. \$5.00.)

An extremely readable group of narratives of the naval careers of fifteen American naval commanders, each of whom derived inspiration or training direct from Commodore Preble, and all of whom were responsible for the creation of an American naval tradition in the War of 1812 period. Recommended reading for those who glory in tales of America's Old Navy, told effectively by this peer among Military historians.

MBCC



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### BOOKS

#### *I. Institutions and Cultures—Asia*

BATE, H. MACLAER: *Report from Formosa*, (New York: Dutton, 1952. Pp. 290. \$3.50.)

Presents an English observer's calm appraisal of the island's current economic, political and strategic problems.

COUGHLIN, WILLIAM J.: *Conquered Press*; the MacArthur era in Japanese Journalism. (Palo Alto, Cal.: Pacific Books, 1952. Pp. 165. Pp. 3 bibl. \$3.00.)

Generally favorable comments on the SCAP Organization's effects.

DICKINSON, CORPORAL "TED" AND McNICHOL, SERGEANT "DAVE": *Korea Illustrated*. (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1952. Pp. 0, \$3.75.)

Photographs and drawings.

SWERINGEN, ROGER and LANGER, PAUL: *Red Flag in Japan*; International Communism in Action, 1919-1951. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 288. Pp. 12 bibl. \$5.00.)

#### *II. Institutions and Cultures—Europe, et cetera*

ADAMIC, LOUIS: *The Eagle and the Roots*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 539. \$5.00.)

The late author's account of a 1949 pro-Tito visit to Yugoslavia.

BROCK, RAY: *Blood, Oil and Sand*, (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 256. \$3.50.)

BROGAN, DENIS W.: *The Price of Revolution*, (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 288. \$3.50.)

CARR, EDWARD H.: *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, V. 2*, (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 407. \$6.00.)

CZAPSKI, JOSEPH: *The Inhuman Land*, translated from the French by Gerard Hopkins, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952. Pp. 317. \$3.50.)

GURIAN, WALDEMAN: *Bolshevism*; an introduction to Soviet Communism, (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1952. Pp. 189. Pp. 3 bibl. \$3.75.)

HODGKINSON, HENRY: *West and East of Tito*, (London: Gollancz, 1952. Pp. 190. 12 shillings 6 pence.)

HUBBARD, GEORGE D.: *The Geography of Europe*; 2nd ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. Pp. 887. \$6.75.)

LENGYEL, EMIL: *The Middle East*, (New York: Oxford Book Co., 1951. Pp. 71. paper 50c.) Oxford social studies pamphlet, No. 8.

LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE: *The Middle East in World Affairs*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952. Pp. 479. Pp. 12 bibl. \$6.00.)

MARTEL, SIR GIFFORD: *East Versus West*, (London: Museum Press, 1952. Pp. 220. 12 shillings 6 pence.)

MIDDLETON, DREW: *The Defense of Western Europe*, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. Pp. 313. \$3.50.) Report on NATO countries' progress.

MORSTEIN, MARX, FRITZ, ed.: *Foreign Governments*; the dynamics of politics abroad, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. 751. \$8.00; \$6.00.)

ORR, CHARLES A.: *Stalin's Slave Camps*; an indictment of modern slavery. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 105. \$1.75; paper, 75c.)

RISHETOR, JOHN S., JR.: *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920*; a study in nationalism. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. Pp. 373. Pp. 12 bibl. \$5.00.)

ROUCEK, JOSEPH S.: *The Geopolitics of the Adriatic*. (Bridgeport, Conn.: Author, University of Bridgeport, 1952. Pp. 8, paper, 50c.)

ROUMALT, JEAN: *Nightmare*, tr. from the French by Vera Traill. (New York: Crowell, 1952. Pp. 284. \$3.50.)

Roumanian journalist's account of Donets Basin Slave Labor Camp in 1945.

SELZNICK, PHILIP: *The Organizational Weapon*; a study of Bolshevik strategy and tactics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. Pp. 358. \$5.00.) (Rand series)

STOWE, LELAND: *Conquest by Terror*; the story of satellite Europe. (New York: Random House, 1952. Pp. 315. \$3.50.)

VOGELER, ROBERT A. and WHITE, LEIGH: *I Was Stalin's Prisoner*. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952. Pp. 314. \$3.75.)

WILLERT, ARTHUR: *The Road to Safety*; a study in Anglo-American Relations. (London: Dereck Verschoyle, 1952. Pp. 184. 15 shillings.)  
World War I through to World War II.

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

BEACH, COMMANDER EDWARD L.: *Submarine*. (New York: Henry Holt, 1946, 1952. Pp. 301. \$3.50.)

World War II Commander of USS Trigger reminisces.

DARBY, HUGH and CUNLIFFE, MARCUS: *Short History of 21 Army Group*; the British and Canadian Armies on the campaigns in North-West Europe, 1944-1945. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 158. paper, \$1.25.)

Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938. Translation and notes by Andreas Mayor. (London: Methuen, 1952. Pp. 220. 21 shillings.)

CLIFTON, GEORGE: *The Happy Hunted*, with a foreword by Lt. Gen., the Viscount Freyberg. (London: Cassell, 1952. Pp. 392. 21 shillings.)  
New Zealand Brigadier's experiences in Africa.

DIRKSEN, HERBERT VON: *Moscow, Tokyo, London Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy*. (Norman, Okla.; Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1952. Pp. 285. \$4.00.)

Reminiscences, 1919-1939, by a former German ambassador to these countries.

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: *Crusade in Europe*. (Garden City: Perma Books, 1952. Pp. 572. paper 50c)

FEAKES, HENRY J.: *White Ensign—Southern Cross*. A Story of the King's Ships of Australian Navy. (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1952. Pp. 246. 42 shillings.)

Its beginnings to late 1930's.

GUDERIAN, HEINZ: *Panzer Leader*, translated from the German by C. Fitzgibbon. Foreword by Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. (London: Michael Joseph, 1952. Pp. 328. 35 shillings.)

Valuable for its frank narrative of armored warfare in World War II.

HARRIS, BRIGADIER LIONEL H.: *Signal Venture*. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 278. \$4.00.)

MARSHALL, BRUCE: *The White Rabbit*. From the story told to him by Wing Comdr. F.E.E. Yeo-Thomas. (London: Evans Brothers, 1952. Pp. 262. 16 shillings.)

World War II British Agent in France Adventures.

MEDLICOTT, W. N.: *The Economic Blockade*, V. 1, History of the Second World War. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, New York British Information Service, 1952. Pp. 732. \$8.00.)

NEWMAN, BERNARD: *They Saved London*. (London: Werner Laurie, 1952. Pp. 192. 12 shillings, 6 pence.)

The Battle of the Flying Bomb raids on London. New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University: *Manpower, Wages and Labor Relations in World War II*. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 93. 25c.)

TANSILL, CHARLES C.: *Back Door to War*; the Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. Pp. 711. Pp. 12 bibl. \$6.50.)

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD and ASHTON-GWATKIN, FRANK Eds.: *The World in March 1939*. Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (London: Oxford Univ. Press 1952. Pp. 546. 45 shillings.)

Area by area description of 1939 conditions.

WEGAND, MAXINE: *Recalled to Service*; translated by E. W. Dickes. (London: Heinemann, 1952. Pp. 454. 30 shillings.)

WESTPHAL, SIEGFRIED: *The German Army in the West*. (London: Cassell, 1952. Pp. 222. 17 shillings. 6 pence.)

A former chief of staff to Rommel criticizes leaders and supports the German army's actions.

WILLIAMS, ERIC E.: *The Tunnel*. (New York: Coward McCann, 1952. Pp. 253. \$3.00.)

The described events are prior to those of *The Wooden Horse*.

### IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: *Rearmament and Anglo-American Economic Relations, a problem paper*. (Washington, 1952. Pp. 72. Pp. 4 bibl. paper, 60c.)

DETOLEDANO, RALPH: *Spies, Dupes and Diplomats*. (Boston: Little Brown (Duell Sloan and Pearce pubn.) 1952. Pp. 254. \$3.50.)

Attacks the Democratic Far Eastern Policy and includes an account of the Sorge Spy Ring.



- DEWAR, HUGO: *Assassins at large*; being a fully documented and hitherto unpublished account of the executions outside Russia ordered by the G.P.U. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 213. \$3.00.)
- DEWEY, THOMAS E.: *Journey to the Far Pacific*. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 355. \$4.00.)
- KEETON, GEORGE W. and SCHWARTZENBERGER, GEORGE, ed.: *The Year Book of World Affairs*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. 390. bibl. and bibl. footnotes. \$7.50.) (London Institute of World Affairs pubn.)
- LEE, ALFRED McCHING: *How to Understand Propaganda*. (New York: Rinehart, 1952. Pp. 293. bibl. \$3.00.)  
Reorganized popular presentation by expert.
- MOYALL, KENNETH L.: *International cartels*; economic and political aspects. (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1952. Pp. 183. Pp. 9 bibl. \$2.75.)
- MIKSCHKE, F. O.: *Unconditional Surrender, the Roots of World War III*. (London: Faber and Faber, 1952. Pp. 468. 25 shillings.)
- PERKINS, DEXTER: *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 195. Pp. 2 bibl. \$3.25.) (Gottesman Lectures, Upsala University, No. 2.)
- U. S. 82nd Congress, 2d session. House committee on Foreign Affairs: *Report on Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Spain*. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 96.) House Report No. 1834.
- U. S. 82nd Congress, 2d session. House Committee on Foreign Affairs: *Mutual Security Act of 1951 and other Basic Legislation*. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 120.) (Committee Print)
- U. S. 82nd Congress, 2nd session. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: *Conventions on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty*. Hearings on Executive Q and R., June 10-17, 1952. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 267.)
- VINACKE, HAROLD M.: *The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951*. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 150. Pp. 3 bibl. notes. \$3.00.)
- WILCOX, FRANCIS O. and KALIJARIR, THORSTEN V.: *Recent American Foreign Policy*, basic documents 1941-1951. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952. Pp. 945. \$6.50.) Prepared by two members of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- WINDRICH, ELAINE: *British Labor's Foreign Policy*. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 277. \$5.00.)
- V. National Warfare, U. S.
- BUDENZ, LOUIS F.: *The Cry is Peace*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. Pp. 255. \$5.50.) American Communists' works since 1945.
- DILLON, MARY E.: *Wendell Willkie, 1892-1944*. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1952. Pp. 378. Pp. 14 bibl. \$4.00.)
- DIRECTOR, AARON, ed.: *Defense Controls, and Inflation*; a conference sponsored by the University of Chicago Law School. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 352. \$3.50.)
- DuPont; *the autobiography of an American enterprise*. (New York: Scribner, 1952. Pp. 138. \$5.00.) 150 Years of the Company.
- GRANT, UYLSSES S.: *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*; ed. by E. B. Long. (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952. Pp. 633. \$6.00.) issue.
- FINLETTER, THOMAS K.: *The Maintenance of United States Air Power*; statement made before the Senate Appropriations sub-committee on armed services 26 and 29, May 1952. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 23.) 82nd Congress Senate Document 140.
- HUNT, GEORGE P.: *The Story of the U. S. Marines*; school and library edition. (Eau Claire, Wisc.: E. M. Hale, 1952. Pp. 192. \$2.12) (Landmark Series).
- LYON, THORBURN C.: *Air Geography*; a global view. (New York: Van Nostrand, 1951. Pp. 60. Paper, \$2.00.)
- MANDELBAUM, DAVID G.: *Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952. Pp. 150. Pp. 5 bibl. \$2.75.) Anthropologist discusses Armed Forces friendship groups.
- MANNING, CLARENCE A.: *The Siberian Fiasco*. (New York: Library Publishers, 1952. Pp. 210. bibl. 1. \$3.75.)
- PILAT, OLIVER R.: *The Atom Spies*. (New York: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 319. \$3.50.)
- PRATT, FLETCHER: *The Monitor and the Merri-mac*. School and Library Edition. (Eau Claire, Wisc.: E. W. Hale, 1952. Pp. 192. \$2.12.) (Landmark series)

RAUSHENBUSH, STEPHEN: *The Future of Our Natural Resources*. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1952. Pp. 275. \$2.00.) (Annals V. 281)

*South Dakota*; a guide to the State. Compiled by the Federal Writers Project of the Works Progress Administration, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Hastings House, 1952. Pp. 448. Pp. 11 bibl. \$5.00.)

WALLACE, ERNEST and HOEBEL, EDWARD A.: *The Comanches, Lords of the South Plains*. (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1952. Pp. 398. Pp. 10 bibl. \$5.00.) One of Civilization of American Indians Series.

WILEY, BELL I.: *The Life of Billy Yank, the common soldier of the Union*. (Indianapolis: Bobs Merrill, 1952. Pp. 454. Pp. 81 bibl. notes. \$6.00.)

WRIGHT, JOHN N.: *Geography in the making; the American Geographical Society, 1851-1951*. (New York: American Geographical Society, 1952. Pp. 450. Pp. 10 bibl. \$5.00.)

## VI. National Warfare

EDWARDS, MAJOR THOMAS J.: *Regimental Badges*. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 370. \$3.25.)

ENOCH, ARTHUR G.: *This War Business*, a book for every citizen of every country. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 375. \$4.00.) Includes valuable statistics on war expenditures.

HURREN, BERNARD J.: *Fellowship of the Air*, Jubilee book of the Royal Aero Club, 1901-1951. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 234. \$6.75.)

KING-HALL, STEPHEN: *My Naval Career, 1909-1936*. (London: Faber, 1952. Pp. 281. 18 shillings.)

MARDER, ARTHUR J.: *Portrait of an Admiral, the life and papers of Sir Herbert Richmond*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952. Pp. 407. 30 shillings.)

PALIT, LIEUTENANT COLONEL D. K.: *The Essentials of Military Knowledge*. (New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 160. \$2.50.)

QUIRKE, TERENCE T.: *Canoes the World Over*; il. by C. Earle Bradbury. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1952. Pp. 137. Pp. 3 bibl. \$4.50.)

STALINS, BARON and others: *Vocabulaire-Atlas Heraldique en six langues*; Francaise, English, Deutsch, Espanol, Italiano, Nederlansch. (New York: W. S. Heinman, 1952. Pp. 119. \$10.00.)

(Academie Internationale d'Heraldique Publication.)

THURSFIELD, REAR ADMIRAL H. G. ed. *Five Naval Journals, 1789-1817*. (Greenwich: Navy Records Society, 1952. Pp. 400. 45 shillings.)

WAGNER, ANTHONY R.: *The Records and collections of the college of arms*. (London: Burkes Peerage, Lt., 1952. Pp. 84. 6 shillings.)

WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, ESME CECIL: *Truth in Masquerade; a study of fashions in fact*. (New York: Roy, 1952. Pp. 208. \$3.50.) Analysis of propaganda interpretations of history.

## VII. Weapons

PARSONS, JOHN E.: *Henry Deringer's Pocket Pistol*. (New York: Morrow, 1952. Pp. 255. \$5.00.) A notable contribution.

RYWELL, MARTIN: *Confederate Guns and Their Current Prices*. (Harriman, Tenn.: Pioneer Press, 1952. Pp. 54. \$1.00.)

WINANT, LEWIS: *Pepperbox Firearms*. (New York: Greenburg, 1952. Pp. 188. \$5.50.) For collector, historian and student.

## PERIODICALS

### I. Institutions and Culture—Asia

"General Mark Clark," cover and account "War in Asia" in *Time*. New York, July 7, 1952.

"The Persian Problem," by Dr. Roberto Guyer, translated in *An Constantoir*, Dublin, April 1952.

"The Economic War Potential of Asia," by Lt. Comdr. Joseph Z. Reday, U.S.N.R. in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Annapolis, November 1951 and *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, May 1952.

"The War in Korea, with Special Reference to the Difficulties of Using Our Air Power," by Wing Comdr. P. G. Wykeham-Barnes, in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, London, May 1952.

### II. Institutions and Culture—Europe

"Tito Speaks," by Josip Broz, assisted by Vladimir Dedejir in *Life*, New York, April 21, April 28, May 5, and May 12.

"South of the Pyrenees—What?," by Lt. Col. James C. Jeffries, in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May 1952.



### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

- "The Belgian Capitulation," by J. C. Bourgingon in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, January 1952.
- "U. S. Submarines in the Blockade of Japan in the 1939-45 War," by Major C. S. Goldenham in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, London, February 1952 and May 1952.
- "Administrative Naturalization Abroad of Members of the Armed Forces of the United States," by Henry B. Hazard in *American Journal of International Law*, Washington, April 1952.
- "The Stalingrad Offensive," Part I, by 2nd Lt. Hans W. Henzel in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, August 1951. Discussion of the German moves against Stalingrad in World War II.
- "Command of Native Troops," by Lt. Col. Harold L. Oppenheimer in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, October 1951. Historical account of how natives have been used in regular army organizations, primarily U. S. and British.
- "Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe," by Forrest C. Pogue in *World Politics*, Princeton, April 1952.

### IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

- "Military in Politics," I and II, by Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times*, New York, April 1 and 2, 1952.
- "Are Generals in Politics a Menace," by Demaree Bess in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, Pa., April 26, 1952.
- "The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Relations," by Edgar S. Fumiss, Jr., in *World Politics*, Princeton, April 1952.
- "The Army and Foreign Civilian Supply," by Col. Louis M. Goshorn in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May 1952.
- "Co-ordination of U. S. Military and Foreign Policy," by Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, U.S.A., ret'd. in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, April 1952.
- "What is Calculated Risk," by Lt. Col. W. E. Showalter in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May 1952.

### V. National Warfare—U. S.

- "Air Materiel Command—Special Report," in *Aviation Week*, New York, August 4, 1952.
- "Brightest Military Minds go to Economics School," (Industrial College of the Armed

Forces) in *Business Week*, New York, June 21, 1952.

- "What Kind of an Elephant is Armor," by Lt. Col. P. L. Bogen in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May 1952. (Armor 1945-1951)
- "Burnside's Amphibious Division," by Robert W. Daly in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, December 1951. An account of the Battle of Roanoke Island, February 7-8, 1862.
- "Our Changed Population Outlook and its Significance," by Joseph S. Davis, in *American Economic Review*, Evanston, Illinois, June 1952.
- "Comedy and Tragedy in Our Occupation of California," by Capt. J. M. Elliott, U.S.N., ret'd., in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, March 1951. An account of the American Occupation of California in 1846.
- "The Role of War in American Economic Development: Price, Income and Monetary Changes in Three Wartime Periods," by Milton Friedman; "The Effect of the Civil War and two American Wars on American Transportation," by John G. B. Hutchins. Discussion by Milton S. Heath and C. R. Whittlesey in *American Economic Review*, Evanston, Illinois, May 1952.
- "And St. David; Comrades in Arms," by Charles Graves in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, March 1951. Historical Associations and Parallels of the British Royal Welch Fusiliers and the U.S.M.C.
- "Industrial Management and the Armed Forces," by Capt. John D. Hayes, U.S.N., in *Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers*, Inc., Washington, May 1952.
- "Economic Problems of Military Mobilization: Planning Military Requirements," by George A. Lincoln; "Military Procurement Policies," by John P. Miller and Discussion by J. Philip Wernette in *American Economic Review*, Evanston, Illinois, May 1952.
- "Offensive Partisan Warfare," by Lt. Col. G. T. Metcalf in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, April 1952.
- "The Third Man," by Edgar A. Mowerer in *Saturday Review of Literature*, New York, 5 July 1952.
- "Corporals and Colonels Get Briefing," by Florine Oatman in *Library Journal*, New York, April 1952.
- "Rearmament and a More Flexible Tariff Structure for the United States," by Karl Pribram in *American Economic Review*, Evanston, Illinois, June 1952.

"Who Failed to get the 'Word'?", by Col. George C. Reinhardt in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, June 1952.

"The Genesis of FMF Doctrine, 1879-1899," Part III, Part IV, by W. H. Russell, *Marine Corps Gazette*, June, July 1951, Quantico.

The following issues of *Focus* published by the American Geographical Society are of particular interest: February 15, "Resources of the Arctic"; March 15, "Great Britain"; April 15, "French Morocco"; May 15, "Venezuela."

### VI. National Warfare

"Soviet Military Discipline," by Prof. Harold J. Berman and Dr. Miroslav Kerner, in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, June 1952.

"The Court Martial of Lord George Sackville, Whipping Boy of the Revolutionary War," by Gerald S. Brown in *William and Mary Quarterly*, Williamsburg, July 1952.

"Communication Security," by Capt. E. D. Doyle, Signal Corps, in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, June 1952.

"A Report on the Papers of Joseph Chamberlain Relating to the Jameson Raid and the Inquiry," by Ethel Dries in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, London, May 1952.

"Eisenhower of Abilene," in *Life*, New York, April 28, 1952.

"The Battle of the Curlews," by Lt. L. J. Emerson, in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, June 1952.

"Portrait of a Commanding Officer," by Capt. F. H. Vosse in *Journal of Royal Artillery*, Woolwich, April 1952. (1760 Advice to Officers)

"The Royal Artillery in Flanders, 1747," by Lt. Col. M. E. S. Laws, ret'd., in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Woolwich, April 1952.

"The Future of Airborne Operations," by Capt. J. A. MacMahon in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, April 1952.

"An Account of the Battle of Hattin (1187), referring to the Frankish Mercenaries in Oriental Moslem States," by Jean Rickerd in *Speculum*, Cambridge, Mass., April 1952.

"A Tough Man for a Tough Job, General Ridgeway," in *Life*, New York, May 12, 1952.

"Standards and Colours in the British Army," by Col. H. C. B. Rogers in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, London, May 1952.

"Forerunner of the Panzer—the Barded Destrier," by Capt. H. R. Sandford in *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Woolwich, April 1952.

"Military Observation in the Land of Bali," by Major Charles A. Wolfe in *Military Digest*, Fort Leavenworth, May 1952.

"The British Army Staff," by Lt. Col. W. F. Woodward, in *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, April 1952.

"Armoured Forces in the Defensive," by General F. Von Senger U. Etterlin, German Army, translated in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, May 1952.

"Zonal Defense," by Lt. General Bodo Zimmerman, German Army, ret'd., translated in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, January 1952.

### VII. Weapons

"Fantastic Versus Conventional Weapons. Unusual arms may weaken defense by making normal warfare seem useless," by Major General J. F. C. Fuller in *Ordnance*, Washington, May-June 1952.

"The Dominant Weapon," by Reginald Hargreaves in *The American Rifleman*, Washington, May 1952.

"Bacon's Thunderous Sound," by Lt. Col. B. R. Lewis in *The American Rifleman*, Washington, May 1952.

"When the U. S. Armed the Russians," by Nicholas W. Orloff in *The American Rifleman*, Washington, June 1952.

"Gunmakers for the American Fur Company," by John E. Parsons in *The New York Historical Society Quarterly*, New York, April 1952.

"Russian Small Arms," by D. G. Stewart Smith in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, January 1952. Reprint from *The Services and Territorial Magazine* (Great Britain).

With the April 1952 issue the *Gun and Cartridge Record* published at Chagrin Falls, Ohio, makes its bow. Its 12" x 18" format and good paper includes drawings of weapons, uniforms and equipment to advantage.



---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE<sup>1</sup>

---

### VICTOR HUGO PALSITS

To his many friends and acquaintances in the fields of history, library work, and archives, it is a source of deep regret to learn that the "Grand Old Man" of the American Military Institute, as well as of the American History Division of the New York Public Library, recently died in the Jamaica Hospital, Queens Borough, New York, at the age of 85. A New Yorker by birth, in 1907 Governor Charles Evans Hughes appointed Dr. Palsits the State Historian of New York, and he held this post for four years. He returned to the New York Public Library in 1914, as its first manuscripts curator, and two years later assumed the additional duties of chief of the American History Division, posts which he retained until his retirement in 1941. The long list of works edited and written by Dr. Palsits includes the *History of Washington's Farewell Address*, *Papers Relating to the Siege of Charleston*, the *Family Correspondence of Herman Melville*, and numerous contributions to staple reference works such as the *Dictionary of American Biography*. His scholarly activities were recognized by a number of leading universities which conferred honorary degrees on Dr. Palsits. The Grand Old Man will be sorely missed at our annual gatherings. As late as last year, December 1951, despite his advanced age, he not only attended the Joint Session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association at the Statler Hotel in Manhattan, but he rose to address the audience with some impromptu and enthusiastic remarks relating to the need for supporting the revived Journal of the Institute. We salute a great soul, and a loyal member.

### MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL PROGRAM

Colonel Frank Hough, a Trustee of the Institute, reports that since inception of the program in 1947, the Historical Branch, G-3 at Marine Corps Headquarters has published nine official monographs covering in detail various campaigns of World War II. These are on sale at the Government Printing Office. Two others, dealing with operations in the Central Solomons and New Britain respectively, are currently in the hands of GPO, with publication anticipated in November, 1952. Three more (the Marshalls, Guam and Iwo Jima) are in work and scheduled for the printer this fiscal year.

Upon completion of the entire series, it is planned to combine the individual monographs, by means of editing and creation of necessary connective material, into a five-volume Operational History which will be published in permanent book form.

### EXHIBITION AT THE NAVAL MUSEUM

The twenty-fourth annual exhibition of the Washington Ship Model Society, by arrangement with The Naval Historical Foundation, was held at the Truxtun-Decatur Naval Museum, Lafayette Square, Washington, D. C., October 1-November 2, 1952. An invitation preview was held on September 30, when prizes and awards were presented for the best models in each class. More than three score models and nautical exhibits were prepared by the Society members, covering centuries of maritime and naval progress. There were replicas of many historical vessels made famous by record passages across the oceans and the daring skill of their captains. Featured for the first time this year were an un-

<sup>1</sup>Publication date, December 1952.

usual mule-powered paddle wheel French military canal barge, a Baltimore clipper privateer, an armed naval steam launch of the White Fleet era, and several recent models of the historic *Constitution*. Officers of the Ship Model Society, responsible for this year's show, are J. E. Beach, Commodore; Karl E. Krumke, Jr., Captain; A. C. Wagner, First Mate; J. W. Harbin, Jr., Ship's Clerk; and Jack Romagna, Purser.

#### ERRATUM

In *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, XV, 4, the author of the article "Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865, is given as Robert J. Futrell. The correct name is Robert F. Futrell.

---

#### ALLEN LLOYD KEYES

It was with deep regret we recently received news from the Director of the West Point Museum that Colonel Allen Lloyd Keyes, a charter member of the American Military Institute, died at West Point on 15 November 1951. Colonel Keyes had served at the Military Academy, with the 19th Field Artillery at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and with the Headquarters of the 5th Division Artillery, Fort Custer, Michigan. He was decorated with the Legion of Merit, and the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster. Colonel Keyes was retired 31 December 1946, for disability, and was residing at West Point at the time of his death. The American Military Institute, as well as the family and friends of the deceased officer, sustains a deep loss in the unexpected passing of this valiant charter member.

---

#### COMBAT PAINTINGS

The Department of the Army has recently printed, and begun to distribute, a set of

ten posters depicting great moments in America's military history. The posters were reproduced from original paintings done by qualified artists. Detailed research on them was done by historians employed by the Army, so that the pictures are scrupulously accurate. The picture-portion of the posters is 14 inches by 20 inches, and there is a brief description of the action printed on the white margin beneath. The events celebrated are:

1. The action of Alexander Hamilton's battery of artillery at Princeton, 26 December 1776.
2. The movement of the Legion of the United States against the Northwest Indians in August 1794.
3. The advance of Brigadier General Winfield Scott's brigade at the Battle of Chippewa, 5 July 1814.
4. The charge of May's squadron of the 2d Dragoons at Resaca de la Palma, 9 May 1846.
5. The assault of the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry on the Confederate works at Vicksburg, 19 May 1863.
6. The stand of the 38th Infantry in July 1918 that earned it the title "Rock of the Marne."
7. The counterattack of U. S. forces at Bataan, 15 February 1942.
8. The air raid on Ploesti, 31 May 1944.
9. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 1944.
10. The Capture of the Remagen Bridge by the 9th Armored Division, 7 March 1945.

Nothing like this series has ever been done before in the United States. All readers of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* would enjoy seeing the paintings, and this will soon be possible. There has been an increasing demand for them by individuals so that the Army intends to place them for sale soon at the Government Printing Office. The price will be fifteen or twenty cents apiece.



## WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION, AUGUST 1941 - MARCH 1942

BY FREDERICK S. HAYDON\*

### (Part II)

A SHARP DIVISION of opinion among ranking agencies with respect to the organization of the Army's high command structure had been clearly revealed by the responses to the War Plans Division's memorandum of 30 August 1941.<sup>61</sup> This memorandum had advocated maintaining GHQ's authority as defined by the War Department's directive of 3 July 1941, although it also called for some curtailment of GHQ's current command jurisdiction over overseas bases and installations. G-1 had rejected the War Plans Division's proposals flatly, and called for a return of control over the Zone of the Interior and all units therein to the Corps Area commanders, who were directly under the War Department, as well as a sharp curtailment of GHQ authority over other areas, with control of major overseas theaters vested directly in the War Department. G-2 had refrained from expressing an opinion. G-3 and G-4 had concurred in the War Plans Division's proposed action. GHQ, represented by its Chief of Staff, General

McNair, had held that the War Plans Division's proposals not only failed to solve the problem, but also confused the issues still more, and in the absence of the War Department's willingness to grant GHQ requisite powers to function properly, now looked with some favor on a major reorganization of the Department. The Army Air Forces had openly and formally demanded a reorganization of the War Department and the elimination of GHQ. Analysis of the prevailing viewpoints among the top echelons thus revealed the Army's high command as a virtual "house divided against itself."

In the meanwhile, three days before General Spaatz of the Air Forces dispatched his memorandum of 24 October to the War Plans Division, calling for reorganization, General McNair again took the matter up with General Marshall's Senior Deputy, Maj. Gen. William Bryden. He briefly outlined the failure of the original WPD committee to come to an agreement as to the answer to the Chief of Staff's original instructions of 14 August. The WPD committee had considered "two radically different lines of action—first, to continue GHQ as now constituted . . . but with its functions defined

\*Colonel Haydon prepared this article in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Part I appeared in *Military Affairs*, XVI, 1, pp. 12-29.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid*, p. 12.

more specifically; or second, to streamline the War Department by separating from it a zone of the interior with its own commander, and absorbing GHQ into the War Department thus streamlined." General McNair advised General Bryden that personally he was inclined to favor the latter course of action. He had expressed this view to General Marshall, but still felt that GHQ could be made workable if it were given "sufficient latitude and authority to justify its existence." The Chief of Staff, according to General McNair, had for the present decided to continue the existing organization. Therefore, General McNair urged that this highly important decision be communicated to the appropriate agencies concerned, and that the War Plans Division be instructed to continue its study of a satisfactory "clarification and amplification" of policies governing GHQ.<sup>62</sup>

A fortnight later the issue was again raised squarely in a conference in the Chief of Staff's office. During this conference on 3 November, General Marshall expressed grave concern over what he called "command failures." He stated that he had been "paralyzed" to learn that a shipment of bombs urgently needed for Singapore which had been sent off at the end of September would not reach its destination until the middle of December. The conference brought out that this was not the only instance of such mismanagement. Others had recently occurred, indicating poor command and staff co-ordination and failure to follow up orders and operations. "We can have no more of this," General Marshall had firmly declared. "This [the War Department] is the poorest command post in the Army, and we must do something about it, although I do not yet

know what we will do."<sup>63</sup> This statement indicates that as of 3 November General Marshall had not yet decided as to what course should be taken in solving the organization and command problem. That he was not yet in favor of a reorganization such as that suggested by Colonel Harrison of the War Plans Division, by General McNair, and by General Arnold, is evident from the record taken of the discussion in the conference of that date. The officer who put down the substance of what was said recorded at the time that

... as General Marshall sees it, we have only begun when an order is issued. . . . There must be some means of knowing how things are progressing before a crisis develops. . . . Careful consideration has been given to the idea of reorganizing the staff. This would virtually eliminate GHQ and provide a small staff, but it would still be an operational staff, and the Chief of Staff and the Deputies would still be troubled by pressure coming towards the top. While they would be freed of much detail, the proposed reorganization would not provide a complete solution.<sup>64</sup>

The divergence of views resulting from comments on the 30 August memorandum, coupled with General Marshall's belief that the proposed reorganization would not provide a final solution to the basic problems of organization and command and his decision to continue the existing framework, led the War Plans Division in collaboration with GHQ to prepare another staff study of the problem. In all likelihood General McNair's suggestion to General Bryden that the War Plans Division resume its studies of the question also contributed to the undertaking of this effort. On 5 November, two days after General Marshall's sharp criticism of faulty command and staff work, the Chief of the War Plans Division, General Gerow, circulated to the other General Staff divisions and to the Chief of the Army Air Forces for concurrence or comment, a new memorandum in

<sup>62</sup>Memo, General McNair for General Bryden, 21 Oct 41, sub: Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority of GHQ, WPD 4558.

<sup>63</sup>Notes on Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff, 3 Nov 41. Copy in WPD File, Notes of Conferences, OCS, in Strategy Section, OCMH.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*



the form of a revised directive to GHQ, to supersede the directive of 3 July 1941.<sup>65</sup>

Although the intent of this new directive was to clarify GHQ's position with respect to command and training functions and its authority to exercise them, the substance of the document did not succeed in improving sufficiently the weaknesses of the directive it was designed to supersede. It did amplify in some respects the authority of GHQ, and might have clarified somewhat GHQ's relationships with War Department agencies. But it did not change fundamentally the restricted position of GHQ that had prevented its effective execution of its missions, unless an interpretation particularly favorable to GHQ were given to the document. Neither did it solve the difficulty of GHQ's lack of essential control over the means, especially supply and transportation, for carrying out its tasks, nor fully clarify the complex relationships of GHQ with War Department agencies.<sup>66</sup>

None of the other General Staff divisions would concur in the new draft directive. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, objected to the document in almost its entirety, and returned a substitute draft directive prepared by his own staff for the War Plans Division's consideration.<sup>67</sup> The G-2 Division, which had withheld comment on the previous memorandum of 30 August on the ground that whatever was decided by the other divisions more closely concerned would be agreeable, now objected to certain aspects of the training responsibilities assigned to GHQ, and further rejected the directive on the ground that it was not specific enough and did not make clear the intended amplification of GHQ

functions.<sup>68</sup> Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, the G-3, likewise refused to agree to the proposed directive. He declared that no "insuperable difficulties have been experienced in operating" under the basic GHQ directive of 3 July 1941; but that in G-3's opinion, the overseas bases under GHQ might be better operated directly under the War Department, since GHQ did not have under its control the means in supplies, personnel, and transportation to carry on their operation without specific co-ordination with other Army agencies for the allocation of such means.<sup>69</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, flatly refused to concur because, in the opinion of his Division, the proposed directive was "indefinite both as to details and as to what is meant by 'command.'" G-4 also feared that the directive as written might be interpreted as granting GHQ the authority to issue instructions to the supply agencies of the War Department. If the directive were published and so construed, action under it would make the War Department supply agencies subject to the instructions of two superiors, GHQ and the War Department, and this would inevitably result in confusion.<sup>70</sup>

These objections of the other General Staff Divisions were confined to what they believed were defects in the drafting of the proposed directive that was intended to make the existing organization work. They were also the result of differences of opinion as to the manner in which that organization should function. None of the G's suggested the alternative of reorganizing the War Department and the General Staff as the solution. It was the Chief of the Army Air Forces

<sup>65</sup>WPD Disposition Slip, with accompanying draft of directive to GHQ, to G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, TAG, and Chief of the AAF, 5 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directive, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-1 for ACofS, WPD, 13 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directive, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>68</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-2 for ACofS, WPD, 12 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directives, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>69</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-3, for ACofS, WPD, 8 Nov 41, sub: General Headquarters Directive, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>70</sup>Memo, ACofS, G-4 for ACofS, WPD, 8 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directive, WPD 3209-10.

who, in also rejecting the directive, reiterated the necessity of adopting the latter course. General Spaatz, expressing the views of General Arnold and the Air Staff for the second time, repeated the arguments and recommendations that had been submitted in the Air Forces' reply to the War Plans memorandum of 30 August, and demanded that those recommendations for a reorganization of the War Department be reconsidered "as a basis for that type of War Department organization required for efficient and expeditious functioning in war." To support this demand, General Spaatz called attention to General McNair's previous statement to the War Plans Division on 2 September, in which he had favored a "streamlining" of the Department. He then proceeded to pick the proposed GHQ directive to pieces paragraph by paragraph, and in each instance presented objections that eliminated almost all likelihood of the Air Forces reaching any compromise agreement in which GHQ could still remain as a major operating agency for the Chief of Staff's field command functions. General Spaatz then concluded:

It is clear that the advisability of continuing GHQ as an agency under the War Department for control of Theaters of Operations and Task Forces is open to question. Therefore, it is most important, at this time, that the organization of the War Department be modernized and streamlined to insure maximum efficiency in the prosecution of war.<sup>71</sup>

The War Department's "house," if the G's, the Air Forces, and GHQ may be so called, was still a divided one. The effort of the War Plans Division to solve this thorny and compelling question, on the assumption that General Marshall still intended to make the existing organization work, had again failed because of wide division of opinion, oppos-

ing convictions, and the complexities of the internal command structure. Nevertheless, General Gerow now resolved to make one final try. He had his staff rework the draft directive of 5 November to incorporate in it certain changes designed to satisfy most of the objections of the other G's. In the revision, he also followed certain suggestions from Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. By 18 November the revised directive was completed, and had the concurrences of G-3, G-4, and GHQ. Most of the objections of G-1 and G-2 had also been met in the new draft. As to the Air Forces' objections to the draft of 5 November, there appeared to be no method of satisfying them by any draft, however it might be revised. On this point General Gerow on 22 November advised General Bryden, the Senior Deputy Chief of Staff, to whom he submitted the new draft directive:

*Provided it is the Chief of Staff's desire to continue GHQ as at present organized for the purpose of delegating to the Chief of Staff, GHQ, certain responsibilities of the Commander of the Field Forces, with respect to the exercise of command, the supervision and preparation of plans, and the supervision and coordination of training, it is believed the proposed directive is a suitable one to accomplish that purpose.*<sup>72</sup>

It is clear that General Gerow made his last try to solve the problem by a directive that would clarify the situation by making the existing organization work on the conviction that General Marshall was committed to this course and would not agree to a War Department reorganization. The proviso contained in his memorandum to General Bryden, above quoted, seems to make this certain.

It also appears that the Chief of the Army

<sup>71</sup>Memo, Chief of the Air Staff for ACofS, WPD, 14 Nov 41, sub: Proposed Revision of Directive to GHQ . . . , WPD 3209-10.

<sup>72</sup>Memo, ACofS, WPD, for General Bryden, DCofS, 22 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directive, WPD 3209-10. The italics in the quotation have been supplied by the present author.



Air Forces doubted whether the strong representations contained in General Spaatz's memorandum of 14 November to the War Plans Division would produce the results he desired—a reorganization along the lines advocated by the Air Forces. At approximately the same time that General Spaatz sent his communication to the War Plans Division, General Arnold addressed a detailed memorandum on the subject directly to General Marshall. The Arnold memorandum is of particular significance in the development of the reorganization movement, since it appears to have been the final weight thrown on the troubled scales that were now to tip in favor of the much discussed reorganization. In it, General Arnold presented a long and studied disquisition on the role, importance, and position of air power in modern war, and emphasized the necessity of separate control under a properly unified command, on a co-equal basis with ground operations, of offensive and defensive air operations. Against this background of tactical and strategic argument, General Arnold expounded his conviction that under the existing organization in which the unsolved problem of GHQ-War Department-Air Forces command and control relationships played so large a part, the great potentialities of the air weapon could not be realized to proper advantage. The real answer was to be found in reorganizing the War Department along the lines already advanced by the Air Forces (and by Colonel Harrison in his August memorandum). Therefore General Arnold urged that such a reorganization be undertaken forthwith. The plan of organization he advocated was the same as that previously described: the three major commands, a Ground Force Command, a Service Command, and the existing Air Forces, with the Chief of Staff in control of the whole, assisted by a small General Staff with an equal representation of air

and ground officers. In addition, General Arnold advocated the creation of a superior "Military Policy Staff," which would be above both the War and Navy Departments, to serve the President in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, since the existing framework of the national defense establishments did not provide the President with an advisory staff.<sup>73</sup>

The Arnold memorandum was referred to the War Plans Division for comment. Despite the fact that the War Plans staff, in the belief that General Marshall did not contemplate a reorganization, was at this very time completing its revision of the proposed directive to GHQ in a final effort to make the present organization function satisfactorily, General Gerow prepared for General Marshall a memorandum in which he concurred in the broad principles of the reorganization plan recommended by General Arnold, and frankly pointed to the advantages it would afford over the existing organization. It would permit, General Gerow declared, a high degree of decentralization. The burden of details of administration and operation, now imposed on the Chief of Staff and his principal staff advisers in an overwhelming volume, could be effectively delegated to the subordinate major commands, thus freeing the Chief of Staff, his Deputies, and the small General Staff for the performance of their proper functions — strategic planning, the formulation of over-all policy, and the superior co-ordination and direction of operations. In addition, the plan would actually create one truly general staff instead of two, which the effective functioning of the GHQ staff as the instrument for the Chief of Staff's field command would unavoidably create. On the other hand, Gen-

<sup>73</sup>Memo, Chief of the AAF for CofS, n.d., sub: Reorganization of the War Department, WPD 4614. This memorandum bears no date, but the attached organization chart, marked Tab A, is dated 14 November 1941.

eral Gerow reminded the Chief of Staff that to make such major changes in the basic organization of the Military Establishment would be a very large undertaking, and would inevitably produce a period of confusion and disorganization. Regardless of the temporary disorganization, General Gerow recommended that the plan "be developed in such detail as to determine its practicability and the extent that it would be an improvement over the existing organization."<sup>74</sup>

General Marshall had also referred the Arnold memorandum to Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, a distinguished officer of long service and experience then serving as Senior Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, whose advice and opinion were often sought by the Chief of Staff on matters of particular importance. General Embick also viewed General Arnold's proposed organization with favor, and agreed with the War Plans Division's recommendation that the suggested reorganization be studied in detail in order that a decision could be reached.<sup>75</sup> In the meanwhile, the final War Plans Division's draft directive for GHQ, which General Gerow had submitted to the senior Deputy Chief of Staff in the belief that General Marshall was still determined to make the present organization work, had reached the Chief of Staff. He took no action on it. It remained on his desk, unapproved, and was still there on 29 November, several days after General Marshall had decided to explore the practicability of the proposed reorganization.<sup>76</sup>

It seems evident that between 18 and 25 November, following the submission of the Arnold memorandum together with the comments on it by General Gerow and General Embick, and following also the presentation of the War Plans Division's final proposed draft directive for GHQ, General Marshall finally reached a decision to act on the question of reorganization. A number of factors probably influenced this decision. Clearly the issue of continuing GHQ and granting it sufficient authority to operate effectively for the purposes for which it was originally conceived, although apparently resolved so far as a majority of the General Staff divisions were concerned, could not be given a solution that would be satisfactory to the Air Forces. Furthermore, the repeated proposals of General Spaatz, followed by the direct recommendations of General Arnold, in the face of repeated disagreements in the past, presented undeniably persuasive merits. At the same time the national emergency was approaching the proportions of a crisis, and concurrently the volume of detail that this situation imposed on the Chief of Staff and his deputies grew apace. Despite the necessity for, and General Marshall's express injunction that detail be decentralized to subordinate agencies, the concentration of responsibility and decision on matters of operational and administrative detail within the Office of the Chief of Staff increased constantly as the quasi-war situation became more and more grave. In violation of the basic principle of command that a commander should deal directly with "a minimum practicable number of subordinates," the number of officers and agencies having direct access to General Marshall in the summer of 1941 approached a total that has been estimated by a later Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff as sixty-one.<sup>77</sup> Colonel Harrison, who

<sup>74</sup>Memo, ACofS, WPD, for CofS, 18 Nov 41, sub: Organization of the Armed Forces for War, WPD 4614.

<sup>75</sup>Memo, General Embick for the CofS, 18 Nov 41, sub: Organization of the Armed Forces for War, WPD 4614. General Embick recommended against the proposed superior "Military Policy Staff" for the President.

<sup>76</sup>Informal pencil note on WPD copy of memorandum, Brig. Gen. H. F. Loomis, WPD, for General Bryden, DCofS, 22 Nov 41, sub: GHQ Directive, WPD 3209-10.

<sup>77</sup>Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 327-29.



had drafted the initial reorganization proposal in August 1941, and who later played a prominent part in working out the details of the actual reorganization that was put into effect in 1942, testified that "at one time the Chief of Staff had to deal personally or through his staff with 40 different [major] commands . . . 40 large and some 350 small."<sup>78</sup> Similarly, Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who headed the committee that drafted and implemented the final reorganization plan, testified that the burden of administrative and operational detail borne by the Chief of Staff was such that relief from it had become imperative. A major purpose of the reorganization, he said, was to provide such relief.<sup>79</sup>

Not only did this situation tend to swamp the Chief of Staff with details and matters for decision that distracted his time and attention from the more pressing over-all duties of his office, but also among the numerous agencies that had access to him it created duplication and overlap. This was especially noticeable in the case of the Chiefs of Arms and the Special Staff established within GHQ. In that headquarters, it became necessary to create special staff sections for the principal combat arms, and these, in connection with the supervision and training of the field forces, took over gradually a considerable number of the functions of the Chiefs of Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery.<sup>80</sup> If GHQ's functions were enlarged, as one line of recommended action had proposed, this division and overlap would increase. Since the Chiefs of

Arms, because of their traditional position of quasi-independence from the General Staff and their customary control of activities peculiar to their respective branches, had direct access to the Chief of Staff, matters of conflict with GHQ functions pertaining to the same activities would undoubtedly be carried to the Chief of Staff for decision and settlement. This would in turn add to the volume of detail already carried by the Chief's office, and would tend to inject delays into the handling of matters requiring rapid action. These considerations, in addition to the others already noted, undoubtedly influenced General Marshall's decision to adopt reorganization as the solution to the GHQ problem and also to the others within the Establishment's machinery.

On 26 November 1941 General Marshall instructed the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Walter B. Smith, to issue a memorandum to the War Plans Division, stating that "the Chief of Staff is favorably impressed with the basic organization proposed" in the Arnold memorandum. Accordingly, General Marshall directed that the plan "be developed in sufficient detail to determine its practicability," as well as to indicate the advantages it would provide over the existing organization. The War Plans Division was charged with the developing of the plan.<sup>81</sup>

Although he delegated to the War Plans Division the responsibility for working out the plan of reorganization, General Marshall personally selected the officer to head the group charged with the detailed studies involved. For this task he chose General McNarney, then on duty in London as a Special War Department Observer. "I selected him," General Marshall later explained, "because he not only was a very capable administrator, but also an officer of the Air Corps,

<sup>78</sup>Testimony of Col. William K. Harrison before Senate Military Affairs Committee, 6 Mar 42, in *Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate*, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, on S.2092, "A Bill to Establish a Department of Defense Coordination and Control," p. 13.

<sup>79</sup>Testimony of General McNarney before Senate Military Affairs Committee, 6 Mar 42, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>80</sup>Interview with General McNarney by the author, 4 Aug 49, copy of record, 5 Aug 49, in files of Strategy Section, OCMH. See also Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

<sup>81</sup>Memo, OCS for ACofS, WPD, 25 Nov 41, no subject, OCS 21278-6.

and a great deal of the intricacy of the reorganization was confused by the part of the air [forces]."<sup>82</sup> General McNarney had also served on the General Staff in the War Plans Division and was thus further qualified for the task in hand.<sup>83</sup> He received cable orders on or about 1 December to report in person to the Chief of Staff for a period of six weeks' special temporary duty, and left London by air on 7 December.<sup>84</sup> The same day the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into the war. The attention of the Chief of Staff, the War Department, GHQ, and all responsible commanders was now focused on immediate measures to be taken in the face of this final and supreme crisis. At this juncture, the reorganization plans, however more urgent now that the country was at war, were temporarily eclipsed by the demands of immediate defensive action and other pressing matters connected with the outbreak of war.

General McNarney, still uninformed of the task for which he had been ordered to Washington, arrived on the evening of 15 December, and reported on the following morning to General Marshall. Then he learned that by Presidential order, he had been appointed to the Roberts Commission recently created to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. This appointment had resulted from a request to General Marshall from Secretary of War Stimson for the name of a capable Air Corps officer to serve on this Commission. General Marshall had mentioned General McNarney, although as he

later stated "it was a very inconvenient thing for me to have him on the [Roberts] Board," because by then General Marshall felt that a reorganization of the Department as quickly as possible was of major importance.<sup>85</sup> In General McNarney's interview with General Marshall on the morning of 16 December there was nevertheless no discussion of reorganization, or of the task for which General Marshall had originally called General McNarney home. The latter proceeded to Hawaii with the Roberts Commission and took part in the investigations held there.<sup>86</sup>

On 25 January 1942, having completed his duties with the Roberts Commission, General McNarney again reported to General Marshall in accordance with his initial orders. It was then for the first time that he learned of the original purpose of his recall from London. General Marshall briefly discussed with him the problems that existed within the organization and command structure of the War Department and the volume of progressively increasing activities and detail within the Department that had developed since the beginning of the emergency. This volume was now bound to continue to increase heavily, and already an inordinate amount of detail fell upon the Chief of Staff personally and on his office. General Marshall referred to the excessive number of officers and agencies having direct access to him on matters and problems of widely varying nature. The Chief of Staff was so immersed in a welter of administrative and operational detail that it was rapidly becoming impossible for him to give essential attention to the broad and over-all questions that were his primary responsibility.

Illustrative of the details pressing upon

<sup>82</sup>Testimony of General Marshall before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 12 Dec 45, in *Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington, 1946), Part 3, p. 1438.

<sup>83</sup>General McNarney was actually assigned to the War Plans Division at this time, being on special duty in London. His assignment to the War Plans Division covered the period from 17 March 1939 to 16 March 1942.

<sup>84</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.

<sup>85</sup>Testimony of General Marshall before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 12 Dec 45, *loc. cit.*

<sup>86</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.



him from below for decision, the following examples are taken at random from the mass of "action papers" that were cleared through General Marshall personally during the critical fortnight that followed the Pearl Harbor disaster. The seeming triviality of some of these matters for the Chief of Staff's personal decision and action at such a time speaks eloquently of the need of some sort of organization to free the Chief of Staff from what he had recently referred to as "pressures coming towards the top." On 10 December 1941, General Marshall gave final approval to General Bryden's recommended decision to activate anti-aircraft sections for the staffs of the First and Fourth Armies, with the proviso that permanent positions for general officers would not be created for these staff sections. The following day he acted to approve a radiogram authorizing General MacArthur in the Philippines to promote officers up to the rank of colonel. On 12 December, against the objections of his Deputy, General Bryden, and his G-1, General Marshall approved the establishment of an Air Medal, to be added to the list of American decorations. The next day he acted on a memorandum transferring the physical location of the Adjutant General's School, and gave attention to the question of the cost of War Department censorship of international mail. The same day necessary approval of the transfer of certain over-age officers claimed his attention. On 15 December, he decided to promote Governor Sam Jones of Louisiana from captain to major in the Reserve, thus closing a long and spirited controversy between G-1 and the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. During the next four days, General Marshall was called on to consider and approve action papers naming an Army post, accelerating the work of certain awards and decorations boards, and granting a request for entertainment funds for overseas

bases. Likewise he had to consider the question of contingent funds for the per diem expenses of certain British technicians who were assisting in Air Corps training.<sup>87</sup> These, and a veritable torrent of other matters for consideration and action, either trivial or vitally important, claimed the Chief of Staff's attention in these crowded and dangerous days following immediately upon Pearl Harbor. At the same time, preparations and studies for the coming ARCADIA Conference with the Prime Minister and with the top-ranking Chiefs of the British military, air, and naval services, to map over-all global strategy and arrive at decisions of the highest military and international importance, also occupied the Chief of Staff's time and attention. Clearly, if he were to perform these latter major tasks without the distraction of such duties as those examples indicated above, the existing organization would simply not do. Thus, General Marshall explained to General McNarney on 25 January a reorganization of the Department was essential. What he wanted, now that the Establishment was involved in actual war, "was some kind of organization that would give the Chief of Staff time to devote to strategic policy and to the strategic aspects and direction of the war."<sup>88</sup>

Up to this point, General McNarney had not been informed of the earlier plans and proposals that had been prepared by the War Plans Division and the Air Staff—the Harrison memorandum of August 1941, the two studies submitted by General Spaatz to the War Plans Division, and the Arnold memorandum of 14 November. General Marshall discussed these briefly with him, and ex-

<sup>87</sup>All the examples given, from 10 December to 20 December, are taken from documents, largely memoranda in the office of the Secretary of the General Staff covering this period, in "Daily Summary of Papers Cleared through the Office of the Sec'y., General Staff," OCS Records, Binder 28.

<sup>88</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.

plained what he wanted done. In General McNarney's words, retrospectively given much later, "General Marshall had made his final decision that he needed a reorganization." The Chief of Staff now intended to have a committee, headed by General McNarney, "do the pick and shovel work."<sup>89</sup> Thus General Marshall's actions over the past six months may be summed up as follows: From August to November he appears to have pondered the issues and at first clung to the idea of making the existing organization function satisfactorily; in November he finally decided to explore the practicable feasibility of the proposed plans of reorganization as a solution to the problem; to implement this exploration he personally selected the officer to supervise the studies that would be required; and now, he had given his instructions to this officer and turned the task over to him and his committee.

General McNarney began work on the morning of 26 January. He was assisted by Colonel Harrison of the War Plans Division and by Lt. Col. Laurence S. Kuter, an Air Corps officer then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff. For the next four days they discussed the problem and the previous plans that had been advanced for its solution—especially the Harrison memorandum. The committee under General McNarney's guidance decided to adopt this plan, with slight modifications. One detail that came up for General McNarney's particular attention in the air organization was the question of the GHQ Air Force headquarters in June 1941. In General McNarney's judgment, this headquarters was no longer justified under war conditions, since it absorbed personnel needed elsewhere and injected an additional link in the chain of command that merely occasioned

delay. Therefore, it was decided to eliminate the Air Force Combat Command headquarters, and effect a streamlined organization of the combat air elements with the Zone of the Interior. This decision led to a further determination to eliminate GHQ as a field headquarters and also the offices of the Chiefs of Arms. Under the original Harrison plan, the Chiefs of both the Arms and the Services were to be subordinated to the proposed Commanding General, Services. Although this arrangement seemed sound enough with respect to the Chiefs of Services, General McNarney felt that in the case of the Chiefs of Arms, their functions would be far better consolidated under a single commander within the proposed Grounds Forces command. Thus it was decided to eliminate the offices of these traditionally powerful and influential Chiefs, who had for years ranked almost on equal terms with the General Staff, and had enjoyed equal access with them to the Chief of Staff. The later repercussions of this decision can readily be foreseen. The solution finally adopted by the McNarney committee was to set up in place of GHQ a headquarters of the Ground Forces which would absorb and consolidate under one commander the functions of the offices of the Chiefs of Arms, and which would direct the training of all ground combat troops in the Zone of the Interior. The Chiefs of Services were to remain as before, but under the newly created commander of the Services, who would control the administration and training of service troops as well as direct the logistical activities of the Army in the Zone of the Interior. The Army Air Forces as constituted would be put in a position of parity with the other two commands. To replace the former overseas functions and operational activities of GHQ and the War Plans Division, General McNarney and his committee now decided that the War Plans

<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*



Division should also be eliminated, and that a new General Staff Division, which was later to be designated the Operations Division, should be created to direct operations for the Chief of Staff. The specific purpose of the abolishment of the War Plans Division and the establishment of this new division was, as General McNarney later said, "to create a command post within the War Department for the prosecution of the war in place of the Commanding General of the Field Forces."<sup>90</sup>

The above plan, which was a slightly modified version of the substance of the Harrison memorandum of August 1941, was completed on 31 January 1942. General McNarney personally carried a memorandum covering the salient features of the reorganization scheme to General Marshall and discussed it with him at some length.<sup>91</sup> This memorandum, distinguished for its compact brevity, read as follows:

1. *The Organization Presented.*
  - a. *Is designed to fight the current war.*
  - b. *It provides:* Commands to furnish individuals, equipment, supplies, and transportation; commands to take individuals and equipment and weld them into trained, balanced units; a command to execute combat functions; the whole comprising the Army of the United States under a single responsible head.
  - c. *It deletes:* Unnecessary or obsolete headquarters, including GHQ, the Air Force Combat Command, Chiefs of Air Corps, Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Cavalry; operating activities of the General Staff.
2. *Concurrences.* If this plan is submitted to staff divisions and other interested parties, the result will be numerous non-concurrences and interminable delay.
3. *Recommendations.*
  - a. Approval in principle.
  - b. Selection of Ground Force, Air Force, and Service Commanders.

- c. Creation of an executive committee responsible only to the Chief of Staff with power to coordinate details and execute the reorganization.<sup>92</sup>

General McNarney outlined the functions under the above proposed organization as follows: For the War Department General Staff, (1) Strategic control and direction of operations; (2) Determination of over-all requirements; and (3) Basic decisions and policies relating to organization, administration, training, and supply, and other matters not delegated. The Commanding Generals of the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Command were each to have the following functions: Administration, supply, organization, and training of the forces and installations assigned or attached to their commands. The Commanding General of the Air Forces was to have the additional functions of development and procurement of aviation equipment. The additional functions of the Service Commander were to be procurement, storage, and issue of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the entire Army (except aviation equipment); also, Zone of the Interior functions—transportation, hospitalization, internal security, counterintelligence, and service functions for both the Ground and Air Forces.<sup>93</sup>

On 1 February 1942, the day following the first presentation of the above plan to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall and General McNarney again discussed the scheme. General Marshall asked whether the plan had been discussed with General Arnold and with Deputy Chief of Staff General Bryden. General McNarney stated that it had not. Thereupon General Marshall directed that a date be set for a meeting to be held in Gen-

<sup>92</sup>Memo, General McNarney for the CofS, 31 Jan 42, sub: Reorganization of the War Department, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization). This memorandum with its Tabs is reproduced as Chart 10 in Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

<sup>93</sup>Tab 1 to memorandum cited in preceding footnote.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*

eral Bryden's office, to be attended by the Chiefs of the five General Staff Divisions, representatives from GHQ and the Army Air Forces, and other superior agencies concerned, at which meeting the plan would be presented and discussed.<sup>94</sup> At the same time, in order to be certain as to the legality of the organizational changes proposed by the Committee, Colonel Harrison had asked the Judge Advocate General of the Army for an opinion on this question. In his reply on 2 February he expressed an official opinion that "under the First War Powers Act (December 18, 1941), the President is vested with certain powers which . . . are sufficiently broad to authorize the proposed reorganization."<sup>95</sup> The stage was now set for the final steps in the plan's adoption.

The meeting ordered by General Marshall to be held in General Bryden's office was scheduled for 5 February. On that date, General Marshall, General Bryden, General McNarney and his fellow committee members, and representatives of the General Staff, GHQ, and the Army Air Forces assembled to hear the plan explained. General McNair, accompanied by one of his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, represented GHQ; from War Plans came General Gerow and Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Chiefs of G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4—Brig. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle, and Maj. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, respectively—attended in person. The Air Forces was represented by Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon. The Chiefs of Arms and Services were conspicuous by their absence.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>94</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.

<sup>95</sup>Memo, JAG for CofS, 2 Feb 42, sub: Reorganization of the Army, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

<sup>96</sup>Notes on Conference in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff at 10:50 a.m., Thursday, February 5, 1942, OCS Records, Notes on Conferences and other Information, Binder 32.

After opening the meeting, General Marshall turned the proceedings over to General McNarney, who explained the outline of the proposed organization, and first called on General McNair for his views. The senior GHQ representative stated that he was enthusiastically in favor of the plan. The Chiefs of the General Staff Divisions likewise expressed their approval of the scheme. General Harmon, speaking for General Arnold, stated that the Air Forces had no general or specific objections to the plan, and was pleased with its outline. The discussion ranged through a number of organizational and implementing details, and on the whole, agreement was reached as to their solution. The only opposition that was voiced came from Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Deputy G-3, who held that the General Staff could not be so greatly reduced as the plan proposed, and still function effectively; but otherwise he agreed in principle to the over-all plan of organization. At this juncture General Marshall interposed that unless there were material cuts in the upper General Staff the plan would fail. In reply to General Bryden's suggestion that elimination of the offices of the Chiefs of Arms and subordination of the Chiefs of Services might cause loss of continuity in policy with respect to the technical development of weapons for the various arms, General Marshall declared that he personally believed that the plan would insure "a progressive and sympathetic development for all arms, and that the needs of all may be much better decided under the proposed plan." Colonel Harrison, who had not suggested the elimination of the offices of the Chiefs of Arms in his original study, now pointed out that this step would remove much undesirable branch consciousness and competition. At the conclusion of the meeting, General Marshall stated that he was pleased with the reaction of the officers who had given their opinions, and directed Gen-



eral McNarney and General Kuter (promoted three days before) to arrange a meeting with the Secretary of War to explain the reorganization plan to him.<sup>97</sup> He also directed that the Chiefs of the General Staff divisions and the other agencies represented submit their specific objections, recommendations, and comments within forty-eight hours. There being no serious objections, beyond those of General Bull, who also felt that the activities and responsibilities of the G-3 Division would be too much restricted, the plan was approved in principle and substance by General Marshall.<sup>98</sup> On 11 February he directed that an Executive Committee on Reorganization be created with General McNarney as Chairman, to implement the plan and put it into effect.<sup>99</sup>

Five days later General McNarney called the first meeting of the Executive Committee on Reorganization. Present at this session on the afternoon of 16 February were representatives of the General Staff divisions, GHQ, the Army Air Forces, and the offices of the Adjutant General, Inspector General, and Judge Advocate General. There were also representatives from the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff and from that of the Under Secretary of War. Charts outlining the reorganization to be effected were distributed to each officer present. General McNarney then formally opened the meeting and announced that the Secretary of War had approved in principle the proposed reorganization indicated on the charts. He then told the members of the committee that they had been appointed to the group by the Chief of Staff for the purpose of co-ordinating the

details and preparing the necessary directives to put the reorganization into effect. With customary terseness and direct simplicity, he then characterized the Executive Committee and its purpose as follows:

It is not a voting committee. It is not a debating society. It is a committee to draft the necessary directives. It will prepare directives and such other papers as may be necessary so that the new organization may be prepared to function as early as March 9, 1942, if so ordered by the Secretary of War.<sup>100</sup>

General McNarney informed the Executive Committee that under the reorganization "the General Staff, as such, will be drastically restricted in personnel." The G-1, G-3, and G-4 Divisions were to be allotted only 12 officers each, in contrast to their aggregate strength of 304 officers at the end of January 1942. Within the General Staff only the new "command post" was to have a large staff, with an allotment of 100 officers, about one third more than were then serving in the existing War Plans Division.<sup>101</sup> General McNarney also described the scope and categories of the directives and instructions that would be required: those defining the authority and responsibilities to be delegated to the Commanding Generals of the three major commands, Ground, Air, and Service; those covering the scope of the functions of the remodelled General Staff, and plans for the co-ordination and execution of those functions; those providing for effective methods of routing communications under the new organization; and an Executive Order for the President necessary to authorize the new organization. The remainder of the session was devoted to the assignment of these various tasks and details to appropriate members of

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.

<sup>99</sup>Memo, OCS for Chief of AAF, CofS GHQ, WPD, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, TAG, IG, and JAG, 11 Feb 42, no subject, OCS 16600-82; and Memo, OCS for General McNarney, 11 Feb 42, no subject, OCS 16600-81.

<sup>100</sup>Minutes of the Opening Session, Special Committee, Reorganization of the War Department, 16 Feb 42, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization). These minutes are reproduced in Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-60.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

the Committee, to discussion of questions relating to these assignments, and to the setting of dates for the completion of the details allotted. Towards the end of the conference General McNarney gave the following significant admonition:

I'd like to impress upon you that this is confidential and this is not to be discussed except with the people with whom it is actually necessary to get the work done. This reorganization at the moment is confidential and is not a subject for open discussion.<sup>102</sup>

The work of the Executive Committee began at once. Its members held a number of conferences in which numerous knotty details were combed out and reduced to orderly directives. Such questions as new administrative procedures and the flow of the inevitable "paper work"; the delineation of the functions of the statistical sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Army Air Forces; a new system and type of message center for the Office of the Chief of Staff; the delineation of the functions and activities of the new [Operations] Division of the General Staff, and those of the Adjutant General's Office under the new Departmental framework; and the determination of joint, co-ordinated, and individual responsibilities of the Ground Force, Air Force, and Service Commands with respect to the issuance of movement orders—all these matters, and many others, required answers and incorporation into clear instructions. Lt. Col. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., the Committee's recorder, recollected after the war that "there were quite a lot of controversial questions on which various strong opinions were aired."<sup>103</sup> Unfortunately for the historian of these events, practically no records were kept of

the deliberations and actual work of the Executive Committee on Reorganization. No minutes of the sessions (save that of the opening meeting) of the Committee and its sub-groups were taken. The Committee was not even provided with adequate stenographic help. As a result, so General Nelson wrote in 1945, "no records exist of what took place except for the final order for the circular establishing the procedures agreed upon." As to the controversial questions and the strong opinions that they drew forth *pro* and *con*, the officer declared, "You will not find these in the record any place."<sup>104</sup> Thus it is known that the provisions of the orders and circular establishing the new organization of 1942 were the result of detailed and exacting work of the Executive Committee under General McNarney; how these documents and their substance were prepared, deliberated upon, and reduced to agreement, the alternatives to the accepted procedures that were advanced and rejected, and the other processes that produced the far-reaching and revolutionary War Department Circular No. 59, must remain largely in the oblivion of unrecorded history or in scattered fragments based on the memories of the participants.<sup>105</sup>

Although the Chiefs of Arms were not consulted in advance with respect to the elimination of their offices from the War Department structure, they presented their contrary views on the subject orally to General Marshall, thus exercising their traditional right of direct access to the Chief of Staff.<sup>106</sup>

<sup>102</sup>Minutes of Special Committee meeting, 16 Feb 42, cited in footnote 100.

<sup>103</sup>Personal Letter, Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., to Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Assistant DCofS, 22 Jul 45, OCS 320 (War Department Reorganization, 1942).

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.* General Nelson wrote in this letter: "I put out the minutes of the first conference and with the stenographic help that was made available to the Committee, this took all night, and was one of the most painful experiences I recall during the reorganization. The only stenographer they would make available to us was a well-meaning young girl who had seen a typewriter once or twice, but this was all."

<sup>105</sup>Nelson, *op. cit.*, Ch. VIII, describes how a few of the details were worked out by members of the Executive Committee.

<sup>106</sup>Information obtained in interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.



The Chief of Field Artillery, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, alone of the Branch Chiefs also placed his objections on record in writing. These objections he couched in vigorous terms, and his correspondence with General Marshall on the subject affords a clear and vivid example of the views and attitudes of the combatant branch chiefs on the question of the reorganization.

On 16 February, the same day that the Executive Committee under General McNarney sat in conference to receive instructions as to implementing the details of the reorganization, General Danford addressed an earnest and impassioned appeal to General Marshall, urging that the elimination of the offices of the Combat Arms be reconsidered, and that the fighting arms each be retained under their respective chiefs and appropriately placed within the new organization. Writing with evident sincere emotion and conviction, General Danford referred with pathos to the "partition" of his office and to his desire, out of "justice to my very loyal personnel" to "go down with the sinking ship." Pointing to the marked advances in Field Artillery under the direction of the Chief of Field Artillery, he recounted the progress attained in its organization, weapons, tactics, and technique—all of which he attributed to the leadership and centralized direction exercised by the office of the Branch Chief. Branch consciousness, pride, and possessiveness were prominent in General Danford's appeal to the Chief of Staff. "I head a vital, vibrant, and living arm that takes the keenest pride in its efficiency and reputation," he wrote, and asserted that "that pride and spirit deserves to be fostered." Further, in an almost fatherly and highly possessive tone, General Danford declared:

As in any other military organization, where leadership counts, and, therefore, where officers and men work for their commanders, my Board is working for me, my School is working for me, my

Replacement Centers are working for me, my Field Artillery Association and Journal are working for me, and we are all working for the Field Artillery and for the Army.<sup>107</sup>

The consolidation of the combat arms under the proposed Ground Forces, minus their own chiefs, he further declared was potentially dangerous to the progress, development, and capabilities of these basic fighting forces: "I profoundly fear, and predict," he wrote, "a creeping paralysis in efficiency when the dead hand of divided responsibility settles again upon the Infantry and Field Artillery. From the depths of my own experience and convictions," he concluded, "I can but earnestly beg that we not sacrifice the gains that have been made in what is the very bone and sinew of the team that must win our battles—the Infantry and Field Artillery."<sup>108</sup>

General Marshall, however determined in his decision that the elimination of the offices of the Chiefs of Arms was essential to the success of the new organization, was not a man to ignore, regardless of how he disagreed with it, the sincere appeal of a long-trying, faithful, and experienced officer of marked accomplishments. Despite the pressures of a myriad details and duties and the burdens of directing the still un-reorganized Military Establishment now fully engaged in war, he found time to write, on 27 February, a kindly and considerate reply to General Danford, evidently calculated to soothe his feelings and remind him of the Chief of Staff's personal regard; but in no way did this alter the original decision.<sup>109</sup>

The Chief of Field Artillery thereupon addressed a second and final appeal to General

<sup>107</sup>Memo, General Danford for General Marshall, 16 Feb 42, no subject, OCS 16500-86.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup>Personal letter, General Marshall to General Danford, 27 Feb 42. There is no copy of this in the OCS Files, but the letter is referred to by date in General Danford's second memorandum on the subject to General Marshall, 28 February 1942, cited in the next footnote.

Marshall, in which he recited again his former arguments and reinforced them with additional observations, among them the fact that recently selected officers for the staff of the Ground Forces had not so much as bothered to call on the Chief of Field Artillery, inspect his office, or learn of its workings, techniques, methods, or organization. He also submitted other arguments to support the necessity of retaining the offices of the Chiefs of Arms, and with spirit he frankly told the Chief of Staff that:

General Craig [General Marshall's predecessor as Chief of Staff] once told me that a loyal subordinate was one who would not be deterred from the effort to keep his Chief from making what seemed to him a serious mistake.<sup>110</sup>

It was, he candidly declared, to keep General Marshall from making a very serious one that this second memorandum had been written. In conclusion, General Danford boldly pronounced a judgment that, despite its failure to achieve its purpose, sounded a dignified and impressive knell for the office he had served so long:<sup>111</sup>

We are at war—the most desperate in our history. Experimentation is not in order. The Chiefs [of Arms] were established by Act of Congress after mature consideration and expert testimony. They are about to be eliminated by a stroke of the pen. So far as Field Artillery is concerned, that elimination is contrary to war experience. If branch spirit and efficiency are of value and to be fostered, heads of branches, real, responsible, and effective are indispensable. I definitely so regard them. The new organization should be drawn to preserve them.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup>Memo, General Danford for General Marshall, 28 Feb. 42, no subject, OCS 16600-86.

<sup>111</sup>General Danford had been in the original group of officers that Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, the first Chief of Field Artillery, had ordered to his staff when he was appointed to that office. *Ibid.* General McNair, in his comments on General Danford's memorandum, referred to the latter's long record of service in the office of the Chief of Field Artillery, "to which he devoted so much of his military career." Memo, McNair for the Chief of Staff, 3 Mar 42, sub: Gen. Danford's Memorandum of February 28, OCS 16600-87.

<sup>112</sup>Memo, General Danford for General Marshall, 28 Feb. 42, no subject, OCS 1660-86.

This final appeal was also given consideration by General Marshall. He referred it to General McNair, the commander-designate of the new Ground Forces to be, for comment. General McNair, himself an artilleryman of long and distinguished career, returned a frankly considered reply which clearly illustrated the conflict of views regarding "branch consciousness" as opposed to consolidation and integration of the combat arms into a unified and balanced fighting team, to be shorn of branch prides and loyalties. It is evident from the McNair reply that the two views could not be reconciled, irrespective of the warmly acknowledged personal friendship enjoyed by the two officers. Branch control, branch consciousness, and the perpetuation of "a galaxy of bureaus," as General McNair referred to the offices of the Chiefs of Arms, could have no place in the plans for the kind of organization sought for the ground combat elements that were to wage World War II. In conclusion General McNair observed:

It is quite natural that General Danford should be distressed to see the abolition of [the] office [of the Chief of Field Artillery]. . . . Nevertheless, I discern no single feature of the new organization which is not sounder and more effective potentially than the organization which is so dear to his heart.<sup>113</sup>

After receiving General McNair's comments, General Marshall took one final step before closing the issue. He referred General Danford's two letters together with General McNair's comments to Secretary Stimson.<sup>114</sup> By this action, the Chief of Field Artillery's protests and appeals were at least heard by the highest tribunal in the Department. The Secretary took no action in the matter, since he had already approved, and had aided in securing the President's approval of the new

<sup>113</sup>Memo, General McNair for General Marshall, 3 Mar 42, sub: General Danford's Memorandum of February 28, OCS 16600-87.



organization as planned. General Danford's communications, which represented the last formal effort of the combat branch chiefs to preserve their existence, were filed without further action in the records of the Office of the Chief of Staff.

During the period of General Danford's futile efforts to have the offices of the Chiefs of Arms preserved intact, the final preparations for putting the new organization into effect were pushed to completion. At this time General Marshall gave considerable attention to the integration of Air Corps officers into the remodelled General Staff, and planned to name Air officers to head at least two of the reorganized staff divisions within the coming six months. He also personally prepared a list of air officers whom he tentatively selected for duty throughout the General Staff, and on 20 February sent this list to General Arnold with the request that he go over it and indicate his agreement or objections to the detail of the officers named.<sup>115</sup> On the same day General Marshall also cleared the necessary papers legally directing the reorganization through the Bureau of the Budget, in accordance with established procedures.<sup>116</sup> These papers included a formal communication to the President from the Secretary of War, explaining the necessity of the reorganization and the general scheme of new organization to be approved, together with a draft of an Executive Order for the President's approval. President Roosevelt formally approved the reorganization and the Executive Order authorizing it on 26 February. He directed, however, that part of the order be rephrased to make very clear

that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, would exercise "his command function in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations directly through the Chief of Staff."<sup>117</sup> The order was reworded in accordance with the President's wishes,<sup>118</sup> and was published on 28 February 1942. It was again republished to the Army as a whole by War Department bulletin on 3 March.<sup>119</sup>

In the process of completing these final preparations, General Marshall personally performed the major task of obtaining the approval of the President and the Secretary of War. General McNarney later recorded that "General Marshall did all the work of getting the final plans approved. . . . He carried the whole load and personally explained the plan to both the Secretary and the President."<sup>120</sup> In the process, only one serious objection was raised. This came from Under Secretary Robert Patterson, who at first protested strongly against the transfer of a number of detailed procurement functions and personnel from his office to the staff of the new Service command.<sup>121</sup> He was persuaded, however, to withdraw his objections, and the final approval of the new organization was complete.<sup>122</sup> On 2 March 1942, War Department Circular No. 59, which represented the summation of all the detailed work of General McNarney's Executive Committee, was published to the entire Military Establishment.<sup>123</sup> It outlined the structure of the new organization and prescribed the functions, responsibilities, and authority of each of its major component

<sup>117</sup>Personal Letter, President Roosevelt to Secretary Stimson, 26 Feb 42, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

<sup>118</sup>Personal Letter, Secretary of War to the President, 27 Feb 42, copy in WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

<sup>119</sup>Presidential Executive Order No. 9082, 28 Feb 42; and War Department Bulletin No. 11, 3 Mar 42. Both in WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

<sup>120</sup>Interview with General McNarney, 4 Aug 49, cited in footnote 80.

<sup>114</sup>General Marshall's informal indorsement in ink, "To Secretary of War, GCM," on memorandum cited in footnote 113.

<sup>115</sup>Memo, General Marshall for General Arnold, 20 Feb 42, no subject, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

<sup>116</sup>Memo, General Marshall for the Director, Bureau of the Budget, 20 Feb 42, no subject, WDCA 020 (1942) (War Department Reorganization).

parts. It directed that the new organization would take effect on 9 March. This far-reaching project, that had taken some eight months to come to fruition, was now an accomplished reality.

The reorganization of 9 March 1942 has been called "the most drastic and fundamental change which the War Department had experienced since the establishment of the General Staff by Elihu Root in 1903."<sup>124</sup> Gone was GHQ, and with it all the concepts, plans, and principles for the machinery for the Chief of Staff's field command in war, together with the efforts to implement them, that had endured for some twenty-one years. Gone were the powerful and influential Chiefs of Arms, who had exercised control over the development and destinies of their branches for an even longer span of time. Their counterparts, the Chiefs of Services, long equally strong and influential in their own respective spheres, were now relegated to subordinate positions under the command of a new overall service organization whose commanding general was soon to acquire power and influence that far exceeded the collective authority of them all. Completely transformed was the War Plans Division, which had been the strategic brain of the General Staff since its creation in 1921, and which before the end of March was to lose its familiar designation that had lasted for more than two decades. Gone, in

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup>Major reorganizations of the Office of the Under Secretary of War and of the G-4 (Supply) Division had been projected in December 1941 and January 1942. Not until February were these reorganization plans coordinated with the over-all War Department reorganization plan. For details, see Chapter II of the manuscript history by John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, to be published in the near future as a volume in THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

<sup>123</sup>Circular No. 59 is reproduced in its entirety, and with accompanying charts, in Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-89. For a summary of its provisions, particularly with respect to the new "command post," see Rav S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, pp. 93-95.

<sup>124</sup>Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

theory at least, were the former operating functions of the other four staff divisions, which were now to be reduced to mere shadows of their former size and functional activity.<sup>125</sup> Soon to go were the traditional Corps Areas, whose commanders had formerly been supreme in their own areas and spheres of responsibility, answering only to the Chief of Staff through the War Department. They, too, were now subordinated to the new Services of Supply, and were soon to lose the titular designations by which they had been known for nearly a quarter of a century. These were indeed "drastic and fundamental" changes.

Rising from the ashes of the old organization, there now emerged three great co-equal commands, clothed with autonomy, whose commanders were responsible only and directly to the Chief of Staff: the Army Ground Forces, commanded by General McNair, the former GHQ Chief of Staff; the Army Air Forces, under its former Chief, General Arnold, which had at last achieved the full autonomy within the War Department it had so long sought; and the Services of Supply (later to be redesignated the Army Service Forces), commanded by General Somervell, recently the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. As the command post for the Chief of Staff there emerged the Operations Division of the General Staff, which was to assume for General Marshall the operational supervision and top echelon direction of the war. Never in the experience of the Department had there been effected such a co-ordinate concentration of control and direction.

### (End of Part II)

<sup>125</sup>In actual practice, the change in functions and the reduction in strength of the G-2 Division were largely on paper and in the organizational titles and structure within the Division. In the long run, the G-2 Division was greatly enlarged by the establishment of the Military Intelligence Service, which represented a reorganization and expansion of the operating elements of the Division.



# THE THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF ARTILLERY AFTER WORLD WAR I

BY FRED K. VIGMAN

THE THEORETICAL derogation of artillery in the post-World War I period, derived, in the main, from the concepts of British writers, particularly Fuller, Hart and Wintringham. These thinkers agreed that the great war was essentially a stalemate, vastly costly and basically attritional. They blamed artillery for the positional warfare that developed. Reacting against immobile war, they stressed mobility, cheaper weapons and quick victories, and in doing so scored artillery adversely.

When Major General J. F. C. Fuller evolved the concept of the mobile armored army, he sought to perfect it by developing two postulates. These were his theory of the decisive nature of weapons in war, and his emphasis on the tank as central to the armored force. His stress on weapons was unequivocal and basic to his whole system of thought. In an official paper he wrote in 1919, which he again quoted in 1944, he held:

Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form ninety-nine per cent of victory. . . . Strategy, command, leadership, courage, discipline, supply organization, and all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are nothing to a high superiority of weapons—at most they go to form one per cent which makes the whole possible. . . . War is primarily a matter of weapons, and the side which can improve its weapons the more rapidly is the side which is going to win.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Fuller, "Armament and World History—the Development of Weapons in the Course of Civilization, I," *Army Ordnance*, July-August 1944.

Drawing from the experience of the first years of World War I, Fuller emphasized the inadequacy of artillery, in order to bring into sharper relief his belief that the tank was the keystone of the mobile armored force. His method was apparent in "The Mechanization of War," written in the early 1930s. He came to the point swiftly: "In 1915, a new tactical theory was propounded: it was: 'Artillery conquers and infantry occupies.'"<sup>2</sup> He added that during the third battle of Ypres, in the summer and autumn of 1917, the British

. . . fired 4,283,550 shells costing £22,000,000 in the preliminary bombardments before the battle opened. In spite of shell-power and motorization, the great artillery battles were a grim and costly failure. The answer to the tactical stalemate had been sought in tonnage of projectiles, but its true answer was to be found in surprise and the maintenance of forward movement. . . . Had the cost of the 4,283,550 shells fired at Ypres been spent on tanks, 17,134 machines could have been produced. At the battle of Amiens only 415 of these machines were used, and with decisive results.<sup>3</sup>

Tom Wintringham, writing in the 1940s, reached a like conclusion in his study of the great artillery battles of 1918.

And the result [of these battle]? The result was that at great cost of lives some square miles of swamp was gained; this swamp had been made impassable for guns and tanks by our own shells and almost impassable for troops. Artillery had become the dominant weapon, but not the decisive

<sup>2</sup>Fuller, *Army Ordnance*, January-February 1931.

weapon . . . a "decisive weapon" is more important. It achieves decision, the end of the battle, victory. The machine-gun, not the field piece or the howitzer, governed the shape of 1914-18 . . . the tank is a device for combining the fire of machine-guns (and weapons able to root out machine-guns) with movement through machine-gun fire.<sup>4</sup>

This, of course, was a variant of Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's theory of the machine-gun as the decisive weapon. The tank logically became the central weapon because it was both the machine-gun carrier and the machine-gun killer.

An evaluation of the role of artillery in World War I from a less particularist and more objective viewpoint gave it a preponderant value. The consensus was that the weight of Allied artillery ground the Germans to a stop and stabilized the fighting into positional or trench warfare. From the German side (albeit unofficially) this was noted by Hermann Foertsch and Ludwig Rehn. The former observed ". . . the fact was that the effect of the enemy's fire was greater than anyone had anticipated . . . The artillery had gained in importance to a degree never dreamed of."<sup>5</sup> Rehn wrote that ". . . after the Battle of the Marne the Allied Powers began to make up their artillery backwardness very rapidly, and by the end of the war were superior in artillery to Germany."<sup>6</sup> The evaluation by an American historian, Irving M. Gibson, was even more emphatic. "When the Germans renewed their large scale offensive on the Western Front in 1916 at Verdun, it was the newly created French heavy artil-

lery which beat them back and saved the country."<sup>7</sup>

The Fuller thesis of the mobile versus the positional, the tank versus artillery, found a response, since it was in rapport with the post-war search of all governments for economy in military establishments. Fuller's computation of the cost of artillery in terms of thousands of tanks carried the appeal of a cheaper and presumably a superior armament. The association of artillery with long-drawn out attrition and its fearful costs also lost it friends.

The Germans were especially susceptible to the Fuller thesis since they assessed their experience with artillery rather low. At Verdun they had nearly 200 batteries of heavy-caliber pieces which opened the battle on February 21, 1916. The ensuing cannonade was perhaps the greatest of all time, and the disappointment in the outcome was in inverse ratio to their complete dependence on heavy and heaviest caliber,<sup>8</sup> an all-or-nothing attitude given a negative cast by the Allied victory of 1918.

Haunted by the remembrance of unsuccessful attritional warfare, the Nazis chose the mobile-and-armored-force concept. Artillery was belittled, as Major Erwin Lessner pointed out in his study of German war preparations, despite the warning of artillerists that such a policy would reduce their firepower below that of their designated enemies.

Their figures, later borne out by the facts, showed that the weight of metal thrown by all firearms of a German unit within a certain time was to that thrown by a Russian one as 5:7,<sup>9</sup> the greatest sacrifice of firepower being of the heaviest pieces. Goering and

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Tom Wintringham, *The Story of Weapons and Tactics from Troy to Stalingrad*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1943.

<sup>5</sup>Hermann Foertsch, *The Art of Modern Warfare*. New York, 1940.

<sup>6</sup>Ludwig, Renn, *Warfare; the Relation of War to Society* (translated by Edward Fitzgerald). New York: Oxford University Press, 1939.

<sup>7</sup>Irving M. Gibson, "Maginot and Liddell Hart: the Doctrines of Defense," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. by Edward Mead Earle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.

<sup>8</sup>Lt. Col. Paul W. Thompson, "Sevastopol and Verdun," *Infantry Journal*, January 1943.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.



other strategists, according to Lessner, counted on a superior mobility to make up for their artillery deficiency. The *blitzkrieg* was hence a necessity, since the Reich had neither the men, machines, nor raw materials to deal properly with the artillery shortage.<sup>10</sup> Another student of *blitzkrieg* warfare noted that "... the new weapon, the dive-bomber, was developed partially to replace the great masses of artillery which were a feature of the last World War."<sup>11</sup>

Nazi successes during the first two years of the war seemed to have vindicated the policy of by-passing artillery. Success, inviting imitation, the Allied powers sought to catch up with German arms and abandoned artillery as the central weapon on the battlefield. Churchill, in his recently published memoirs, revealed the extent to which the Allied leaders believed that the power of the field piece had been nullified. His first belief that the anti-tank gun and field gun could frustrate or break up tanks was shaken, he wrote, when "... the Hitler inrush of a vast offensive, led by spearpoint masses of cannon-proof or heavily armored vehicles, breaking up all defensive opposition, for the first time in centuries, and even perhaps since the invention of gunpowder [rendered cannon] impotent on the battlefield."<sup>12</sup>

Churchill was to undergo a change of heart and policy as a result of the experience of Imperial troops in desert fighting. Paradoxically, the German all-purpose 88mm gun was to be the influencing factor. In his continuing memoirs Churchill quoted a memorandum distributed October 7, 1941, holding that "... renown awaits the Commander who first in this war restores Artillery to its prime

importance upon the battlefield, from which it has been ousted by heavily armoured tanks . . . our guns must no more retreat on the approach of tanks than Wellington's squares at Waterloo on the approach of hostile cavalry."<sup>13</sup>

The deadly efficacy of the German 88s at the debacle of Knightsbridge box, Black Saturday June 12, 1942, in which 230 tanks of the 300 that sallied forth that morning, were destroyed or badly shot up, with almost no enemy casualties, caused a fundamental reorientation in arms. The crisis was resolved by a change in command and by restoring artillery to a central place in the battle formation. This was indicated by the great counter offensive that began at the battle of El Alamein, which was opened October 23, 1942 with 832 twenty-five pounders and 753 six pounders. In explaining the factors of Montgomery's victory, Major General Sir Francis De Guingand held that the massive use of artillery was the most important factor.<sup>14</sup> The about face was emphasized by Brigadier W. C. Antsey when describing the turn in the tide at Alamein, in "Return of the Guns."

This return to the guns to a major role on the battlefield, carried further in Sicily and, be it noted, duplicated in Russia, is remarkable. The need of infantry for all the firepower that can be given them was foreseen by the Germans and was met by their development of the mortar. But there they stopped. Placing their faith in mortars, dive bombers, and the tank, they failed to foster the artillery.

Although independently arrived at, Russian reliance on artillery followed closely on British experience. The victory at Stalingrad clinched the central position for artillery in the Soviet Army. The Russian counter-offen-

<sup>10</sup>Major Erwin Lessner, *Blitzkrieg and Bluff: the Legend of Nazi Invincibility* (translated by A. B. Ashton). New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943.

<sup>11</sup>Major F. O. Miksche, *Attack: A Study of Blitzkrieg Tactics*. New York, 1942.

<sup>12</sup>Winston Churchill, "The Second World War, Book II." *The New York Times*, May 5, 1948.

<sup>13</sup>"Artillery Today: the British find the Light Howitzer a Versatile Weapon," *Army Ordnance*, January-February 1943.

<sup>14</sup>De Guingand, *Operation Victory*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947.

sive which opened November 19, 1942, under the command of Marshal of Artillery Voronov, began with a barrage that surpassed any in previous battles, and was officially credited with being the principal cause of the German rout. Lieutenant General Ignati Prochko asserted that artillery was the weapon which stopped the Germans after their initial victories, and stabilized the front before Leningrad and Moscow.

The Germans suffered their first heavy defeat near Moscow in the autumn of 1941. In this rout of the enemy, the Soviet artillery played a decisive part. Stubborn battles between German tank divisions and the Soviet artillery ended in victory for the Russian gunners. More than 1,500 tanks—thirteen tank divisions—attacking Moscow were destroyed on the outskirts of the capital; and the majority were lost as a result of artillery fire. By the summer of 1944, the Germans had lost seventy thousand of their tanks on the Soviet-German front. Those losses came as a result of the power of Soviet artillery.<sup>15</sup>

American arms-component concepts were similar to those of our European Allies. They called for attainment of parity with the Germans in the tank and plane team, which team was considered the spearhead of the armored force. But the series of victories over the Germans, after El Alamein, caused a reevaluation and the *Field Service Regulations* June 15, 1944, conceded that no one arm wins battles. A cautious qualification crept in in the section on artillery, "Concentrations of artillery fire are regulated to bring the greatest possible volume to fire on objectives of decisive importance at the critical moments of the attack."

Actual combat experience further modified the non-committal stand on naming a decisive weapon. Major General John A. Crane, a senior artillery officer, said

With the campaigns in Poland and France, in 1939 and 1940, came a huge expansion of our armored force. "Blitzkrieg" was the password, and prosaic, conventional artillery was "stream-

lined" down and cut to the bone. We learned the hard way. We learned that it took artillery and still more artillery, to counter tanks and enemy artillery.<sup>16</sup>

As the Western campaign progressed, the role of artillery was stepped up. Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins wrote to Brigadier General W. B. Palmer of the VII Corps Artillery, summing up American experience in the crisis of the Battle of the Bulge.

The great superiority of our artillery gave us a tremendous edge on the Germans. . . . This was true throughout the campaign, but especially during the deadly fighting about Aachen in the critical days of September, October and November 1944, when the VII Corps was extended over a wide front and vulnerable to enemy attacks from three sides.<sup>17</sup>

Brigadier General G. M. Wells singled out the 155 mm. cannon (the M1) as the outstanding piece, indeed as the prime weapon on the Western front.

The Germans paid a belated tribute to artillery in recounting their experiences on the Eastern Front. One Captain von Schnau, writing in the *Artilleristische Rundschau*, May 1944, contended that ". . . artillery has shown itself, especially in defense, to be the backbone of the front."<sup>18</sup> Such evaluation, pragmatic rather than theoretical, served to restore the concept of artillery as the capstone in the arms-component on the battlefield. But only one of the British writers mentioned above, publicly recognized the fact. Captain Liddell Hart admitted his failure properly to appreciate the role of artillery, "Contrary to my anticipation the ordinary field gun has continued to play a very large part in this war—helped by the fact that it now fires a somewhat heavier shell, and is generally motor-driven."<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup>"Must We Always Learn the Hard Way," *The Field Artillery Journal*, June 1946.

<sup>17</sup>*The Field Artillery Journal*, September 1946.

<sup>18</sup>Quoted from "Artillery in Major Battles" (translated in the *Military Review*, December 1944).

<sup>19</sup>Hart, "Some Lessons of the European Warfare," *Yale Review*, Spring 1945.

<sup>15</sup>*Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., November 17, 1945.



## THE STORMY CAREER OF CAPTAIN MC NEILL, CONTINENTAL NAVY

BY WILLIAM J. MORGAN\*

RANKING THIRD on the seniority list of naval captains commissioned by Congress in 1776 was Hector McNeill, of Massachusetts. Captain McNeill was born in Ireland of Scotch ancestry. Possessing long valuable sea experience, McNeill was, however, destined to a brief tumultuous career in the Continental Navy. He was given command of the frigate *Boston*, 24 guns, then outfitting in the city of the same name. Although constantly prodded by the Marine Committee, McNeill was unable to get his ship to sea until May 1777.

Many and long were the tribulations of a Revolutionary War captain trying to supply and man a vessel of war. Certainly not the least of the varied problems was enlisting and keeping a crew. Desertions were a routine occurrence, and in desperation McNeill appealed to the Council of Massachusetts:

What I would more particularly point out at this time, is that there is scarcely a day passes but instances offer, of desertions from Regiments and Ships in the Continental Service, yet within my Knowledge there has not been a single instance of punishing an offender. . . . With what Spirit can an officer advance Monies to Cloathe the Naked Objects, who offer themselves, as willing to serve in their severall Capacity's, if the next moment those Men may with impunity go away in a Privateer, or enter into any other Corps, either by Sea or Land? and run no risque by being detected?\*

\*Lt. Commander Morgan is in the Naval History Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.

\*\*Most of the McNeill quotations in this article are extracted from letters and papers gathered by the eminent naval historian, the late Gardner W. Allen, and printed in the *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, November, 1921.

To counter this evil and retake the run-aways, McNeill urged that Massachusetts pass regulations, "whereby all Travellers, on the Publick Roads, should be obliged to give an account of themselves, to proper persons of the Committee's of Safety, in each Town as they pass." Several of McNeill's seamen ran off to Marblehead, joined the crew of the privateer *Rising States*, and he was powerless to do anything about it.

After soul-trying difficulty, McNeill mustered a crew of over two hundred officers and men. Guns and supplies were begged from any likely source as the Captain went deeply into personal debt to ready his ship for sea. At last, agents were appointed to receive any prizes sent in by the *Boston*, and McNeill sailed in company with the *Hancock*, 32 guns, Captain John Manley.

Happy he was to get to sea: "The long wish'd for hour is at last come in which I bid farewell, to the sleepy Agents, disheartned Tradesmen and distress'd Seamen who frequent the Street of Boston." . . . "For mine own part, I have Suffered so much in fitting out the Ship I now have the Honour to Command, that I do not think I would undertake such a Task again for any Sum whatever unless I was better Supported than I have been hitherto."

Captain Manley, formerly Commodore of "Washington's Fleet" during the siege of Boston, was senior to McNeill and commanded the two ship squadron. This boded ill for the success of the venture; it was well-known that bad blood existed between the Captains.

These old independent merchant sailors did not take kindly to the discipline and restraints of naval service. Dr. Samuel Cooper sensed trouble when he informed John Adams, 3 April 1777, "Manley and McNeal do not agree. It is not, I believe, the Fault of the first. . . . If they are not better united, infinite Damage may accrue."

On 29 May, the squadron captured one small brig. At dawn the next day, the Americans fell in with a British convoy of three ships escorted by the *Somerset*, 64 guns. McNeill reported that, "Capt: Manley was not convinced of the size of our Opponent untill she was with Shott of him, when very Luckily for him the Hancocks Heels saved his Bacon." *Somerset* left her merchant charges to give chase to the *Hancock* and *Boston* for some six hours before nightfall compelled her return to the convoy.

The cruise remained uneventful until 7 June, when Manley's ships came up with the British frigate *Fox*. A "Spitefull Short Action" ensued between the *Hancock* and the Britisher. "The *Fox* had pegg'd Mr. Manley's ribs so well that he had his pumps going." Finally the *Boston* closed to gunshot range or as a crew member's journal tells us, "at Last we Came up and Gave them a Noble Broid Side witch made them to Strike a meadeatly a Bout half after one." McNeill seizing the palm of victory, sent his First Lieutenant, Mr. Browne, on board the *Fox* to command the prize crew. This was too much for the Commodore. He summarily replaced Lt. Browne.

After taking the *Fox*, McNeill urged Manley to turn southward for the Carolina coast where the chance of falling in with a superior force was less than in the northern latitudes. But, Manley "did as he pleas'd" and "we loiter'd away three weeks or a Month." "I follow'd him," continued McNeill, "as the Jackall does the Lyon, without Grumbling."

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon 6 July

1777, three British vessels began to chase Manley's squadron. McNeill was bringing up the rear. The British vessels were the ship *Rainbow*, 44, frigate *Flora*, 32, and the brig *Victor*, 10. By the next morning, the British and American vessels were separated by five or six miles. The distance was gradually closed and a hot but one-sided action followed. Commodore Collier, in the *Rainbow*, took out after Manley's *Hancock*, which a British officer, who had been held prisoner in Boston, recognized. Collier reported that Manley, "struck the Rebel Colours to His Majesty's ship, after a Chace of upwards of 39 hours." The prize vessel *Fox* struck to the *Flora* at about 6 P.M., 7 July. Captain Brisbane of the *Flora* reported that, "The Ship that we afterwards learned to be the *Boston* was, at the time the *Fox* struck, as far to windward as we could but discover the head of her Topsails out of the Water." This was Captain McNeill running for sanctuary in the mouth of the Sheepscott River on the Maine coast. McNeill had exchanged several rounds with the English before departing and two men aboard his vessel were killed, but the *Boston* had offered no really effective assistance to her consorts.

Thus, trapped in "Sheepgut" River, ended the ignominious first and only cruise of Captain Hector McNeill, Continental Navy. The *Boston* and her unhappy captain were hemmed in by British cruisers off the river-mouth until able to slip out on 10 August and skulk into Boston on 21 August, from whence McNeill had departed with great hope three months before.

While bottled up at Wiscasset, McNeill's pen poured forth his troubles to the Marine Committee, to John Langdon, Continental Agent at Portsmouth, to the Council of Massachusetts, to Captain Thomas Thompson and to his wife, among others. He sent 16 prisoners taken from the *Fox* overland to Boston. Two of the sixteen escaped at



Falmouth, or as McNeill put it in a letter to the Committee of Safety for that town, they were, "Negligently left behind in this place." He then proceeded to admonish the Committee in no uncertain terms.

Were our poor Countrymen who unfortunately fall into the hands of the Enemy no better guarded or let run at loose in this manner we might entertain some hopes of their being able to find their way once more to their own home, but alas the contrary is too well known. Many of them have been constrain'd to take arms against their Country, all who refuse so to do have been close confin'd and treated with such cruelty as would Shock the heart of a Barbarian untill they can be redeem'd by Exchange suffer they must. . . . This is but poor encouragement for Men to enter into the Service of their Country, who tho they may take and convey home Prisoners enough to redeem themselves in case of their being taken, yet have only this Melancholy reflection for their Comfort. Namely That their indolent, faithless Countrymen, suffer such to Slip through their fingers, while they poor Souls are sure to perish in a Prison unless they be redeem'd.

But the Falmouth Committee of Safety and Captain Manley were not the only causes of grumbings in McNeill's "gizzard." Richard Palmes, Marine Captain aboard the *Boston*, provoked further anger. On 10 August 1777, McNeill put his Marine Captain under arrest with the following order.

Your unofficer like behaviour and repeated breach of my Orders, obliges me to confine you to your birth untill it may be in my power to bring you to a Court Martial, where I hope you will have justice done.

The next day McNeill issued a further clarifying order to Palmes.

You may thank your own folly and impertinence for what has now befallen you. I dispise your insinuations of Cruelty, as indeed I do Every thing Else you can say of me consistent with truth. You may go to the house of Office as offten as Nature calls, provided you return immediately to your berth and keep your Tounge Still as you pass and repass. This you will attend to at your Perril.

On 25 August 1777, McNeill wrote to the Marine Committee requesting a court-martial

for Palmes, characterizing him as a "composition of the Fool and Knave" who cast his commission into the fire aboard the *Boston* and was guilty of other, "frothy foolish conduct." Then, on 9 September McNeill informed the Navy Board that he had allowed Palmes some liberty at the request of his fellow-officers. Had he behaved properly, said McNeill, he would have forgotten "all that was past." However, he continued, Palmes seemed incurable and so the Navy Board was asked to bring him to trial as soon as possible, specifically charged with, "misapplication of the Ships Stores, Neglect of duty, disobedience of orders, and attempts to Excite Murmuring and Mutiny among the Ships Company."

While under arrest, Palmes made his way from Boston to Providence where he presented himself and his case before two members of the Navy Board. These worthy gentlemen were so impressed that they not only tried to get Palmes his share of prize money, which McNeill was withholding, but ordered the Marine Captain transferred from the *Boston* to the *Warren* then at Providence. When Captain McNeill learned of this utter disregard for his authority he was bitterly outraged. He eloquently expressed his indignation to the Marine Committee.

This I must Complain of as a most unprecedented Step. Never was a man taken from under Arrest and preffer'd to any other Employment without first undergoing a Court Martial. If precedents of this kind be permitted once to take place, farewell Discipline and good Order, farewell Honour, and honesty. The Service will then become a recepticall for unclean birds who will hereby be Encouraged to take Shelter there, and all men of good principals will totally forsake it.

Ignoring McNeill's arguments and impassioned plea, the Marine Committee upheld the authority of the Navy Board to order "the Exchange of any officers from one Ship to another as the service may require." And here the issue dropped. Two years later

Palmes was apparently in trouble again for we find the Marine Committee writing to the Navy Board that, "if Captain Palmes has transgressed in any manner that will subject him to a Court Martial it is our desire that you immediately Order One to be held upon him." Nevertheless, on a list of commissioned officers of the War of the Revolution sent by Secretary of War Knox to President Washington in 1794, is the name of Marine Captain Richard Palmes, with no indication that he suffered any disciplinary action.

The experience with Palmes soured McNeill on Marine officers in general. Here is what he had to say to the Marine Committee on this subject.

I must now beg leave to give my Opinion respecting Marine officers for such Ships as ours, so much hampered for want of room. I think in conscience a Subaltern is Enough, three Marine officers takes up so much room to accommodate them that we are pinch'd beyond measure to afford it. Then they have Little or no duty to do, are allways in the way and apt to disagree with the Sea officers so that it takes much trouble to mannage them, then they run away with so much of the prize money from Officers who are really usefull, that 'tis painfull to hear the murmurings it Occasions. Might it not be proper to Lessen their Number down to one on board and give what the other two did Enjoy between the Chaplin and Surg'n.

Captain Manley, in the *Hancock*, it will be remembered, had been taken prisoner by the British when McNeill's *Boston* had escaped to Maine. Referring to his late Commodore in a letter to the Marine Committee, McNeill with great magnanimity wrote, "I hold it criminal to asperse the character of any man much more the Absent." "But," he continued, "inasmuch as I find myself involved in a chain of difficultys by his blunders and misconduct, I must in justice to my self say, That he is totally unequal to the Command with which he has been intrusted, he being ignorant, Obstinate, Overbearing and

Tyranical beyond discription, a man under whose command none can live with pleasure but such creatures as himself, and those also must be of his own makeing."

McNeill's analysis of Manley's character and qualifications, however, was not enthusiastically received by all. James Warren of the Eastern Navy Board wrote to John Adams in September, 1777, that McNeill's officers would not go to sea with him again, and that they placed the blame for the disastrous cruise on the captain of the *Boston* and not Manley. Warren mentions McNeill's "unlimited conceit."

By June of 1778, Manley, who had been exchanged, returned to Boston. A Court of Inquiry was held for the loss of the *Hancock* and Manley was acquitted. During the same month Captain McNeill was tried for failure to support Manley, was found guilty, and removed from the naval service.

The court's decision was a stunning blow to McNeill. He found himself "thereby rob'd of his reputation and exposed to perpetuall infamy." John Paul Jones freely offered his condolences to McNeill, but it does not seem that his aid went beyond sympathy.

"Exceedingly Agrieved," the former captain of the *Boston* went to Philadelphia where he remained many months in a futile effort to have the court-martial decision reversed. The Marine Committee did recommend to Congress on 15 January 1779 that "the Sentence of the Court Martial against Capt. McNeill be not carried into execution." But for some reason Congress did not consider the report and McNeill's suspension stood. Thereafter, he returned to Massachusetts and engaged in privateering, but never again served in a vessel of the Continental Navy. A Mr. Gray of Portsmouth recorded, "Capt. Hector McNeill was lost at sea on Christmas night, 1785."



---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

## NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

---

### THE HISTORIAN AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY: SOME REFLECTIONS FOR AIR FORCE HISTORIANS\*

BY PAUL J. SCHEIPS

#### I

HOWEVER MUCH we as individuals may abhor war and all its ramifications—and presumably most of us do—the historians cannot ignore the role of war and violence in human history. Even we in the democratic United States have experienced much warfare. Counting the Revolutionary War, we have engaged in the course of 175 years in 14 wars and in addition, “in over 170 distinct military campaigns.”<sup>1</sup>

Military history is of course but one phase of history, but as long as we have military forces it will remain an important phase, for it can teach us military lessons for the future. It cannot be ignored because it “has been an inescapable aspect of the human story.”<sup>2</sup> Given our imperfect world and the repeated experience we have had with warfare, it would seem that we in the United States should have given considerable attention to military history. Yet, in the past, we have not done so, either as individuals or as a government. As a maritime power, however, it is fitting that our greatest student of strategy and its history, and our outstanding

exception to the generalization made here, was a naval officer, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who wrote on the role of the Navy.<sup>3</sup> Historians, however, are aware that the United States has never been a militaristic nation and that in spite of the violence we have

that the Nation had engaged in 12 wars up to the time of publication. The Korean conflict is of course an additional one, with a legal and international character quite different from any previous armed conflict in which we have been engaged. The wars referred to, as listed and described *ibid.*, Tables 36-41, are: the American Revolution, Franco-American War, Tripolitan War, War of 1812, War with Algiers, Mexican War, American Civil War, Spanish-American War, Boxer Expedition, Mexican Revolution (during which the U.S. bombarded and occupied Vera Cruz and undertook a punitive expedition against Pancho Villa), World War I, Russian Revolution (during which the U.S. participated in the Allied expeditions against Bolshevik Russia following World War I), and World War II. Some of these were hardly wars in the modern sense, but together they involved two decades or more of fighting. Certainly the list is formidable, particularly when our military campaigns are added to it. These would include, e.g., the Indian campaigns, the Philippine Insurrection, and interventions in Latin America. Counting all these the U.S. has been involved in some military campaign or war for an average of more than one year since 1776. By that year the American people had already had much experience in colonial wars and campaigns.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel Eliot Morison, “Faith of a Historian,” *The American Historical Review* [hereafter referred to as AHR], LVI (Jan. 1951), 267. This was Morison’s presidential address at the annual dinner of the American Historical Association in Chicago, 29 Dec. 1950.

<sup>3</sup>Mahan was honored abroad before he was accepted at home. He not only wrote much himself, but much has been written about him and his concept of seapower. See, e.g., Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942), chap. xiii (“Alfred Thayer Mahan: Sea Power and the New Manifest Destiny [1889-1897]”), pp. 202-22.

\*This is an elaboration of a paper prepared for a conference of all unit historians of the Air Proving Ground, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, 10 April 1951. The author is Asst. Chief, Historical Division, AAG, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

<sup>1</sup>Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (2 vols., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), I, 636, apparently excluded the Revolutionary War in stating

known and participated in our great energies have been primarily absorbed by the requirements of a growing democratic nation. Although there are undoubtedly limits beyond which we cannot safely go, it is appropriate to point out that in spite of the horrors and expense of our greatest war, we emerged from it in 1945 industrially stronger and more populous than we had ever been in the past.

In keeping with the constitutional nature of our government in which military considerations must be subordinated to the overriding requirements of the civil state, not even our armed forces gave very much attention to a military history program until recently. Indeed, as recently as the post-World War I years "the United States had no true military history program." By contrast,

Great Britain, Germany, Austria and other European countries did important work in this field and by writing the story of their forces managed to learn a number of lessons which were of value to them in World War II. The Germans and the Russians developed their historical programs to the extent that their historians (frequently of relatively high rank) were able to contribute directly to the development of doctrine. The United States, on the other hand, after a few trials at military history decided only to publish an official order of battle, and to produce volumes of selected documents of the war. . . .<sup>4</sup>

The situation which produced World War II was responsible for the conviction among our nation's leaders that a careful recording of military history might be an aid in providing national security in the future. Thus there developed the present historical programs of the armed services, the Air Force program having been fathered by the Army Air Forces which "took a considerable lead

in the field, and built up a number of historical units in 1943."<sup>5</sup>

Today the historical program of the Air Force is organized to support the USAF Historical Division, which is located at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The objective of the program, as stated in the governing regulations, are to:

- a. Collect and preserve historical records.
- b. Prepare and publish histories and monographs in order that an objective, comprehensive, accurate, and unbiased record of the Air Force may be maintained.
- c. Prepare special studies for use in various phases of planning.
- d. Perform research for the purpose of answering queries posed by components of the Department of Defense or other authorized Government agencies.

---

represented the Historical Division, Department of the Army. The point of neglect is also made in the "Guide to the Writing of American Military History," *Military Affairs*, XIV (1950), 7.

<sup>5</sup>Pogue, "The Writing of Military History," *AMC Conference Proceedings*, p. 6.

It has been pointed out that "there was no official history of American military aviation undertaken during World War I. What qualifications might be necessary to that statement would be this: Suddenly at the last moment all squadrons were ordered to appoint some officer to compile his history. This order was varyingly obeyed with results which may hardly fall within the definition of the word 'History.' The lessons of World War I military aviation were in part lost for lack of a scientifically compiled record. A simple scientifically based prognostication of what would have come had the war lasted a few months longer [based upon the historical record] was buried beneath the residue of rush, reaction, and general retrenchment." "Army Air Forces Historical Program," a paper read by Lt. Col. Clanton W. Williams, Chief, Historical Division, AC/AS, Intelligence, at the meeting of the American Historical Association in New York, 30 Dec. 1943, p. 1. (This quotation is taken from a mimeographed release of the Bureau of Public Relations, War Dept.)

The development of the present program can be traced back at least to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's letter to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 4 March 1942, stating his "hope that officials in war agencies will bear in mind the importance of systematic records. . . ." For a longer quotation from this Roosevelt letter and the development of the program to the end of 1943, see *ibid*, in *toto*.

<sup>4</sup>Forrest C. Pogue, "The Writing of Military History" (a digest), *Proceedings of the Conference of Field Historians, Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 15-16-17 November 1949* [mimeographed; hereafter referred to as *AMC Conference Proceedings*], p. 6. Dr. Pogue



- e. Prepare historical data, including determination of combat credit.
- f. Develop through publication of scholarly, interesting volumes the military education of present and future members of the Armed Services and a sound public understanding of air power and the role of military aviation in exerting this power.<sup>6</sup>

The regulation further lays it down that the Air University is responsible for maintaining an effective Air Force Historical Program. This includes over-all supervision of the global Air Force Historical Program, assembling and maintaining an Air Force historical archives [which contains over 500,000 documents on the World War II period alone], preparation of the official history of the Army air component of 18 September 1947 and the Air Force thereafter, preparation of the annual history of Headquarters USAF and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, preparation of the history of Air Force participation in the Atomic Energy Program, and preparation for the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, USAF, of reports of a historical nature as may be required including the Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force.<sup>7</sup>

An additional responsibility of the Air University, which is perhaps self-evident and therefore not specifically stated in the regulation, is "to advise and assist" its faculty and students<sup>8</sup> by making available to them the records which are in the archives of the

University and the USAF Historical Division.

It is here that the function of the unit historian and the place and purpose of the unit history begin to be evident. The unit histories of the lowest echelons provide the basis for the histories of the next higher echelons, and so on, and this is true for both the operating units and the staff sections. The histories of detachments, squadrons, groups, wings, and air divisions, to name the most usual subordinate operating units, are used in the preparation of numbered air force and command histories, although they do not usually constitute the sole basis of the latter histories. More than this, however, the histories of these subordinate units stand as histories in their own right. Copies are transmitted regularly to the USAF Historical Division for its permanent archives<sup>9</sup> and at the same time should be maintained in the files of the preparing offices and in the files of the numbered air forces and the commands. Thus they are maintained for constant reference as the need arises. The need, it can be said, may range from the necessity to trace the military descent of an organization to orienting a new commanding officer and other personnel. Higher echelons have some discretion in determining how often subordinate units must submit histories. At present numbered air forces and commands prepare and transmit their own histories to the USAF Historical Division semiannually.<sup>10</sup> Copies of air force and command histories, of course, must also be kept on file in permanent air force and command archives for they, like the histories of subordinate units, are constantly needed for reference purposes. In passing, attention should be called to the histories of staff sections, the importance of which some Air Force personnel tend to over-

<sup>6</sup>AFR 210-3, 30 Aug. 1951, par. 2. Such objectives are commonly included in command regulations, as in APGR 210-5, 11 Dec. 1950, par. 2; ConACR 210-1, 7 April 1950, par. 3; and the recently issued ADCR 210-1, 9 March 1951, par. 3.

<sup>7</sup>AFR 210-3, 30 Aug. 1951, par. 3. For an excellent recent description of the "USAF Historical Program," see the article by that title by Albert F. Simpson, Chief, USAF Historical Division, *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, LXXXIX (13 October 1951), 189, 214.

<sup>8</sup>Albert F. Simpson, "Field Histories in the USAF Historical Program," *AMC Conference Proceedings*, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup>AFR 210-3, 30 Aug. 1951, par. 3d.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, par. 3.

look. Full and complete histories of staff sections, the planning and supervisory agencies of the Air Force, are vital and should be regularly submitted on all levels.

If unit histories are incomplete or inaccurate the historical program will suffer and, as a result, the Air Force may suffer because these unit histories and those of the air forces, commands, and comparable organizations are the basis for the official histories and special studies which are prepared by the USAF Historical Division, as well as the special studies prepared by the students and staff at the Air University. Some of these play an important part in the determination of high policy. To get down to cases, poor unit histories will provide a poor basis for the special study on armament testing, personnel administration, morale, organization, or any one of the many other subjects on which staff studies might be required for help in the solution of particular problems.

In order to determine what constitutes a good unit history it is necessary to know first what a historian is and what history itself is.

### III

It is profitable to discover first what competent historians regard as the characteristics and functions of a historian. Samuel Eliot Morison, our leading student of naval history, believes intellectual honesty, an ability to see matters in balance and proportion, and skepticism are among the characteristics without which a writer cannot call himself a historian.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Morison, "Faith of a Historian," *AHR*, LVI, 262-71. Morison believes (*ibid.*, p. 271) "too rigid specialization is almost as bad for a historian's mind, and for his ultimate reputation, as too early an indulgence in broad generalization and synthesis." The Air Force historian on the lowest echelons perhaps cannot avoid great limitations to his scope, but those on the highest echelons can conceivably prevent over-specialization by writing on at least several of the many phases of Air Force history, to which numerous disciplines contribute—economics, politics, education, psychology, engineering, physics, etc.

For almost 2500 years, Morison says, Western civilization has recognized truth

as the essence of history. . . . Sublimating his own views of what ought to have been or should be, he must apply himself to ascertaining what really happened. Of course his own sense of values will enter into his selection and arrangement of facts. It goes without saying that complete "scientific" objectivity is unattainable by the historian. His "choice of facts to be recorded, his distribution of emphasis among them, his sense of their significance and relative proportion, must be governed by his philosophy of life." . . . The fundamental question is "What actually happened, and why?"<sup>12</sup>

Thus, for example, if a historian should discover through his research a sequence of events bearing on an important change of command, he should state the facts involved and interpret them as best he can so as to explain the change and the reasons for it for the benefit of some future student or policymaker who otherwise would probably be at a complete loss. To suppress the facts involved in such a sequence out of regard for some person's feelings or because controversial issues are involved, as has been done upon occasion, is intellectual dishonesty and a prostituting of the function of history. The result is not true history and its value is questionable.

The historian must select and arrange the most significant facts that most accurately explain and describe the course of particular happenings of the past. "The historian's professional duty," Morison declares, "is primarily to illuminate the past for his hearers or readers; only secondarily and derivatively should he be concerned with influencing the

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 263, and the references there. Morison slightly misquotes Laurence L. Howe, "Historical Method and Legal Education," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* [hereafter *AAUP Bulletin*], XXVII (summer 1950), 353, who writes: "The fundamental question [regarding history] is what actually happened and how we know it."



future.”<sup>13</sup> Without intellectual honesty, “the quality that the public in free countries always has expected of historians,”<sup>14</sup> the past cannot be illuminated. It may appear only darkly, as in the case of suppression of facts; or a corner of it may be lighted by an unnatural glare, as when a set of facts has been deliberately or carelessly distorted. In either case it cannot be said that it is illuminated.

One aspect of intellectual honesty, Morison rightly points out, is the historian’s feeling of “a sense of responsibility to his public. . . . His decisions . . . may well enter into the stream of history and vitally affect the future.” (If a failure in a mission is reported as a success, may this not influence still another failure in the future, perhaps at a most critical time?) At the same time, “the historian who knows, or thinks he knows, an unmistakable lesson of the past, has the right and the duty to point it out, even though it counteract his own beliefs or social theories.”<sup>15</sup>

Balance and proportion (*mesure*) in history can be illustrated in diplomatic history, for example, by saying that it cannot be written simply by dealing with exchanges of diplomatic correspondence divorced from “the forces of economics, public opinion, and the like behind the foreign offices.”<sup>16</sup> In other words, the historian cannot relate a given set of facts in a vacuum and thereby produce a balanced history in which events

and activities are seen in their proper perspective. He should relate them to other events in the world of which he writes. This may seem at first glance to be impossible for the unit historian writing an organizational history at a low echelon, for he may not believe that he can see very much of the world from his vantage point. But he can see more than he thinks he can and he can achieve a certain balance if he will relate the history of the particular activities of his unit during the period he reviews to those of preceding periods; or if he will show how his unit—perhaps a staff division—plans for, supervises, and then evaluates the operations of a particular squadron; or if he will show how the activities of his unit mesh with those of another or, even more important, how they fail to mesh because they duplicate and overlap.

In commenting upon skepticism as “an important historical tool,” Morison states that “it is the starting point of all revision of hitherto accepted history,” and he declares that “every historian should be wary of his [own] preconceptions, and be just as critical of them, skeptical of them, as of the writings of his predecessors”<sup>17</sup> (or, he might have added, of the alleged facts and of the opinions and assertions he dredges up in the course of his research). To take an extremely elementary example, this means that the unit historian should not accept as fact an assertion that a certain unit was redesignated at a certain time. He should examine the relevant order.

In the *Manual for Air Force Historians* the personal qualifications of such historians are stated as follows:

The historian should have enough native *curiosity* to want to know what is happening in his unit and enough *initiative* to go out and get the facts. He should have such innate *honesty* that

<sup>13</sup>Morison, “Faith of a Historian,” *AHR*, LVI, 264. The idea of “influencing the future” raises the question of value judgments. Should the historian make them? On this subject the present writer agrees with R. Elberton Smith, “Value Judgments and the Social Sciences,” *AAUP Bulletin* (winter 1949), 628-42. “Whatever the terminology adopted to describe the social studies,” Smith writes, “it is the position taken herein that they have, the capacity both to acquire systematic knowledge and to make value judgments, and hence to deal directly with questions of social policy.” *Ibid.*, p. 635.

<sup>14</sup>Morison, “Faith of a Historian,” *AHR*, LVI, 264.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 265; also see n. 13, *supra*, on the subject of value judgments.

<sup>16</sup>Morison, “Faith of a Historian,” *AHR*, LVI, 269.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 268.

he can approach and handle research and writing *objectively* and *critically*. He should have that sort of *personality* which, coupled with *enthusiasm* for the program, *tact* in dealing with people, and *discretion* in handling delicate situations, will enable him to enjoy the confidence of his associates.<sup>18</sup>

The same source states his professional qualifications in this language:

At all levels, and especially at the higher levels, the historian is desired who has had training and experience in history, social science, or comparable fields involving disciplined research and writing. He should know the technique of locating, analyzing, evaluating, and maintaining pertinent documents. He should be able to present and interpret data in a written narrative, properly organized and documented. He should be able to plan and direct a sound program.<sup>19</sup>

The duties and responsibilities of the historian are such, according to the Air Force directives, that

he must collect, interpret, analyze, and organize documents and so use them, together with data obtained from interviews, staff meetings, and other sources, to record and preserve the history of his unit. He must strive for constant objectivity, critical evaluation, and a full appreciation of the importance of factual data, as against hearsay evidence, prejudice, and propaganda.

In performing his functions the historian must bear in mind that his work is not designed solely to produce "history for history's sake," but that it must also have utility to . . . [his] own and other Air Force elements. It must help the Air Force to understand the past, evaluate the present, and plan for the future. Thus plans, changes, problems, failures, and deficiencies must be presented no less than accomplishments. He should also bear in mind that he can render a real service to his commander and his commander's staff by doing research jobs and answering questions.<sup>20</sup>

An eloquent statement of the functions of a unit historian, by an unfortunately anonymous Air Force practitioner of the art and science of historical writing, is contained in

a Strategic Air Command manual for historians which was prepared recently. "The historian," this statement declares,

is the chronicler of his organization. His is the responsibility of recording scientifically its place in the history of the Air Force. He must analyze, evaluate, and record the missions, projects, activities, successes, and failures of his unit. He has the added responsibility of recording the general life of the organization and the careers of its key personnel. He must possess . . . [innate] curiosity and an unquenchable thirst for truth. In dealing with events recently passed, certain factors are very important, among them unflagging objectivity and an appreciation of the reliability and importance of facts. No human being, and that includes historians, can be absolutely without prejudice. But the conscientious historian can buttress his objectivity by an awareness of himself, of his background, environment and biases, of all the forces in his personality that tend to mold his reactions to the factors with which he works. . . .<sup>21</sup>

It now seems desirable, after having examined various statements and views of the qualities and responsibilities of the historian, to turn to a similar examination of the history he writes. This will be saying much the same things that have just been said, but in a slightly different way, since we have shifted our vantage point. This should be helpful.

Allan Nevins has written that history is an "integrated narrative or description of past events or facts written in a spirit of critical inquiry for the whole truth."<sup>22</sup>

Carl Becker, who graced the historical faculty at Cornell University, once explained in a presidential address before the American Historical Association:

History as the artificial extension of the social memory (and I willingly concede that there are other appropriate ways of apprehending human experience) is an art of long standing, necessarily so since it springs instinctively from the impulse to enlarge the range of immediate experience; and

<sup>18</sup>Manual for Air Force Historians (June 1950), p. 5.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Hq., SAC, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Neb., *Preparation of Histories* (SAC Manual 210-1) (June 1951), p. 2.

<sup>22</sup>Quoted *ibid.*, p. 3, from Allan Nevins, *The Gateway to History* (New York, 1938), p. 22.



however camouflaged by the disfiguring jargon of science [or of the Air Force, one might add!], it is still in essence what it has always been. History in this sense is a story, in aim always a true story; a story that employs all the devices of literary art (statement and generalization, narration and description, comparison and comment and analogy) to present the succession of events in the life of man, and from the succession of events thus presented to derive a satisfactory meaning. The history written by historians . . . is thus a convenient blend of truth and fancy, of what we commonly distinguished as "fact" and "interpretation." In primitive times, when tradition is orally transmitted, bards and story-tellers frankly embroider or improvise the facts to heighten the dramatic import of the story. With the use of written records, history, gradually differentiated from fiction, is understood as the story of events that actually occurred; and with the increase and refinement of knowledge the historian recognizes that his first duty is to be sure of the facts, let their meaning be what it may. Nevertheless, in every age history is taken to be a story of actual events from which a significant meaning may be derived; . . .<sup>23</sup>

Professor Morison says that

For my part, I stand firm on the oft-quoted sentence of Leopold von Ranke, . . . "The present investigation," said Ranke in the preface to his first volume published in 1824, "will simply explain the event exactly as it happened." Ranke was far from the first to say that. He picked up the phrase, I imagine, from Wilhelm von Humboldt, who, in an address to the Prussian Academy three years earlier, declared the proper function of history to be "the exposition of what has happened." Some 2200 years earlier, Thucydides wrote, "The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest. But if he desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter . . . shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied."<sup>24</sup>

To the Strategic Air Command historian we are again indebted, this time for an excellent description and analysis of the unit his-

tory, which, he says, "is a complete, detailed objective analysis of the missions and activities of the unit." Continuing, he states that its discussion must embrace "all activities, regardless of classification, which are historically important. In discussing the missions of the unit it should relate them to the missions of" the command, or the numbered air force, as the case might be, and the Air Force. "Important problems and difficulties encountered, the methods developed for dealing with them, the results accomplished, and the knowledge gained in the process must be given careful attention." It must, according to this same source, embody historical perspective, the evaluation of facts, and impartiality; and it must be well-written in the sense of adhering to high standards of "clarity, coherence and absolute accuracy of expression."<sup>25</sup> Neither the topical content nor the technique of composing a good unit history can be dealt with in the confines of this paper, but they are subjects worthy or careful attention.<sup>26</sup>

It may be protested that the attention here given to the characteristics of the competent historian and the competently written history is unnecessarily repetitious and therefore wearisome and superfluous; however, the unit histories which the writer has seen have all

<sup>25</sup>SAC Manual 210-1 (June 1951), pp. 2, 3. Professor Nevins recently emphasized the importance of literary form in historical writing. See his "The Struggle to Make the Past Alive," *The New York Times Book Review*, 13 January 1952, pp. 1, 14.

<sup>26</sup>On the matter of topics, however, see "Topics to be Considered," *ibid.*, pp. 4-6; the outline for monthly historical reports attached to TACSM 210-1, 17 Aug. 1950; and the questionnaire (incl. 1) attached to AF-TRCR 210-1, 28 Jan. 1949. On "How to Write a Unit History," see e.g., the memorandum by that title by Melvin H. Tennis, Historian, APG, Eglin AFB, Fla., which was prepared for "Unit Historians Major and Minor, APG and Attached Units," for distribution at the APG conference for unit historians, 10 Apr. 1951. Ernest G. Schwiebert, historian for the Air Research and Development Command, has written one of the most recent accounts of how to prepare unit histories. See his *Lectures on Historical Reporting*, Prepared for Historical Officers' School, Hq. Air Research and Development Command, Baltimore, Md. (n.d.), pp. 43 ff.

<sup>23</sup>Carl L. Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian" [presidential address delivered before the American Historical Association at Minneapolis, 29 Dec. 1931], *Everyman His Own Historian* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1935), p. 248.

<sup>24</sup>Morison, "Faith of a Historian," *AHR*, LVI, 262.

too often done violence to the truth, so that the documented emphasis on true accounts, which is what most of the foregoing material in this section boils down to, seems wholly justified. Now it is not the belief of the writer that unit historians generally make a deliberate effort to violate the truth in their accounts and that they purposely twist facts. Actually, when a story is pieced together from a badly organized unit history the facts used seem to come forth essentially unscathed. The major complaints are that not enough facts are used, that part of the story state them somewhere in his account.) It is the conviction of the writer that the reason is left out, and that the would-be historian fails to synthesize, analyze, interpret, and evaluate. It is a trick of the clever propagandist or a device of the irresponsible journalist to color his story by deliberately omitting information. No responsible historian would like to be caught so prostituting his profession. (Because it is physically impossible, sometimes, to secure certain essential facts, the historian should not only be aware of the limitations of his sources, but should clearly state them somewhere in his account. It is the conviction of the writer that the reason for the poor unit histories which have come to his attention, leaving out the factor of indifferent literary quality, lies in large part in a failure to understand, by both the historian and his superior, the true character of history and the importance of the historical program, and in a lack of the will to hew to the line of principle in the matter; hence, the emphasis here on the matter of function and the effort here to describe the historian and his history. Perhaps with understanding will come a will to implement that understanding.

#### IV

The passing reference that has been made to the not entirely unanticipated failure of personnel to understand the function of history, raises a question that is peculiar to his-

torical writing in an atmosphere such as that of the Air Force, which, with all respect for the credit due it in its typical realms of endeavor, is not organized to foster a sympathetic milieu for the free intellectual inquiry that is at the basis of historical writing. The so-called military mind, which is found not only among the military fraternity, but which is nevertheless nurtured by it, is not given to a ready understanding of free inquiry. Nevertheless, if the Air Force is to utilize the historian it must take the historian as he should be or not at all, for otherwise he cannot serve the purpose of objective inquiry for which he exists and the whole program will become suspect. Those who determine policy in the Air Force are obviously agreed that free historical inquiry must be protected if the *Air Force* historical program is to prosper, for all their directives emphasize the necessity for objective history. Therefore, where lack of understanding exists on lower echelons the problem is a delicate one of education, susceptible of solution by a tactful and intelligent campaign.

The governing Air Force regulation reveals a specific provision for review of prepared historical material, which should be noted. "Each echelon," the provision states, will examine carefully all historical material sent forward by the next lower echelon *and will point out any methods by which the material may be improved. The primary concern of the higher echelon will be to insure that each unit provides a full and clear account of its actions, both administrative and operations, routine or special.*<sup>27</sup> The emphasized words reveal the significant parts of this provision. By definition no historical material could ever be improved by such things as distortion and omission, for example, so that it follows that it could only be improved by greater adherence to the truth as through the addition of facts or by alteration of interpretation to harmonize with the facts. "The primary concern of the higher

<sup>27</sup>AFR 210-3, 30 Aug. 1951, par. 6. Emphasis added.



echelon will be to insure . . . a full and clear account," the regulation continues. This can only mean, especially when taken with the emphasis on objectivity that recurs again and again in the various other regulatory provisions and manuals, that Air Force history can be reviewed only to make it *better* history, as it has been defined in this paper.

There is also another highly relevant provision in the same regulation. "Air Force activities," this one declares, will furnish all data of historical importance whether current or not and regardless of classification, to personnel who are carrying out historical duties. All documents which are concerned with the events, actions, operations, and administration of any Air Force activity will be considered as having historical value.<sup>28</sup>

This is so clear as not to require comment, except to point out that only the historian is competent to determine which is of historical importance and that all Air Force histories are so protected under the classification provisions of the regulation on "Safeguarding Military Information"<sup>29</sup> that the necessities of security can never be used with justification as a reason for denying a properly-cleared historian access to information, for his history, as classified information, will not reach the public, except as the law permits. It will reach only security-cleared individuals whose duties require that they see it.

In a dictatorship those who determine policy set intellectual limits beyond which no one dares go except upon pain of, at the very least, banishment. In Communist Russia, for example, where so-called "self-criticism" is permitted, no one is ever permitted to criticize the system itself—and the system seems to become more all-embracing as time passes. Thus, the geneticist cannot criticize the theories of Soviet genetics, but only the zeal with

which the Soviet "science" is furthered; the student of government can criticize, in theory at least, the way a constitutional provision is implemented, but not the provision; and the historian can write of Soviet or some other history, but woe befalls him if he discovers or utilizes a set of historical facts that do not glorify the USSR and its system. The objectivity that Western scholarship demands is castigated in the Soviet Union as strictly bourgeois and therefore not to be tolerated. The point is, in a dictatorship, a frame-of-reference is set up by the powers that be and all intellectual activities have to be fitted to the frame. "'Frame of reference' history, Morison points out, is the only kind that historians are allowed to write under a dictatorship, but they are not allowed to construct the frame."<sup>30</sup>

Air Force historians, by reason of their peculiar situation within a highly disciplined organization, the likes of which have not always been congenial to intellectual endeavor,<sup>31</sup> must take care that, in spite of regulations, they do not find themselves producing frame-of-reference history.

In the event that, for any reason, a unit historian should be denied access to important and relevant information, his history should state what was denied, together with an indication as to where the information can be obtained. If it is possible to append documentary material, although not feasible to discuss it, the historian should refer to it in passing, footnote the reference and append the material by all means. By so doing he can preserve his own integrity, comply with the regulations, and give the air force, command, or Air Force Historical Division historian information with which he can construct a sound account of the events concerned.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, par. 8.

<sup>29</sup>AFR 205-1, 14 Mar. 1949, sec. ii.

<sup>30</sup>Morison, "Faith of a Historian," *AHR*, LVI, 268.

## CONFEDERATE MUSTER ROLLS

BY RALPH W. DONNELLY\*

SOME OF THE most revealing and probably least used sources of Confederate military history are the muster rolls of the various organizations. Unfortunately, these have suffered the ravages of war and time as have so many other source materials of the Civil War.

The muster roll used during the Civil War was a large sheet of paper about 20 x 30 inches, printed on both sides. It provided a space for writing the name of each member of the unit, his rank, enlistment data, when and by whom last paid, names of those present, remarks, calculation of present pay due, signature space for soldier receiving pay, and signature of witness to payment. On the back was a recapitulation of the unit's strength, present and absent. In turn each of these categories is subdivided into various explanations of presence and absence. An additional tabular form is provided for recording alterations in the company strength since the last muster date. The major causes of alterations of a unit's strength are given as joined, resigned, discharged, transferred, died, and deserted. Methods of joining, causes of discharge, and reasons for death are provided for as subdivisions under those categories. A memoranda space provides for tabulating the number of recruits needed, wounded in action, serviceable horses, and unserviceable horses.

\*Mr. Donnelly, recently appointed Treasurer of the American Military Institute, is an active member of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia, and is on the Washington staff of the Southland Life Ins. Co. of Dallas, Texas.

A "Record of Events . . ." space, when filled in, is a valuable source of information on the history of a unit. This space was expressly provided in order to carry out these instructions: "*Actions in which the company, or any portion of it, has been engaged, scouts, marches, changes of station, everything of interest relating to the discipline, efficiency, or service of the company, will be minutely and carefully noted, with DATE, PLACE, DISTANCES MARCHED, &c., &c.*"

In addition, the Inspector and Mustering Officer had a space in which he could record his findings as to the company's discipline, instruction, military appearance, arms, accoutrements, and clothing.

The rolls were ordinarily made out every two months. General Orders No. 16, Headquarters Virginia Forces, May 15, 1861, provided that: "The periodical musters will take place at the end of the alternate months, commencing with the 30th of June next."<sup>1</sup> It was originally provided that three muster and pay rolls would be made at each muster, one to be retained with the company records, and two for the Paymaster. One *muster* roll was to be made at the same time for forwarding to the Adjutant General. Shortages of paper forms, the interference of active duty, the infrequency of pay, and the frequent loss of the company's records combined to make the muster rolls of the later years something less than was originally planned and ordered. One notation found on rolls of troops serving in the Valley of Virginia indi-

<sup>1</sup>Official Records . . . , Series IV, 1, 325.



cates that the capture of Staunton led to the destruction of company records stored there. As a result, subsequent rolls were compiled on a basis of those present and those remembered.

Individual soldiers, especially when customarily having charge of the rolls, presumably retained various copies or drafts in their possession. The problem today is to locate these and to persuade their families to part with such historic relics for deposit in central public record collections.

About two years ago the writer decided to go to Richmond, Va., to endeavor to locate the family of the late Charles T. Loehr, the author of the "War History of the Old First Virginia Infantry Regiment, Army of Northern Virginia" (Richmond, 1884). The intent was to see if the papers used in compiling his history were still available. An appendix to his book lists the men who served in that regiment during the war and gives their company designation. A search of War Department records indicated that Loehr listed some men as being members of Capt. Charles K. Sherman's Company E, Washington (D. C.) It was my fond hope that Loehr's papers, if located, would furnish the source for these names.

To my great surprise, on asking Miss Bass at the Virginia State Archives if she could indicate a starting point on such a search, she informed me that she had known Mr. Loehr when she was a child. Even more to the point she told me that one of Mr. Loehr's daughters, desiring to make a proper disposal of her father's papers, had been advised by Dr. Douglas S. Freeman to deposit them with the State Archivist. This she had done, and among these papers<sup>2</sup> were a set of muster rolls covering the regimental membership as of July 1-August 31, 1861. While I did

not locate my unidentified men, the roll of Sherman's company on file seems to have been the copy retained for the company's records. It contained the signatures of almost all of the enlisted men and made possible the verification of the spelling of their names. It covered the same period of time as the muster roll on deposit in the National Archives in Washington.

This story is related to show how helpful it is to find historical material at public depositories. The detective-like search may prove highly colorful and entertaining, but it is uneconomical in the use of precious time. Besides being more convenient for those engaged in research, modern methods in the restoration and preservation of documents go far towards making historical source material available to more students over a longer period of time. The gathering of documents from private individuals for placement in centralized depositories might well constitute a valuable current aim of various patriotic organizations.

Suggestion two is to urge the proper cataloging and indexing of material once assembled so as to make its use possible. A mere accumulation of documents without an exact guide to the contents invites several unsatisfactory situations; on the one hand the documents are handled unnecessarily by many who have no need of them but feel forced to examine them to determine the actual contents, or, on the other hand, they are ignored because the cataloging indicates, in error or by misleading statement, that the material is not pertinent.

In further pursuit of muster rolls on District of Columbia Confederates, I noticed that the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress received a bundle of Confederate muster rolls some years ago which were very loosely described as follows:

Confederate Army, 1861-1865.

1861-2, muster rolls and returns, quarter-

<sup>2</sup>Virginia Archives, Accession #22140. There are nine rolls in the set: Field and staff, and companies B, C, D, E, G, H, I, and K.

master and pay vouchers, discharges, forms, blanks, requisitions, etc. Four portfolios. (A considerable number of these are returns of the Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1864.)<sup>3</sup>

The paucity of material on the group of men I was working on made it almost obligatory to check even the most obscure sources. Consequently the bundle of muster rolls was requested. While I must admit that a careful reading of the citation does not actually say that the muster rolls are from the Army of Tennessee, the implication is that they are. Inspection disclosed that *not one* of the rolls was for a company of the Army of Tennessee or other Mississippi Valley Department or command. The States represented in the company muster rolls were Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Virginia. A number were from the Army of Northwestern Virginia which operated in what is today West Virginia under Generals Robert S. Garnett, Robert E. Lee, and W. W. Loring. These units were later absorbed in General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's Valley command, part of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Some nine rolls representing six regiments in the Army of Northwestern Virginia are for the summer of 1861 and shed light upon the ill-fated Garnett's campaign. It is of this campaign that Dr. Freeman says, "Accounts of the operations of Garnett's forces on and after July 11 are few."<sup>4</sup> It might be that these rolls and similar ones provide the necessary source material for a re-evaluation of the campaign.

This misleading cataloging indicates another requirement for the proper processing of documents, the need of handling by persons with sufficient knowledge of the field to insure accuracy. This involves a knowledge

of the War and its campaigns, the organization of the armies, and an acquaintance with the higher officer personnel.

The following is a list of the returns and muster rolls filed in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress as "Confederate Muster Rolls" and consisting, in part, of Accessions 449 and 123. They are listed in the order in which they lie in the file folder.

ITEM	DESCRIPTION
1.	46th Va. Inf., Co. A, M. R. for November-December, 1862.
2.	Return of Hardee's Corps, Army of Tennessee, April 6, 1865.
3.	Report of Cavalry strength, Army of Tennessee, April 7, 1865.
4.	Same for April 3, 1865.
5.	Summary of Casualties, Armies of Tennessee and Mississippi consolidated, May 7-September 1, 1864.
6.	Return of S. D. Lee's Corps, Army of Tennessee, April 10, 1865.
7.	Report of Prisoners Captured by Cavalry, Army of Tennessee, March 18-21, 1865.
8.	Return of Hardee's Corps, Army of Tennessee, April 3, 1865.
9.	12th Ga. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for June 15-August 31, 1861.
10.	26th Ga. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for January 1-August 31, 1864.
11.	60th Ga. Inf., Co. H, M. R. for May 1-October 1, 1864.
12.	3rd Ark. Inf., Co. A, M. R. for June 15-August 31, 1861.
13.	44th Va. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for May 1-June 30, 1863.
14.	31st Ga. Inf., Co. A, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
15.	44th Va. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for February 28-April 30, 1863.
16.	44th Va. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1862.
17.	44th Va. Inf., Co. F, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.

<sup>3</sup>*Handbook of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress* (Washington, 1918), 72f.

<sup>4</sup>Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command* (New York, 1943) I, 36, note 53.



18. 6th La. Inf., Co. C, M. R. for May 1-August 31, 1864.
19. 5th Va. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for December 31, 1863-April 30, 1864.
20. 44th Va. Inf., Co. F, M. R. for February 28-April 30, 1863.
21. 9th La. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for May 1-August 31, 1864.
22. 44th Va. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.
23. 44th Va. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.
24. 44th Va. Inf., Co. F, M. R. for April 31[!]-June 30, 1863.
25. 44th Va. Inf., Co. G, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.
26. 7th La. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
27. 44th Va. Inf., Co. G, M. R. for April 30-June 30, 1863.
28. 44th Va. Inf., Co. H, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.
29. 44th Va. Inf., Co. H, M. R. for April 30-June 30, 1863.
30. 1st Ga. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for May 31-August 31, 1861.
31. 44th Va. Inf., Co. I, M. R. for August 31-October 31, 1863.
32. 44th Va. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for June 30-August 30[!], 1861.
33. 61st Ga. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for May 1-August 31, 1864.
34. 2d La. Inf., Co. G, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
35. 12th Ga. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for June 9-August[?] 31, 1861.
36. 1st La. Inf., Co. C, M. R. for March 1-August 31, 1864.
37. 23rd Va. Inf., Co. ?, M. R. for June 30-August 31, 1861.
38. 6th La. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for May 1-August 31, 1864.
39. 5th La. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for May 1-August 31, 1864.
40. 5th Va. Inf., Co. C, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
41. 7th La. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
42. 38th Ga. Inf., Co. G, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
43. 44th Va. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for November 1-December 31, 1863.
44. 4th Va. Inf., Field & Staff, M. R. for April 30-October 31, 1864.
45. 23rd Va. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for June 30-August 31, 1861.
46. 31st Va. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for June 30-August 31, 1861.
47. 14th La. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for May 1-September 1, 1864.
48. 31st Va. Inf., Co. C, M. R. for June 30-August 31, 1861.
49. 8th La. Inf., Co. K, M. R. for April 31[!]-August 31, 1864.
50. 44th Va. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for October 31-December 31, 1862.
51. 1st La. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for January 1-August 31, 1864.
52. 5th Va. Inf., Co. H, M. R. for December 31, 1863-August 31, 1864.
53. 38th Ga. Inf., Co. D, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
54. 31st Ga. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
55. 31st Ga. Inf., Co. F, M. R. for January 1-August 31, 1864.
56. 44th Va. Inf., Co. E, M. R. for September 1-October 31, 1863.
57. 44th Va. Inf., Co. C, M. R. for February 28-April 30, 1863.
58. 38th Ga. Inf., Co. B, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
59. 42nd Va. Inf., Co. I, M. R. for April 30-October 31, 1864.
60. 38th Ga. Inf., Co. H, M. R. for April 30-August 31, 1864.
61. 44th Va. Inf., Co. I, M. R. for December 31, 1861-February 28, 1862.

---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

## THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

---

### REVIEWS

*Lincoln Finds a General. A Military Study of the Civil War.* Volume Three. Grant's First Year in the West. By Kenneth P. Williams. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. Pp. 585. \$7.50)

In the two preceding volumes of this work, Kenneth P. Williams traced the North's conduct of the War in the East through the battle of Gettysburg. Volume three is devoted to the first year of the conflict in the West. The focus in this volume sharpens on Grant, and any lingering doubt as to the identity of the general whom Lincoln is to find is dispelled. The stage is made ready for the climactic achievement at Vicksburg which set the North on the road to victory and Grant on the path to the supreme command—and the White House.

Volume three, like its predecessors, has some outstanding virtues. The professor of mathematics continues to demonstrate his mastery of the art of writing. His narrative is straightforward, simple, lean and vigorous. His accounts of battles are clear and stirring. Especially gripping is his account of Pope's capture of Island No. 10.

The organization is good. The reader never has to fumble for position or direction. Each campaign is treated in its relation to the over-all situation. The author's skill in presentation enables him to translate a mass of confusing and often conflicting detail into concise, meaningful and frequently colorful episodes.

On the other side of the balance sheet are some deficiencies which to me appear serious. First is an undue reliance on published sources, and especially on the so-called *Official Records*. Except in the instances of Stanton and Lincoln, to whose manu-

scripts token reference is made, unpublished sources appear not to have been explored. The vast and important store of military records in the National Archives seems to have been unexploited. Newspapers are occasionally cited, but the overwhelming preponderance of references is to the published records of the army and navy. These are the author's Bible, and while they and some of the other sources used are exceedingly rich in information, the accepted standards of our time demand a broader base for a major historical work.

Another serious fault, in my opinion, is the way in which the author uses his sources. In the first two volumes, and to the limited extent that he is treated in the third, McClellan appears the villain. That evidence which serves to portray him in unfavorable light (and his shortcomings were such as to make him an easy victim) is abundantly invoked, while that of an opposite character is played down or passed over. On the other hand, materials favorable to Grant, the hero of the piece, are made the most of, while those of contrary import are minimized or rejected.

The author does some impressive tight-rope walking in his effort to take the onus of surprise at Shiloh off of Grant, and he seems bent on turning the failure to fortify there into a virtue. I am not convinced; more than that, I am left much disturbed by what appears to be a subjective determination to picture Grant's performance at Shiloh as a model one. Here, as elsewhere, I find myself raising the question: Is this the sort of technique that produces good history?

The treatment of Halleck is another case in point. The author seems inclined throughout to handle him with soft gloves. In discussing Hal-



leck's replacing of Grant with C. F. Smith after Donelson, jealousy is discounted and no reference is made to Halleck's most damning act—that of suggesting to McClellan that Grant had reverted to the bottle. One wonders how different would have been the author's treatment if McClellan and not Halleck had been the immediate superior reporting on Grant.

Readers of army connection or background will doubtless note with approval the author's ability to use military terms correctly and to draw meaningful inferences from tactical situations and command decisions. Mr. Williams' staff experience is plainly evident in the use of such terms as command post, intelligence summary, operation Henry, situation map, zone of combat, organic guns, railhead, task force and psychological warfare.

BELL IRVIN WILEY  
Emory University

*Mr. Lincoln's Army*, by Bruce Catton, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 372. \$3.75.)

"*Mr. Lincoln's Army*" brings out vividly the story of the famous army of the Potomac during the early years of the Civil War when it was under the command of General George B. McClellan.

General McClellan is depicted as a man of destiny with the sole idea that he was divinely chosen as the instrument of the Republic's salvation; and his rise and fall is well described by the author. It shows the necessity in War of the final acceptance of the doctrine that full and unquestioning obedience must be accorded to a military superior, no matter how personally odious or stupid the latter may seem.

By the use of soldiers' letters and diaries Mr. Catton illustrates the reaction of the people in the early years of the war who thought then of the conflict as a romantic adventure, but war's grimness was soon realized by the individual soldier and its romance soon faded away. The author has generously supplied his book through the use of these materials with all the ingredients of a best seller—action, suspense and humor. Unlike many historians, in addition to imparting a knowledge of history, he entertains the reader.

This readable book should appeal to the scholar as well as to the layman, since it neither deifies nor debunks.

MAJOR JOSEPH NAZZARRO, U.S.A.  
A.P.O. 613, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

*Glory Road; the bloody route from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg*, by Bruce Catton. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 416., pp. 7 bibliography. \$4.50.)

Mr. Catton has continued his treatment of the Army of the Potomac, so well begun in *Mr. Lincoln's Army*, and we are now privileged to follow its fortunes on the *Glory Road* from Fredericksburg to Gettysburg. *Glory Road* is not just another Civil War book. It is an intensely absorbing discussion of a much misunderstood and underestimated American army described with unforgettable phrases and substantiated by exhaustive research. Mr. Catton's treatment of the Army of the Potomac is not only comparable in every essential respect with Freeman's writings on the Army of Northern Virginia but very possibly is more objective. The layman and the scholar will gain a fresh outlook on the entire Civil War period by reading *Glory Road*. One does not need an extensive background in the period to enjoy every page, but his respect for the scholarship exhibited will increase in proportion to his knowledge of the personalities and events described.

This ability to sketch characters is one of the author's strong points. Although perhaps a bit vague on General Meade, Mr. Catton has left us with superb descriptions of Hooker, Halleck, Stanton, Howard, and Morton; and these descriptions are not exaggerated to glamorize the book; they are amazingly accurate and discerning.

As one would expect, much space is devoted to detailed accounts of the battles themselves with the strategic and tactical implications in each. Against the backdrop of the fighting, the author places the key personalities involved. With the exception, perhaps, of Governor Morton, the right amount of emphasis is devoted to the essential figures. Just as important, however, and possibly of more interest to the average reader is Mr. Catton's revealing comments on the oft-ignored phases of army life—morale, desertion, soldier life, equipment, and medical facilities. Various "minutiae" of soldier life of the period are mentioned which are historically interesting in themselves, such as the account of the origin of the soldier's last call—taps. These little known facts add much to the book, and Mr. Catton helps his reader to gain perspective on certain points on which most of us are misinformed even today. This is well brought out in his discussion of the role played by "foreigners" in the Army of the Potomac, especially the Germans and Irish. The author repudiates the

long-contended thesis that Chancellorsville was lost because the 11th Corps was a poor unit due to the Germans in it. We are surprised to learn that these patriotic soldiers made up only about half the 11th Corps; the others were native Americans. The "Dutchmen" fought well for their adopted land but were placed in a hopeless position by Howard who went to hospitals on Sundays to distribute fruit and unsolicited religious tracts but curiously neglected to protect his troops from disgraceful surprise and subsequent disastrous rout. This insistence on fairness is typical of the author's approach to his evaluation of the Federal commanders. For example, Mr. Catton believes Burnside to have been "about as incompetent a general as Abraham Lincoln ever commissioned" but still finds him to have been a warm and rather lively human being. Throughout the book are choice bits of characterization which are both amusing and accurate. One cannot forget nor refute Catton's definition of Wendell Phillips as a "gadfly of abolition."

*Glory Road*, in the main, is the story of the Army of the Potomac during the critical period of the Civil War. We march with the men towards the belatedly arrived pontoons and witness their superb valor against admittedly impossible odds at Fredericksburg. It is reasonable to say that no better treatment of that slaughter has ever appeared. After apparently losing all morale in January 1863, the defeated army tries again at Chancellorsville, is again defeated through no fault of its own, but retains confidence in itself and finally tastes long delayed victory in July at Gettysburg. The author then takes his leave in this volume, but we remain to ponder. We realize that he has demonstrated rather conclusively that the Army of the Potomac was a splendid fighting instrument and needed only good leadership to win victories. We see an army of men fighting for an ideal and not for hatred. The looting and devastation were actually the result of a young country "feeling its oats" and the inevitable concomitants of war.

The author dwells at considerable length on the western units of the Army, particularly the famous Iron Brigade. Here, as in his long discourse on Governor Morton of Indiana, one feels that he is a bit out of perspective unless it be that he wishes to point out the significant role played by the Western states in what one commonly assumes was an Eastern army. Or perhaps Mr. Catton uses the Iron Brigade to illustrate the hauteur exhibited by

the veteran regiments of a brigade toward a newly assigned regiment which had to prove itself before being accepted. At all events, *Glory Road* is a definite addition to the study of the Civil War. It is refreshing to be able to read a work which not only features a Federal army but also accomplishes its presentation in so readable and instructive a style. Students of military history must read this book to get a fair evaluation of current notions about the combat efficiency of the Army of the Potomac. Above all, Mr. Catton has permitted us to gain a much better appreciation of the army by his ability to see above the sordidness and incompetency—the goal for which the officers and men were fighting. One gathers that, despite fluctuating morale, the men's goal was preservation of a union in which Democracy would be permitted to develop for themselves and posterity. The appearance of a book like *Glory Road* is a healthy sign. After finishing the book, one realizes that at last justice has been done to a fine army and that the author has clothed that army with a character all its own.

DR. FRANCIS A. LORD

Silver Spring, Maryland

(Member Civil War Round Table  
Washington, D. C.)

**Hitler directs his War.** The secret records of his daily military conferences, selected and annotated by Felix Gilbert from the manuscript in the University of Pennsylvania Library. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. 187. \$3.25.)

Many millions of words have been written since the fall of the Hitler regime, about the man, the soldier, the strategist, and the leader. The great majority of these words are based upon opinions of historians, authors, alleged personal friends, and commentators. But in this small volume is contained the spoken words of Hitler, himself, as transcribed by his own official stenographers. Here is a short, if incomplete, history of Hitler's supervision of the war, indicating his thought processes, and his beliefs in his own divinity.

At the close of the War in early May 1945, the Americans had overrun Berchtesgaden. Immediately upon occupation, information was received concerning the possibility of salvaging notes of the staff conferences held among Hitler and his generals. American intelligence officers were led to a spot near the headquarters in Berchtesgaden where the charred remains of Hitler's own copy of the minutes of his conferences had been burned.



By careful manipulation, the notes of some fifty-one conferences were recovered, most of them written in shorthand, some of them typewritten and bearing the word "Fuehrerkopie."

Dr. Kurt Peschel, head of the stenographic service at Hitler's headquarters, was then put in charge of making the record, the position he held under Hitler. With the aid of some of the original stenographers and assistants, who were still alive, the salvaged conference notes were reassembled in Chronological order only two months after they had been worked upon by the same persons for the Fuehrer himself. The record, as reassembled, was used at the Nuremburg Trials and is now in the possession of the University of Pennsylvania Library. Extracts from the original were annotated and now comprise this most amazing volume.

Commencing at almost the first page, the reader will be astonished to learn of the overbearing manner in which Hitler always treated his generals, his quick decisions, his ability to scoff at an expert decision when it conflicted with his own "divine" inspirations. At a conference on December 1, 1942, in a discussion with Jodl and Keitel respecting the quelling of disturbances, after being advised of the danger of the use of too much brutality on the part of the SS, he quietly orders them to continue such methods even though he personally believes they are brutal. It is his old theory of strength over mind.

It is interesting to note the change in attitude toward his best generals when they begin to fail. In a conference on December 12, 1942, the topic was the retreat of Rommel from El Alamein. Hitler places the blame on the fact that Rommel was softening due to combat fatigue. He belittles his Desert Fox by saying: "But I really think one shouldn't leave a man in a position of such heavy responsibility too long. That gradually demoralizes his nerves. . . . One should really carry out the principle of not having a man in the theatre of war too long. . . . Then someone comes in fresh, who wants to earn his laurels and is relatively fresher." One can almost hear Hitler saying: "I am the only one who can lead indefinitely."

In the same conference on December 12, 1942, Hitler openly shows his contempt for the Italians when he says: "We won't succeed with the Italians anywhere—ten to twenty thousand Germans, shoved in between the Italians, might give some staying power; with the Italians alone it is impossible."

Hitler's philosophy was never more clearly demonstrated than in the conference of February 1, 1943, when he was learning of the Russian push against his best troops on that front. He immediately envisioned them falling apart in spiritual bankruptcy" and detailed his own ideas of a good soldier: "With soldiers, the fundamental thing is always character, and if we don't manage to instill that, if we just breed purely intellectual acrobats and spiritual athletes, *we're never going to get a race that can stand up to the heavy blows of destiny.* His idea was for them to fight to the last man, even if the cause were lost. He was sure "they couldn't take it." It is surprising to find his leading staff officers acting as "yes men," at these outbursts against their good troops, leading one to believe the oft expressed theory that they were either seeking to ingratiate themselves with their leader, or that they did not dare oppose even his slightest wish.

It is interesting to see his reaction to the first news of Americans in action. His information came from the African theatre where, he was informed, American prisoners had no political faith, nor a strong political conviction. They were rowdies "who'll take to their heels very quickly; they won't be able to weather a crisis." Hitler felt the English were better than the Americans because they were fighting for their country and Empire. "One never has this feeling about the Americans."

The gradual change from confidence in success to bewilderment and almost fanatic distrust is clearly evidenced as the war progresses. Hitler begins to rave at everyone, including Goering. At a conference in 1943 respecting the bombing of England, Hitler belittles his air force on their ability to bomb small targets when they "can't find London." "I can only win the war if I destroy more of the enemy's than he destroys of ours; by teaching him the terrors of war. That's always been the way, and its the same thing with regard to air war."

After the attempt on Hitler's life in August 1944, his distrust of everyone became a daily occurrence. In his mind, he was the only one fighting the war. At the close of the August 31 conference, his position could not be more clearly stated when he said: "I think its pretty obvious that this war is no pleasure for me. For five years I have been separated from the rest of the world. I haven't been to the theatre, I haven't heard a concert, and I haven't seen a movie. *I live only for the purpose of leading this fight, because I*

know that if there is not an iron will behind it, this battle cannot be won. I accuse the general staff of weakening combat officers who joined its ranks, instead of exuding this iron will, and of spreading pessimism when General Staff officers went to the front . . ."

This was the beginning of the end. From here-on, everyone was his enemy. All students of military operations and historians should read *Hitler Directs His War*. Although it sounds like fiction, it is the actual spoken word for all to study. It was particularly gratifying for your reviewer to verify many of the incidents which were made known to me while connected with the War Crimes Trials at Dachau in 1946 and 1947. My German stenographer was Karl Thöt, one of Hitler's stenographers, and one of those mentioned in the foreword as a member of the group responsible for the translations of their own notes of the conferences. I did not believe him at the time but here is the proof!

COLONEL A. H. ROSENFELD, JR., U.S.A.  
Alexandria, Virginia

*Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker.* Translated by John Andrews. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951. Pp. 322. \$3.25.)

After a lost war, it is *de rigueur* for the defeated generals and politicians to explain why it was lost, each being careful to make clear that it was not his fault. Middle-aged and elderly readers will recall the spate of German *apologiae* that appeared in the decade after 1918, in which the German Government was absolved of responsibility for the war and defeat was ascribed to "the stab in the back" by civilian incompetence and treachery. A similar series of publications relating to the second World War is now emanating from the paladins of the Third Reich, who exculpate themselves by blaming both the war and its disastrous end on Adolf Hitler.

Ernst von Weizsäcker is the most important politician to take the field, for he was Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, that is, second in command to Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister, from 1938 to 1943. Weizsäcker was not a diplomatist by profession. The son of a prime minister of Wuerttemberg, he served in the German navy from 1900 to 1920 and joined the Foreign Office only after a naval career was cut off by the limitation of the German fleet under the Treaty of Versailles. He served in Basle, Copenhagen, Geneva, Oslo, and Berne, and after 1936

in Berlin, where he became Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office and finally State Secretary. Of these years, Weizsäcker writes as a conventional German Nationalist. The German navy was not, according to him, preparing for war against Britain (he never heard of the toast "der Tag"). The War of 1914 resulted from the machinations of the Entente and particularly of Sir Edward Grey. The treaty of Versailles was an iniquitous breach of contract by the Allies and aimed to sow permanent discord between Germany and Poland. The League of Nations was a farce because the Allies were not sincere about disarmament. Holding such views, Weizsäcker was well suited to be an instrument in the execution of Hitler's "revisionist" policies.

The Herr Baron, however, does not admit this. He insists repeatedly, almost too often in fact, that he was opposed to war and strove constantly for peace. From time to time he addressed memoranda to Ribbentrop warning of the danger of war. He occasionally saw Hitler himself to the same end, and he was in close touch with the generals who, in 1938, were opposed to war against Czechoslovakia and, after 1939, were fearful of German defeat and disaster. He claims to have tried to keep the British Government informed of the danger, speaking now to Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador, now through the brothers Kordt, one of whom was attached to Ribbentrop's staff, the other to the German Embassy in London. Weizsäcker also says that Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, worked with him for peace. He has to recognize, and does so frequently that his labors and conspiracies were in vain.

Why then did Weizsäcker, the advocate of peace, not quit? He is not the first statesman who has advanced the argument that he was not a politician but a civil servant whose duty it was to serve the government of the day, even, when he disagreed with its policies and that, by remaining in office, he could moderate its policies. Weizsäcker's arguments would be more convincing if it were really evident that he objected to the aims of Hitler. No one who reads the numerous memoranda written by him which are printed in *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, published by the British, French and United States Governments, can feel that Weizsäcker was at bottom opposed to what Hitler was trying to do; that he did not want war, because he thought that Germany would be beaten and destroyed, is probably true, but as long as Hitler was winning without war, the Secretary of State was not pro-



testing. The principal value of his book is the additional evidence it provides of the fact that the German Foreign Office counted for little in the decisions on foreign policy, which were made by Hitler, who indeed had little use for the Foreign Office, even if he did expect it to carry out his decisions.

At the end of his story, Herr von Weizsäcker fulminates against the treatment he received at the hands of the Americans, who tried him and, finding him guilty, sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. He died on August 4, 1951.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT  
Alexandria, Virginia

*Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the Americal Division*, by Captain Francis D. Cronin. (Washington, D. C.: Combat Forces Press, 1951. Pp. 432. Maps and photographs.

The Americal Division, unusual in the United States Army during World War II in that it was named instead of numbered and activated in New Caledonia rather than in United States territory, had one of the longest combat records of any division in the Pacific. Beginning its career as a heterogeneous mixture of National Guard units designated Task Force 6814, it was rushed overseas in early 1942 to garrison the island of New Caledonia, a key point on the U.S.-Australian line of communications with the seemingly irresistible Japanese offensives were threatening.

Captain Cronin, the author, is well-qualified as division historian. He brings to his task careful research and a straightforward, clear style together with a special feel for the Americal's operations derived from his wartime experience as an officer of the division.

Captain Cronin's volume shares with several other fine division histories the merit of avoiding exaggerated claims, boast, and bombast. *Under the Southern Cross* is admittedly sympathetic to the American Division but is faithful to the facts. It makes a sincere effort to place the Americal's operations in their proper perspective, and gives due credit to other units which fought alongside. It happily lacks the aggrieved tone regarding the doings of higher headquarters that is the bane of unit biography. *Under the Southern Cross* is rewarding reading for the general student of the war in the Pacific as well as for the veteran of the Americal.

JOHN MILLER, JR.  
Office of Military History  
United States Army

*Legend Into History*. An Analytical Study of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, by Charles Kuhlman, (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1952. Pp. xxv + 250. \$5.00.)

This is the most recent responsible work on this subject and is the most comprehensive study of the various actions in all their phases, to come to our attention. Representing an immense amount of research and analysis, it may well be the last word on this much debated battle.

While Dr. Kuhlman presents himself as an analytical historian, and disclaims any authority as a military expert, he does evince a sound knowledge of calvary tactics, as would be expected with General Hamilton Hawkins for his mentor. As a historian, he denies all bias yet one sometimes wonders.

The originality of the author is seen in his proposal of several novel theories, some of which are difficult to accept, but he supports them with a mass of data and conclusions. He suggests Custer acted on such faulty assumptions and defective estimates of the situation that it does not add to his military reputation. It is his theory that Custer, after discovering the size of the Indian village and abandoning offensive operations, continued north looking for a good defensive position, expecting the others to join him, instead of returning and reuniting his regiment as he should have while there was only skirmishing.

While admitting Curley, the Crow scout, told many conflicting stories, Dr. Kuhlman apparently accepts his claim that he escaped disguised in a Sioux blanket, and also many of his accounts of the battle, while Colonel Graham in *The Story of the Little Big Horn* says "his story has been completely discredited by the other Crow scouts."

He criticizes both Benteen and Reno, the latter with his decimated battalion and wounded, for not pressing on to aid Custer after he had promised to aid Reno, but no one in their commands even surmised the facts. They realized Custer was heavily engaged and might be forced to retreat north and join Gibbon, but this reviewer has often heard General Godfrey say no one suspected for a moment Custer was unable to care for himself. He probably could have, had he taken and held a purely defensive position as Reno and Benteen did successfully. As a matter of fact, they did make an effort to join him and marched more than a mile north to Wier Point, but the movement was tardy, sporadic and finally attracted such a horde of Indians they were barely able to

regain Reno Hill. It is Dr. Kuhlman's theory that Custer planned to send three troops to support Benteen's march when he saw his battalion at Wier Point, but the movement was not properly coordinated and resulted in disaster. This may explain the Indian stories that some of Custer's troops were marching off the field and refutes the implication they were deserting their comrades. It also helps explain the wide dispersion of the bodies of the troopers and the concentration of the officers'.

He stresses the use of arrows by the Indians and does not believe they were as well armed, organized or led as Colonel Graham or Mrs. Custer in *Boots and Saddles* indicate, but if only 10% were armed with repeating rifles, they outnumbered and outranged the troops in each piece-meal engagement, and other Indians secured arms.

Dr. Kuhlman has very cleverly worked out a theory, which, if correct, might account for the disaster, but its logic does not satisfy this writer. He claims Custer's original verbal order to Bugler Martini, while on the gallop, which Martini later confirmed, was to tell Benteen to "bring ammunition packs" which he would have done by cutting out the stronger mules carrying the reserve cartridges and galloping them to the front, but when Adjutant Cook gave Martini a written order he said "bring packs," which was not practicable with the slow moving pack-train composed of draft, and not trained pack-mules which travel easily at a dog trot, while the train as a whole was handicapped by many exhausted and untrained animals.

It does not seem possible, at this late date, another white survivor of Custer's outfit should show up, but while Dr. Kuhlman says "the crop of 'sole survivors' threatens to exceed the number of men in the battalion" he is "convinced that a trooper named Frank Finkel" of Co. C did escape from the fight. He supports this belief with very little evidence and refers to his 17-page manuscript in the Oshkosh (Wis.) Museum, which this reviewer has not had an opportunity to examine. Until then he hesitates to take a positive position contrary to that of our author. But if Trooper Finkel was a bona fide "survivor" why did he wait until 1921 to make it known publicly? Even an admitted skulker would have been exonerated. There was no Frank Finkel in Co. C. There was, however, for several years Corporal, afterwards Sergeant, August Finckle, who is listed as killed in the battle. Is he the man? It is possible the au-

thor purposely gives little information at this time, planning to publish a book on the subject later.

Nevertheless, while one may question many of the author's theories and conclusions, the time factors have been most carefully worked out and the volume shows intelligent examination of both the main and valley battle fields. Aside from this examination, studying the location of empty cartridge shells and the grave markers, on which theories of Custer's dispositions are based, there is little new of importance, but simply thorough analyses of known data supplemented by field work.

The volume is indexed, printed in medium type, well bound, with ample maps and copious notes, 26 pages of fine print, adding much to the work, but some should have been included in the text.

HENRY S. MERRICK

*Lt. Col. AUS (Ret.)*

*Historian, Order of Indian Wars*

\* \* \*

The Preparedness Subcommittee of the U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services of which Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas is chairman has issued forty-three reports on their Investigation of the Preparedness Program from September 6, 1950, through August 28, 1952.

These reports include studies of commodities as Rubber, Nos. 1, 2, 29; Nickel 4; Tin 13, 41; Tungsten 27; many service installations and special reports as Report of the Alaskan Task Force, No. 7 (Senate Document No. 10); Navy and Marine Corps, No. 31; Administrative top heaviness of our armed forces, No. 33; Interim report on Defense Mobilization, No. 35; Report on the Munitions Board No. 38; Interim Report on Defense Mobilization of our Air Power, No. 39; Report on the utilizations of Manpower by the Armed Services, No. 40; Interim Report on Moroccan Air Base construction, No. 42; and Interim Report on Defense Mobilization Aircraft Procurement, No. 43. Most of these reports are committee prints and the subcommittee's annual report was printed March 20, 1952.

For the student of contemporary mobilization problems both these reports indicated above and those of the corresponding House committee must be examined in order to obtain a clearer picture of American problems during this period.

G.J.S.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### *I. Institutions and Cultures—Asia*

- ABEGG, LIBY: *The Mind of East Asia* (tr. from the German). New York: Thames and Hudson, 1952. Pp. 351. Bibl. notes. \$4.50.)
- CALDWELL, JOHN C.: *The Korea Story*. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952. Pp. 192. \$3.00.)
- FATEMI, NASROLLAH S.: *Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923; Anglo-Russian power politics in Iran*. (New York: Russell F. Moore, 1952. Pp. 344. Bibl. notes, 1st of 3 volumes, \$5.00.)
- FITZGERALD, CHARLES P.: *Revolution in China*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952. Pp. 298. \$4.50.)
- GEER, ANDREW C.: *The New Breed; the story of the U. S. Marines in Korea*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 410. \$3.50) Korean Chronicle—July-December 1950.
- GROTH, JOHN: *Studio Asia*, il. by the author. (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 208. \$4.95.) Korea, Japan, Indo-China and Hong Kong visited.
- LATOURETTE, KENNETH S.: *The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 208. \$3.00.) American Institute of Pacific Relations Publication.
- LEMOINE, ANDRE: *Un du Bataillon francais en coree*. (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1951. Pp. 185.)
- MAULDIN, BILL: *Bill Mauldin in Korea*. (New York: Norton. Pp. 171. \$2.75.)
- MOUSSET, PAU: *Parallile 38*. (Paris: Gallimard, 1951. Pp. 294.)
- OLIVER, ROBERT: *The Truth about Korea*. (London: Putnam, 1951. Pp. 178.)
- RAND, CHRISTOPHER: *Hongkong, the Island Between*. (New York: Knopf, 1952 (1949-1952). Pp. 244. \$3.00.)
- Ritour de Coree; recits de quatre correspondants de guerre francaise sur le front de Coree*. (Paris: R. Julliard, 1951. Pp. 724.) The Correspondants: Serge Bromberger, Philippe Daudy, Henri de Turenne and Jean-Marie de Premonville.
- REISS, CURT: *The Berlin Story*. (New York: Dial, 1952. Pp. 368. \$3.75.)
- TENNEN, MARK A.: *No Secret is Safe Behind the Bamboo Curtain*. (New York: Farrar

- Straus and Young, 1952. Pp. 270. \$3.50.) Maryknoll priest's life in China.
- VOORHEES, LT. COL. MELVIN B.: *Korean Tales*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)
- U. S. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session—Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the internal security act. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952. 15 parts.)
- U. S. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session—Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Senate Rpt. No. 2050 June 20, 1952. Institute of Pacific Relations. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 244.)

### *II. Institutions and Cultures—Europe, et cetera*

- ABBAS, MEKKI: *The Sudan Question; the dispute over the Anglo-Egyptian condominium 1884-1951*. (New York: Praeger, 1952. Pp. 220. \$4.25.) (Colonial and comparative studies.)
- Africa South of the Sahara; an assessment of human and material resources: prepared by a study group of the South African Institute of International Affairs under the chairmanship of Major General Francis de Guingand*. New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 310. \$6.00.)
- BASSECHES, NIKOLAS: *Stalin*, tr. from the German by E. W. Dickes. (New York: Dutton, 1952. Pp. 384. \$4.75.)
- BAUMER, FRANKLIN LE VAN, ed.: *Main Currents of Western Thought; readings in western European intellectual history from the Middle Ages to the present*. (New York: Knopf, 1952. Pp. 715. Pp. 5 bibl. notes. \$7.50.)
- BENNETT, LOWELL: *Berlin Bastion*, the epic of Post-War Berlin. (Frankfurt/Main: F. Rudl, 1951. Pp. 263.)
- BONN, MORITZ J.: *Whither Europe—Union or Partnership*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 207. \$3.75.) Anti Union-pro partnerships.
- CALVOCORESSI, PETER, AND HARDEN, SHELIA: *Survey of International Affairs, 1947-48*, intro.

- by Arnold Toynbee. (New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 591. \$9.00.) (Royal Inst. of International Affairs Publication.)
- CHURCHILL, WINSTON L. S.: *In the Balance*. Speeches 1949 and 1950, ed. by Randolph S. Churchill. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. Pp. 466. \$5.00.)
- CZARNOMSKI, F. B.: *Can Russia Survive?* An examination of the facts and figures of Soviet reality. (London: Simpkin Marshall, 1952. Pp. 128. 7 shillings, 6 pence.)
- DVORIN, EUGENE P.: *Racial separation in South Africa*. An analysis of apartheid theory. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 268. Pp. 9 bibl. \$4.50.)
- FISCHER, LOUIS: *The Life and Death of Stalin*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 280. Pp. 3 bibl. \$3.50.)
- GALLICO, PAUL W.: *Trial by Terror*. (New York: Knopf, 1952. Pp. 299. \$3.00.) Contemporary novel of American reporter in Russian zone of Austria whose false confessions are caused by modern torture methods.
- GORDEY, MICHEL: *Visa to Moscow*, tr. from the French by Katherine Woods. (New York: Knopf, 1952. Pp. 429. \$4.50.)
- HERRIOT, EDOUARD: *In Those Days*; before the First World War, tr. from the French. (New York: Old and New World Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 276. \$3.75.) (Editions A. De Milly.)
- HINSHAW, DAVID: *Heroic Finland*. (New York: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 328. Pp. 2 bibl. \$4.50.)
- JANSE, RENEE S., comp.: *Soviet Transportation and Communications*, a bibliography. Washington: Library of Congress, 1952. Pp. 345. \$2.25, paper.)
- KELLY, LADY MARIE NOELE: *Mirror to Russia*. New York: British Book Center, 1952. Pp. 248. \$4.50.)
- KIRK, LYDIA: *Postmarked Moscow*. (New York: Scribner, 1952. Pp. 278. \$3.00.)
- KOLARZ, WALTER: *Russia and Her Colonies*. (London: George Philip and Son, 1952. Pp. 335. 25 shillings.)
- LATHAM, EDWARD, ed.: *Crisis in the Middle East*. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1952. Pp. 189. Pp. 15 bibl. \$1.25.) (Reference shelf V. 24, No. 4.)
- NORTHROP, F. S. C.: *The Taming of the Nations*; a study of the cultural bases of international policy. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 374. Pp. 12 bibl. notes. \$5.00.)
- OSTORIC, P. D.: *The Truth about Yugoslavia*; intro. by Ivan Mestrovic. (New York: Roy, 1952. Pp. 323. \$3.50.)
- POLLOCK, JAMES K., AND THOMAS, HOMER: *Germany in Power and Eclipse*: the background of German Development. (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1952. Pp. 669. Bibl. \$10.00.)
- SCHECHTMAN, JOSEPH B.: *The Arab Refugee Problem*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 148. Bibl. notes. \$3.00.)
- SCHMIDT, DANA A.: *Anatomy of a Satellite*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1952. Pp. 521. \$5.00.) The Czechoslovakia coup is described as the basis for future help for similar countries.
- SMUTS, JAN C.: *Jan Christian Smuts; a biography*. (New York: Morrow, 1952. Pp. 510. Pp. 5 bibl. \$6.00.) The South African leader as seen by his son.
- ULAM, ADAM BRUNO: *Titoism and the Cominform*. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 251. Pp. 2 bibl. notes. \$4.50.) Russian Research Studies, No. 5.
- WITTLIN, TADEUSZ: *A Reluctant Traveller in Russia*; tr. from Polish by N. E. P. Clark. (New York: Rinehart, 1952. Pp. 285. \$3.00.)

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

- BENT, R. A. R.: *Ten Thousand Men of Africa*. (London: H. M. Stationery Office for the Bechuanaland Government, 1952. Pp. 128. 8 shillings, 6 pence.)
- BOHN, HELMUT: *Du Heimbehrer dus russiseher Kriegsgefangensehoft*. (Frankfurt am Main: Nietzner, 1951. Pp. 68.) (Institut zur Forderung Offenlecher Angelegenheiten. Frankfurt am Main. Klunschriften fur den Staatsburgen, No. 14.)
- BORGHESE, J. VALERIO: *Sea Devils*, tr. from the Italian *Decima Flottiglia Mas* by James Cleugh and adapted by the author. (London: Melrose, 1952. Pp. 264. 18 shillings.) (World War II Human Torpedoes.)
- BRICKHILL, PAUL: *Escape or Die*, authentic stories of the RAF Escape Society, commentary by H. E. Bates, foreword by Air Marshall Sir Basil Embry. (New York: Norton, 1952. Pp. 248. \$2.95.)
- CHURCHILL, PETER: *Of Their Own Choice*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1952. Pp. 218. 12 shillings, 6 pence.)
- FULLER, JEAN O.: *Madeleine, The Story of Noor Inayat Khan*. (London: Gollancz, 1952. Pp. 192. 13 shillings, 6 pence.) British Agent in Occupied France.



- GALLERY, DANIEL V.: *Clear the Decks*. (London: Harrap, 1952. Pp. 215. 12 shillings, 6 pence.)
- GLEESON, JAMES, AND WALDRON, TOM: *Now It Can Be Told*. (London: Elek, 1952. Pp. 188. 15 shillings.)
- GUDERIAN, GENERAL HEINZ: *Panzer Leader*, foreword by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, tr. from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (New York: Dutton, 1952. Pp. 528. \$7.50.)
- HINSLEY, FRANCIS H.: *Hitler's Strategy*. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 266. \$3.75.)
- ITALY. *Stato maggiore dell'esercito*. Ufficio storico. I gruppi di combattimento, Cremona, Friuli, Folgore, Legnano, Mantova, Piceno (1944-1945). (Roma, 1951. Pp. 564. Illus., maps.)
- JOUBERT DE LA FERTE, SIR PHILIP: *The Fated Sky*. An autobiography. (London: Hutchinson, 1952. Pp. 280. 18 shillings.) R.A.F. commander in World War II.
- LEDERREY, COLONEL SWISS ARMY: *La Defaite Allemande a l'est les armées. Soviétiques en guerre de 1941 a 1945*. (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle, 1951. Pp. 270.)
- MARTIN, JEAN PIERRE: *Les Finances de guerre du Canada*. (Paris: A. Colin, 1951. Pp. 212.) (Fondation nationale les sciences politique cahiers 24.)
- METHUEN, LORD: *Normandy Diary*. (London: Hale, 1952. Pp. 288. 100 pps. illus. 63 shillings.) (Painter's description of architecture and historic sites during World War II, British army preservation attempts.)
- MILLIS, WALTER, ed.: *The Forrestal Diaries*. (London: Cassell, 1952. Pp. 542. 25 shillings.) (Contains introductory note by Lord Alexander.)
- MOSS, WILLIAM S.: *A War of Shadows*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 239. \$3.95.)
- NAMIER, SIR LEWIS B.: *In the Nazi Era*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952. Pp. 210. Bibl. footnotes. \$2.25.) Includes discussion of post-war German leaders' memoirs.
- NEUMANN, INGE S., comp.: *European War Crimes Trials*; a bibliography, ed. by Robert A. Rosenbaum. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. Pp. 113. \$1.00.)
- PINTO, ORESTE: *Spy Catcher*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 218. \$2.75.)
- TIPPLESKIRCH, KURT VON: *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs*. (Bonn: Athenaenum Verlag, 1952. Pp. 790. 38 D.M.)
- U. S. 82nd Congress. Selected Committee to conduct an Investigation of the facts, evidence and circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre. *Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings*, Oct. 11, 1951 - April 26, 1952, and Exhibits. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 1823 in 6 parts.)
- Cong. Ray J. Madden of Indiana is Chairman. Hearings were held in Washington (Parts 1, 2); Chicago (Part 3); London (Part 4); Frankfurt (Part 5). Exhibits (Part 6).
- Interim Report*, July 2, 1952. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Off., 1952. Pp. 31.) House Report No. 2430. This important report summarizes the findings of the hearings—holds that the USSR was responsible and recommends further action.
- VON PAPEN, FRANZ: *Memoirs*, tr. by Brian Connell. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952. Pp. 325. 25 shillings.)
- WAITE, ROBERT G. L.: *Vanguard of Nazism*, the free corps movement in postwar Germany, 1918-1923. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 356. Pp. 33. Bibl. \$6.00.)
- WEGAND, GENERAL MAXIME: *Recalled to Service*; the memoirs of General Maxime Wegand, tr. from the French by E. W. Dickes. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 467. \$6.25.) His World War II memoirs.
- WIELLUS, ARMAND: *Les Origines internationales du drame belge de 1940*. (Bruxelles, Etablissements généraux d'imprimerie, 1950. Pp. 402.)
- YOUNG, EDWARD: *One of Our Submarines*. (London: Rupert, Hart-Davis, 1952. Pp. 316. 18 shillings.) Excellent description of life submerged.

#### IV. United States Foreign Relations

- BARNES, JOSEPH: *Wilkie*; the events he was part of—the ideas he fought for. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952. Pp. 405. \$5.00.)
- BIESELE, RUDOLF L., etc. eds.: *Readings in American History*, v. 1, 1492-1865; v. 2, 1865 to the present. Pp. 372, Pp. 415. Bibl. footnotes. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. \$2.50 each volume.)
- Brookings Institution: *Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, 1952-53*. (Washington: Brookings, 1952. Pp. 426. \$4.00, \$2.00.)
- CARLYLE, MARGARET, ed.: *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48*. (New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 905. \$14.00.) (Royal Inst. Inter. Affairs Pubn.)

- ELLIOTT, WILLIAM Y.: *United States Foreign Policy; its organization and control*. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 306. \$3.75.) (Woodrow Wilson Foundation Study Group Report.)
- I *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Ottava Serie*, 1935-1939. Vol. XII. (23 Maggio-11 Augusto 1939. Roma: Liberia dello Stato, 1952.)
- LIPPMAN, WALTER: *Isolation and Alliances*. An American Speaks to the British. (Boston: Little Brown, 1952. Pp. 62. \$1.50.)
- PALMER, NORMAN D., ed.: *The National Interest—alone or with others*. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1952. Pp. 210. \$2.00 paper.) (Annals V. 282.)
- PATTERSON, GARDENER, AND BEHRMAN, JACK N.: *Survey of United States International Finance*, 1951. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 336. Bibl. notes. \$2.25 paper.)
- PERKINS, DEXTER, CONANT JAMES B.: *The Story of U. S. Foreign Policy: Our future in the atomic age*. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1951. Pp. 62. 35c.) (Headline Series No. 90.)
- RIGGS, FRED W.: *Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 204. Pp. 3 bibl. \$2.75.) (Amer. Inst. Pacific Relations Pub.)
- SALVEMINE, GAETANO: *Mussoline Diplomatico*, 1922-1932. (Bari: Laterza, 1952. Li. 2500.) (Libri del Tempo.)
- SHARP, WALTER R.: *International Technical Assistance Programs and Organizations*. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952. Pp. 157. Pp. 3 bibl. \$2.50 paper.)
- STRAUSZ-HUPE, ROBERT: *The Zone of Indifference*. (New York: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 319. Bibl. footnotes. \$3.75.)
- VANDENBERG, ARTHUR H.: *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*; ed. by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and Joe Alex Morris. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. Pp. 261. \$5.00.)
- U. S. Dept. of State, *In Quest of Peace and Security. Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy 1941-1951*. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 120. 55c paper.) Contains in easily available form the major wartime documents on conferences, those relating to defeated and occupied areas and those relating to security against aggression.
- U. S. Department of State, *Our Foreign Policy*, 1952. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 79. 25c.) (G.F.P. Series 56.)
- U. S. President: *Second Semi-annual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program*, April 6 to October 6, 1950. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951. Pp. 50.) U. S. Congress House Document 119, State Dept. G.F.P. Series 47.)
- U. S. President: Third report—October 6 to March 31, 1951. (Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1951. Pp. 50.) U. S. Congress House Document 179. State Dept. G.F.P. Series 59.
- U. S. President: Fourth Report—April 11, 1951 to October 9, 1951. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952. Pp. 99.) U. S. Congress House Document 352. State Dept. G.F.P. Series 68.
- U. S. President: *The Mutual Security Program . . . for a strong and free world*. First Report to Congress, December 31, 1951. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952. Pp. 81. With appendix volume of documents.)
- WILLIAMS, WILLIAM A.: *American Russian Relations, 1781-1947*. (New York: Rinehart, 1952. Pp. 56. Bibl. notes. \$5.00.)

#### V. National Warfare, U. S.

- BEEBE, GILBERT W., and DeBAKEY, MICHAEL E., M.D.: *Battle Casualties; incidence, mortality and logistic considerations*. (Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas, 1952. Pp. 303. Bibl. \$10.50.)
- BILL, ALFRED H.: *Valley Forge, the Making of an Army*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 271. Pp. 5 bibl. \$3.50.)
- BLACK, ROBERT C., III: *Railroads of the Confederacy*. (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. C. Press, 1952. Pp. 374. Pp. 8 bibl. \$6.00.)
- BLUMENTHAL, WALTER H.: *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution*. (Philadelphia: George S. MacManus Co., 1952. Pp. 104. \$3.75.)
- BOULWARE, L. R., and others: *What to do about communism in unions*; No. 2 in the series. (New York: General Electric, 1952. Pp. 62. Paper apply.)
- BRANDENBURG, HOWARD H.: *Navy Evidence; a digest of evidence based on court martial orders of the Navy, 1916-1951*. (Lake Forest, Ill.: Lake Forest Books, 1952. Pp. 189. \$7.50.)
- BRINISTOOL, EARL A.: *Troopers with Custer; historic incidents of the Battle of the Little Big Horn*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stockpole Co., 1952. Pp. 343. \$5.00.)
- BROWER, BILL: *The Complete Army-Navy Joke Book*. (New York: Stravon Publishers, 1952.)



- Pp. 126. \$2.00.)
- BROWN, WILLIAM S.: *California Northeast, the Bloody Ground*. (Oakland, Cal.: Biobooks, 1951. Pp. 225. \$15.00.)
- BRYAN, WILLIAM A.: *George Washington in American Literature, 1775-1865*. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 292. Pp. 23 bibl. \$4.00.)
- BURR, NELSON R., comp.: *Safeguarding our Cultural Heritage*; a bibliography on the protection of museums . . . archives and libraries in times of War. (Washington: U. S. Library of Congress, 1952. Pp. 127. 35c paper.)
- CAMPBELL, WILLIAM G. and others: *Economics of Mobilization and War*. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1952. Pp. 200. \$3.35 paper.)
- Coast Guardsman Manual: (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1952. Pp. 824. \$3.50.)
- DISNEY, COLONEL PAUL A.: *Tactical problems for armor units*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 214. \$2.50 paper.)
- FREEMAN, DOUGLAS S.: *George Washington*; a biography, V. 5. Victory with the help of France. (New York: Scribner, 1952. Pp. 586. Pp. 6 bibl. and bibl. notes, \$7.50.) (30 April 1778 - December 1783.)
- HOWARD, JOSEPH K.: *Strange Empire*; a narrative of the Northwest. Preface by Bernard DeVoto. (New York: Morrow, 1952. Pp. 613. \$6.00.) (Louis Riel and the Metis, 1870-1885.)
- JOHN, EVAN, pseud.: *Atlantic Impact, 1861*. New York: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 305. \$3.75.) The Trent Case.
- KARIG, CAPTAIN WALTER, and others: *Battle Report*; the War in Korea. (New York: Rinehart, 1952. Pp. 536. \$6.00.) The Navy during the first six months of the Korean conflict.
- KIEFFER, JOHN E.: *Studies in World Economic Geography*. (New York: Crowell, 1952. Pp. 91, \$1.95, paper.)
- LEE, ROLAND F.: *United States: Historical and Architectural Monuments*. (Mexico, D. F.: Instituto Panamericano de Geografia e Historia, 1951. Pp. 121.) Contains a history of the U.S. preservation movement, the National Park Service, including pertinent laws, descriptions, illustrations and map of sites.
- LEGAR, CLARA EGLI, comp.: *The Hotchkiss Map Collection*. A list of manuscript maps, many of the Civil War period, etc. (Washington: U. S. Library of Congress, 1951. Pp. 67. \$6.00.)
- LORANT, STEFAN: *Lincoln, a picture story of his life*. (New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 256. Pp. 6 bibl. \$6.00.)
- MASSEY, MARY E.: *Ersatz in the Confederacy*. (Columbia: Univ. of S. C. Press, 1952. Pp. 245. Pp. 14 bibl. \$5.00.)
- NOEL, CMDR. JOHN V., JR.: *Naval Terms Dictionary*. (New York: Van Nostrand, 1952. Pp. 253. \$4.50.)
- RANDALL, JAMES G.: *Lincoln, The President, Midstream*. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1952. Pp. 482. \$7.50.) (Vol. 3 of his biography concerned with the year 1863.)
- REDFORD, EMMETTE S.: *Administration of National Economic Control*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 420. Bibl. footnotes. \$5.50.)
- REINHARDT, GUENTHER: *Crime without punishment, the secret Soviet terror against America*. (New York: Hermitage Press, 1952. Pp. 322. \$3.50.)
- SIBLEY, MULFORD Q., AND JAROK, PHILLIP E.: *Conscription of Conscience; the American State and the conscientious objector, 1940-1947*. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 590. Pp. 19 bibl. \$6.50.)
- SIEVERS, HARRY J.: *Benjamin Harrison, Hoosier Warrior, 1833-1865*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. Pp. 365. Pp. 10 bibl. \$5.00.) Through the Civil War period.
- SPIER, HANS: *Social Order and the Risks of War; papers in political sociology*. (New York: George W. Stewart, 1952. Pp. 506. Pp. 41 bibl. notes. \$4.75.)
- SWEENEY, LEONORA H.: *Amherst County, Virginia, in the Revolution, including extracts from the Lost Order Book, 1773-1782*. (Lynchburg, Va.: J. P. Bell Co., 1951. Pp. 225. \$15.00.)
- TAX, SOL, ed.: *Indian Tribes of Aboriginal America*; selected papers of the 29th International Congress of Americanists, 1949. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 420. Pp. 24 bibl. \$7.50.)
- Uniform and Dress, Army and Navy of the Confederate States of America*. (Philadelphia: Ray Riling, 1952. No. p. \$10.00.) "Facsimile reproductions from the original regulations . . . and other . . . sources."
- VAN ROYEN, WILLIAM, and others: *The Mineral Resources of the World*. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952. Pp. 190. Bibl. \$10.75, \$8.00.) (Univ. of Md. Atlas of the World's resources, V. 2.)

- WALKER, ROBERT A., ed.: *America's Manpower Crisis*; the report of the Institute on Manpower Utilization and Government Personnel. Stanford University, August 22, 23, 24, 1951. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952. Pp. 199. \$3.00 paper.)
- WARD, CHRISTOPHER L.: *The War of the Revolution*, ed. by John R. Alden. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 1013, 2 vol. Pp. 12 bibl. \$15.00.)
- WAYMAN, MRS. DOROTHY G.: *David I. Walsh, Citizen Patriot*. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952. Pp. 374. Bibl. notes. \$5.00.)
- WEBER, THOMAS: *The Northern Railroads in the Civil War, 1861-1865*. (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1952. Pp. 330. Pp. 9 bibl. \$4.00.)
- VI. *National Warfare, United States—Fiction*
- DAVIS, BURKE: *Yorktown*. (New York: Rinehart, 1952. Pp. 306. \$3.50.) An entertaining novel which catches the flavor of the period of the American Revolution described.
- DEVON, LOUIS: *Ride to Glory*. (New York: Crowell, 1952. Pp. 255. \$3.00.) Fictional biography of Secretary of War John A. Rawlins.
- HORNE, HOWARD: *Concord Bridge*. (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merril, 1952. Pp. 320. Pp. 3 bibl. notes. \$3.00.)
- LANCASTER, BRUCE: *The Secret Road*. (Boston: Little Brown Co., 1952. Pp. 268. \$3.50.) Intelligence in the American Revolution based upon history.
- THOMPSON, ARTHUR A.: *The Road to Glory*. Story of the third Purple Heart. (New York: Library Publishers, 1952. Pp. 288. \$3.75.) The novel based upon the records of the life of the American Revolutionary spy, David Bissell.
- don: Batchworth Press, 1952. Pp. 198. 18 shillings.) Portuguese defeat of August 4, 1578, described in detail.
- DUBOIS, JOSIAH E., JR., AND JOHNSON, EDWARD: *The Devil's Chemists*; twenty-four conspirators of the international Farben Cartel who manufacture wars. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952. Pp. 384. \$3.75.)
- GOOCH, GEORGE P.: *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, rev. with new intro. (New York: Longmans, 1952. Pp. 583. \$8.50.)
- LIDDELL-HART, B. H., ed.: *The Letters of Private Wheeler, 1809-1828*. (London: Michael Joseph, 1951. Pp. 284. 18 shillings.)
- MARDER, ARTHUR J., ed.: *Fear God and Dread Nought*. The correspondence of Admiral of the fleet, Lord Fisher of Kolverston, Vol. I. The Making of an Admiral. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952. Pp. 377. 30 shillings.)
- MOOREHEAD, ALAN: *The Traitors*. (New York: Scribners, 1952. Pp. 222. Bibl. \$3.50.)
- RICHMOND, SIR HERBERT: *Portrait of an Admiral*; the life and papers of Sir Herbert Richmond by Arthur J. Marder. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 407. \$6.00.)
- Spain Servicio Historico Militar; *Segundo curso o superior de Metedologia y critica historicas para formacion tecnica del moderno historia Tor*. (Madrid: Estado mayor central del ejercito, servicio historico militar, 1950. Pp. 358.)
- THOMPSON, JAMES M.: *Napoleon Bonaparte*. (New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 472. Pp. 9 bibl. notes. \$6.00.)
- VERITEX, JEAN: *Les carrefours du haut-merite, la medaille militaire*, preface de Docteur G. Remy-Neris. (Paris: Editions Elzevir, 1952. Pp. 171, plates. 3600 francs.)
- WALES, HORACE GEOFFREY QUARITCH: *Ancient Southeast Asian Warfare*. (London: B. Quaritch, 1952. Pp. 206.)

#### VII. *National Warfare*

- ANDERSON, ROGER C.: *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853*. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 628. Pp. 6 bibl. \$7.50.)
- ALBERTINI, LIUGI: *The Origins of the War of 1914*, tr. from the Italian and ed. by Isabella M. Massey. V. I, European Relations from the Congress of Berlin to the eve of the Sarajevo murder. (New York: Oxford, 1952. Pp. 640. Bibl. footnotes. \$9.00.) The first of three volumes.
- BOVILL, E. W.: *The Battle of Aleazar*. (Lon-

#### VIII. *Weapons*

- BRIDGEMAN, LEONARD, ed.: *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1951-1952*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. \$22.50.)
- HALL, A. R.: *Ballistics in the Seventeenth Century*; a study in the relations of science and war with reference principally to England. (New York: London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 193. \$4.00, 21 shillings.)
- HUNSAKER, JEROME C.: *Aeronautics at the Mid-century*. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 116. \$3.00.) (D. H. Terry Founda-



tion lecture, concluding chapter evaluates social and political effects of military and civil aeronautics.)

LENT, CONSTANTIN P.: *Rocketry and Jet-Propulsion*. (New York: Pen-Ink Publishing Co., 1951. Pp. 64. \$5.00.)

WILKINSON, PAUL H.: *Aircraft engines of the World, revised*. (New York: Author, 1952. Pp. 320. \$12.00.)

## PERIODICALS

### I. Institutions and Culture—Asia

"They Make Men Whole, the Medical Battalion and Chaplains in Korea," by Lynn Montross in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, December 1952.

"Marine Air War," by Fred W. Braitsch in *Leatherneck*, November 1952.

"Easy Med," by George E. Burlag in *Leatherneck*, Quantico, January 1952. Marine Medical Personnel in Korea.

"Burnside's Amphibious Division," by Robert W. Daly in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, December 1951. An account of the Battle of Roanoke Island.

"Marine Artillery in Korea," by Kenneth W. Condit in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, November 1952.

"The FMF in Korea," by James A. Donovan, Jr., in *Leatherneck*, Quantico, November 1952.

"No Victory without Economy," by Lt. Col. C. J. Fleps in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, June 1952.

"Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir," by Ernest V. Giusti and Kenneth W. Condit in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, July 1952.

"Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul," by Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest V. Giusti in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, June 1952.

"Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter," by E. H. Giusti in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, May 1952.

"Marine Air Covers the Breakout," by Kenneth W. Condit and Ernest V. Giusti in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, August 1952.

"Japan," *Focus*, New York, October 1952.

"The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt," 1600 Square Miles of Trouble, by Lynn Montross in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, January 1952.

"Buttoning up the Offensive," The Marines in Operation Killer," by Lynn Montross in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, February 1952.

"Advance to the 38th Parallel, the Marines in Operation Ripper," by Lynn Montross in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, March 1952.

"All in a Day's Work, the Engineers and Shore Party in Korea," by Lynn Montross in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, September 1952.

"March of the Iron Cavalry, Marine Tanks in Korea," by Lynn Montross in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, December 1952.

"Mao's Strategic Defensive," by Lt. Col. Brooke Nihart in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, November 1952.

"The Chinese Communists," by A. D. C. Peterson in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, April 1952.

"The Queen's Men," by Leslie Smith, in the *Leatherneck*, Quantico, September 1952. Commonwealth and Empire Troops in Korea.

### II. Institutions and Culture—Europe

"Can We Beat the Red Luftwaffe?," by Victor Black in *American Mercury*, New York, September 1952.

"Turkey at the Straits," by John Gellner, Sqdrn. Ldr., RCAF, in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, April 1952.

"Germany," *Focus*, New York, September 1952.

"Background for Russian Action," by Lt. Col. J. D. Hittle in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, January 1952.

"Stalin's Secret War Plans," by Gen. Alexis Markoff in *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, September 20, 1952.

"How Does Our Air Force Stand Up Against Stalin's," by Wesley Price in *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, September 6, 1952.

"Soviet Population Policy," in *Population Bulletin*, Washington, August 1952.

"The Soviet State," in *Officers Call*, Washington, Volume 4, No. 2.

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

"How Top Was My Secret," a contribution to Military History, by Linnell Jones in *American Mercury*, New York, September 1952.

"Our Secret Deal Over Germany," by Albert L. Warner in *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, August 2, 1952.

### IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

"The Geneva Conventions of 1949," by Raymond T. Yingling and Robert W. Ginane in *Ameri-*

*can Journal of International Law*, Washington, July 1952.

### V. National Warfare, U. S.

- "The Truth about General Grow's Moscow Diary," by Demaree Bess in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, September 27, 1952.
- "Birth of a Base" ("Blue Jay"), in *Life*, New York, September 22, 1952.
- "We Can Have Guns and Butter," by George S. Brady in *Ordinance*, Washington, November-December, 1952.
- "Planning for Defense," by Dr. Vannevar Bush, in *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, Washington, November 1952.
- "A Battle of Bureaucrats, 1781," by Lynton K. Caldwell in *New York History*, Cooperstown, April 1952.
- "Our Unprotected Seaports: A Cinch for Saboteurs," by Will Chasan and Johnston in *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, July 19, 1952.
- "Stress the Fundamentals," by General J. Lawton Collins in *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, Washington, November 1952.
- "The Editor and the Graphic Arts," by Saxe Commins in *Saturday Review of Literature*, New York, November 1952.
- "History in Double Think," by Elmer Davis in *Saturday Review of Literature*, New York, June 28, 1952.
- "The Defense of Europe—1952," by George Fielding Eliot in *Ordinance*, Washington, July-August, 1952.
- "Crazy Bet, Union Spy," in *Virginia Cavalcade*, Richmond, Spring 1952.
- "The Chaplains Corps," by Claude R. Lewis in *Leatherneck*, Quantico, April 1952.
- "The New Commandant," by Ronald D. Lyons, in the *Leatherneck*, Quantico, January 1952. Review of the career of General Lemuel Shepard, Jr., New Commandant of the U.S.M.C.
- "What's Your Rank," by T/Sgt. Edward J. Evans in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1952. Evolution of military ranks and titles.
- "Freeman's Washington": A triple evaluation; I, Washington as a Personality (Cornelia Meigs); II, Washington as an Eighteenth Century Man (Perry Milton); III, Washington as a Virginia Rebel and as a Commander-in-Chief. Bernard Kollenberg in *William and Mary Quarterly*, Williamsburg, April 1952.
- "Craney Island," by William H. Gaines, Jr., *Virginia Cavalcade*, Richmond, Winter, 1951.
- "Great Dates of the Corps" in *Leatherneck*, Quantico, November 1952.
- "The Addison Blockhouse," by John W. Griffen in *The Florida Historical Quarterly*, Gainesville, January 1952.
- "The Killed, Wounded, Injured and Sick of World War II," by G. V. in *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, October 1952, (Review.)
- "The Eagle and the Dove," by Reginald Hargreaves in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, July 1952. An account of Military Civilian attitudes vis-a-vis each other.
- "Marine Corps Glossary," by Lt. Col. R. D. Heintz, Jr., in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, November 1952.
- "The Need for Body Armor," by Lt. Col. Robert H. Holmes in *U. S. Army Combat Forces*, Washington, September 1952.
- "Robert E. Lee," by Stanley Horn in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Winter 1952.
- "Baltimore's War," by Wilbur H. Hunter, *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Winter 1952.
- "The Marine's Answer Man" (Joel D. Thacker), by Bill Kreh in *Washington Star Pictorial Magazine*, June 29, 1952.
- "The Old Brick House at Sandy Hook" in *Ordinance*, Washington, September-October 1952.
- "Ann Arbor and the Coming of the Civil War," by George S. May in *Michigan History*, Lansing, September 1952.
- "Trial by Ice," by Lt. Col. L. Metzger, Lt. Col. H. L. Oppenheimer and Lt. Cmdr. O. W. Price in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, August 1952.
- "Freedom of Action in War," by Rear Admiral Edward A. Mitchell, U.S.N., in *Ordinance*, Washington, November-December 1952.
- "He's the Strongest Admiral" (Vice Admiral William Callaghan), by Hugh Morrow in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, July 12, 1952.
- "43 Years of Motor Transport," by Harry C. Olson, Lt. Col., in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, December 1952. Development of Motor Transport.
- "Saddle-Up," by Lt. Col. Harold L. Oppenheimer in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, July 1952. Uses for pack animals and troops in warfare, especially recent warfare.
- "Tell it to the Marines," by Major Phillip N. Pierce, in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1952. Origin of the famous expression.



# HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE<sup>1</sup>

## MILITARY AFFAIRS CATCHING UP

With the publication of this issue our quarterly, for the first time since the end of 1949, has almost caught up with the calendar. The time we have been striving to regain was lost during 1950, when MILITARY AFFAIRS suspended publication. In order to keep the record straight for members, and to save future readers untold confusion, the following table gives the month of issue for each number since publication was resumed.

<i>Volume and year</i>	<i>Number and season</i>	<i>Month when issued</i>
XIV (1950)	No. 1, Spring 1950	December 1950
	No. 2, Summer "	March 1951
	No. 3, Fall "	May 1951
	No. 4, Winter "	September 1951
XV (1951)	No. 1, Spring 1951	November 1951
	No. 2, Summer "	March 1952
	No. 3, Fall "	June 1952
	No. 4, Winter "	October 1952
XVI (1952)	No. 1, Spring 1952	November 1952
	No. 2, Summer 1952	December 1952

Number 4 of Volume XVI, it is expected, will be issued in early March 1953. The Spring Number of 1953 (XVII, 1) will follow at end of March or early April.

Members may be confused by bills they have received, or will receive, but a little attention to the above Table will show them where they stand. Bills for 1952 were not sent out until we were ready to start publication of the 1952 issues, that is in November 1952. The last billing prior to that—the billing for 1951—was done more than a year before.

Now, when the four issues of Volume XVI (1952) are completed, bills will be mailed for Volume XVII (1953). Since the latter

will probably be in the mail in March, it is obvious that the interval between dues for 1952 and 1953 will be very short. This is offset by the fact that the 1951-1952 interval was very long. In any case, after March no more dues will be required until the end of 1953. Thereafter they will be on a normal annual basis.

## THE BUDGET FOR 1952

The new Treasurer, Ralph W. Donnelly, has prepared a tentative budget to cover the four numbers of the Quarterly for 1952.

Summarized it is as follows:

### *Estimated income:*

Dues from 403 members @ \$3.50 (This figure is based on current membership)	\$1410.50
Subscription fees from 650 subscribers @ \$3.60	2233.25
Sales of single copies, reprints, etc.	150.00
Dividends and interest	200.00
	<u>\$3993.75</u>

### *Estimated expenses:*

Publication of four issues and two indexes costing 4 × \$800 plus \$200	\$3400.00
Miscellaneous expense (printing, postage, etc.)	300.00
Joint Meeting with American Historical Ass'n.	50.00
Surplus	193.75
	<u>\$3993.75</u>

If dues and subscriptions come in as estimated, so that this budget can be applied, it will be possible to enlarge and "dress up" the magazine somewhat. Everything points to an improved quarterly and to a brighter future.

## CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY

Major General Orlando Ward, the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, retired at the end of January 1953. His place was filled by Major General Albert

<sup>1</sup>Publication date, February 1953.

Cowper Smith whose career as an officer began in April 1917, a few days after the United States entered the first World War. Newly graduated from West Point, 2d Lt. Smith was at once caught up in the war. With VII Corps, he took part in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. General Smith's branch was the Cavalry, consequently he was involved in the beginnings of the Armored Force in July 1940. He commanded the 14th Armored Division during its active combat service from November 1944 to June 1945. He served more than once as instructor at the Military Academy, and for four years on the teaching staff of the Command and General Staff School. Whether General Smith is in sympathy with the objectives of the Office of Military History, of course, remains to be seen.

#### MONCADO AWARD

The Moncado Committee of the American Military Institute has at last made its first award. After lengthy consideration and thorough screening of many manuscripts on American military history which had been submitted, the Committee chose the work of Dr. J. Franklin Leach for the first prize award of \$500. The winning manuscript, entitled "The Law, Theory, and Politics of Conscription in the United States," is a study of the development of what we know today as selective military service and training, and was offered as research and dissertation for a doctoral degree in history at the University of California.

The runner-up was also a doctoral dissertation at the same academic institution, entitled "The Citizen Soldier, 1790-1815," by Dr. John Keith Mahon, presently in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Dr. Mahon received a certificate of honorable mention, without stipend. His work deals with the development of the militia system in the United States in the

early years of the Republic.

The Moncado Committee is now embarking on a new program for its second award, which will not be as large as the first, as it will be confined to the interest obtainable on the invested fund. Presented as a biennial prize the stipend is expected to be about \$200. All those interested are requested to submit entries. Manuscripts should be typed in double space on standard size typewriter paper, and should relate to some phase of American military history. Military history is interpreted to include all services, and all types of related activity, such as technology, and logistics, as well as strategy and tactics, and military policy. Manuscripts should be forwarded before June 30, 1953, to the Chairman, Moncado Book Fund Committee, c/o American Military Institute, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. After reading and consideration, manuscripts will be returned at the author's expense.

#### CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE ACTIVITIES

The Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia continues with its very active, keenly interesting, and well-attended programs during the current fall and winter season. Following the splendid day's trip to the battlefield of Antietam, 4 October 1952, the Round Table held an indoor session at the Army Navy Club in Washington, 14 October, learning more about Gettysburg. Major General Carl A. Baehr, USA Ret., presented at that evening dinner meeting a truly formidable illustrated account of the handling of the artillery of both armies at the Battle of Gettysburg. It is hoped that General Baehr will undertake the onerous task of converting his mountain of written notes to an integrated narrative form, so his brilliant analysis may reach a wider and equally interested audience through publication in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, or similar suitable media.



## SHERIDAN AND CEDAR CREEK—A REAPPRAISAL

RAOUL S. NAROLL\*

NEAR noon one pleasant October Sunday,<sup>1</sup> a long column of horsemen was to be seen stretching along a Shenandoah Valley road, across the river from Front Royal. Their leader was sitting on the veranda of Mrs. Richards' farmhouse, eating his lunch and chatting with his staff officers, when a blue-coated horseman came trotting down the road. The rider reined in his animal at the veranda steps. His heavy boots thudded briskly as he approached the seated officers.<sup>2</sup>

"Urgent dispatch for General Sheridan," he announced.

A staff officer took the envelope, opened it, and handed Major General Philip H. Sheridan the yellow flimsy sheet within. He scanned it and handed it back. As the message passed from hand to hand among the seated officers, an excited buzz of comment arose. Sheridan had now taken a message pad and was writing carefully. When he finished, he handed what he had written to the dispatch rider.

"Take this back to Cedar Creek," he told him.

The rider saluted, thudded down the steps, mounted smartly, snatched the reins from

the orderly who had been holding them, and trotted away. The message he now carried was for the eyes of Major General Horatio G. Wright. It read:<sup>3</sup>

"General: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position strong. If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impression that we have largely detached. . . . If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him. Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up everything that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up on Tuesday, if not sooner."

The message from Wright the rider had brought Sheridan had been equally terse. It had read:<sup>4</sup>

"General: I enclose you despatch which explains itself. If the enemy should be strongly re-enforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right, give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and resisting."

Its enclosure had been still more terse. But in its sixteen words lay the nub of the matter. It was addressed to Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early, who lay with his army—or what was left of it—in his old entrenchment at Fisher's Hill, where Sheridan had beaten him so badly not four weeks before. The message read:<sup>5</sup>

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you and we will crush Sheridan. Longstreet, Lieutenant-General."

These words had been wigwagged from hill to hill by the Confederate signal stations.

\*Captain Naroll is a member of the California National Guard, has had six years of Regular Army service in the infantry and in military intelligence, and is presently completing his doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Los Angeles.

<sup>1</sup>U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Volume XLIII, Part I, p. 580. In later citations, this work will be referred to as O. R., without reference to series or volume number, which remain unchanged throughout the paper. Thus the foregoing citation would be given simply as "O.R. I:580."

<sup>2</sup>Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, New York: 1888, II:62-3.

<sup>3</sup>O.R. II:389-90.

<sup>4</sup>O.R. II:389.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

Other eyes than theirs had been watching; an alert Union signal officer, who had the Confederate cipher, had taken it down and deciphered it. Sheridan, on his way to Washington for an interview with Chief of Staff Halleck and Secretary of War Stanton, had left Wright in command of his army at Cedar Creek. But with him he had taken all that army's cavalry. This force, under Brig. Gen. Alfred A. Torbert, was to escort him part way, and then wheel south for a raid through Chester Gap on the Virginia Central railroad at Charlottesville.<sup>6</sup> But now this plan would have to be abandoned, and the cavalry corps, 8,000 strong,<sup>7</sup> would have to be returned to Cedar Creek, where Wright with three infantry corps, 25,000 strong,<sup>8</sup> was already busy fortifying his position.<sup>9</sup> Early, heavily outnumbered, lay at Fisher's Hill, a few miles south of Cedar Creek, with but 12,500 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.<sup>10</sup>

After Sheridan dispatched his reply to Wright, he began to be troubled with second thoughts. Instead of ordering the cavalry back to Cedar Creek immediately, he took it with him through the Blue Ridge mountains to Rectortown, as originally planned. At Rectortown there was a telegraph line to Washington and Sheridan lost no time in using it. Could not Halleck—he hinted as broadly as it was proper for a subordinate to do—could not Halleck come to see him?<sup>11</sup> To that question, Halleck returned no an-

swer. Sheridan was left with an unpleasant dilemma: he could leave his army at a time when he had good reason to expect an attack or he could postpone his interview with the people in Washington. There was heavy pressure on him to go to Washington. True, no one had ordered him to: both Stanton and Halleck had carefully phrased their requests so as to leave him full discretion.<sup>12</sup> But they were anxious to talk to him; and he was anxious to talk to them. Stanton had been expecting him for several days, and planned to see Grant as soon as he had talked with Sheridan. This was Sheridan's opportunity to persuade all his superiors to adopt his way of thinking about his future operations. Grant had all along wanted him to push against the Virginia Central railroad and the James canal: not merely with cavalry raids that would interrupt their operations for a week or two, but with his whole army. If Sheridan could put the railroad and the canal out of operation permanently, he would tighten the already heavy pressure on Lee's army in the trenches around Richmond.<sup>13</sup> This wish Grant had repeated but five days before, on the 11th, when he telegraphed Halleck:<sup>14</sup>

"... I think Sheridan should keep up as advanced a position as possible toward the Virginia Central road, and be prepared with supplies to advance on to that road at Gordonsville and Charlottesville at any time the enemy weakens himself sufficiently to admit of it. The cutting of that road and the canal would be of vast importance to us."

But Halleck at the War Department was uneasy about seeing Sheridan move further south. With mountain chains dividing and subdividing the way into parallel corridors, it seemed impossible to prevent a Confederate force from slipping down one of them to-

<sup>6</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:62-3.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861-5*, Boston: 1901, p. 129.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>O.R. I:579.

<sup>10</sup>Livermore, *op. cit.*, p. 130. Early was not nearly so heavily outnumbered as he later claimed; significantly, Gordon refuses to vouch for Early's figures but implies that as a matter of honor they are not to be questioned. Clarence C. Buel and Robert V. Johnson, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, New York: 1887, IV:530; Jubal A. Early, *Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States*, Philadelphia: 1912, pp. 451-2; John B. Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, New York: 1903, p. 343.

<sup>11</sup>O.R. II:386.

<sup>12</sup>O.R. II:355, 386.

<sup>13</sup>U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, New York: 1885, II:317-8.

<sup>14</sup>O.R. II:339.



ward Washington, as Early had done only three months before. Halleck wanted to keep Sheridan's army fairly near Manassas Gap, where the corridors could all be watched at once. It was as much as the cautious Halleck's nerves could stand to contemplate Sherman at the end of a precarious supply line in Atlanta, with Hood constantly cutting his communications.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, Halleck delicately shifted the emphasis of Grant's instructions, transmitting them to Sheridan the following day in these words.<sup>16</sup> "General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for future operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes."

But Grant must have learned how his meaning had been tampered with, for one the 14th, Friday, he repeated his instructions in a telegram addressed directly to Sheridan.<sup>17</sup> Sheridan was not happy with Grant's orders. He thought them too risky,<sup>18</sup> but in his reply to Grant said nothing of risk. His avowed objection was that the plan was too wasteful of troops.<sup>19</sup> He wanted to return to Grant's army with most of his men, and leave only a small garrison in the Valley.<sup>20</sup>

There seemed nothing for it but to go to Washington. At dawn the following morning, Monday 17th, he was in the saddle, riding east with a cavalry brigade as escort, while Torbert with the bulk of his riders were at last on their way back to Cedar Creek. At the railhead, Sheridan sent his escort after them, while he and his staff took the cars to Washington. There he succeeded in persuading Stanton to take his views; by Monday noon, he was in a railroad car on

his way to Martinsburg to rejoin his command.<sup>21</sup>

No doubt he was feeling pleased with himself, as he sat smoking a heavy cigar and watching the scenery click by. Only thirty-four years old, only eleven years an officer, and he was near the top of his profession. The events of the past month had made his name a household word. On the first of August, 1864, Grant had ordered him to the Valley—the scene of so many Southern triumphs that Northerners were calling it "the Valley of Humiliation." Early had then just returned from the latest of these triumphs—the raid on Washington, which only Lew Wallace's desperate delaying action at the Monocacy had saved from capture. Early had cut the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, those two arteries of supply which were almost as important to the Union forces as their opposite numbers at the south end of the Valley, the Virginia Central railroad and the James canal, were to the Confederates. The Valley was still furnishing Lee's forces with ample harvests to feed his troops, his cavalry horses, and his draft animals.

For six weeks after his arrival, Sheridan had bided his time, organizing his forces, collecting information, waiting his chances, falling back. Perhaps he had not been entirely sure of himself; this was his first large independent command. At last, he felt ready. By the 19th of September he sent Early, "whirling through Winchester"; three days later he routed Early's forces a second time at Fisher's Hill. The Valley was now naked before him; he pushed as far up it as he dared (his communications were being harried by Mosby's irregulars) and sent a cavalry force to burn the railroad bridge at Waynesboro. In the second week of October, he retired slowly down the Valley, sys-

<sup>15</sup>Cf. Sherman's telegram to Grant, William T. Sherman, *Memoirs*, New York: 1875, II:153-4.

<sup>16</sup>O.R. II:345.

<sup>17</sup>O.R. II:363.

<sup>18</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:55.

<sup>19</sup>O.R. II:345-6.

<sup>20</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:55.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid*, II:66.

tematically laying it waste, as Grant had ordered his predecessor, Hunter, to do.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, in less than three weeks, he had gained two spectacular successes and had consumed or destroyed all the rations and forage the Valley had to offer. These feats were not the less gratefully received by the authorities because of their effect on the Lincoln ticket in the coming election. The President promoted Sheridan to the permanent rank of brigadier general and Stanton had a hundred-gun salute fired in honor of his victory at Winchester.<sup>23</sup>

These were pleasant thoughts; on the other hand there was the disquieting message from Longstreet. That might or might not be a ruse, but there was no denying the fact that for a badly-beaten general, Early was showing a surprising amount of push. He had not only reoccupied his old lines at Fisher's Hill but on Wednesday had pushed a force within pistol shot of Cedar Creek. Had to watch Early. Early had nerve. A good thing he had not sent the VIth Corps back to Grant.<sup>24</sup>

While Sheridan was riding from Washington to Martinsburg, two Confederate officers high on Three Top Mountain were studying his army. The officers were Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, Early's senior division commander, and Captain Jed Hotchkiss, his topographical engineer. From their vantage point at the Confederate signal station the Union army at Cedar Creek lay bare

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, I:465, 485.

<sup>23</sup>O.R. II:117.

<sup>24</sup>On the 12th, Sheridan had ordered the VIth back to City Point, as instructed; he did not then believe that Early would advance down the Valley, but thought him at Craig's Creek, between Brown's Gap and Waynesboro (O.R. II:345-6). Early's move on the 13th revealed his error; he immediately countermanded the VIth Corps' orders. But in his telegram to Halleck notifying him of this change in plans he disingenuously explained the change thus: "If any advance is to be made on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, it is not best to send troops away from my command. . . ." (O.R. II:355). Compare this statement with his dispatch to Grant of the day before (O.R. II:345-6).

before them, and they had perceived its weak spot. Through their strong field glasses, they could see every trench and palisade, every parapet, every line of troops, every piece of artillery, every wagon and every tent. They counted the guns and the regimental flags, and thus were able to determine not only the precise disposition but the approximate strength of Sheridan's army.<sup>25</sup>

That army lay in echelon on a series of ridges roughly paralleling the course on Cedar Creek. Crook's VIIIth Corps formed its left, with Thoburn's division entrenched on the most advanced crest, its batteries commanding Robert's Ford, and Hayes' division camped on a second ridge a mile to the rear.<sup>26</sup> Across the Valley Pike from Crook, Emory's XIXth Corps was posted on high ground commanding the bridge across Cedar Creek. Like Thoburn, Emory was entrenched, with batteries trained on the frontal approaches; Grover's division was on the left, McMillan's division on the right. On a fourth ridge a mile to the northwest of Emory camped Wright's VIth Corps, with its three veteran divisions commanded by Wheaton, Getty and Keifer. On a fifth ridge a mile to the northwest of Emory camped Merritt's cavalry division, while on the extreme right of the army, nearly two miles west of Merritt lay the cavalry of the watchful Custer. (The remainder of the army's cavalry, Powell's division, was absent from the field; Sheridan had posted it at Front Royal, at the head of the Luray Valley, to cover Lomax' division of Confederate cavalry.) Thus Sheridan's army was spread over five miles of ground, not formed in a continuous line, but grouped on a series of ridges. This arrangement was made neces-

<sup>25</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 334.

<sup>26</sup>A small detachment from Kitching's provisional division was camped with Hayes, but this augmentation of his forces was not sufficient to compensate him for his heavy losses in men and units on detached service.



sary by the nature of the ground: a confusion of hills which were often steep and stony eminences and valleys which were often deep gullies. Nor was the high ground arranged in a single ridge system but instead was scattered in a confused way over the field. Many of its crests were wooded. It was not the handiest field in the world in which to fight a battle.<sup>27</sup>

And there was to be a battle, Early had already decided.<sup>28</sup> Hoping to bluff Sheridan into retreating, he had caused his signallers to transmit that spurious message from Longstreet, whose effect, as we have seen, was only to alert and strengthen the Union force.<sup>29</sup> Since Sheridan's army had not moved, Early's must; he could stay no longer at Fisher's Hill, for want of forage—Sheridan had so devastated the Valley that all supplies now had to be hauled by wagon from Waynesboro.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Lee had sent him Kershaw's division to strengthen his badly battered forces and had been pressing him for a victory. "One victory will put all

things right," Lee wrote him on the 27th,<sup>31</sup> and on October 12th, he wrote again:<sup>32</sup>

I have weakened myself very much to strengthen you. It was done with the expectation of enabling you to gain such success that you could return the troops if not rejoin me yourself. I know you have endeavored to gain that success, and believe you have done all in your power to insure it. You must not be discouraged, but continue to try. . . . With your united force it can be accomplished.

On the 13th, Early moved up with his entire army through Strasburg to Hupp's Hill, within three miles of Cedar Creek. Keeping the bulk of his army concealed behind the hill, he sent out a small force under Gordon to feel out the Union defenses.<sup>33</sup> Quite by chance, this reconnaissance in force stumbled upon a brigade of Hayes' division, on its way to establish a Federal signal station on Three Top Mountain. Early drove the brigade back across the creek but did not attempt to follow it further. Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes noted in his diary: "General Early very timid."<sup>34</sup>

Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes had never been more mistaken. For the plan which Gordon and Hotchkiss worked out while studying the Federal lines from the lookout on Three Top Mountain was the boldest plan of battle imaginable and it was that plan of battle which Early adopted.<sup>35</sup> Tuesday, October 18th, at 2:00 P.M. he gave his division commanders their instructions. They would make a surprise attack the following dawn. Wharton's division would move down the Valley Turnpike on the center of the Union line; Kershaw's division would attack the left via Robert's Ford. These were to be the holding attacks. The main blow was to

<sup>27</sup>No single map of the field and the battle is adequate. Pond's map must be consulted for an adequate grasp of the relief while Hotchkiss' map shows the vegetation and the troop movements; the two agree on troop movements, but here the former is probably following the latter. The times shown for the successive positions of units differ in Pond and Hotchkiss; here the latter is more accurate; George E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, New York: 1883, map facing p. 222; Capt. Jed Hotchkiss' map to accompany Early's official report, O.R., *Atlas*, Plate LXXXII-9. The photograph of the terrain in Early, *Narrative*, facing p. 483 and the drawings in *Battles and Leaders*, pp. 516, 522 make the country seem more gently rolling than it actually is. For example, the eminence appearing as a gentle rise in *Battles and Leaders*, p. 516, is shown to rise more than 100' above the river bottom by U. S. Geological Survey, Map, *Strasburg, Va.*, 1:62,500, Ed. of 1950. Compare the comments of De Forest on a "steep and stony eminence" and a "deep gully"; John W. De Forest, *A Volunteer's Adventures*, New Haven: 1946, p. 216.

<sup>28</sup>Early, *Narrative*, pp. 437-8.

<sup>29</sup>See Hazard Stevens, "The Battle of Cedar Creek . . ." *Civil War Papers, Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, Boston: 1900, I:193, on the Longstreet spurious message.

<sup>30</sup>Early, *loc. cit*

<sup>31</sup>O.R. II:880.

<sup>32</sup>O.R. II:892.

<sup>33</sup>O.R. I:579; Early, *Narrative*, p. 437.

<sup>34</sup>Rutherford B. Hayes, *Diary and Letters of R. B. Hayes*, Chas. R. Williams, ed., Columbus: 1922, II: 524-5.

<sup>35</sup>Early, *Narrative*, p. 439; Gordon, *Reminiscences*, pp. 335-6; O.R. I:580.

be delivered by a striking force made up of Gordon's, Pegram's and Ramseur's divisions, all under Gordon. They would cross the river at the foot of Fisher's Hill and make their way, single file, along a narrow path which would lead them across the face of Three Top Mountain, high above the Federal pickets in the river bed below. They would emerge near Bowman's Ford, which they were to storm. From there a road conducted them behind the Federal left to the camp. Payne's cavalry brigade would march with Gordon, and once the attack was launched, would strike for Belle Grove house, hoping to capture Sheridan himself. Rosser with the remainder of his cavalry division would attack the Union cavalry near the back road. Orders would be sent to Lomax, near Front Royal, to attempt to defeat or elude the Union cavalry opposing him and to ride for the Valley Pike, where he could strike the Union rear. The artillery would remain at Fisher's Hill until the attack began, so that the noise of its wheels would not give alarm; but once firing started it was to ride at a gallop down the pike to join the battle. All units would move out by 2:00 A.M. Canteens and swords would be left behind; all unnecessary noise forbidden. Everything possible must be done to gain surprise. The attack would begin promptly at 5:00 A.M.

While Early was issuing these orders, Sheridan was wearily jogging down the road to Winchester. In his company were two officers from the War Department, sent to survey the area and draw plans for a permanent fortification. As he later wryly recalled: "Colonel Alexander was a man of enormous weight, and Colonel Thom correspondingly small and as both were unaccustomed to riding we had to go slowly, losing . . . much time."<sup>36</sup> Whether for this reason alone, as Sheridan asserted, or because the three offi-

cers stopped along the way for refreshments, as Joseph Hergesheimer suggests,<sup>37</sup> it took them most of the day to ride the twenty-three miles from Martinsburg to Winchester. When they finally arrived, Sheridan received word from Wright that all was quiet, and that he had ordered a strong reconnaissance on Fisher's Hill at dawn of the morrow.<sup>38</sup> Sheridan decided to spend the remainder of the day at Winchester. About five o'clock the following morning, an officer awakened him with the report that heavy cannonading was heard from the direction of Cedar Creek. But Sheridan knew that a reconnaissance in force had been ordered, who could be expected to "bang away at the enemy, simply to find out what he was up to." He dismissed the officer and went back to bed. For a while he lay there, fitfully, trying unsuccessfully to fall asleep.<sup>39</sup>

His army at Cedar Creek was now wide awake. Thoburn's division, on the extreme left, was grappling hand to hand with Kershaw's greyjackets. About 4:30 Kershaw had driven in the pickets at Robert's Ford, using only the bayonet so as not to alarm the whole camp. But the pickets had gotten off a ragged volley or two and this had been enough to alert not only Thoburn's troops, but the other division of Crook's corps as well, although it lay some distance away on an adjacent ridge.<sup>40</sup> About five o'clock,

<sup>37</sup>Joseph Hergesheimer, *Sheridan, A Military Narrative*, New York: 1931, p. 264.

<sup>38</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:67; cf. O.R. II:406-7.

<sup>39</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:69.

<sup>40</sup>Statements vary as to the time the attack began but a comparison of all accounts leads to the conclusion that the firing began about 4:30 A.M., or a little after, while the First Division works were stormed punctually at 5:00 A.M., as ordered; see especially O.R. I:372, 379, 381, 385, 394, 406, 410, 591. The reports of officers with the XIXth Corps are also of interest, but it must be born in mind that what most of them first heard was not the ragged volley of the 5th N. Y. picket line but Kershaw's main attack; O.R. I:308, 322, 327, 329, 338, 343, 347, 353. Not only the time indications, but the troop movements shown on the map submitted with Sheridan's official report, O.R. *Atlas*, Plate LXIX, are quite unreliable.

<sup>36</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:67.



Kershaw's division stormed Thoburn's intrenchments. They were manned by half dressed, half awake men, who nevertheless put up quite a struggle. Col. James P. Simms, commanding the first brigade of Kershaw's division to reach the works, reported that the opposing troops poured "volleys of musketry and cannon" into his men: "The enemy made a stubborn resistance. Some of them were shot down while firing upon our men at a distance of a few feet."<sup>41</sup> But there were great gaps in Thoburn's line. Several of his units were on detached service.<sup>42</sup> Each of the absent units had an assigned place in the line of entrenchments; no one had been ordered to replace them; and Confederate troops poured unopposed through some of these gaps.<sup>43</sup> The division was swept aside; its commander, Thoburn, fell vainly attempting to rally his men, most of whom fled the field in panic.

By this time Hayes' division had been formed into line of battle, ready to receive Kershaw's assault.<sup>44</sup> General Wright soon joined Hayes, bringing a brigade of the XIXth Corps with him. Wright had also ordered up two divisions of the VIth Corps, lying in reserve more than a mile away.<sup>45</sup> Wright now had his two forward corps formed in a solid line of battle, and if Kershaw's attack had been the main one, the situation would soon have been in hand. But the left of his line was quite weak; nearly half of Hayes' division was absent on detached service.<sup>46</sup> This weak unit, together with two small detachments from another,<sup>47</sup>

now received the full force of Early's main thrust: three divisions under Gordon, coming unexpectedly from the river bed, attacked them from the left rear. It was this attack which was the key to Early's battle plan and it worked flawlessly. Hayes' division soon fell back,<sup>48</sup> although his first brigade held long enough for the division to save its trains.<sup>49</sup> With the retirement of Hayes' division, the whole Federal line gave way, in considerable confusion and disorder.<sup>50</sup> Wright accordingly ordered the VIth Corps, coming up from its camp, to form a line in the rear, which it succeeded in doing. The XIXth Corps took up a position on its right, but the VIIIth Corps was now out of combat as a coherent unit.<sup>51</sup>

Early's army was now re-united. Gordon's group, consisting of his own, Pegram's and Ramseur's divisions were formed in a line of battle facing east, with the pike behind them. Kershaw's division, which had wheeled left to follow the retreating XIXth Corps, faced the extreme right of the Federal line, which now ran southeasterly, intersecting Gordon's line at an acute angle. The Confederate line now wheeled to the right, and drove the Union army from its position. The XIXth Corps, and most of the VIth Corps, fell back about two miles, and reorganized on a line about a mile and a half north of Middletown. But Getty's division was still in the fight. It retired slowly and stubbornly, in perfect order, keeping in touch with the Union cavalry on both flanks. Twice it beat back fierce Confederate attacks. By 11:00 o'clock it made its final stand, throwing up rail breastworks.<sup>52</sup> So stout a resistance had it shown, that Early and Gordon thought they were still fighting the entire

<sup>41</sup>O.R. I:591; D. August Dickert, *History of Kershaw's Brigade*, Newberry, S. C.: 1899, p. 448.

<sup>42</sup>His entire second brigade, one third of his infantry, was at Winchester, together with a battalion of his third brigade; this unit also lacked the 23rd Illinois; O.R. I:83, 129, 372.

<sup>43</sup>O.R. I:365. Col. Wildes succeeded just in time in closing the gap left by the 5th New York, the picket battalion (O.R. I:380).

<sup>44</sup>Hayes' *Diary*, II:527; O.R. I:403.

<sup>45</sup>O.R. I:158.

<sup>46</sup>Only 1445 men present out of 2381 (O.R. I:403).

<sup>47</sup>Kitching's Provisional Division (O.R. I:129).

<sup>48</sup>O.R. I:404.

<sup>49</sup>O.R. I:406; Hayes' *Diary*, II:527.

<sup>50</sup>O.R. I:284.

<sup>51</sup>O.R. I:158-9; Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:83.

<sup>52</sup>O.R. I:194.

VIth Corps.<sup>53</sup> On its right, firmly astride the Valley Pike, was Merritt's cavalry, heavily engaged,<sup>54</sup> with most of Custer's backing it up.<sup>55</sup> Meanwhile the three cavalry regiments remaining on the extreme right occupied Rosser's much larger force, preventing it from getting at the stragglers streaming down the pike.<sup>56</sup> The large force of cavalry on the Union left worried Early and led him to keep his men as far as possible in the woods where the cavalry could not get at them.<sup>57</sup> But there was no other flaw in his happiness.

Exulting in his triumph (25 pieces of artillery and 1500 prisoners already taken at but slight cost in losses to his army), Early was content for the day. "The sun of Middletown!" he exclaimed, when the sun came out dispelling the dense fog which had obscured operations.<sup>58</sup> And Middletown might indeed have proved an Austerlitz for him, if he had thrown his whole army against Getty's division. But he was content with his day's work.<sup>59</sup> Gordon protested the halt and urged a double envelopment, which he believed Early had ample troops to accomplish.

"No use in that; they will all go directly," Early replied.

"That is the Sixth Corps, general. It will not go unless we drive it from the field."

"Yes, it will go too, directly."<sup>60</sup>

So Early's army waited for the Federals to retreat. But they were not going to retreat. Sheridan was back. He had eaten a

full breakfast, and toward 9:00 A.M. had started for the field with his staff. The almost continuous cannonading had not disturbed him, since he was convinced that it was Union guns "banging away at the enemy simply to find out what he was up to."<sup>61</sup> He had scarcely ridden a mile south of Winchester, however, before he met the harbingers of disaster: the fleeing baggage wagons, the wounded, the panic-stricken—unmistakable signs of a beaten army. He ordered the troops in Winchester to form a skirmish line across the Valley, to stop fugitives and reorganize them. Then, with two staff officers and twenty men of the escort, he pushed for the front.<sup>62</sup>

"About face, boys;" he called to the stragglers, time and again. "We are going back to our camps. We are going to lick them out of their boots."<sup>63</sup>

Many cheered him and faced about as he bade.<sup>64</sup> "In a minute there were groups of men facing south with shouldered arms and intense enthusiasm shown on their faces. 'Where are you going?—'Going to have another lick at them. . .'"<sup>65</sup> Mounted officers galloped across the fields among the fleeing soldiery with the news that Sheridan was back. "Hundreds at once turned back with enthusiasm, and cheering, and started for the front. . . . The moral effect upon the army of his inspiring presence has never been and can never be exaggerated."<sup>66</sup>

When Sheridan reached the line of the XIXth Corps, Wright and Emory had the army well along the way to reorganization.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>53</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 341.

<sup>54</sup>O.R. I:433, 449.

<sup>55</sup>O.R. I:523.

<sup>56</sup>O.R. I:433.

<sup>57</sup>O.R. I:449; *Battles and Leaders*, IV:527.

<sup>58</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 359.

<sup>59</sup>He later excused his delay on the grounds that his forces were weakened by large numbers of men falling out to plunder the Union camp. But this story has been discredited; Gordon, *Reminiscences*, Chapter XXV, *passim*; cf. Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants*, New York: 1944, III:603-4.

<sup>60</sup>So ran the conversation as Gordon remembered it years later; Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 341.

<sup>61</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:70-1.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, II:77-80.

<sup>63</sup>De Forest, *Adventures*, p. 222; cf. Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:81.

<sup>64</sup>Richard B. Irwin, *History of the Nineteenth Army Corps*, New York: 1893, p. 428.

<sup>65</sup>S. E. Howard, "The Morning Surprise at Cedar Creek," *Civil War Papers, Massachusetts Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, Boston: 1900, II:423.

<sup>66</sup>Stevens, *op. cit.*, I:223.

<sup>67</sup>O.R. I:159, 285. Compare De Forest, *Adventures*, p. 221.



He was effusively greeted, General Torbert, his cavalry commander, crying: "My God! I am glad you've come." He ordered the XIXth and the remainder of the VIth to move up and form on Getty's division, which for an hour had been standing up to the Confederates without them.<sup>68</sup> By the time these arrangements had been made it was past noon. Sheridan now rode up and down his entire line to show himself to his troops!<sup>69</sup> 'Boys, if I had been here, this never should have happened,' he declared over and over in his animated way. 'I tell you it never would have happened. And now we are going back to our camps. We are going to get a twist on those fellows. We are going to lick them out of their boots.'

About one o'clock, Early finally permitted Gordon to feel out the enemy. The skirmishers reported a solid line of breastworks, and Early abandoned all further thought of assault.<sup>70</sup> Sheridan was thinking of nothing else. He says he intended to make a counter-attack earlier, but was delayed until 4:00 P.M. by a false rumor that Longstreet had come up the Luray Valley and was advanc-

ing on Winchester from Front Royal.<sup>71</sup> Sheridan threw almost all his effective force to the right of the pike, where they confronted four Confederate divisions. The confused state of affairs in the minds of the Confederate commanders—minds numbed by the fatigue of a watchful night and a driving morning—is shown both by the ragged disposition of the Confederate line<sup>72</sup> and the incoherent and contradictory accounts which the responsible officers later gave of the action.<sup>73</sup> Not only was the Confederate left separated by a yawning gap from the advanced right, but there was a smaller gap in the line toward Gordon's extreme left flank.<sup>74</sup> Since Sheridan's plan of attack was that of a grand left wheel—the whole line turning on the pivot of its left—the larger gap in Early's line did him no harm, but the smaller gap proved fatal. It was at this point that the Union line was strongest; its men poured through, and the Confederate left disintegrated. "Regiment after regiment, brigade after brigade, in

<sup>68</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:84.

<sup>69</sup>De Forest, *Adventures*, p. 222.

<sup>70</sup>O.R. I:562; Early, *Narrative*, I:447; De Forest, *Adventures*, p. 222. Accounts of this "feeling" of the Union right differ widely. The official Union reports describe it as a full-dress attack (O.R. I:32, 285, 323; cf. Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:86). Both Pond and Freeman likewise so describe it, although Freeman in a footnote calls attention to the confusion in the sources; George E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, New York: 1883, p. 237; Freeman, *op. cit.*, III:606. While no reports from Gordon's division appear in the O.R., the reports of officers of Kershaw's division, which according to Early's account took part in the movement, appear to tell the story: Simms' report (O.R. I:591) makes no mention of an attack. Goggin's report (O.R. I:594) says: "After proceeding some distance the troops on our right having halted this command was halted also, and my skirmishers, together with those of Bryan's [Simms'] brigade, advanced to clear the woods of a body of skirmishers in front of my left, which was handsomely done, when the line again moved forward and occupied a road half a mile distance in advance." This can only be the line shown as the 1 P.M. position of the Confederate left in Hotchkiss' map, (O.R. *Atlas*, Plate LXXXII-9). Compare De Forest's account, who at the time was with General Emory: "About three [?] in the afternoon Emory received notice from Sheridan that a column was advancing upon our wood; and presently a violent fusillade broke out along our

front line, accompanied by battle yells from our second line; though meanwhile I did not hear a hostile bullet, nor did we have a single man hit. The uproar lasted several minutes, and then I was told that the column had retreated. Was there one? I certainly did not see it, although I was posted close in rear of our centre, gazing eagerly over the prostrate ranks of vollying men. . . . The generals treated it with all due seriousness and Emory sent a report of it to Sheridan." (De Forest, *Narrative*, p. 222). Hotchkiss in his report (O.R. I:1031) says simply: "A portion of the left was advanced some distance (see plate [LXXII, *Atlas*])." Douglas, who was then with Ramseur's division (p. 301), says: "At any rate our victory was over at ten o'clock. The enemy, knowing their strength and our precarious situation, took their time to get ready, and six hours passed away in virtual inactivity." Henry K. Douglas, *I Rode with Stonewall*, Chapel Hill: [c. 1940], p. 317; this account was based on Douglas' diary and was written in its published form shortly after the war.

<sup>71</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:87-8.

<sup>72</sup>Freeman's sketch, *op. cit.*, III:602 is oversimplified.

<sup>73</sup>Cf. Pond, *op. cit.*, p. 237n. It must be remembered that by the afternoon of the 19th most of the officers were tired, the Confederates at least having been up all night as well as having fought all morning. Sheridan must have been almost the only officer to have had both a good night's rest and a proper breakfast.

<sup>74</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 347.

rapid succession was crushed, and like hard clods of clay under a pelting rain, the superb commands crumbled to pieces.<sup>75</sup> Only a determined stand in the center by Ramseur and Goggin, with a few hundred men, saved Early's army from complete destruction. True, the Confederate right remained firm, "but no portion of this force could be moved to the left without leaving the Pike open to the cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once."<sup>76</sup> When this force was outflanked, Early ordered it to retire.

The Union cavalry now pursued the withdrawing Confederates. Leaving but three regiments to watch Rosser, the impetuous Custer galloped with his division for the bridge across the creek in the enemy's rear. This charge, across an open plain in full view of Early's army, completed its panic. Every man bolted for the bridge. Custer then wheeled his command to the right and crossed the creek over a small ford about half a mile to the right of the pike. He bore down upon the fleeing mass of Early's army and scattered it to fragments. It was saved from destruction only by the fall of night, whose darkness intervened at this opportune moment.<sup>77</sup> Custer's cavalry had now in its headlong gallop become almost as confused as the fleeing enemy; but two of his regiments continued the pursuit through Strasburg to Fisher's Hill, gathering in many prisoners and forty-five guns (many of which the Confederates had captured early in the day).<sup>78</sup>

Early's troops fled in continued confusion throughout the night. They made for their old camp at New Market, where they soon "sorted themselves out," nearly all answering roll calls the next day.<sup>79</sup> On the morning

of the 20th, Sheridan sent Merritt's cavalry in pursuit. They rode through Woodstock to the neighborhood of Edinburg, where they met Rosser's Confederate cavalry. Making no attempt to push further, they contented themselves with scouting and patrolling south of Woodstock.<sup>80</sup> On the 21st, they turned their horses around and rode back down the Valley to their old camp at Cedar Creek.<sup>81</sup> The battle was over.

## II

But it was to be fought again and again and again in the following decades as veterans of both sides gathered to rehash the war. General Gordon—who also had fought at Bull Run, Fair Oaks, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Winchester, Petersburg and Appomattox—said of the battle of Cedar Creek:<sup>82</sup>

No battle of the entire war, with the single exception of Gettysburg, has provoked such varied and conflicting comments and such prolonged controversy as this remarkable engagement between Sheridan and Early at Cedar Creek. No battle has been so greatly misunderstood in important particulars, nor have the accounts of any battle been so productive of injustice to certain actors in it, nor so strangely effective in converting misapprehensions into so-called history. . . .

. . . no day in the great war's calendar, nor in the chronicles of any other war, so far as my knowledge extends, was filled with such great surprises—so much of the unexpected to both armies . . . no other single day saw each of the contending armies victorious and vanquished on the same field and between the rising and the setting of the same sun. This nineteenth of October, therefore, is, I believe, the most unique day in the annals of war.

The principal strategic prizes at stake in the battle have already been indicated. The minimum task of each commander was to keep occupied a proportionate share of enemy troops (so that the main army at Richmond would not be proportionately weak-

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 348.

<sup>76</sup>Early, *Narrative*, p. 449.

<sup>77</sup>O.R. I:524-5.

<sup>78</sup>O.R. I:526.

<sup>79</sup>Jed Hotchkiss, "Virginia," *Confederate Military History*, III, Atlanta, 1899, p. 511; O.R. I:582.

<sup>80</sup>O.R. I:451, 461, 582.

<sup>81</sup>O.R. I:91.

<sup>82</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, pp. 332, 352.



ened) and to defend the arteries of supply at his end of the Valley. The maximum task of Early was to destroy Sheridan's army, cut the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, and by threatening Washington, to force still further detachments from Grant's army around Richmond. Similarly, the maximum task of Sheridan was to destroy Early's army, to cut the Virginia Central railroad and the James canal, and by threatening Lynchburg to force still further detachment from Lee's army.

If the results of the battle are studied in the light of these requirements, it will be seen that it was a decisive victory for neither side. Casualties were about equal; but Sheridan recouped his morning's losses in artillery and trains and came out with a substantial net profit in this respect.<sup>83</sup> Since Sheridan could afford to lose men far better than Early could, the result of the day was clear gain for the Union forces, but apart from consideration of this bloody balance sheet, neither side accomplished anything significant in a military way. Yet the battle was uniformly received as a great victory by the people of the North<sup>84</sup> and almost as uniformly as a disaster by the South.<sup>85</sup> In the Confederate Senate, chagrin went so far as to attribute the disaster to overindulgence in applejack by General Early.<sup>86</sup> In its reception by the people North and South rather than by its immediate military results, which were inconsiderable, the battle of Cedar Creek must be counted one of the great

Union victories of the war. It humiliated the South on the scene of its most brilliant successes. It correspondingly encouraged the North and must have contributed substantially to the success of the Lincoln ticket the following month.

In its influence on the course of the war, then, as well as in its intrinsic drama, the battle has well deserved the attention which has been lavished upon it, and upon the campaign which it ended. However, despite the pints of ink which have been consumed describing it, the battle has never been dealt with adequately. The most nearly satisfactory accounts from the Union point of view are those of Hazard Stevens and George E. Pond. Stevens was a participant, and drew on his own faded memories for some detail and color, but his account is basically a secondary one, and drew upon more Union sources than any other writer.<sup>87</sup> Pond was a professional soldier and a skilled student of military history; he based his workmanlike account on the then unpublished official records and Early's *Memoir*.<sup>88</sup> The best accounts from the Confederate point of view are those of General Gordon and of Douglas Southall Freeman. Gordon not only played a leading part in the battle himself, and drew liberally on his fading memories of it, but he made a careful study of Confederate literature and corresponded extensively with other surviving participants.<sup>89</sup> Freeman's ac-

<sup>83</sup>Livermore, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30.

<sup>84</sup>O.R. I:62-3. James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress*, Norwich, Conn.: 1184-6, II:31.

<sup>85</sup>O.R. I:561; Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 319; Gordon, *Reminiscences*, p. 373; cf. Freeman, *op. cit.*, III:612. See also J[ubal] A. Early, "Soldiers of the Army of the Valley," Leaflet, October 22, 1864, Huntington Library. Jefferson Davis later pointed out that Early and his troops had not done so badly, all things considered; Jefferson Davis, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, New York: 1881, II.

<sup>86</sup>Jubal A. Early, "Letter from Lt. Gen. Early [to Committee on Military Affairs, C. S. Senate]," Pamphlet, November 28, 1864, Huntington Library, pp. 1-2.

<sup>87</sup>Stevens used Sheridan's *Memoirs*, the *Official Records*, Irwin's *History of the Nineteenth Army Corps, Battles and Leaders*, and Benjamin W. Crowninshield, *The Battle of Cedar Creek*, Cambridge: 1879, a pamphlet of uneven merit. The major Union source which Stevens missed was De Forest's original account, J. W. De Forest, "Sheridan's Victory of Middletown," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, XXX (1865) 353-360. The later edition, cited in note 27, *supra*, which alone contains the illuminating remark on the Confederate "attack" in the afternoon, quoted in note 70, *supra*, did not, of course, appear until many years after Stevens wrote; see citation, note 29, *supra*.

<sup>88</sup>See note 27, *supra*.

<sup>89</sup>See note 10, *supra*. Gordon used the *Official Records*, Early's *Memoirs* (Jubal A. Early, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War . . .*, 1st Ed., Toronto: 1866,

count of the battle, like that of many other writers with a Confederate viewpoint, becomes so engrossed in discussing why Early failed to press the attack in the late forenoon that it treats rather cursorily other aspects of the battle.

None of Sheridan's biographers except Joseph Hergesheimer<sup>90</sup> has done anything significant with the battle; most wrote mere panegyrics. The early ones followed De Forest's account, at first or second hand; the later ones, Sheridan's *Memoirs*. Hergesheimer alone has made a serious attempt to explore the sources and to consider Sheridan's part critically; but he did not think it necessary to consult the *Official Records* of the battle and his account has other weaknesses: he attributed the Union defeat of the morning to surprise, he followed Early's account<sup>91</sup> uncritically, and he ignored Sheridan's inactivity after the battle. Fletcher Pratt's account of the battle<sup>92</sup> is a pedestrian panegyric, far inferior to his analysis of Sheridan's cavalry tactics at Yellow Tavern.

Sheridan's part in the battle of Cedar Creek has thus been variously assessed. His severest critics were his former opponents on the field.<sup>93</sup> His most ardent admirer was his superior, Grant. Shortly after the battle, Grant wrote Stanton: "Turning what bid fair to be a disaster into glorious victory stamps Sheridan, what I have always thought him, one of the ablest of generals."<sup>94</sup> Years later, Grant expressed an even more flattering assessment of Sheridan's capabilities: "I

regard Sheridan as not only one of the greatest soldiers of our war, but one of the greatest of the world; as a man who is fit for the highest command. No better general than Sheridan ever lived."<sup>95</sup>

This expert opinion hardly any writer on Sheridan has ventured to dispute. Hergesheimer, however, attributed his success at Cedar Creek largely to chance and considered his greatest military virtues his determination and his ability as a quartermaster.<sup>96</sup> W. F. G. Shanks, writing for *Harper's Monthly* not long after the battle, made a shrewd assessment of Sheridan:<sup>97</sup>

He may be said to be an Inspiration, rather than a General, accomplishing his work as much, not to say more, by the inspiring force of his courage and example as by the rules of war. . . . When the historian sums up his character, with all the facts now hidden laid profusely before him, he will hardly rank Sheridan with those who have carefully and wisely planned. He belongs rather to that class of our officers whose strong arms have boldly and brilliantly executed and who have won the distinctive classification of 'fighting generals.'

This assessment is a little hard on Sheridan, taking his career as a whole, for it allows him nothing for his reorganization of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, that radical and brilliantly successful innovation in the petty strategy and grand tactics of cavalry employment. As an assessment of Sheridan's part in the battle of Cedar Creek, however, it hits the nail on the head. The first fact to remember in assessing Sheridan's performances at Cedar Creek, as well as elsewhere in the Valley, is that he always outnumbered his foe and outnumbered him heavily. While the exact figures may perhaps remain forever uncertain, it

2nd Ed.: Lynchburg: 1867; both these editions are now rare, but the Huntington Library has a copy of each; I found nothing pertinent in either which does not appear verbatim in *Battles and Leaders* or in Early's *Narrative*, *Battles and Leaders*, and Hotchkiss' "Virginia" (see note 79, *supra*).

<sup>90</sup>And possibly also James G. Wilson, whose work, *Philip Henry Sheridan*, published in 1892, has become rare; I was unable to consult it.

<sup>91</sup>In *Battles and Leaders*, IV:522-530.

<sup>92</sup>Fletcher Pratt, "Little Phil," *The Coast Artillery Journal*, LXXXII (1939), 431-443, 531-542.

<sup>93</sup>Hotchkiss, "Virginia," p. 511; Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 307; Early, *Narrative*, p. 428.

<sup>94</sup>O.R. II:423.

<sup>95</sup>Quoted in R. A. Alger, *Eulogy on the late General Philip H. Sheridan*, Detroit: 1888, pp. 11-2, from John Russel Young, *Around the World with General Grant*.

<sup>96</sup>Hergesheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>97</sup>W. F. G. Shanks, "Recollections of General Sheridan," *Harpers Monthly*, XXXI (1865), p. 299.



seems unlikely that Early disposed of more than 15,000 soldiers, horse and foot, commissioned and enlisted, on the field of Cedar Creek, while Sheridan had on the spot nearly twice as many.<sup>98</sup>

A second fact to remember is that Sheridan was responsible for the performance of his army before he rejoined it as well as after. His army was attacked in positions he had selected; he left it even though he had reason to expect attack; and if he had returned from Washington as quickly as he went there, he would have been back at Cedar Creek the day before the battle.<sup>99</sup>

Other important facts stand out undisputed from the discordant welter of official reports and unofficial post-mortems which constitute our sources. 1) Sheridan's army was badly defeated in the morning. 2) The day was saved by the stout resistance of Getty's infantry and Merritt's cavalry, and by Early's decision to suspend the Confederate attack. 3) When Sheridan came up, he inspired a badly beaten army with new confidence. 4) He reorganized his army promptly and beat Early as badly in the late afternoon. 5) He did not pursue Early with more than one cavalry division—a mere tenth of his total force—and that division rode back to Cedar Creek two days after the battle.

For our reappraisal of Sheridan's merits and shortcomings as a commander at Cedar Creek, let us reexamine these facts. In considering the morning defeat, most writers are content to attribute it to surprise. Surprise does not explain the result. All the fords of Cedar Creek, and of the Shenandoah river below the creek, were guarded,<sup>100</sup> and riders patrolled the river bottom.<sup>101</sup> Strictly speak-

ing no unit was surprised, for all had some warning before being attacked; indeed, every unit but Thoburn's division had ample notice that a battle was being fought. About 4:30 A.M., Kershaw opened the battle by driving in the pickets at Robert's Ford; the picket firing there alerted the remainder of Crook's corps, and the other units of the army were alerted about 5:00 by Kershaw's attack on Thoburn's lines. Half the XIXth Corps was standing in ranks under arms when this attack began;<sup>102</sup> the other half was promptly organized.<sup>103</sup>

No, the only unit whose defeat can be put to surprise, in the sense that it was attacked before all its men were under arms and formed in line of battle, was Thoburn's division and even that unit put up a fight. Sheridan's army was not surprised at Cedar Creek; it was defeated in detail.<sup>104</sup> Early attacked and defeated in turn one half of Crook's corps, the other half of Crook's corps, Emory's corps, and Wright's corps. The VIIIth he routed hopelessly; the XIXth he mauled badly; and the VIth he handled roughly.

Whose fault was that? Not Wright's, for he immediately attempted to fight the army as a unit: he ordered the XIXth, the cavalry, and two divisions of the VIth up before Hayes' division was struck. The fault was Sheridan's; for he had so placed his army, on such ground, that its units could not support one another properly. The field he had chosen afforded no single height from which its entire extent might be observed; instead it was divided and subdivided by ridges, ravines and woods into many secluded nooks. (Matters were made worse on the day of the battle by a morning mist which soon thickened into fog.)<sup>105</sup> This poor choice of terrain contributed heavily to the

<sup>98</sup>Livermore, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-30.

<sup>99</sup>He left Cedar Creek Sunday morning and arrived at Washington Monday morning; he left Washington Monday at noon and returned to Cedar Creek Wednesday about 10:30 A.M.

<sup>100</sup>*O.R. Atlas*, Plate LXXXII-9.

<sup>101</sup>Gordon, *Reminiscences*, pp. 336-7; but the pickets were not numerous.

<sup>102</sup>*O.R.* I:322.

<sup>103</sup>Howard, *op. cit.*, II:417.

<sup>104</sup>As Pond points out, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

<sup>105</sup>Stevens, *op. cit.*, I:203-4.

confusion which prevailed while the battle was being fought and which survives in the written accounts of its participants. It has not gone unnoticed. According to Richard B. Irwin, Sheridan himself believed the choice of ground a poor one.<sup>106</sup> General Merritt remarked that there were "many serious objections to it as a position for defense."<sup>107</sup> Captain Hotchkiss, the topographical engineer who with Gordon planned the Confederate attack, also later commented on the weakness of the ground.<sup>108</sup>

Sheridan not only made a poor choice of ground but he did not arrange his army wisely. The nature of the ground made concentration of his army important if the units were to support one another. Sheridan spread them over five miles of ground, on six separate ridges.<sup>109</sup> To make matters worse, he put his reserve and all his cavalry on his right; and divided the weakened left. Clearly Sheridan, like Wright, feared only an attack on his right.<sup>110</sup> But some of his officers did not share this unconcern about the weakened left. General Emory remarked to a staff officer a day or two before the battle: "They can march thirty thousand men through there [the gap between Thornburn and Hayes] and we not know it until we have them on our flank."<sup>111</sup> At the same time, Captain Du Pont, the Regular Army officer who commanded Crook's artillery brigade, was making anxious inquiries about the unprotected flank of the VIIIth Corps and receiving no satisfaction.<sup>112</sup> When the attack

began, Emory exclaimed in unhappy triumph: "I said so. I knew that if we were attacked it would be there."<sup>113</sup>

Sheridan must thus be held largely responsible for the defeat his army suffered on the morning of the 19th. He is entitled to only half credit for rallying his army at midday: equal honors must go to the firm stand made by Getty and the cavalry. But for the triumph of the afternoon, the responsibility is largely his. The dynamic force of his personality pervaded his whole army. Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, a knowledgeable observer and an impartial one, visited Sheridan's camp at Cedar Creek a few days after the battle:<sup>114</sup>

"I was struck, in riding through the lines, by the universal demonstration of personal affection for Sheridan," Dana remarked. "Everybody seemed personally attached to him. He was like the most popular man after an election—the whole force honored him. Finally I said to the general: 'I wish you would explain one thing to me. Here I find all these people, of every rank—generals, sergeants, corporals and private soldiers; in fact everybody—manifesting a personal affection for you that I have never seen in any other army, not even in the Army of the Tennessee for Grant. I have never seen anything like it. Tell me what is the reason?'"

'Mr. Dana,' said he, 'I long ago made up my mind that it was not a good plan to fight battles with paper orders—that is, for the commander to stand on a hill in the rear and send his aides-de-camp with written orders to the different commanders. My practice has always been to fight in the front rank. . . . That is the reason the men like me. They know that when the hard pinch comes I am exposed just as much as they.'

Sheridan's leadership and dash certainly had a tremendous effect on his troops. The rally of his fleeing men did not happen quite as dramatically as the poet described it, but every witness who was present and who left

<sup>106</sup>Irwin, *op. cit.*, p. 413.

<sup>107</sup>In *Battles and Leaders*, IV:514.

<sup>108</sup>Hotchkiss, "Virginia," p. 511.

<sup>109</sup>Crowninshield, *op. cit.*, p. 30, says that General Wright weakened the left wing by placing all the cavalry but a small detachment on the right wing. The responsibility for this change remains Sheridan's, for Wright had reported his intended dispositions on the 16th, four days before the battle (O.R. II:389), a fact Crowninshield could not be expected to know without consulting the then-unpublished *Official Records*.

<sup>110</sup>Cf. O.R. II:389.

<sup>111</sup>De Forest, "Middletown," p. 354.

<sup>112</sup>H. A. DuPont, *The Campaign of 1864 in the Valley of Virginia*, New York: 1925, pp. 166-9.

<sup>113</sup>De Forest, *loc. cit.*

<sup>114</sup>Charles A. Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War*, New York: 1898, pp. 249-50.



a record testifies to the electric effect of Sheridan's return. Perhaps the most sober and reserved account is that in Hayes' diary: "General Sheridan appeared; greeted with cheering all along the line. His enthusiasm, magnetic and contagious. He brought up stragglers. 'We'll whip 'em yet like hell,' he says."<sup>115</sup>

Inspired with his impetuous spirit, his men did "whip 'em like hell." The fruits of their victory were not harvested. Early was beaten but not broken.<sup>116</sup> Instead of pursuing him in force, Sheridan remained on the defensive, quitting the awkward position at Cedar Creek for one more defensible at Kernstown, a few miles north.<sup>117</sup> He left Early to reorganize at New Market and to march down the Valley again three weeks later.<sup>118</sup> Early occupied the battlefield of Cedar Creek, probed Sheridan's lines, and vainly challenged him to come forth and do battle. Sheridan later explained that we went on the defensive at Kernstown "to enable me to detach troops to General Grant and where, by reconstructing the . . . railroad . . . my command might be more readily supplied."<sup>119</sup> Was this the decision of the "best of generals"? A Sherman or a Grant—not to speak of a Hannibal or a Napoleon—would have done more. Grant had originally told Halleck:<sup>120</sup>

I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field [there], with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and to follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central Railroad.

When Lincoln saw this dispatch, he wired Grant:<sup>121</sup>

<sup>115</sup>Hayes, *Diary*, II:527.

<sup>116</sup>O.R. I:582.

<sup>117</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:97-8.

<sup>118</sup>Hotchkiss, *loc. cit.*

<sup>119</sup>Sheridan, *loc. cit.*

<sup>120</sup>Grant, *Memoirs*, II:317-8.

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, II:318.

This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of 'putting our army south of the enemy,' or of 'following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you that it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

Nearly three months had passed since that exchange of telegrams, when the battle of Cedar Creek was fought. Sheridan had succeeded Hunter, had won three spectacular successes, and had devastated the Valley. But Lincoln was proved right, after all. "I repeat, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it."

On the day after Cedar Creek, Grant pleaded with Sheridan:<sup>122</sup>

If it is possible to follow up your great victory until you can reach the Central road, do it, even if you have to live on half rations. . . . If the army at Richmond could be cut off from Southwest Virginia it would be of great importance to us, but I know the difficulty of supplying so far from your base.

Sheridan's reply was long and full of excuses:<sup>123</sup>

I have found it impossible to move on the Central railroad as you desired. If I do so it must be up the Valley via Swift Run Gap, or Brown's Gap, or across via Front Royal and Chester Gap. To move by Chester Gap I would have to leave at least 5,000 (the whole of General Crook's) in the Valley. To open the Orange and Alexandria Railroad would require a corps on it to protect it, which would leave me very little to operate with successfully. To advance against Gordonsville and Charlottesville with a line of communications up this valley and through the Blue Ridge is impracticable. [Why? From Harrisonburg, where Sheridan had been with his whole army two weeks before, it was but thirty-four airline miles through Brown's Gap to Charlottesville. Thirty-four airline miles to the railroad and the canal. Was it because Sheridan

<sup>122</sup>O.R. II:346.

<sup>123</sup>O.R. II:464-5.

could not haul grain and forage so far? Then it was a serious blunder to destroy the grain and forage of the upper Valley.] I have been meditating cavalry operations against the Central railroad as soon as the necessary preparations can be made. The cavalry has lost largely in numbers by expiration of service and is not half as strong as it was three weeks ago. . . . Rest assured, general, I will strike, and strike hard, whenever opportunity offers. . . . We are now reduced to an effective force of not over 22,000 infantry. From the accounts of officers, Early's infantry when he attacked me was 25,000; the number of cavalry not yet known.

Actually, Early's infantry now numbered but 11,000 men, half of Sheridan's.<sup>124</sup> He had less than 1700 cavalry.<sup>125</sup>

Grant rested assured for nearly a month, while Sheridan sat idle in camp, allowing Early to recruit and recoup and resume the offensive.<sup>126</sup> Finally, on November 19th, Grant received information that Early had been recalled to Richmond. He telegraphed Sheridan:<sup>127</sup>

It is reported from Richmond that Early has been recalled from the Valley. If you are satisfied that this is so, send the Sixth Corps to City Point without delay. If your cavalry can cut the Virginia Central road, now is the time to do it.

Grant's information was garbled; Lee had not recalled all of Early's force, but only Kershaw's division.<sup>128</sup> By the 28th, Grant knew this; yet he finally decided to call back the VIth Corps anyway, since it now seemed clear that Sheridan was not going to do anything with it.<sup>129</sup> Not until the 19th of December, two full months after Cedar Creek, did Sheridan launch his cavalry strike, and by that time, not surprisingly, the weather had turned bad.<sup>130</sup> Early marched his infan-

try through a driving hailstorm to meet the blow; but they were not needed. Before they could come up, Rosser with less than a thousand men<sup>131</sup> attacked Custer in his camp and drove him back down the Valley.<sup>132</sup>

Thus it would appear that Sheridan showed something less than ideal energy and vigor in following up his victory at Cedar Creek. It is not too much to say that he failed to exploit it at all. In his conduct during October and November of 1864, then, Sheridan showed himself to be something less than one of the greatest generals of all times. He went on the defensive, though heavily outnumbering the enemy and with an important task unaccomplished. He chose his ground poorly, deployed his troops unwisely, and left his army while expecting attack. His army was beaten in detail while he was away, largely because his dispositions had exposed its left and made it difficult for Wright to fight the army as a unit. On his return, Sheridan inspired his shaken troops with confidence and led them with vigor. But although he made maximum use of the force at his disposal during the battle itself, he did not follow up his victory.

Sheridan later revealed in his *Memoirs* that he was eager to leave the Valley and to return to Grant's army.<sup>133</sup> Usually officers prefer to exercise an independent command when they have the chance. But Sheridan probably sensed his own limitations: there was no better man than he when it came to leading an attack<sup>134</sup> or defending a good position against odds<sup>135</sup> or conducting a cavalry raid;<sup>136</sup> but when it came to managing an army and pressing home a campaign, he still had things to learn.

<sup>124</sup>O.R. II:911.

<sup>125</sup>O.R. II:903.

<sup>126</sup>O.R. I:36.

<sup>127</sup>O.R. II:645.

<sup>128</sup>O.R. I:584.

<sup>129</sup>O.R. II:683.

<sup>130</sup>O.R. II:804. There had been good campaigning weather until December 9th, barring a few chilly days; see the day by day entries in Hotchkiss' journal, O.R. I:582-6.

<sup>131</sup>Early says Rosser had less than 600 men (*Narrative*, p. 457); but this statement must be suspected.

<sup>132</sup>Early, *loc. cit.*; O.R. I:588, II:821.

<sup>133</sup>Sheridan, *Memoirs*, II:55.

<sup>134</sup>As at Chickamauga.

<sup>135</sup>As at Murfreesboro.

<sup>136</sup>As at Yellow Tavern.



## DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR ARMY TROOPS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

BY FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA\*

THE TROOPS of the Regular Army of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century were flung wide upon the frontiers, serving to protect the nation from Indian tribes and foreign foes. A small number of the troops allowed by a frugal Congress were maintained in forts along the Atlantic seacoast, but the majority were scattered along the Northern, Western, and Southwestern frontiers. Between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War the military establishments formed a ring around the settled regions of the nation. After 1848, however, the areas beyond the Mississippi Valley to the west became the scene of Regular Army activity, and few troops remained east of the Mississippi. The following maps show the distribution of troops and indicate in graphic form the changes brought about by modifications in military policy and the progress of settlement.<sup>1</sup>

In 1817 (Map A) the army posts and the concentrations of troops still followed the wartime distribution. Large numbers of soldiers were garrisoned in the areas in the South and on the Northern frontier where they happened to be when the hostilities ended. The coastal forts were maintained, and in the region west of Lake Michigan appeared a new extension of American authority as the army moved in to re-establish Forts Dearborn and Mackinac and to build

Fort Howard. A string of new outposts was constructed along the upper Mississippi.

By 1822 (Map B) the troops had been redistributed in accordance with the frontier needs of the day and the reduction of army strength in 1821. The artillery posts along the Atlantic, although maintained in full number, were each garrisoned by a mere handful of men. A modicum of defense was provided on the Canadian border from Plattsburg to Detroit, and troops were kept at Pensacola and Baton Rouge, but the major allocations of troops were to the Northwest frontier, where the important movements up the Mississippi and the Missouri

<sup>1</sup>The maps are based on data of troop strength and distribution furnished by the Adjutant General in the annual reports of the Secretary of War. The strength reports of which tabulation has been made are dated for most years in November or December. No attempt has been made to show all changes in troop assignments, but the major shifts in concentration can be followed easily from map to map. All circles on the maps are placed at army posts or encampments except for field operations in the Seminole War (Map D) and the Mexican War (Map F) and occasional minor field operations on Map H. In these cases the circle has been placed in the general area of operations. The area of the circles is proportionate to the number of troops. Open circles on Map F indicate volunteer troops or the total of regular and volunteer troops.

The sites of army posts have been determined from descriptive material in the records of the Adjutant General's Office or from contemporary maps. Of special value for the trans-Mississippi forts are the maps included in Surgeon General's Office, *Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States . . . from January, 1839, to January, 1855* (34 Congress, 1 session, Senate Executive Document no. 96, serial 827) and *Statistical Report of the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States . . . from January, 1855, to January, 1860* (36 Congress, 1 session, Senate Executive Document no. 52, serial 1035). Data on army strength by years from 1789 to 1879 may be found in *Strength of the Army* (45 Congress, 3 session, House Executive Document no. 23, serial 1852).

\*Dr. Prucha, who is presently at St. Louis University, Missouri, received his doctorate at Harvard in 1950, and a popularized revision of his dissertation with the title *Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest 1815-1816*, is being published by the Wisconsin Historical Society.

resulted in new forts at the mouth of the Minnesota and at Council Bluffs, and to the Southwest, where Forts Jesup and Smith began to act their role as sentinels in the Indian country.

The year 1830 (Map C) showed little change in basic frontier defense, but later in the decade of the 'thirties a re-apportioning of the troops almost deprived the eastern coast of soldiers and concentrated the men in four distinct areas (Map D). The Seminole Wars created the first demand for troops. Numerous small garrisons were scattered over Florida, and many troops (augmented by the increased authorizations for men in 1838) were sent into the Seminole country. A second demand grew out of troubles along the United States-Canadian boundary known as the Patriot War. Alert to prevent fanatical patriots on both sides of the line from setting off a general war, the War Department detailed troops to the garrisons at Oswego, Niagara, and Detroit. The forced migration of the Eastern Indians into the Indian Country beyond the "permanent" Indian frontier called for larger concentrations on the western fringes of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri. And in the upper Mississippi Valley unsettled Indian problems required the maintenance of sizable garrisons.


By 1843 (Map E) the crises had passed in Florida and in the North, and the distribu-

tion of troops assumed a more normal aspect, with a return to the chain of small garrisons on the periphery of the nation. But soon the Mexican War radically upset the scheme (Map F). Aside from the troops pooled temporarily at the recruiting center of New York, very few men of the Regular Army were to be found outside the war area. In a few spots on the Western frontier they were replaced by Volunteers, and Volunteers also swelled the total of troops in the actual combat.



The Mexican War and the consequent territorial aggrandizement caused a dramatic shift in the location of army posts (Map G). The line of forts that once marked the military frontier in the Mississippi Valley had all but disappeared, and the soldiers found themselves in a string of small posts along the Indian frontier in Texas, in garrisons on the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico, at widely-spaced forts on the trails of migrants to the West, and in California and the Pacific Northwest. New aggregations of soldiers authorized in the 1850's followed the veterans into the trans-Mississippi regions, and the whole land from the Great Plains west was dotted with military establishments, which were set up wherever Indian power and frontier insecurity seemed to demand a detachment or company (Map H).

EACH MEMBER IS REQUESTED TO RECRUIT AT LEAST ONE  
NEW MEMBER DURING THE YEAR







DISTRIBUTION  
OF REGULAR ARMY TROOPS



DISTRIBUTION  
OF REGULAR ARMY TROOPS





DISTRIBUTION  
OF REGULAR ARMY TROOPS

## FRENCH THREAT TO BRITISH SHORES, 1793-1798

BY DONALD R. COME\*

THE good republican of France who looked across the English channel in the year 1793 could see the shores, or feel behind the mists the ominous presence of his most redoubtable enemy. In the view of this republican, England as a nation ruled the seas and threatened the very coasts of France; as a government it kept under the yoke of tyranny its own and subject peoples; as a member of the first coalition it urged on flagging allies. To minds of vigorous cast and with inclination toward direct action, a blow dealt straight across the water to the heart of the oppressor was the necessary step. This was not a new idea. Since 1666 plans of invasion against England had multiplied to fill numerous boxes in the French archives. When war seemed imminent in late 1792, and broke out in February 1793, a new flood of plans began which continued unabated until in English eyes their purport became embodied in the name, Bonaparte.<sup>1</sup>

A continuity and connection existed between all the plans, from the Committee of Public Safety in 1793 to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. There was a general continu-

ity in that their source was an ever-present hatred among the French for their everlasting enemy. There was a specific connection in that certain elements of some of the plans were based directly on previous plans.

A continuity likewise existed in the obstacles which arose to prevent the execution of the plans. Although M. Émile Bonnechose, a biographer of Lazare Hoche, concluded that the explanation for failure could be only "in the mysterious designs of that Providence which rules human destinies,"<sup>2</sup> some very concrete obstacles repeatedly appear as the mystery is unraveled. To trace the interplay of obstacles and plans is to trace the chances of success or failure of invasion.

Certain of these obstacles were greater at one time than another; in 1793 and 1794 they were all present in considerable force. No mystery surrounds the hard fact that troops of an army cannot be used in full strength at two different places at the same time. France in 1793 faced on her borders the combined armies of Austria and Prussia. In the west of France itself, dissident provincials joined with royalists who had fled from the French court to make common cause in civil war against the government and mob in Paris. Opposed to them was a national army filled with large numbers of new recruits and officered by men who had risen to replace the departed nobility. Action on the land

\*Dr. Come is on the staff of the Department of Social Hygiene of Michigan State College at East Lansing, Michigan.

<sup>1</sup>Édouard Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande* (Paris, 1888), pp. 52-72; Édouard Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Iles Britanniques* (4 vols.; Paris, 1900-1902), I, 13-28, 121-31, 279-80.



borders and in the rebellious west foreclosed the use of troops against England.

Moreover, there is no particular mystery in the rather common phenomenon of conflicting opinion and authority which paralyzes aggressive tactics. The shifting of central political power in France, while not directly affecting invasion plans, seemed to be reflected in the existence of contentions between civilian and military, between army and navy.

And finally, many hardheaded Frenchmen in the 1790's were inclined to connect failure with the miserable condition of the French fleet. Compared to the British fleet, it was small in numbers; repairs were badly needed; timber, rigging and sails were lacking; discipline was relaxed under republicanism; especially serious was the paucity of trained officers to replace the old nobility in the skilled business of navigating a sailing vessel.<sup>3</sup>

Most of the plans for invasion involved the mustering of a naval force which could stand against the proud and mighty British fleet. On January 21, 1793, before war had been declared on England, one Hassenfratz exclaimed before the Paris Society of Jacobins that a powerful fleet, commanded by good officers and used as a means to invade England, would make victory a certainty.<sup>4</sup> This need for a strong navy continued to hold prominent position in the thoughts of leading Frenchmen. On February 1, the day of the declaration of war, M. Barbaroux told the members of the National Convention, "It is now a question of finding the means to make the arms of the republic successful on the seas."<sup>5</sup>

A specific proposal of means was that of the Jacobin Club of Cherbourg which made its contributions to the flood of plans by inviting General Dumouriez to use that port's facilities to prepare the invasion of England. Dumouriez was an old hand at the business. In 1777 as the Commandant of Cherbourg he had planned hostile expeditions against the channel islands and the Isle of Wight.<sup>6</sup> He had felt in December, 1792, that France could run the risk of a war with England which an invasion of Holland might bring. He then believed that Holland could be quickly overrun and that the Dutch fleet could be combined with the French. With such combined power, the English could be crushed. By January 18, 1793, the possibility of quick success over the Dutch and consequent naval power was doubtful in his mind. Without this power, Dumouriez was more interested in peace than war with England.<sup>7</sup>

Like Cherbourg's, many other proposals in these early months of war brought no immediate, concrete efforts.<sup>8</sup> The will was mighty but the means were lacking. Citizen-minister Carnot showed interest in the plan of General Vergnes to send against England ten thousand well-armed men with naval support from Lorient and Brest.<sup>9</sup> General Lazare Hoche, with whom the invasion of England was to become practically an obsession, desired to throw on the shores of England one hundred battalions of infantry, strongly supported by cavalry and artillery. How was this army to reach England? "Cover the sea with the ships of the merchant marine. Let them be armed for war; let them form a bridge from the coasts of France to arrogant

<sup>2</sup>Émile de Bonnechose, *Lazare Hoche* (Paris, 1874), pp. 208-09.

<sup>3</sup>A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire* (2 vols.; Boston, 1912), I, 49-64.

<sup>4</sup>F. A. Aulard, ed., *La Société des Jacobins* (6 vols.; Paris, 1889-1896), IV, 695-96.

<sup>5</sup>*Le Moniteur*, February 3, 1793.

<sup>6</sup>H. F. B. Wheeler and A. M. Broadley, *Napoleon and the Invasion of England* (London, 1908), I, xxi-xxii; Arthur Chuquet, *Les guerres de la révolution* (11 vols.; Paris, 1886-1895), V, 23.

<sup>7</sup>Chuquet, *Les guerres*, IV, 122; V, 20-22.

<sup>8</sup>For a number of early proposals, see Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 13-28.

<sup>9</sup>C. L. Chassin, *La Vendée patriote* (4 vols.; Paris, 1893-1895), I, 354-55.

Albion." Not scheming and cunning were needed, but "iron, fire and patriotism."<sup>10</sup>

In such an atmosphere of "iron, fire and patriotism" which so often surcharged the air around the Committee of Public Safety, this body ordered on September 22, 1793, that the minister of the navy, in concert with the ministers of war and interior, make all necessary preparations for the landing of one hundred thousand men on the coasts of England. As part of the plan, Jeanbon Saint-André and Prieur of the Marne were on the same day ordered to the coast as Committee representatives to take whatever measures they thought suitable in regard to the fleet.<sup>11</sup> Saint-André drew up his own program before leaving Paris for Brest. Counter-revolutionists should be arrested and sent to Paris for trial; the ranks of the naval officers should be purified of unpatriotic men; good order and the filling of requisitions should be attained by cooperation of the navy, the troops of the army, and the representatives; soldiers and sailors of the fleet should be outfitted; and finally, the ships of the fleet should be rehabilitated, not for the specific aim of invading England, but that they might sail in any designated place.<sup>12</sup>

The problems posed by Saint-André's program were so great in themselves that they overwhelmed ideas of invasion of England. Even though invasion was kept in mind as the ultimate goal, it is impossible to believe that the representatives thought that it was immediately practicable. The many problems of rehabilitating the fleet engrossed them to the exclusion of any consideration of specific techniques for invasion. And though much was done at Brest in reconstituting the French navy as a fighting force, Saint-André thought

that the work in other ports was moving with "disheartening slowness."<sup>13</sup> At the end of January, 1794, all he could tell the Jacobin Club at Paris was that France now had a navy, but not a formidable one.<sup>14</sup>

The French fleet was not only weak; it was also very busy with vital matters aside from the invasion of England. The fleet was needed to escort past the British squadrons a group of food-laden ships which were expected from America.<sup>15</sup> It was needed to prevent the British from giving aid to the uprisings in the western departments or from launching destructive landing parties on the French coast. British intrigues were suspected at Brest; an attack on the part of Lorient, with the intent of burning its warehouses, was feared.<sup>16</sup> It is apparent that the British had the upper hand in the matter of invasion. What there was of the French fleet had to concern itself with defense; moreover, to have risked its destruction before the food ships were safely in port would have jeopardized the welfare of the nation.

Along with a navy which was feeble and inadequate, France had an army, which, however strong and vigorous, continued to be hard pressed. Whatever the emphasis with which Billaud-Varenne asserted, "Rome will soon be attacked in Rome; one hundred thousand men are ready to land in England,"—the fact of the matter was that no such body of troops existed.<sup>17</sup> Prieur of the Marne might tell the people of Lorient that, "Soon, next spring I hope, for all arrangements for the project are ready, we shall go

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, IX, 658; VII, 329, 414, 500, 539, 590; VIII, 14, 83, 236, 297, 370; R. R. Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled* (Princeton, 1941), pp. 207-09.

<sup>14</sup>Aulard, ed., *La Société des Jacobins*, V, 635-36.

<sup>15</sup>A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, I, 122-23.

<sup>16</sup>J. J. M. Savary, *Guerres des Vendéens et des Chouans* (6 vols.; Paris, 1824-1827), II, 465-67; Aulard, ed., *Actes du Comité*, VII, 414.

<sup>17</sup>Billaud-Varenne, quoted by Gabory, *L'Angleterre et la Vendée*, 181, II, 181.

<sup>10</sup>Hoche, as quoted by Émile Gabory, *L'Angleterre et la Vendée* (2 vols.; Paris, 1930-1931), II, 180-81; G. Escande, *Hoche en Irlande* (Paris, 1888), pp. 4-5.

<sup>11</sup>F. A. Aulard, ed., *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut Public* (27 vols.; Paris, 1889-1933), VII, 1-2.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, VII, 82-83.



to visit the banks of the Thames."<sup>18</sup> But little evidence can be found to warrant the assumption that all arrangements were ready.

The troops in the west were engaged in violent civil war. This same Prieur drew detachments of men from Lorient and Brest to try to keep the rebels of the Vendée from penetrating the department of Morbihan.<sup>19</sup> The regular generals of the army found themselves wholly involved in attempting, without great success, to quell the rebellion.<sup>20</sup> So great was the disturbance that Saint-André complained of the "cruel uncertainty" which resulted from broken communications with Paris.<sup>21</sup> To make invasion arrangements in such an area was plainly impossible.

Moreover, the main body of French troops continued to be concentrated on the land frontiers. Carnot's plan of campaign drawn up in January, 1794, centered French strength in the north because there was situated the major part of the enemy's forces. No vigorous offensive against a foreign enemy was expected of the armies of the west. The first two aims assigned to these armies were the crushing of the rebels in the Vendée and the guarding of the coasts from foreign incursions. The third aim, to be sure, was the effecting of the landing planned for the coasts of England. But Carnot doubted that any such invasion could take place in 1794. Preparations were to be carried on with all the vigor possible with an eye to the future and with the added purpose of disturbing the English, so that they might withhold some troops from the Low Countries to ward off a possible invasion.<sup>22</sup>

The grandiose plan of September 22, 1793,

to throw one hundred thousand men against England had thus degenerated into a threat and a future possibility. Even as a threat it was not very mighty at this early date. Lord Cornwallis and a few others concerned themselves over the danger; Brighton and perhaps other coastal towns constructed defense camps on neighboring hills in 1793 and 1794. But the general attitude of the British government until 1796 was that little danger of invasion existed.<sup>23</sup>

In view of the great difficulties which confronted any invasion attempt in these early years, it is not surprising that the French government formulated no specific war aims. Talk about what would be done with a conquered England remained on the level of generalities. These generalities did, however, often touch on vital issues. The central issue was whether the French nation was fighting a united English nation bent on world dominance, or whether the mass of the English people were being deceived and coerced by a tyrannical government. And even as there has been debate whether the German people as a whole or the Nazi leaders as a particular group should be made to suffer for Germany's crimes, so the French debated whether war guilt and punishment should be saddled on the English people or only on the coteries of George III and Pitt the Younger.

These issues arose on the day of the declaration of war in the debates of the National Convention. The majority view, as expressed by Jeanbon Saint-André, Barbaroux, and Barère and others, was most sympathetic toward the English people as distinguished from their rulers. Once the domination of the world by the British fleet were stopped by defeat at the hands of the French, the British people would be freed from their

<sup>18</sup>Prieur, quoted by Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled*, pp. 211-12.

<sup>19</sup>Aulard, ed., *Actes du Comité*, VII, 611.

<sup>20</sup>Étienne Charavay, ed., *Correspondence Générale de Carnot* (4 vols.; Paris, 1892-1907), IV, 119, 129, 140, 145, 147-48, 287.

<sup>21</sup>Aulard, ed., *Actes du Comité*, VIII, 296.

<sup>22</sup>Charavay, ed., *Correspondence Générale de Carnot*, V, 279-83; Savary, *Guerres*, I, 121-27.

<sup>23</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 60-61; J. Holland Rose and A. M. Broadley, *Dumouriez and the Defence of England Against Napoleon* (London, 1908), pp. 215-16, 238-39.

constitutional slavery; their eyes would be opened to the tyranny of their rulers; the British government, which was pushing to destruction two peoples who ought to be united, would be destroyed.<sup>24</sup>

When Jeanbon Saint-André reported on the navy to the Paris Jacobin Society at the end of January, 1794, his position did not seem altered. While asserting that France must have a navy capable of opposing those of England and Spain combined, he still did not desire to alienate the mass of the English nation. Citizen Legendre added a warning and exhibited a keen insight into propaganda methods. If Frenchmen continued to exclaim, "Destroy Carthage," without making a distinction between government and people, Legendre was sure that Pitt could convince the English people with his word-pictures portraying London in ashes and every Englishman with his throat cut.<sup>25</sup>

By no means did all Frenchmen agree with Legendre. Amidst frequent outbursts of applause Robespierre asserted that a people which acted as accomplice in the crimes of its government, could not be distinguished from that government. "I declare that I hate the English people," he exclaimed, "and will continue to do so until it breaks and destroys its government." To Robespierre, no people was good whose government was not conformable to that of France. Such people would meet with as harsh treatment as the governmental functionaries themselves.<sup>26</sup>

When the applause for Robespierre had subsided, Saint-André took the floor and partially adjusted his position to Robespierre's. The adjustment was not complete.<sup>27</sup> That portion of Jacobin opinion which followed Robespierre had moved beyond the sentiments which the National Convention

had held at the outbreak of war. There was not, however, actually much difference in the final result which each desired. Robespierre demanded that the English people achieve by their own means a republican form of government. Implied in the thought of the members of the Convention was the idea that once the French had conquered England and had freed the people from the bonds of tyranny, the latter would by free choice establish such a government. The evangelistic faith of French republicanism was strong.

There was no need for specific decision on how to treat the English people. Even as the discussion went on at the Jacobin Club, Carnot was drawing up his plan of campaign which postponed the invasion of England. On January 31, 1794, the next day after this plan was issued, the Committee of Public Safety ordered that a more limited invasion be prepared against the channel islands of Jersey, Guernsey and Aurigny.<sup>28</sup> A suggestion for the invasion of these islands, which became places of refuge for emigres and rebels, had been sent to the Committee in September, 1793, by Garnier, a representative on mission. The generalship was now intrusted to Rossignol, the general of the Army of the Coasts of Brest. In profound secrecy twenty thousand men were to be gathered at Port-Malo. The troops were to land at day-break some time between the nineteenth and twenty-eighth of February. Rossignol's instructions for these landings follow the pattern of modern island warfare. An advance guard goes ashore under the protection of gunfire from the ships. After this guard gains positions, engineers, mechanics and laborers swarm to the land and erect fortifications in preparation for the main body of troops.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>24</sup>*Le Moniteur*, February 3, 1793.

<sup>25</sup>Aulard, ed., *La Société des Jacobins*, V, 620, 632-33.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, V, 633-35.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, V, 635-36.

<sup>28</sup>Aulard, *Actes du Comité*, X, 568-70.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 568-70; Letter of Minister of War to Rossignol, February 5, 1794, in Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 37-41.



Ever-recurring difficulties ordained that no landings should take place. Both disorder among the troops and dissension among the leaders contributed to failure. Rossignol would not cooperate fully with Billaud-Varenne and Ruamps, whom the Committee had sent to oversee the execution of its measures. The two representatives accused Rossignol of setting the example of insubordination; they charged him with being unpatriotic; and, as the bewildered general later said, "They spoke to me so often of the guillotine that it disgusted me."<sup>30</sup> Besides the lack of cooperation between army men and civilians—bad sailing weather, lack of arms and provisions, such inadvertencies as arsenic being packed in the same boxes as bread, knowledge by the British of the expedition—all these things contributed toward delay.<sup>31</sup>

In spite of delay, Billaud-Varnne and Ruamps indicated the febrile enthusiasm which often characterized the Committee's representatives, by suggesting that the Isle of Wight be invaded after the other islands were taken. This was in a letter which listed some of the obstacles preventing embarkation and which was dated March 4, four days after the expedition was to have sailed.<sup>32</sup> The Committee was not much less enthusiastic. Only considerations for the safety of the fleet should set limits to the courage of the representatives; the ten thousand Hessians on the Isle of Wight were not to be feared, but conquered.<sup>33</sup>

Stark reality soon confronted both representatives and Committee. An outbreak of particularly violent fighting with the rebels in the west constituted a final obstruction which brought invasion plans to an end. The

troops gathered at Port-Malo were redistributed to the danger points, so that by April 6, only six thousand remained.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, on May 30, Carnot, in ordering the transfer of troops from western France to the lower Rhine region, admitted again that the general "maritime enterprise" against England was adjourned. This adjournment, he said, resulted as much from lack of naval facilities as from the need for troops on other fronts.<sup>35</sup> At the very time of the order, Saint-André's fleet, rehabilitated with much trouble and pains, had encountered the British fleet while protecting the food-ships coming from America. From the encounter it emerged still further weakened by the loss of six ships.<sup>36</sup>

Until the rebellion in the west could be put down, until a strong navy could be built, and until French troops could be freed from duty on other fronts, no serious invasion attempt was possible.

## II

In August of 1794, the man who was to pacify western France became the commander of the Army of the Coasts of Cherbourg. This man was Lazare Hoche who at the beginning of the war had desired to cross the channel on a bridge of merchant ships in order to crush England, the greatest enemy of France. His desires lost no strength with the passage of time; he hoped on taking command that soon the rebels in the west would be conquered, and that his army could strike at the treacherous foreigner.<sup>37</sup>

No quick pacification was accomplished. Although peace with Prussia, Holland and Spain in 1795 lessened the pressure on the land frontiers, the rebels in the west kept

<sup>30</sup>Rossignol, quoted by Chassin, *La Vendée patriote*, III, 467-71; see also, III, 466, 562-63; Aulard, *Actes du Comité*, XI, 218.

<sup>31</sup>Chassin, *La Vendée patriote*, III, 563; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 48-49.

<sup>32</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 48.

<sup>33</sup>Aulard, *Actes du Comité*, XI, 440-41.

<sup>34</sup>Chassin, *La Vendée patriote*, III, 467, 470-71; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 51.

<sup>35</sup>Savary, *Guerres*, III, 514-15.

<sup>36</sup>Palmer, *Twelve Who Ruled*, pp. 346-50.

<sup>37</sup>C. L. Chassin, *Les pacifications de l'ouest* (3 vols.; Paris, 1896-1899), 458-59; Savary, *Guerres*, IV, 129.

fighting on. Together with Austria they engrossed the armies of France. It was not until July, 1796, that Hoche could report to the Directory that the civil war was over. The fear that the British, who had been threateningly cruising the coast, should land to aid the rebels, was now removed from French minds. With each step toward victory, thoughts had been able to turn more freely toward plans of invading England.<sup>38</sup>

During the early part of 1796, Carnot together with Generals Humbert and La Barollière, formulated plans to institute a "chouannerie," or a kind of guerrilla warfare, in England. The object of bringing about a revolution in England was renounced. The purpose was to disturb the British government, to occupy a part of its army, and to make it desire peace. Republican evangelism took a secondary place for a short time. As General La Barollière said, the invasion troops should speak much about liberty, but "have positively only the plan to destroy and not at all to edify."<sup>39</sup>

Hoche received these ideas with enthusiasm, and diligently applied himself to the details of planning. As the plans were worked out, a corps of from sixteen hundred to two thousand men, formed under the specific command of Humbert and the general supervision of Hoche, were to land on the coasts of Cornwall, England. In carrying on guerrilla warfare the troops were ordered to avoid a general engagement with enemy troops. By sudden attack and retreat, bridges should be destroyed, communications broken, naval stores burned, and government supplies seized.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Chassin, *Les pacifications*, I, 252; II, 457, 569-70; Savary, *Guerres*, IV, 474; VI, 319.

<sup>39</sup>"Ideas for the Establishment of a Chouannerie in Ireland," by General Humbert, and "Note from La Barollière to General Clarke," in Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 61-64, 64-66; Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, pp. 84-86.

<sup>40</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 66-67; Savary, *Guerres*, VI, 333-37.

Although revolution in England had originally been renounced as a specific aim of the expedition, certain revolutionary elements entered into the plans which were formulated. Care should be taken to wage destruction against houses of the gentry, not against cottages. It was hoped that mine workers might be roused into insurgency. The kind of terrorism which Hoche contemplated was to be so disturbing, that by June 9 he felt that he could at least pose the question, "Cannot one hope for a revolution?"<sup>41</sup>

The French troops under Humbert were to be composed of men who might well strike terror into the hearts of their enemy. The corps was made up of persons known for murder, rape and robbery—armed with guns and a brace of pistols, and well stocked with brandy and tobacco for inspiration. Hoche had in mind a second corps to be sent against Wales which was to be composed of convicts and deserters from foreign armies. The composition of these troops indicates that French leaders were still loath to release their best men for an invasion enterprise against England. It was consciously planned that whatever the outcome of the invasion, this gang of thugs should leave France for the good of France.<sup>42</sup>

By the middle of June, 1796, the improving situation in the west of France and the strength of the French army warranted a forceful blow against the British, even while Bonaparte was to invade Italy and Joubert was to hold the line in the Germanies. It was not to be a blow directly against England itself, but rather against Ireland which was considered a source of English strength.

The Irish were the chief instigators of this aspect of the plan; they in turn were represented chiefly by Wolfe Tone who was the

<sup>41</sup>Hoche to the Directory, Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, pp. 89-91; also, pp. 86-87.

<sup>42</sup>Hoche to the Directory, June 18, 1796, Guillon, *France et l'Irlande*, pp. 93-94; Savary, *Guerres*, VI, 336.



founder of the United Irish Society, a revolutionary group containing both Catholics and Protestants. Tone arrived in Paris in February, 1796. By the end of the month he had gained assurance that the Directory would support the Irish with arms and men in revolt against the English. But at this time the aid which the French thought they could give, in view of their own revolt in the west, was so small as to be considered useless by Tone.<sup>43</sup>

He continued to pound his point to Carnot and other officials both orally and in writing. Differences and antipathies between France and England in character, customs, forms of government, and commercial relations were set forth as reasons for an attack by the French. The best way to deliver this attack and to check the power and riches of England was to detach Ireland from the British Empire. A people would be freed from tyranny at the same time. Not only reasons for and method of attack were expounded, but also hope for success. A French army of twenty thousand men would be a signal for the united uprising of Protestants and Catholic peasants. Even a French army of five thousand men could succeed with the Irish in overcoming the weak British army. With unwarranted optimism Tone asserted that two-thirds of the British army in Ireland and two-thirds of the sailors in the British fleet were Irishmen who would offer no resistance to a French invasion.<sup>44</sup> Whatever the merit of all of Tone's arguments, it was a case of a fast-talking Irishman convincing a group of keen-minded Frenchmen.

Furthermore, the military and naval situation merited some offensive action. Al-

though it was to be a month before Hoche declared that all rebellion in the west had been put down, the Directory informed him on June 19, 1796, that his success made possible plans which had previously been considered purely speculative. The plans were for invasion of Ireland.<sup>45</sup> The condition of the navy had been improved somewhat. Since his appointment as minister of the navy in 1795, Truguet had busied himself with rehabilitating the fleet for an expedition to India and Ceylon and for an invasion of England.<sup>46</sup>

The Directory now presented to Hoche the task of executing the combined plans of Tone and Truguet along with some elements of the "chouannerie" plan thrown in. Since the fleet was still weak, it had to do double duty. On the way to India, five thousand men chosen from the armies of the coast were to be dropped off at Galloway Bay in Ireland. A second fleet was to fit out at Brest to transport another six thousand men, who would be so chosen as to "purge France of many dangerous individuals." The third and final part of the planned expedition to Ireland consisted of a fleet from Holland carrying five thousand men, mostly deserters from foreign armies, who would be commanded by French officers.<sup>47</sup>

The previously planned "chouannerie" took the form of a diversion which would contribute greatly to the success of the Irish undertaking. In time, however, plans were formulated to expand to five thousand the number of troops going to Wales and Cornwall; General Quantin was designated the commander. Furthermore, if success in Ireland should come quickly, Hoche was to take advantage of the opening Quantin

<sup>43</sup>"Journals of Wolfe Tone," in W.T.W. Tone, ed., *Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone* (Washington, 1826), II, 14-18, 20, 35; Hippolyte Carnot, *Mémoires sur Carnot par son fils* (2 vols.; Paris, 1861-1863), II, 80.

<sup>44</sup>Tone, *Life*, II, 29-31, 48-57, 105-08; Wolfe Tone, "Mémoires sur l'Irlande," in Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, appendix, pp. 449-66.

<sup>45</sup>Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>46</sup>Truguet, "Système maritime et offensif contre l'Angleterre," in *Ibid.*, pp. 109-12.

<sup>47</sup>Directory to Hoche, June 19, 1796, in *Ibid.*, pp. 95-99.

would make, transfer his troops from Ireland to England, and effect a full-dress invasion.<sup>48</sup>

England was kept in mind throughout all of the French preparations for the invasion of Ireland. Not only the leaders but also the troops regarded a blow against her to be the final objective. As they gathered along the coast, the men sang:

Tremble, trop perfide Angleterre!  
Crains pour tes orgueilleux ramparts (sic);  
Sur tes cités bientôt la guerre  
Fera flotter nos étendards.<sup>49</sup>

Even if the direct invasion of England by Hoche's forces should not take place, the Directory was convinced by Wolfe Tone's argument that England without Ireland would be a second-rate power, and would not be able to maintain its superiority on all of the seas.<sup>50</sup>

Definite outlines were made for the general disposition of government and institutions of Ireland, since the French thought it a certainty that that country would fall under their control. Although Hoche intended to proclaim to the Irish that French ambitions reached only to the breaking of the fetters of tyranny which the English had shackled on them, in actual practice the promise of free choice of governmental form was not to have been strictly observed. The Directory impressed upon Hoche that the relations between the two countries would be best promoted if Ireland should adopt a system of government similar to France's. For the good of both Ireland and France, any national assembly which was favorably inclined toward the English should be dissolved. In any case, the reins of government

should be kept in French hands until the making of the general peace.<sup>51</sup>

The religious situation in Ireland offered a difficult problem for the French to solve. They did not feel that the Irish, being mainly Catholics, were ready to adopt a "natural religion" based on "pure deism." The best solution was to let Catholicism exist alongside Anglicanism and the Presbyterianism of the Scotch-Irish in the north. But a balance of the three should be kept. Hoche was not to let the Irish adopt Anglicanism or Presbyterianism as the state religion, because this would offer a means of rapprochement for the English. Yet these denominations should be kept strong enough to oppose Roman Catholicism, whose elements were held to be opposed "to sound institutions of philosophy and morality and to the progress of the sciences."<sup>52</sup>

However rigid the formulae for the new order in Ireland, the French did not consider themselves to be mere conquerors forcing their institutions upon a subjugated people. Hoche was not insincere in proclaiming to his troops that the Irish were friends of the French and should not be treated as a conquered people.<sup>53</sup> The troops gained inspiration from singing:

Portons encor la liberté;  
Des Irlandais brisons les chaînes.<sup>54</sup>

When one considers that comprised in the "liberté" to be borne, was a definite set of institutions considered by the bearers to be superior to all others, elements can be noted of that nationalism which was to become the bane of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But this does not deny the sense of

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 99; Escande, *Hoche en Irlande*, pp. 108-10, 120-22.

<sup>49</sup>Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, appendix, pp. 473-74.

<sup>50</sup>Directory to Hoche, June 19, 1796, in *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>51</sup>Escande, *Hoche en Irlande*, pp. 94-99, 162-63.

<sup>52</sup>"Instructions pour le général en chef Hoche sur l'expédition d'Irlande," in Guillon, *La France et l'Irlande*, appendix, pp. 479-85.

<sup>53</sup>"Proclamation a l'armée d'Irlande," appendix in *Ibid.*, pp. 471-72.

<sup>54</sup>Quoted in *Ibid.*, appendix, p. 473.



purity of purpose which the French had; powerful movements gain strength from sincerity.

Not all Irishmen put the same trust in the French as Wolfe Tone did. When the threat of invasion became very great and a landing by the French was expected, an anonymous Irish ballad writer answered the song of the French troops by singing:

They come the true cause, they say, to  
advance,  
Twang 'em, we'll bang 'em, and hang 'em  
up all;  
But what is more rare they bring freedom  
from France;  
Twang 'em, we'll bang 'em, and hang 'em  
up all.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, the Lord Lieutenant was impressed by the generally good disposition of both troops and people at the time of crisis.<sup>56</sup>

The English also prepared to meet the French. When Hoche began to bring order out of chaos in the west in 1795; when French armed might increased; when Spain, the possessor of a navy, allied itself with France in August, 1796; when preparations for invasions and "chouanneries" were noted in French ports; at all these times impetus was given to direct British thought toward the matter of banging and twanging any Frenchmen who should set foot on British soil. In somewhat more elegant terms, Pye, the English poet laureate, wrote early in 1795 an ode which predicted the repulsion of any French attempt; he soon added a verse to the national anthem on the same theme. And it was still in 1795 that Robert Burns composed a song for his fellow-members of the Dumfries Volunteers:

Does haughty Gaul invasion threat?  
Then let the louns beware, Sir.

There's wooden walls upon the seas,  
And volunteers on shore, Sir.<sup>57</sup>

British thought advanced beyond the stage of poetry. Officials took steps to translate thought into action. In 1796, when the danger first was considered truly serious, coastal surveys were begun and a detailed and systematic scheme of defense was drawn up.<sup>58</sup> At the same time increases were made in foot militia and irregular cavalry.<sup>59</sup> The English considered the French a real threat.

To turn into accomplishment the threat of a "chouannerie" in England and an invasion of Ireland, Hoche applied all his energy to the preparations in the French ports. But progress was slow. Despite Truguet's efforts, the French navy was in poor condition. That money was lacking, which in the eighteenth century as well as the twentieth, stimulated the patriotic efforts of war workers. It cut the enthusiastic soul of Hoche to hear workers in the shipyards say that they would work better if they were paid. The lack of money, lack of bread, lack of shoes; troops on the verge of mutiny; imposing English squadrons along the French coast—all contributed to the gloomy picture which Hoche saw at the end of August, 1796.<sup>60</sup>

The task of convoying to England for the "chouannerie" five thousand men under Quantin was intrusted to a fleet of small gunboats commanded by Joseph Muskeyn, a Fleming who had served in the Swedish navy. Muskeyn had convinced the Directory early in 1796 that small gunboats would be ideal for the defense of the French coast and possibly for an attack on the coasts of the enemy. With some difficulty a fleet of them was built, and they were manned by crews drawn from the armies of the west. These

<sup>55</sup>T. Crofton Croker, ed., *Popular Songs, Illustrative of the French Invasions of Ireland* (London, 1855), p. 61; for other songs ridiculing the French concept of liberty, see pp. 62-69.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>57</sup>Wheeler and Broadley, *Napoleon*, I, 197-200.

<sup>58</sup>Rose and Broadley, *Dumouriez*, pp. 215-25.

<sup>59</sup>Wheeler and Broadley, *Napoleon*, I, 26-27.

<sup>60</sup>Chassin, *Les pacifications*, II, 565-66; Escande, *Hoche en Irlande*, pp. 141-42, 150-51.

crews were one of a kind with the undesirable whom they were supposed to convey; the generals of the armies would release to Muskeyn only the worst and least disciplined men.<sup>61</sup>

Quantin's men ran true to form; their wholesale desertions together with insubordinate officers necessitated the embarkation of the group before it should dissolve. After waiting for favorable winds, the expedition set sail in mid-November, only to run immediately upon bad weather. Muskeyn's little gunboats found rough seas impossible to navigate; they and the troop ships were scattered along the French coast.<sup>62</sup>

Dissolution was now practically automatic. Muskeyn's gunboats were relegated to patrol duty for the time being. What there had been of regular troops found their way back to their old companies; the criminals were put back under lock and key.<sup>63</sup> Thus before the main expedition had left for Ireland, the diversion and the possible forerunner of a full dress invasion of England had failed. Its naval consort could not stand rough weather; its army of cast-offs had from the first, set limits to its effectiveness.

The chief factor which delayed the forces of Hoche was the lack of a strong fleet. The plan of having a part of the expedition leave from Holland was put aside. The plan of having part of the troops dropped off on Ireland while the ships went on to India met the vigorous opposition of Hoche. He claimed that Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse was subordinating the Irish expedition to his fantasies about India. This together with the slowness of the rehabilitation of the fleet brought the army and navy into open oppo-

sition. Hoche charged the navy leaders with incompetence, bad faith and failure to cooperate.<sup>64</sup>

In the midst of these verbal blasts, the Directory decided to take drastic action. Hoche was to have his own way; unity of command was needed to bring about effective teamwork between army and navy. On October 13, 1796, the India venture was called off; Villaret was soon dismissed from his post as admiral of the expedition; on November 19, Hoche was made a temporary admiral in order that discipline could be maintained and that success would be assured.<sup>65</sup>

Although Morrad de Galles, who replaced Villaret-Joyeuse, was much more cooperative in carrying out his orders, Hoche despaired over the weakness of the navy, and on December 8, in a sudden moment of depression, renounced the project to the Directory, and offered to lead the assembled troops in any other area of battle.<sup>66</sup> In truth the navy was still weak. Morard admitted that the crews were so green that encounter with the enemy should be avoided if at all possible because the outcome for the French was to be feared.<sup>67</sup>

Finally, on December 15, the expedition set sail. Hoche still had no good word for the navy. "The whole army," he said, "is about to prove that the French navy still exists."<sup>68</sup> But army dominance and strength was not to get the troops safely ashore in Ireland. The Directory had its doubts even as the expedition sailed; for on December 17, it sought unsuccessfully to cancel the whole affair. And taking Hoche at his earlier

<sup>61</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 71-79; Maurice Bottet, *Napoléon aux camps de Boulogne* (Paris, 1914), pp. 36-37.

<sup>62</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 80-88; Bottet, *Napoléon*, pp. 39-42.

<sup>63</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 89-90; Bottet, *Napoléon*, pp. 42-45.

<sup>64</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 143-47.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 147-49, 155; Escande, *Hoche en Irlande*, p. 158.

<sup>66</sup>Chassin, *Les pacifications*, II, 617; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 152-55.

<sup>67</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 160, 163.

<sup>68</sup>Hoche, quoted by Chassin, *Les pacifications*, II, 617.



word, it called him to Paris for reassignment.<sup>69</sup>

It would have been fortunate had the Directory's order reached the fleet before it sailed. Incompetence and bad weather were to combine to make the expedition a fiasco. Before the fleet had cleared the French coast, four ships had collided with heavy damage, a fifth had sunk on a rock with great loss of life, and confused and missed signals had resulted in a division of forces. Heavy fog and strong winds prevented unification. Although the greater part of the fleet reached the coast of Ireland off Bantry Bay, neither of the two leaders, Hoche and Morard de Galles, was with that section. Strong head winds prevented the unskilled French from sailing the thirty miles from the entrance to the head of the bay where a landing could have been made. When the wind did break somewhat, the admirals were still loath to risk their precious ships, and failed to carry out the orders of General Grouchy, the highest ranking army officer, to prepare for a landing. When the wind rose again, the whole force headed back for Brest.<sup>70</sup>

Only after the main body of the expedition had started back did a little group of ships bearing the commanders, Hoche and Morard de Galles, make their appearance at Bantry Bay. With such a small force they attempted no landing, but decided to return to Brest. The return trips of each group were not without adventures and encounters with the British. At the end of the expedition the French navy was weaker by the loss of twelve ships, with honors for the destruction being about equally divided between the wind and the British.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 617.

<sup>70</sup>Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, I, 351-57; Bonnechose, *Lazare Hoche*, pp. 207-11.

<sup>71</sup>Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, I, 357-60; Bonnechose, *Lazare Hoche*, p. 212.

The French fleet had not been an entire failure. It had eluded the British to approach the shores of Ireland mostly intact, even if in two sections. In better weather a landing would have undoubtedly been effected. On the other hand, if the seamen had been more skillful, if authority had been centered and had been followed, a landing would have been made despite the difficulties. And if the navy had been really strong, it could soon have taken the sea again in a renewed attempt; but battered as it was, postponement was necessary.

It is rather useless to speculate over what the result would have been had Hoche's troops landed. They might well have caused the British serious trouble in Ireland, or even have brought about its detachment from British control. But it should be noted that this expedition was still not an "all-out" blow against the English. The pick of the French troops were engaged in the Germanies and with Bonaparte in Italy; Hoche's troops included a large number of "undesirables" whose loss would not have hurt the main French army.

### III

The year 1797 saw the revival by the French of three old projects against the English, and the planning of a fourth on a greater scale than had ever been considered previously. A party of men was landed for a "chouannerie" in Wales; another invasion of Ireland was planned; Muskeyn's gunboats attempted the recapture of the Saint-Marcouf Islands. Finally, preparations for a direct invasion of England by Napoleon Bonaparte were begun.

The "chouannerie" plans were but a development of those which Carnot, Humbert and La Barollière had made early in 1796.

The new expedition was intended to replace Quantin's, which had piled up along

the French coast on putting to sea. The troops were fewer in number, comprising only one thousand to twelve hundred men, but they were akin in background to Quantin's thugs and toughs. Their commander was an American, Colonel Tate.<sup>72</sup>

Some differences distinguished the Tate expedition from the plans for previous ones. Muskeyn's gunboats were not to do convoy duty. Rather the men were to be carried on three heavily armed transports. And although the same general method of guerilla warfare was to be followed, Tate was specifically informed to raise an insurrection if he could. Thus the definite aim of stirring up a revolution, which previous plans lacked, was embraced in Tate's instructions, along with the provisions for cutting communications, destroying commercial facilities, and levying contributions on Liverpool and other cities.<sup>73</sup>

The folly of expecting a mere handful of men of dubious character to strike a serious blow in England was soon displayed. Tate landed at Fishguard Bay, in Wales, on the morning of February 23, 1796. That very day he dispatched a letter to Lord Cawdor, the commander of the local troops, informing him that circumstances "render it unnecessary to attempt any military operations, as they would tend only to bloodshed and pillage."<sup>74</sup> The whole expedition collapsed. Even the hope of the French to rid their country of a number of desperate characters was not fulfilled, for the English, not wanting them either, sent a large proportion back to France.<sup>75</sup>

The revived plan for the invasion of Ireland fared even worse by being nipped before any troops were actually embarked. The

Dutch fleet was to carry twenty thousand troops, only six thousand of whom would be French, to the shores of Ireland. But this fleet, venturing forth to combat the English admiral, Duncan, who blockaded the coast, was thoroughly beaten at the battle of Camperdown on October 11.<sup>76</sup> Invasion was impossible; the French were relying wholly on the Dutch for transport. The small number of French soldiers which were to engage in the operation reflected the policy of Carnot, who informed Hoche that the fate of the continent ought to be decided before any invasion of Ireland took place.<sup>77</sup> Hoche never saw the day when all French resources could be directed against England, for he died on September 19, 1797,<sup>78</sup> one month before Bonaparte made peace with the Austrians at Campo Formio.

As for Muskeyn and his gunboats, Truguet's plan to have them depart from mere patrol duty to attempt to retake the Saint-Marcouf Islands, met only with additional disaster. The gunboats showed again that they could not stand rough weather; storms drove them back into port before they had even reached the coasts of the islands. The Directory, considering another trial to be useless, set Muskeyn again to the task of defending the coast from possible British attack.<sup>79</sup>

In the midst of all these failures, the French armies on the continent were defeating the Austrians, and were preparing the way for the treaty of Campo Formio which Bonaparte signed on October 17, 1797. Even before peace came with the Austrians, Bonaparte had in mind an attack on England, which would be the one remaining enemy. On September 17 he wrote an address to the

<sup>72</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 238-39.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 239; Wheeler and Broadley, *Napoleon*, I, 40-49.

<sup>74</sup>Tate to Cawdor, in Wheeler and Broadley, *Napoleon*, I, 57; see also, I, 50-51.

<sup>75</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 246.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, I, 257-59, 266.

<sup>77</sup>Carnot to Hoche, June 9, 1797, in *Ibid.*, I, 253.

<sup>78</sup>Wheeler and Broadley, *Napoleon*, I, 21.

<sup>79</sup>Bottet, *Napoléon*, p. 45; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 275, 277-78.



French navy, declaring: "Comrades, as soon as we have pacified the continent, we will unite with you to gain the freedom of the seas."<sup>80</sup>

The idea was not forgotten. The very day after the Peace of Campo Formio was signed, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that the time had come to destroy the English monarchy. As he pointed out, French forces were now free to concentrate on the enemy, which if not soon destroyed, would raise up new coalitions. But the navy needed special attention. The final advice was, "Let us concentrate all our activity towards the navy and let us destroy England. That done, Europe is at our feet."<sup>81</sup>

This view was shared both by the Directory and by a large part of the public. The last great continental power had been forced to make peace. The tyrant of the seas could now be crushed.<sup>82</sup> On October 26, the day it received Bonaparte's dispatch, the Directory ordered the creation of an Army of England with Bonaparte as its commander and with General Desaix, the close friend and admirer of Bonaparte, in direct command pending the latter's arrival.<sup>83</sup>

Desaix entered into the work of organization with great enthusiasm and zeal.<sup>84</sup> The army under his command continued to expand until by April, 1798, it comprised over fifty thousand men. These men were not cast-offs, but were French regulars drawn from other fronts.<sup>85</sup>

Within the ports great activity reigned in the attempt to gather together a fleet capable of fighting the British and a flotilla able to carry the men and the necessary arms and provisions. New ships were built, others rehabilitated and others requisitioned. Demands were made on the Dutch for two hundred to two hundred and fifty fishing boats to be used for transport. Gunboats built on the lines of Muskeyn's gained new popularity as their numbers were multiplied for another attempt to retake the Saint-Marcouf Islands.<sup>86</sup>

Although Bonaparte found it necessary to remain in Italy for some time, and in the latter part of November represented the French at the Congress of Rastadt, he by no means failed to concern himself with the project against England. Particularly did he warn that the navy must be strengthened; good ships and a good admiral supported by first-rate subordinate officers should be obtained. The Army of England he felt to be already organized; it only needed transference to the coast. From the Army of Italy Bonaparte dispatched many regiments; he handpicked his generals, including Kléber and Caffarelli.<sup>87</sup>

Little evidence supports the statement of Talleyrand that Bonaparte, in early December, returned to Paris from Rastadt with the purpose of proposing to the Directory an expedition to Egypt.<sup>88</sup> To the contrary, Bonaparte's previous ideas on the conquest of Egypt, which were more nebulous than those of Talleyrand, were put aside for the time being as he engaged wholeheartedly in preparations for the invasion of England.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>80</sup>*Correspondance de Napoléon Ier.* (32 vols.; Paris, 1858-1870), III, 305.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 390-92.

<sup>82</sup>Friedrich M. Kircheisen, *Napoleon I, Sein Leben und Seine Zeit* (9 vols.; Munich and Leipzig, 1911-1934), III, 238; *Mémoires du Prince de Talleyrand* (5 vols.; Paris, 1891-1892), I, 254-56.

<sup>83</sup>Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 239-40; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 283; Arthur Chuquet, *Quatre généraux de la révolution* (4 vols.; Paris, 1911-1920), III, 321-22, 324; IV, 170.

<sup>84</sup>Chuquet, *Quatre généraux*, II, 324-25.

<sup>85</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 283, 347, 363, 369-70.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*, 290-92, 295, 298-99, 319, 323-24.

<sup>87</sup>*Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, III, 401-02, 410-13; Chuquet, *Quatre Généraux*, II, 285; III, 384-85; Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 245-47.

<sup>88</sup>*Mémoires*, I, 258.

<sup>89</sup>Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 258-75, especially pp. 263-65, 270.

Bonaparte continued to concern himself with the details of invasion; he checked on the artillery which was being gathered; he looked into the matter of light carts on which to carry provisions and the horses needed to draw them. His true interest was further attested by the dispatch of two personal representatives, General Andréossy and the Navy-engineer Forfait, to expedite the preparations.<sup>90</sup>

The question might be asked, Why did Bonaparte give up the planned expedition against England to go to Egypt? Bonaparte's personal trip of inspection along the coasts in early February, 1797, and the reports of General Caffarelli, persuaded him to notify the Directory on February 23 that France did not have the mastery of the sea which was absolutely necessary for an invasion of England. Considerable doubt filled his mind as to whether such mastery could be gained that year, if ever it could be gained at all. If by the end of April the necessary ships were not in readiness, the necessary officers and crews not trained, no invasion would be possible; the time of long nights with mild weather, which were necessary for a secret crossing, would be past. In such a case, France then had three alternatives: it could strike at England by invading Hanover; it could send an expedition to the Levant which would menace the Indian trade; or it could make peace with England.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, III, 244-45; *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, III, 471-73; Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 307, 317.

As reports of the weak condition of the French navy continued to pour in, Bonaparte inclined more and more toward the second alternative. Desaix was shocked by the paucity of means for invasion to be found at Brest; Kléber's original enthusiasm sobered down to the belief that an attack by gunboats on the Saint-Marcoufs was impracticable.<sup>92</sup> Decisive for Napoleon was the report on March 2, 1798, of Lambrecht, the temporary minister of the navy. The fleet lacked hemp and munitions, sailors and provisions. At Brest there were only four ships which were completely fitted out.<sup>93</sup>

On March 5 Bonaparte submitted to the Directory detailed plans of preparation for an expedition to Malta and Egypt; on April 24 orders were given to transfer twenty thousand men of the Army of England to the Army of Mayence; on May 19 Bonaparte set sail for Egypt.

The preparations which caused the English to start in fear and to revile the name of Bonaparte, collapsed into futility. France might well have crushed internal revolt and found leadership in one man; it might well have beaten down her enemies on the continent. But the recognized power of the British fleet kept the invader from the shores of England.

<sup>91</sup>*Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, III, 489-91; Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 246-47, 255.

<sup>92</sup>Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives*, I, 301, 331; Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 255; Chuquet, *Quatre généraux*, III, 384-85.

<sup>93</sup>Kircheisen, *Napoleon*, III, 256.



---

# THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

---

## REVIEWS

*The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944.* Prepared under the editorship of Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate by the Air Force Historical Division. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950. Pp. xxxii, 825. Illustrated. \$6.00.)

Poor as the European Theater may have been in 1942, the Pacific was poorer still. The Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom could, and did, fall back upon the highly developed industrial resources of England and received assistance from the well-equipped R.A.F. Such aid was not available on the far flung islands of the Pacific, in the fog-bound Aleutians, and in the steaming jungles of Burma. From Australia and India came a few supplies and other help, but mostly the Pacific depended upon the long over-water supply lines which led back to the United States. Shipping was scarce and port facilities in many areas non-existent. Men fought nature on the ground and the Japanese in the air and would have been hard put to indicate which was the more implacable foe.

For the student of air power the Air Force Historical Division has provided in this publication material for prolonged and searching thought. From experience with interdiction of rail lines in Burma, it is possible to predict what has been happening in Korea. As much as the destruction of track, bridges, and marshalling yards may hamper the foe's logistics, if he is really determined, he will get supplies through. Only with vigorous ground action that makes him use up his stocks can this tactic hope to be really effective.

The use of air transport to move forces and to supply them, to set up airstrips and keep them operating revolutionized jungle warfare in New Guinea and Burma. The isolation of island positions and their continued neutralization by aircraft completely upset Japanese calculations. The reader can almost see this concept grow in the minds of air and theater commanders. There is much on the development of air doctrine, not the least of which concerns that erratic genius of the China theater—Clare Chennault, whose tactics were as brilliant as his strategy was hazy. Unfortunately, the authors nowhere take up the fascinating, if somewhat controversial topic, of why the Army Air Forces and the Marines developed such different concepts of close air support from similar experience.

In common with the historical series being prepared by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, the *Army Air Forces in World War II* presents the view of the particular service with which it is concerned. For example the Central Pacific Campaign which occupies so much space in Navy accounts appears here in rather small compass. The authors themselves all served the Army Air Forces either in military or civilian capacity and, as a result, have both used its files and absorbed its point of view. Although this is not a serious fault, provided the reader remembers the origins of the volume, it does occasionally lead to misrepresentation of the attitudes and organization of the other services where mention of them must be made for the sake of completeness. The reviewer feels that in discussing matters of unified command the Navy's viewpoint has not always been fairly presented. The interesting problem is suggested as to whether, when all the historical

series of the various services have been completed, some ambitious author can develop from them a synthesis which will give the history of the war as whole.

Throughout the writers have striven to present a careful picture of the operations of the Army Air Forces. They have not glossed over mistakes either in execution or planning. With the aid of Japanese records enemy shipping losses at the Battle of the Bismarck Sea are as accurately tabulated as they probably can be. The ineffectiveness of high altitude bombing against ships is clearly revealed, and one author raises the question of why the Army Air Forces repudiated the dive bomber when Marine and Navy squadrons often flying off the same fields used this type of aircraft so successfully. The significant part played by the Army Air Forces in reducing the effectiveness of both Japanese Army and Naval Air Forces is fairly represented and the difficulties faced by men and machines clearly set forth.

The volume was prepared by a number of authors, and despite the work of the editors, differences in treatment are still evident. Throughout, however, the reader can detect the change in tone as the Army Air Forces grow in size, obtain improved aircraft, develop tactics suitable to the Pacific, learn to cooperate with other services, and gradually beat down their opponents. No account perhaps better illustrates Lord Tedder's thesis that the important lessons come from the early part of a war when men and equipment are scarce, the foe powerful and determined, and the going tough. The Air Force Historical Division has made a distinguished contribution to the history of the Pacific War. It deserves careful reading from officers of the Army and Navy and from those of the Air Force itself whose experience may have been too exclusively European as well as from all students of military history.

DR. HENRY M. DATER  
Department of Defense

*Troopers With Custer.* By E. A. Brininstool.  
(Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1952. Pp. 343. \$5.00.)

The author is one of the outstanding students of Western Americana and Dean of those now living, having been born in 1870. This volume is a greatly expanded edition of the author's "A Trooper with Custer" published in 1925 by the Hunter-Trader-Trapper Co., a collection of tales by participants in the Battle of the Little Big Horn, previously published in the H-T-T magazine.

In this edition an account of the campaign, which is neither complete nor correct in all details, and several very interesting narratives have been added, some only remotely or not at all connected with the campaign. As an example of an error, in his story, Trooper Slaper, Co. M, states he never received the Congressional Medal of Honor, while the legend under his photograph, p. 37, taken by the author in 1926, says he did. The Department of the Army Decorations Board advises there is no record of it.

There is little new material on the Custer campaign of 1876 in this edition. Among other items published for the first time is a detailed letter from Major Brisbin (commanding Gibbon's cavalry) to General Godfrey in 1892 which merely confirms others who claim the Indians could have decimated Gibbon's column also; especially after it was divided and the cavalry sent out of supporting distance, had their attention not been diverted to the south by the 7th Cav.

The author is decidedly pro-Reno, crediting him with acts of others, and has a chapter denying he was a coward in the Valley Fight, but does not defend his inefficient and unduly hurried flight, having left several men in the timber, and his failure to cover it properly by fire. The account of those who finally rejoined the command is the most thrilling chapter of a volume replete with thrills. If others were deserted and later captured, they never lived to tell their tales. The Indians naturally denied taking and torturing any prisoners, but several of Reno's command were missing.

The author is not disposed to give much credence to Crow Scout Curley's account of Custer's annihilation, although they were acquainted and apparently good friends as there is a photograph of them together (p. 245) taken in 1913. He also denies there were any white survivors, ignoring Dr. Kuhlman's statement, in *Legend into History* (1951) (Note 56), that he is "convinced" 'a trooper, Frank Finkel, Co. C, did escape from Custer's command.

This makes an exceedingly readable volume, especially adapted to those interested in thrilling accounts of Indian warfare. It is well illustrated (64 photos, some new) but no map, which should have been included for those unfamiliar with the campaign. The printing is good and free from typographical errors.

LT. COL. HENRY S. MERRICK



***Red China's Fighting Hordes***, by Lt. Colonel Robert B. Rigg. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company, 1951. Pp. xiv + 378. \$3.75).

Colonel Rigg's first-class book is the most informative and illuminating discussion of China written in many a long year. The author has wide experience in Chinese military affairs, having served in China as assistant military attaché, as observer in military truce teams and even as military prisoner of the Chinese communists. With a great deal of insight, he discusses almost every important aspect of the communist army: its military concepts and favorite tactical devices, its military commanders, its organization, training, logistics, equipment, psychological warfare techniques, campaigns, and future intentions or assignments. He reproduces important and, to the general public, inaccessible texts, such as Mao Tse-tung's ten military principles and Liu Piao's prescriptions for the "short attack." While Colonel Rigg is rightly impressed by the military accomplishments of the Chinese communists, and while his book is a sober warning to those who would underrate that dangerous opponent, he does not overlook the many glaring weaknesses of the "People's Liberation Army." There is a great deal of realism but not a trace of defeatism in Colonel Rigg's discussion. He leaves no doubt that the Chinese communists can be defeated, and decisively so. For better or worse, Chinese affairs have now assumed world importance. Hence Colonel Rigg's book is of the highest interest to all politically interested Americans. Certainly it should be on the shelf of every alert American officer. Colonel Rigg must be congratulated for an exceedingly difficult job excellently done.

STEFAN T. POSSONY  
Georgetown University  
Washington, D. C.

***The Official Record of a Court of Inquiry Convened at Chicago, Illinois, January 13, 1879 by the President of the United States Upon the Request of Major Marcus A. Reno, 7th Cavalry To Investigate His Conduct at the Battle of the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876.*** Published by Col. William Alexander Graham, U.S.A. Retired. (Col. W. A. Graham, Pacific Palisades, Calif., 1951. Pp. 59 incl. appendices, folio, hand sewn, hand bound. One and two volumes \$35.00 and \$40.00).

Despite the large volume of material published during the past years there has existed a gap in the information available to students of military history, collectors of western history and those interested in the story of his particularly fascinating bit of American history. Col. Graham's publication of the record of the Court of Inquiry now opens a new source of original material. The restricted official record of the Court of Inquiry has been in the AGO Section of the National Archives for many years and is sealed and not available to researchers because of its worn and tattered condition.

A number of copies of the record of the Court of Inquiry were made prior to publication of the record. Col. Graham made one manuscript copy in 1919-1920 and checked it with the original. Then a second copy (with three carbons) was typed under his supervision in Washington in 1933 and checked by the Judge Advocate General's Office. One of these copies was double checked with the 1920 manuscript copy and was used as the master copy for this book. In Aug. 1932 the late Dr. Francis R. Hagner of Washington transcribed one of the J.A.G. copies in quadruplicate. The Hagner copies were sold by his estate at public auction and one copy is now in the William Robertson Coe Collection, Yale University Library, two copies are in the Manuscript Room, New York Public Library and one copy is in the Newberry Library, Chicago. Lt. Col. Eugene Hart in Sept. 1938 made copies of the Hagner record and two of the Hart copies are in the Manuscript Room, New York Public Library. H. B. McConnell of Cadiz, Ohio also has a copy of the Graham transcribed record.

Only 125 copies of the record of the Court of Inquiry were published by Col. Graham in this edition. The record includes the testimony of twenty-three survivors of the fight or of persons closely connected to the fight. This constitutes the only source of sworn testimony of the men who participated in the fight. The edition also contains the June 13, 1878 letter of Fredrick Whittaker and Major Reno's letter of June 22, 1878 which formed the basis of the request for an inquiry into his conduct in the fight. In addition, the interview of Fredrick Whittaker which appeared in the Chicago Time, Jan. 23, 1879 is also published.

KENNETH M. HAMMER  
Major, USAF  
Mountain Home, Idaho

*The Railroads of the Confederacy.* By Robert C. Black. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952. Pp. 360. Illustrated. \$6.00.)

*The Northern Railroads in the Civil War: 1861-1865.* By Thomas Weber. (New York: King's Crown-Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. 318. \$4.00.)

By 1861 the railroad had become a vital element of the American economy. Without regard to the regional political and social differences, rail lines had stretched—in complementary fashion—throughout the country, their layout governed by the powerful laws of supply and demand. In the North the lines trended generally East and West to facilitate shipment of the rich harvests from the Middle and Far West to the populous Atlantic Coast and beyond to Europe. In that region which became the Confederacy the rails ran preponderantly on a North-South axis, feeding the fruit of Southern agriculture Northward and to the great ports of Mobile, New Orleans, Savannah, and Charleston. Secession thus meant for the South a truncated network of mass transportation facilities maladjusted to the economic and military policies which the Confederacy was forced, by circumstances, to adopt. The closure of Southern ports by the Union blockade made the inadequacy of the Confederate railroad system still more painfully obvious to the Richmond authorities. Yet, inadequate as they were, the rails were destined to carry the chief transport burden of the Confederacy. Their successes in accomplishing this task, the difficulties encountered, and their role in the conduct and conclusion of the war are the subject of Mr. Black's excellent volume.

The greatest problem of the Southern railroads during the war was, without doubt, that of supply and maintenance. When the iron horse could no longer be nourished from indigenous or smuggled resources it stumbled and fell, carrying along with it the hopes of the Confederacy. Many methods of supply were perforce essayed: elimination of tariffs on rail material; requisition and impressment of rolling stock and rail from the less useful (and, one might add, the less well politically supported) lines, seizure of equipments by civil and military authorities, and downright thievery from the neighboring rail lines in the North. These measures, however, all proved insufficient to combat the great rate of war

attrition. The obvious resolution of many of these supply and operational problems of the Southern roads lay in a centralized control of transportation, but in this field efforts were effectively frustrated by numerous forces, not least among which were the States-Rights Governors, many of whom directly represented extensive State interests in the railroads which were subject to attempted dictation from Richmond. Confederate transportation difficulties on the operational plane were compounded by a fantastic complex of problems. A latter-day railroad efficiency expert would have, in 1861, collapsed at seeing the magnitude of the task confronting him. By 1864 he would have been quite insane. The Quartermaster General was quite likely to issue orders directly contrary to those issuing from the Railroad Bureau; military officers in the field were wont to interfere mightily with the efficient operation of the roads; municipalities and competing drayage companies successfully prevented the construction of through-connections at vital locations, etc. Thus, efforts to maintain, build, and operate the railroads of the Confederacy during the war were frustrated by a multiplicity of vested interests, varying degrees of incompetence, and the lack—in the last analysis—of the national enthusiasm and spirit of patriotic self-abnegation without which the Confederate cause was foredoomed.

With this background one may indeed wonder that the railroads were able to perform their assigned tasks in many vital operations of the Confederate Army. Yet, in the fall of 1863, the railroads were capable of transferring Longstreet's First Corps from Orange Court House to Chickamauga Creek, i.e. from twelve to twenty thousand troops (estimates differ even today) over seven hundred and fifty miles in less than two weeks. During the previous summer Bragg had succeeded in moving about the same number of men over a circuitous rail route from Corinth to Chattanooga, via Mobile in about the same time. Speaking of the Chickamauga rail concentration, Mr. Black notes that "if Bragg failed to press the ensuing Federal rout, that, once more, was no fault of the railroads, which for the second and last time had enabled him to strike with a rough equality of numbers." (Page 191). In addition to these spectacular movements, there were many other large scale transports of Confederate troops during the war—notably the arrival of Jackson at First Manassas and the use of rails in Hood's ill-fated Tennessee campaign of 1864. By 1864, however,



the Confederacy was in such straits that no amount of effort on the part of the much-maligned railroads (and railroaders) could redeem the cause for independence. At the end, the decisive tactical blow to the Confederacy was dealt when the South Side and Danville roads were out—thus providing substantial evidence to support Mr. Black's statement that "... for the South, the War between the States, to its last weeks, remained a railroad war." (Page 282).

In contrast to the dire poverty and pressing necessity which characterized the Confederate rail lines activities, the North was well off—in fact, benefited considerably under the impetus of war-time demand. It is impossible to formulate an exact comparison of the roles played by the Northern and Southern railroads since in the North the demand for rail services was compatible with commercial advantage, adequate materiel was available, and sufficient quantities of entrepreneurial talent existed to take technological advantage of these circumstances. As Mr. Weber points out, for the North, the "period from 1861 to 1865 was an important one for the railroads, not because of any great expansion, but rather because of the general consolidation of gains made in the fifties, the experimenting with new and better methods of operation, the finding of new methods of economizing, and the growth in technical ability." (Page vii). Since the majority of the northern roads were far removed from the vicinity of active campaign and because the owners of the companies were quite willing to profiteer as well as to submit to the rare assumption of public control, the principal bone of contention with the Government during the war was the question of compensation for services.

The principal achievement of public railroad regulation during the war was embodied in the U. S. Act of January 31, 1862, by which the Government was enabled to assume control of rail facilities whenever military necessity required. Under the *aegis* of this Act, two great railroaders, Herman Haupt and Daniel McCallum were able to perform yeoman service during four years of war, seizing roads when necessary (the Gettysburg campaign), improvising field repairs in Virginia and elsewhere, and setting up the U. S. Military Railroad system which made a great contribution to the eventual victory in the field. There was, then, a dichotomous aspect to the use of Northern railroads during the war: on the one hand, the lines transported men and materiel on

a commercial basis in agreement with the Government, and on the other hand a railroad system distinctly military in character was established which was to provide a *corpus* of experience to be studied in the U. S. and abroad until the Second World War. Of the two aspects, the latter is by far the more significant for the history of our sectional struggle and for the history of warfare.

There were unavoidable conflicts of personalities: (*vide* Haupt's relations with Stanton and the latter's explosive "I will relieve you at once, sir!" of September, 1863), and numerous examples of jealousy in attainment (particularly in the Western theater) but by and large the railroads of the North played their role with a minimum of controversy and a maximum of efficiency. The relatively easy adjustment of Northern railroads to wartime conditions, their accomplishments, and tantalizingly short sketches of the personalities involved are the subject matter of Mr. Weber's book.

One should read Black first and then Weber. By so doing, the reader will receive a more distinct impression of problems and accomplishments as between North and South. By way of specific critique: Mr. Black might have discussed more fully the effects on the efficiency of the railroads in the Confederacy, deriving from payments for services in fiat money and bonds—but this is a specialist point and in no way detracts from the reviewer's opinion that the quality of his volume will assure its status as standard in the field for years to come. Mr. Black's treatment of the pre-war railroad situation and his analyses of general war time conditions are excellent. He has indeed fulfilled the need for a "full history of the railroads of the Confederacy" (Coulter, *et al*).

Mr. Weber on the other hand, has provided us with the most comprehensive analysis to date of Northern railroad problems, but his treatment is uneven and frequently bogs down under indigestible clouds of statistics and he has made an unnecessarily pedantic use of footnotes. The meat of Weber's work lies in the field of economics and is essentially outside the immediate purview of the military historian. His survey of the setting up and operation of the U. S. Military Railroads is lamentably short although this portion of the book is liable to be of most interest to the civil war student.

As a matter of fact, the U.S.M.R.R. deserves a full scale study (especially in the Western theater where, in the opinion of this reviewer, it

performed vital and unacknowledged services for the Union cause). No doubt some of these opinions can be ascribed to the fact that Black has directed his attention to the equation: War/Railroads while Weber concentrates largely on economics and political problems far removed from the battle front. One might add, parenthetically, that a monograph treatment of the relationship of both Northern and Southern railroads to strategy and tactics would provide an essential connecting link between these two volumes and complete, for the time being at least, need for study of this aspect of the history of our great Conflict. The lack of maps in Mr. Weber's study is inexcusable. In sum, however, one may now hope that, as a result of the nearly simultaneous appearance of these two books, authors of more general works dealing with the war between the States will take proper account of the neglected and important role played by the railroads, North and South, in war plans, strategy, tactics, economics, and politics.

ROBERT STANLEY WATSON  
U. S. Treasury Department  
Washington, D. C.

**Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853**, by R. C. Anderson, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. 619. 10 photographs. \$7.50.)

Perhaps the best way to commence a review of this book is to say that Page 1 brought the reviewer out of the depths of a comfortable arm chair to his study desk and charts. What's more he remained there for over a half of a thousand pages! The microbe hunter, his eye glued to his microscope, is fascinated by what he sees and interprets on his slide. He can not tear himself away. This book is an historical lens which when applied to the western basin of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea makes the naval wars in the Levant seem as real as the *Times'* account of Operation MAINBRACE. And if laid down unfinished the book beckons the military reader just as the waiting microscope does the scientist. For it is not only what he sees highlighted in the center of the historical slide that holds his interest but is also that which lies just beyond and which he hopes will swim into his view.

The British author has selected the period from 1559 to 1853 in which to set his detailed story of Levantine sailing-ship warfare. He picks 1559 as his starting date because it was on April 2 of

that year that France and Spain signed the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis which settled their difficulties—at least temporarily—in the western Mediterranean and permitted the Christian powers of the West to concentrate their efforts against the Moslem danger which was threatening Europe. Three hundred years later the last battle of wooden sailing ships was fought at Sinope in the Black Sea. In destroying the Turkish squadron in this prelude to the Crimean War the Russians brought the supremacy of the sailing warship to an end. Steel and steam were henceforth to rule the sea. So this year of 1853 serves as a natural point of termination for Dr. Anderson's work. These three centuries of naval history are essentially the picture of the struggle between Venetian and Turkish navies for the inland seas; then, the destruction of Turkey's naval power by the Russians and finally the ascendancy of English and French sea power.

The opening chapter briefly outlines naval warfare in the Mediterranean from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the beginning of the author's detailed story some two hundred years later. This prepares the reader for the opening campaign at Jerba in 1560.

During the sixteenth century the Turks were unsuccessful in their siege by sea of Malta, and they lost 30,000 men and some 250 vessels at Lepanto in 1571. However, the Holy League (Spain, Venice and the Vatican) did not follow up their advantage and within a year the Turkish commander-in-chief, Uluch Ali, was again raiding the coasts of North Africa, Italy and Greece.

Perhaps most of this failure in military follow-through was due to the faulty command relations of this period. This disability, however, is still a plague on all three arms of the military establishment, and in this book one can see the roots of this trouble reaching back into the 16th century. During the Sicilian campaign, for example, in August 1943, the Allied Commander discovered that the commanding general of his 15th Army Group was communicating directly with London concerning matters which should have gone through the chain of command. Likewise, in 1571, following the Battle of Lepanto, Don Juan, Admiral of the combined sea forces of the West found that Veniero, the Venetian commander, had reported the account of the battle directly to Venice without the Spaniard's approval.

Dr. Anderson's story of the 25 years (1645-



1669) and two wars between the western allies and Turkey for the possession of Crete is also replete with quarrels between commanders, the evils of a non-unified command, and the conflicting national interests which hampered the focusing of combined strengths against a single objective.

It would seem that history such as this might have its lessons for today?

In the author's descriptions of the wars of the eighteenth century there is also a good account of the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Tchesma in 1770 which gave the Russians complete control of the Mediterranean. Catherine the Great had sent part of her fleet into the Mediterranean for the first time only the year before and the ships had come all the way from the Baltic for this action. In spite of their success afloat there was no complementing military strength to be projected ashore. By 1776, the Russian fleet had left the Mediterranean and unlike the Turks had no advance bases or new territorial claims to show for their victories. In this lack of achievement there is a lesson deserving of consideration.

Of especial interest to Americans during this period are the accounts of John Paul Jones' service in the Russian Navy and the later operations of U. S. naval forces against Tripoli and Tunis.

A general description of the book's make-up is as follows.

The volume has ten illustrations, nine of which show types of ships of the period. The other is a photograph of a contemporary painting of the Battle of Lepanto. There are also 19 simple line drawings of naval plans of actions. The only map, a sketch of the Aegean, is inadequate. This is perhaps the principal defect of the work. Certainly a good map of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea is an imperative for the reader. Two indexes are provided: one contains the names of ships while the other is a list of naval officers mentioned in the book. Both indices are useful but a single detailed index would have been of more help to the average reader. The bibliography is adequate and is separated according to chapters. A helpful aid is found in that dates by year are shown at the top of each page of the text.

Dr. Anderson is also the author of *Naval Wars in the Baltic* as well as a number of other volumes of naval history, rigging and ship construction. He is president of the Society for Nautical Research. His qualifications to write naval history

are those of the painstaking scholar rather than those of the experienced naval officer. But as he says in his preface, quoting from Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridges, author of *The Art of Naval Warfare*, "The naval historian who has had no naval experience can and, if he is accurate and lucid, almost certainly will produce a valuable work; but it is on condition that he leaves strategy and tactics alone." It is evident that the author set his work against this gauge. *Naval Wars in the Levant* is written in an accurate and lucid style. Dr. Anderson does not expound on naval strategy and tactics: he does not discuss "lessons": but he presents the facts so clearly that the reader will enjoy the somewhat unique pleasure of arriving at his conclusions on his own, unhampered and unassisted.

This is definitely a rewarding book for knight or scholar.

WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.  
Colonel, USMC  
Washington, D. C.

*The Hidden History of the Korean War*, by I. F. Stone. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952. Pp. 364. \$5.00.)

It would be no sarcasm to say that the title of this book was well chosen. For if the history of the Korean war was hidden, the author has further enveloped its main events in a smokescreen creating doubts and suspicions of United Nations motives.

This result is brought off with the skill of a deft and accomplished polemic writer. At no time, for instance, does Mr. Stone state flatly that the South Koreans were the aggressors of the civil strife, but that impression is definitely and unmistakably planted in the unwary reader's mind by inferences based on the author's premise that President Syngman Rhee and General Douglas MacArthur were actually the warmongers.

References to Soviet Russia and Red China are made with an apparent air of objectivity. But Mr. Stone's conclusions could scarcely offend a follower of the party line or a reader of the *Daily Worker*. Even so, *THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR* cannot be called a genuine historical contribution even from the leftist viewpoint; since he only uses the current news stories of two New York newspapers as his main documentation.

LYNN MONTROSS  
Washington, D. C.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## BOOKS

## I. Institutions and Cultures—Asia

- ANSTAY, VERA POWELL: *The Economic Development of India*; 4th ed. (New York: Longmans, 1952. Pp. 687. Pp. 18 bibl. \$8.00.)  
It has been rewritten to cover events up to 1939.
- CHASSIN, L. M.: *La Conquete de la Chine par Mao Tse-Tung, 1945-1949*. (Paris: Payot, 1952. Pp. 244.)
- CUTFORD, RENE: *Korean Reporter*. (London: A. Wingate, 1952. Pp. 192.)
- DEVILLERS, PHILIPPE: *Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 a 1952*. (Paris: Ed. du Seul, 1952. Pp. 471.)
- DZELEPY, E.: *La Guerre n'est pas pour Demain (la leçon de Coree)*. (Paris: R. Julliard, 1952. Pp. 262.)
- EMBREE, J. F.: *Selected Bibliography on Southeast Asia*, rev. & expanded by Bruno Lasker, 2nd ed. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952. Pp. 27. 35c.)
- HOBBS, CECIL, comp.: *Southeast Asia*. (Washington: U. S. Library of Congress, 1952. Pp. 163. \$1.15.) An annotated bibliography.
- JAPAN: Economic Stabilization Board. *Economic Survey of Japan, 1950-1951*. (Toyko, 1951. Pp. 257.)
- KENNEDY, EDGAR S.: *Mission to Korea*. (London: D. Verschoyle, 1952. Pp. 181.)
- Korean Report, 1948-1952*. (Korean Pacific Press, 1952. Pp. 50. Free.)
- LEVI, WERNER: *Free India in Asia*. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1952. Pp. 161. Pp. 10 bibl. notes. \$2.75.)  
Indian foreign policy since 1947.
- LINKLATER, ERIC: *Our Men in Korea*. (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1952. Pp. 79, illus., maps. 6 pence.)
- MONNEROT, JULES: *La Guerre en Question*. (Paris: Gallimard, 1951. Pp. 262.)
- MUS, PAUL: *Viet-Nam, Sociologie d'une guerre*. (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1952. Pp. 373.)
- NORTH, R. C. and POOL, I. DE S.: *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites*. (Stanford: Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 130. \$1.75.)  
Hoover Institute Studies, series B., Elite studies No. 8.
- OLIVER, ROBERT T.: *Verdict in Korea*. (State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1952. Pp. 207. \$4.00.)

## II. Institutions and Cultures—Europe, etc.

- ASHWORTH, WILLIAM: *A Short History of the International Economy, 1850-1950*. (New York: Longmans, 1952. Pp. 256. \$3.25.)  
English history of world economic interrelations.
- BENNETT, THOMAS HANLEY: *The Soviets and Europe, 1938-1941*. (Geneve: Impr. Populaires, 1951. Pp. 112.)
- CARRIAS, EUGENE: *Le Danger Allemand, 1866-1945*. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952. Pp. 259.)
- CASSELLS, JOHN M.: *The Sterling Area; an American Analysis*. (Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 672. \$3.00.)  
Contains basic economic information about the Sterling Area.
- CATROUX, GEORGES: *J'ai vu tomber le rideau de fer, Moscou, 1945-1948*. (Paris: Hachette, 1952. Pp. 317.)
- CILIGA, ANTON: *La Yougoslavie Sous la Menace Interieure et Exterieur*. (Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1951. Pp. 132.)
- CITROEN, HANS ALBERT: *European Emigrations Overseas, Past and Future*. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1951. Pp. 48.)
- CLOUGH, SHEPARD and COLE, CHARLES: *Economic History of Europe*, 3rd ed. (bibl.). (Boston: Heath, 1952. Pp. 937. \$5.75.) "Besides important changes made in the chapters dealing with the period between the two World Wars, the chapter on World War II has been rewritten, a new chapter on the developments since 1945 has been added, and the reading lists have been brought up to date."
- CODDING, GEORGE A., JR.: *The International Telecommunications Union; an experiment in international cooperation*. (New York: W. S. Heinman, 1952. Pp. 512. Pp. 18 bibl. \$10.00.)  
A history.
- DALLAS, DON: *Dateline Moscow*. (Melbourne: W. Heinemann, 1952. Pp. 272.)
- Economic Position of West Germany*. (Institute of Int. Fin. of New York Univ., 1952. Pp. 46. 50c.)
- EDDING, FRIEDRICH: *The Refugees as a Burden, A Stimulus, and a Challenge to the West German Economy*. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1951. Pp. 53.)



- THOMPSON, E. M.: *France and Germany in West European Defense*. (Washington: Ed. Research Reports, 1952. Pp. 20. \$1.00.)
- THOMPSON, E. M.: *War Prisoner Repatriation*. (Washington: Editorial Research Reports, 1952. Pp. 20. \$1.00.)
- WILGUS, ALVA, ed.: *The Caribbean: peoples, problems and prospects*. (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1952. Pp. 258. \$4.50.) (School of Inter-American Studies Publication, series 1, volume 2.) Volume contains the papers delivered at the Second Annual Conference on the Caribbean, December 1951.)
- III. *Military and Naval Operations in World War II*
- AGAR-HAMILTON, J. A. I., and TURNER, L. C. F.: *Crisis in the Desert, May-July 1942*. (London: Oxford Univ. Press. (Cumberledge), 1952. Pp. 368. 42 shillings.) Official South African War History.
- ARMSTRONG, WILLIAM: *Pioneer Pilot*. London: Blandford Press, 1952. Pp. 267. 15 shillings.)
- BLUMENTRITT, GUENTHER: *Von Runstedt. The Soldier and the Man*. (Foreword by Field Marshal Von Runstedt, translated by Cuthbert Reavely. (London: Odhams Press, 1952. Pp. 288. 16 shillings.)
- BROWN, BRIG. GEN. W. BAKER, ed.: *The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers*, Volume IV, Volume V; the Home Front, France, Flanders and Italy in the First World War. Volume VI, Gallipoli, Macedonia, Egypt and Palestine, 1914-1918; Volume VII, Campaigns in Mesopotamia and East Africa and the inter-war period, 1919-1938. (Chatham: The Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952. Pp. 434, 728, 444, 351. 35 shillings, each.)
- BUCKMASTER, MAURICE J.: *Specially Employed*. The story of British Aid to French Patriots of the Resistance. (London: Batchworth Press, 1952. Pp. 200. 12 shillings, 6 pence.)
- BULLOCK, ALAN: *Hitler, a study in Tyranny*. (London: Odhams Press, 1952. Pp. 776. 25 shillings.)
- Les Cahiers du Bolchevisme pendant la campagne 1939-1940. Molotov, Dimitrov, Thorez, Marty*, foreword by A. Rossi. (Paris: D. Wapler, 1951. Pp. 67.)
- ELLSWORTH, LYMAN R.: *Guys on Ice*. (New York: McKay, 1952. Pp. 277. \$3.00.) World War II in the Pribiloff Islands.
- HITLER, ADOLF: *Libres Propos sur la Guerre et la Paix*, recueillis sur l'ordre de Martin Bormann. (Paris: Flammarion, 1952. Pp. 370.)
- HEUSINGER, ADOLPH: *Hitler et L'O.K.H.*, 1923. 1945. Tr. from German. (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1952. Pp. 280. maps.) Original edition published under title; *Befehl im Widerstreit*.
- KING, FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST JOSEPH, and WHITEHILL, WALTER M.: *A Naval Record*. (New York: Norton, 1952. Pp. 689. \$6.75.)
- DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, MARSHAL: *The History of the French First Army*. Translated by Malcolm Barnes, with a preface by General Eisenhower and an appreciation by B. H. Liddell Hart. (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 532. 42 shillings. \$9.50.)
- LISTOWEL, THE COUNTESS OF: *Crusader in the Secret War*. (London: Christopher Johnson, 1952. Pp. 287. 18 shillings.)
- MACDONNELL, J. E.: *Valiant Occasions*. Foreword by Admiral Sir John Collins. (London: Constable, 1952. Pp. 262. 15 shillings.)
- Poland*. (Focus, Volume 3, Number 3.) (New York: American Geog. Society, 1952, 10c.)
- RINTELEN, ENNO VON: *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse; Erinnerungen des deutschen Militarattachés in Rom, 1936-1943*. (Tubingen: R. Wunderlich, 1951. Pp. 265.)
- SCHAEFFER, HEINZ: *U-Boat 977*. Preface by the Earl of Cork and Orrey. Foreword by Nicholas Monsarratt. (London: William Kimber, 1952. Pp. 207. 15 shillings.)
- TAYLOR, TELFORD: *Sword and Swastika; Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952. Pp. 444. Pp. 2 bibl. \$5.00.)
- United States*. Department of the Army. Office of Military History: *The War Against Germany*; Europe and adjacent areas. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 448. \$3.25.) 567 photographs. Pictorial record volume.
- United States*. Department of the Army. Office of Military History: *The War Against Germany and Italy*; Mediterranean and adjacent areas. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 465. \$3.50.) 495 Photographs. Pictorial record volume each emphasizing the men and women of all nations who aided American Victory to the scanting of pictures of higher commanders and staffs.
- WARDLOW, CHESTER: *The Transportation Corps; responsibilities, organization and operations*. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office Pp. 454. Illustrations and tables. \$3.25.)

## IV. U. S. Foreign Relations

DAVID, JOAN: *Inside the State Department*, how it works at home and abroad. (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1952. Pp. 64. Paper, 75c.)

FIFIELD, RUSSELL H.: *Woodrow Wilson and the Far East*; the diplomacy of the Shantung Question. (New York: Crowell, 1952. Pp. 398. Pp. 8 bibl. \$5.00.)

At World War I Peace Conference.

FRIEDMANN, WOLFGANG: *An Introduction to World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1952. \$3.00. Pp. 3 bibl.) Additions include coverage of the Schuman Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty and expanded sections on Japan and China.

GREW, JOSEPH C.: *Turbulent Era*; a diplomatic record of forty years, 1904-1945. 2nd volume edited by Walter Johnson and Nancy H. Hooker. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952. Pp. 1592. bibl. footnotes. \$15.00.)

GRIFFIS, STANTON: *Lying in State*. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1952. Pp. 315. \$3.75.)

Ambassador's Memoirs.

HOSELTIZ, BERT F., ed.: *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. 306. \$4.75.) (Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation Lectures.) Discusses the historical approach to the cultural aspects of economic growth and the problems of underdeveloped areas in the world.

HOXIE, R. GORDON, ed.: *Frontiers for Freedom*. (Denver: Univ. of Denver Press, 1952. Pp. 340. \$3.75.) The program of the University of Denver's World Affairs Institute in 1951.

MOOR, C. C. and CHAMBERLIN, WALDO: *How to Use United Nations Documents*. (New York: N. Y. Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 26. \$1.50.)

STEWART, MAXWELL, ed.: *Strengthening Our Foreign Policy*. (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1952. Pp. 28. 25c.)

United States. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services: *Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical Materials*. Hearings before the special sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Services—81st Congress, 2nd Session. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1950. Pp. 221, tables.)

United States. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs. *The Mutual Security Program*. Hearings—82nd Congress, 1st Session on the Mutual Security Program. H.R. 5020 and H.R. 5113. (Washington: U. S. Gov't

Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 11, tables, diagrams.)

United States. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Staff memorandum of information on India Emergency Assistance Act. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 45.)

United States. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. *Mutual Security Act of 1951*. Hearings, 82nd Congress, 1st Session on S. 1762. A bill to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the U. S. by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international security. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 7, tables, diagrams.)

United States. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Investigations of shipments of Communist China. Hearings. 81st Congress, 2nd Session. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 83.)

United States. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs: *Mutual Security Act Extension*. Hearings, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. H.R. 7005 to amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and for other purposes. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office. Pp. 27. Tables, maps, diagrams.)

United States. Mutual Security Agency. The Overseas Territories in the Mutual Security Program. (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 16.)

*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1951; including an account of the proceedings of the 6th Session of the General Assembly. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 1039. \$12.50. bibl. footnotes.)

## V. National Warfare—United States

BOYD, GEORGE A.: *Elias Boudinot*, Patriot and Statesman, 1740-1821. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 334. Pp. 8 bibl. \$5.00.)

BRETT, GEORGE H. and DOUGLAS, ALBERT: *The Air Forces Officers Guide*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952. Pp. 378. bibl. footnotes. \$5.00.)

CARR, ROBERT: *The House Committee on Un-American Activities*, 1945-1950. (Ithaca: N. Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 502. Pp. 6 bibl. & bibl. footnotes. \$6.50) (Cornell studies in Civil Liberty.)

A review and an appraisal of this committee's activities.

CHAPMAN, ROBERT: *Tell It to the Chaplain*. (New York: Exposition Press, 1952. Pp. 151. \$3.00.) Army Chaplain's experiences.



- COLM, GERHARD: *American Economy in 1960; economic progress in a world of tension.* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1952. Pp. 166. \$2.00.)
- CONANT, J. B.: *Threat to Our National Security.* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1952. Pp. 12, free.)
- COWAN, ROBERT: *A Bibliography of the History of California and the Pacific West, 1510-1906; new edition.* Introduction by Henry R. Wagner and additional notes by Robert G. Cowan. (Columbus, O.: Long's College Book Company, 1952. Pp. 316. \$15.00.)  
"Together with the text of John W. Dwinelle's address on the acquisition of California by the United States of America."
- DEVOTO, BERNARD A.: *The Course of Empire.* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952. Pp. 664. Pp. 75 bibl. notes. \$6.00.) American expansion from the beginning to 1811.
- DONALD, DAVID, ed.: *Divided We Fought; a pictorial history of the Civil War, 1861-1865.* (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 462. Pp. 5 bibl. notes. \$10.00.)
- HAVIGHURST, WALTER: *George Rogers Clark, Soldier in the West.* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952. Pp. 223. \$3.00.)
- JOHN, EVAN: *Atlantic Impact, 1861.* (London: Heinemann, 1952. Pp. 296. 15 shillings.)
- MASER, CLIFFORD: *After Seven Years.* (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1952. Pp. 40. 25c.)
- MIRSKY, JEANNETTE and NEVINS, ALLAN: *The World of Eli Whitney.* (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 362. Pp. 19. bibl. \$3.75.)
- MARTIN, MICHAEL and GELBER, LEONARD: *The New Dictionary of American History.* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 701. \$10.00.) Contains more than 4,000 descriptive statements and approximately 1,300 biographical entries.
- NASH, BRADLEY D.: *Staffing the Presidency.* (Washington: National Planning Association, 1952. Pp. 91, paper, \$1.00.) (Planning pamphlets No. 80.)
- Nature and the Needs of Higher Education; the report of the Commission on Financing Higher Education.* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 202. \$2.50.)
- POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA AND OTHERS: *Symbols of Democracy.* Introduction by Peter H. Odegard. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 91. Paper, \$1.25.) (Hoover Institute Studies, series C, Symbols, No. 4.)
- SANGER, DONALD and HAY, THOMAS: *James Longstreet: 1, Soldier; 2, Politician, officeholder and writer.* (Baton Rouge, La.: State Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 468. Pp. 5 bibl. \$6.50.)
- SWANTON, JOHN: *The Indian Tribes of North America.* (Washington: U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 732. \$3.50.) (Smithsonian Institute Bur. of Amer. Ethnology, bulletin 145.) Definitive geographical guide to and brief histories of the Indian tribes of this continent. (40 pages of bibliography.)
- Threat to Our National Security, The.* (New York: Committee for Economic Development. Pp. 38. 1952. Paper, apply.)
- WEBB, WALTER PRESCOTT: *The Great Frontier.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. 8 pages bibl. \$5.00.)  
A re-evaluation of modern history in terms of the end of the world frontier area which was opened by the explorations of Columbus.
- WELLS, HENRY A.: *Monopoly and Social Control; introduction by Wendell Berge.* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1952. Pp. 167. \$3.75. bibl. footnotes.)
- WOLDMAN, ALBERT A.: *Lincoln and the Russians.* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 320. Pp. 6 bibl. \$5.00.)
- WU, YUAN-LI: *Economic Warfare.* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. Pp. 415. \$6.00, \$4.50.) (Prentice-Hall economics series.)  
Discusses wartime economic controls relating to trade, export-import planning and the experience based upon World War II as well as upon theory.

## VI. National Warfare

- ALBERTINI, LUIGI: *The Origins of the War of 1914, translated and edited by Isabella M. Massey, Volume I. European relations from the Congress of Berlin to the eve of the Sarajevo murder.* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 612. Pp. 6 bibl. 50 shillings.)
- CRESWELL, JOHN: *Generals and Admirals; the Story of Amphibious Command.* (London: Longmans, 1952. Pp. 192. 18 shillings.)
- EDWARDS, MAJOR T. J.: *Military Customs; 2nd revision and enlarged edition.* (New York: British Book Centre, 1952. Pp. 204. \$3.25.)
- ESCH, P. A. M., VAN DER: *Prelude to War; the international repercussions of the Spanish Civil War—1936-1939.* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1951. Pp. 190.)

- GEYL, PIETER: *From Ranke to Toynbee*. (Northampton: Smith College Studies in History, Volume 39, 1952. Pp. 80. \$2.00.)
- The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919*. Being selections from the private diary and correspondence of Field Marshal, the Earl Haig of Bemerseyde. Edited by Robert Blake. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952. Pp. 383. 25 shillings.)
- HARGREAVES, E. L. and GOWING, M. M.: *Civil Industry and Trade*;
- KOHAN, C. M.: *Works and Buildings*,
- POSTAN, M. M.: *British War Production*. (London: H. M. Stationery Office and Longmans. Pp. 678; 540; 512. 37 shillings, 6 pence; 32 shillings, 6 pence each.)
- Latest volumes in official civil history of World War II.
- Harwell, the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment, 1946-1951. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 128. Pp. 16 bibl. \$3.75.)
- MURRAY, ARTHUR C. (Viscount Elibank): *An Episode of the Spanish War, 1739-1744*. (London: Seeley, Service, 1951. Pp. 91. 10 shillings, 6 pence.)
- RUBIN, E.: *140 Jewish Marshals, Generals and Admirals*. (London: DeVero Books, 1952. Pp. 300. 21 shillings.)
- RUNCIMEN, STEVEN: *A History of the Crusades*, Volume 2. The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East, 1100-1187. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1952. Pp. 533. Pp. 7 bibl. \$7.50.)
- THURSFIELD, A. G., ed.: *Brassey's Annual, the Armed Forces Year Book*, 1952. (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1952. Pp. 430. 63 shillings.)
- WEDGEWOOD, CICELY V.: *Montrose*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952. Pp. 158. \$1.75.)
- 17th Century Scottish Soldier.
- WILLIAMSON, JAMES A.: *Sir Francis Drake*. (New York: Macmillan, 1952, Pp. 160. \$1.75.)
- HARDING, LOUIS: *A Brief History of the Art of Navigation*. (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1952. Pp. 142. \$3.75. Pp. 2 bibl.)
- "An outline and background of the methods employed by navigators for finding their way around the seas."
- KINERT, REED: *American Racing Planes and Historic Air Races*, illustrated by the author. (Chicago: Wilcox and Follett, 1952. Pp. 130. \$5.95.)
- ROBINSON, ARTHUR H.: *The Look of Maps; an examination of cartographic design*. (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1952. Pp. 114. Pp. 5 bibl. and bibl. notes. Illustrations and diagrams. \$2.75.)
- RYWELL, MARTIN: *Colt Guns*. (Harriman, Tenn.: Pioneer Press, 1953. Pp. 134. \$2.00.)
- VAN MELSEN, ANDREW G.: *From Atomos to Atom*; the history of the concept atom, translated from the Dutch by Henry J. Koren. (Pittsburg: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1951. Pp. 252. Pp. 8 bibl. \$4.25. Paper, \$3.50.)
- WILLIAMSON, HAROLD: *Winchester*, the gun that won the West. (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. Pp. 510. Pp. 6 bibl. \$10.00.) (Sportsman's Press Book.)
- The history of the Winchester repeating rifle and the company that built it into one of the most valuable guns on the western frontier, until the company was reorganized under new managers.

## PERIODICALS\*

### I. Institutions and Culture—Asia

- "The 'Long March' as extended Guerilla Warfare," by Wilbur B. Dinegar, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1952. An account of the Chinese Communist Armies in the 1930's.
- "Indo-China; A Military-Political Appreciation," by Edward L. Katzenbach, in *World Politics*, January 1952.
- "Commodore Perry and the Bonin Islands," by Hyman Kublin, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1952.
- "The Middle East at Mid-Century," in *Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1952.

### II. Institutions and Culture—Europe

- "Lessons for NATO from Recent History," by E. L. Burns, in *Saturday Night*, 12 April 1952.

\*Compiled by R. W. Davis.

## VII. Weapons

- BURGESS, ERIC: *Rocket Propulsion*, with an introduction to the idea of interplanetary travel. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1952. Pp. 235. 21 shillings.)
- GATLAND, KENNETH W.: *Development of the Guided Missile*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 143. \$3.75.) Its evolution and possibilities of future use.



- "The British Official Histories of the Two World Wars," by Brigadier General Sir James E. Edmonds and "Pardon," in *Army Quarterly*, July 1952.
- "The Hussar Among the Fenians," by G. A. Hayes-McCoy, in *An Cosantoir*, October 1952.
- "Is European Army Breaking Down?" in *U. S. News and World Report*, 29 August 1952.
- "The Supreme Allied Command, Europe," by C. S. Jackson, in *Army Quarterly*, April 1952.
- "The Defense of Europe," by H. Krub, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1952.
- "The German Military Mind; a Survey of Recent German Military Writing," by Peter Mendelssohn, in *Political Quarterly*, April-June 1952.
- "Geopolitics of the Ukraine," by Joseph Slabey Roucek, in *Ukraine Quarterly*, Autumn 1951.
- "NATO Defense College," by Albert Newton Stubblebine, in *Quartermaster Review*, July-August 1952.
- "Reichswehr and Republic," by Oscar William Traber, in *Armor*, January-February 1952.
- "Three Years of NATO," in *Military Review*, September 1952.

### III. Military and Naval Operations in World War II

- "The Invasion of Norway," by Kurt Assman, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1952.
- "A Gentlemen's Agreement," by Russell Brooks, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1952. Surrender of the French Near Eastern Squadron in World War II.
- "La Propaganda-abteilung de France, Taches et Organization," by Elizabeth Dunan in *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale*, Paris, October 1951. Volume I, No. 4.
- "The War in the Pacific, 1945," by Lt. Col. H. E. Fooks, in *Journal Royal United Service Institution*, August 1952. The Liberation of the Philippines.
- "I Led the Air Attack on Pearl Harbor," by Mitsuo Fuchida, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1952.
- "The Shohakus-Pearl Harbor to Leyte Gulf," by Hajime Fukaya, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1952.
- "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," by William F. Halsey, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1952.
- "The Landing in Morocco," November 1942," by

- H. Kent Hewitt, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1952.
- "The Air Invasion of Holland," by Major James A. Huston, in *Military Review*, August 1952 and September 1952.
- "Admiral King and the Naval High Command," by Ernest Joseph King, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1952.
- "Why Japan's Anti-Submarine Warfare Failed," by Atsushi Oi, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1952.
- "The German Campaign Against Poland in 1939," by Lt. Col. Stuart O. Van Slyke, in *Military Review*, December, 1952. Demonstration of the application of the Principles of War.
- "Quelque aspects des rapports diplomatiques Italo-Allemands d'apres les derniers diplomates de l'axe," by Maurice Vaussard in *Revue D'Histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale*, Paris. October 1951. Volume 1, Number 4.
- "Les Idees de Fr. Meinecke sur les origines de la catastrophe," by E. Vermil in *Revue D'Histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale*, Paris. October 1951. Volume 1, Number 4.
- "The End of Yamato," by Mitsuru Yoshida, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1952.

### IV. Foreign Relations

- "Defense Sites Negotiations between the United States and Panama, 1935-1948," in *Department of State Bulletin*, 11 August 1952.
- "Journey Into the Unknown; the Problem of Alliances," by Reginald Hargreaves, in *U. S. Naval Proceedings*, June 1952.
- V. National Warfare—United States
- "A Criticism of Air Power Strategy," in *Military Review*, September 1952.
- "Are the Lessons of History No Longer Valid?," by Arthur A. Ageton, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1952.
- "The Naval Affairs Committee, 1816-1947," by Robert G. Albion, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1952.
- "A Perilous Confusion," by Norman Angell, in *World Report*, August 1952.
- "Dissection of the 'Fortress America' Idea," by Hanson Wightman Baldwin, in *New York Times Magazine*, 17 August 1952.
- "The Alamo, Shrine of Texas Liberty," by C. Stanley Banks in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Fall 1952.
- "Some San Francisco Uniforms of 1870," by

- Anne S. K. Brown, in *Military Collector and Historian*, March 1952.
- "The National War College," by Harold Roe Bull, in *Army Information Digest*, July 1952.
- "The Battle of Phillippi," by Eva M. Carnes, in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Summer 1952.
- Dimitrizenc, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1952.
- "Our Changing Navy?," by William Joseph, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1952.
- "Effects of Civilian Control on the Development of Military Leadership," by Donald Brooks Harriott, in *Military Review*, December 1951.
- "Industrial College of the Armed Forces," by John Daniel Hayes in *Navy Training Bulletin*, Navy Personnel, August 1952.
- "Amphibious Power in the Atomic Age," by Fred Elmer Haynes, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1952.
- "The United States Navy in Japan, 1945-1950," by M. D. Ingram in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1952.
- "Combined Operations in Lower Units," by Joseph Wilson Johnston, in *Military Review*, July 1952.
- "Forcing the Hudson River Passage, October 9, 1776," by Richard J. Koke, in *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, October 1952.
- "The History of the Prevention of Fouling," by Frederick B. Laidlow, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1952.
- "National Security Council's Role in the U. S. Security and Peace Program," by James S. Lay, in *World Affairs*, Summer 1952.
- "Meyronnet de Saint-Marc's Journal of the Operations of the French Army under D'Estaing at the Siege of Savannah, September 1779," edited and annotated, with an introduction, by Roberta Leighton, in *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, July 1952.
- "For Negroes It's a New Army Now," by Ernest Leisler in *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, December 13, 1952.
- "Trends in Army Psychological Warfare," by Robert A. McClure, in *Army Information Digest*, February 1952.
- "The Decade of Transition—Our Early Steam Navy and Merchant Marine," by R. T. Merrill, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1952.
- "Sea Power of Tomorrow," by George Harold Miller, in *United States Naval Proceedings*, September 1952.
- "Some Phases of the Compulsory Military Training Movement," by Chase O. Mooney and Martha E. Layman, in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, March 1952.
- "Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Disciple of Admiral Mahan," by William L. Neumann, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1952.
- "Security for the Free World," by George Hamden Olmsted, in *Armor*, May-June 1952.
- "Overall Chief of Staff Recommended," in *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, 26 January 1952.
- "A Soldier's Reading," by Beatrice Ayer Patton, in *Armor*, November-December 1952. The favorite books on military history of General Patton.
- "The United States Navy and the San Francisco Fire," by John E. Pond, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1952.
- "Air Power Needs Its Mahan," by George Cooper Reinhardt, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1952.
- "The Need for a National Staff," by George Cooper Reinhardt and William R. Kintner, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 1952.
- "Address of General Matthew B. Ridgway," in *Congressional Record*, 22 May 1952.
- "Does War Worry You?," by Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, in *Combat Forces Journal*, January 1953.
- "Reflections on the Role of Intelligence Officers," by Brig. General P. M. Robinett, in *Military Review*, November 1952.
- "Southern Ohio and the Union in 1863," by Eugene H. Roseboom, in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June 1952.
- "Selection and Training of United States Army Officers in War and Peace," in *Army Quarterly*, July 1952.
- "How Airpower Can Fight the Psychological War," by James H. Straubel, in *Air Force*, February 1952.
- "The Civil War Diary of C. F. Boyd, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry," edited by Mildred Throne, in *Iowa Journal of History*, Part I—January 1952; Part II—April 1952; Part III—July 1952; Part IV—October 1952.
- "Unification Appraised After Five Years; Four Secretaries Bring Many Changes," in *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal*, 13 September 1952.
- "The U. S. Military Mind," in *Fortune*, February 1952.
- "The Mysterious Mission of ORO," by Herbert Yahraes, in *Saturday Evening Post*, 23 February 1952. Describes the work of the Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University).



"The Burning of Richmond," by William M. E. Rachel in *Virginia Cavalcade*, Richmond, Spring 1952.

"Christmas Dinner for Lee's Army," by William M. E. Rachel in *Virginia Cavalcade*, Richmond, Winter 1951.

"Walled Fortress and Resort Hotels" (Old Point Comfort), by William M. E. Rachel in *Virginia Cavalcade*, Richmond, Summer 1952.

"Marine Corps Aviation," the Early Days, by Robert Sherrod in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, May-June 1952.

"Aviation Birthday," by Robert W. Tallent in *Leatherneck*, Quantico, June 1952.

"Biological Warfare, Menace or Myth," by James A. Tobey in *Technology News*, Cambridge, November 1952.

U. S. Dept. of State, Office of Public Affairs, has issued *Background* at various intervals—"Mutual Security for the Free World," April 1951; "Brazil: Plans for National Development," May 1951; "Iran: Point of World Interest," June 1951, July 1952; "Understanding the Schuman Plan," July 1951; "Burma: Outlines of a New Nation," July 1951; "The Communist Peace Crusade," and "The Communist Festival for Youth," August 1951; "Indo China; the War in Southeast Asia," October 1951; "The Philippines Today," November 1951; "Pacific Security, its New Foundations," and "United Nations General Assembly," April 1952; "Turkey, Frontier of Freedom" and "Jugoslavia, Titoism and U. S. Foreign Policy," June 1952. These average 8 pages.

"Red Pipe Line Into Our Defense Plants," by Lester Velie in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, October 18, 1852.

"Battle for New Bern," by Capt. Richard A. Ward in *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, August 1952. Civil War Battle in North Carolina.

"Old Fort Henry" (Kingston, Ontario), by Ronald L. Way in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Spring 1952.

"Men in Blue," by Bell Irvin Wiley in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Winter 1952.

"Civil Control of Military Power" (review), by Colonel Frederick B. Weiner in *U. S. Army Combat Forces Journal*, Washington, October 1952.

"West Point"—is described in seven varied articles in *New York History*, Cooperstown, July 1952.

"Bull Run," by Francis W. Wilshin, *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Winter 1952.

"Vicksburg, Headland" by Roger W. Young in *American Heritage*, Brattleboro, Winter 1952.

## VI. National Warfare

"Courage in the Soldier," by General Gunther Blumentritt, German Army, Retd., tr. in *An Cosantoir*, Dublin, March 1952.

"A Window on the World." Impression of an American Tour by Cyril Falls in *The Illustrated London News*, London, October 25, 1952.

"La 2<sup>e</sup> D.B., de son débarquement en Normandie a la Liberation de Paris," by Capitaine Even in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars 1952.

"The Wage for the Job," by Major Reginald Hargreaves in *The Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, October 1952. An account of the pay given troops in various countries through the ages.

"ANG: Chinese Gordon," by Lt. William V. Kennedy, in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico December 1952.

"Paris fut sauve par Joffre, Sept. 1914," by Lt. Col. Picne Lyet, in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars, 1952.

"Les Aeroports de Paris sous les bombes, 1914-1945" by M. Claude Postel in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars 1952.

"Bibliotheques Militaires Parisiennes" by Controleur General Rousset in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars 1952.

"Assault Landing in Egypt," by Henry I. Shaw, Jr., in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Quantico, September 1952. British at Aboukir Bay, March 1801.

"Those Commandos," by Robert W. Tallent in the *Leatherneck*, Quantico, June 1952. British Royal Marines as commandos.

"La Division de Paris au + eu (10<sup>e</sup> division d'infanterie 1914-1945)" by Commandant Jean Vial in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars 1952.

"La Medaille Militaire," 1852-1952, by Colonel de Virieu in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Paris, Mars, 1952.

"Regimental Routine and Army Administration in North America in 1759." Extracts from company order books of the 42nd Royal Highland Regiment. Ed. by Colonel R. F. Wallace in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, London, Spring 1952.

"Documents and the Historian" by Elizabeth Wiskemann in *The Times Literary Supplement*, London, Friday, October 3, 1952.

- "Conflict of Command in the Red Army, 1918-1942," by Littleton B. Atkinson, in *Military Review*, March 1952.
- "New Light on the Flanders Campaign of 1793," edited by Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1952.
- "Glimpses of Napier and Soult," by Lt. Col. P. R. Butler, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1952.
- "Wellington the Man," by Godfrey Davies, in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Autumn 1952.
- "The Value of Military History," by Captain Cyril Falls, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, July 1952. A lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, 3 April 1952.
- "Could Napoleon Have Won?," by C. S. Forster in *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1952.
- "Sir John Moore's Light Infantry Instructions of 1798-1799," edited by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller in *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Summer 1952.
- "The Fighting Man and the 'Frocks'," by Reginald Hargreaves, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1952. Some incidents in the relationship between civil and military leaders in history.
- "Background for Russian Action," by James Donald Hittle, in *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1952.
- "Combined Operations Past and Present," by H. Horan, in *Military Review*, March 1952.
- "Liddell Hart: One View," by Col. Robert J. Icks, in *Armor*, November-December 1952.
- "Historique des tirailleurs marocains," (Part I), by Commandant Lugand, in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Juin 1952.
- "Regiments du Maroc," d'apres des documents de la Residence Generale, in *Revue Historique de l'Armee*, Juin 1952.
- "Guerilla Warfare," by Alexander Papagos, in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1952.
- "The Second Sir Walter Scott in India," by W. M. Parker, in *Army Quarterly*, October 1952.
- "The Irish Brigade at Fontenoy," by Sir Charles Petrie in *An Cosantoir*, November 1952.
- "The Humanities in Cadet Colleges," by R. A. Preston in *Canadian Army Journal*, May 1952.
- "The Development of the Canadian Army," (Part I) by Colonel C. P. Stacey, in *Canadian Army Journal*, April 1952. The First Two Centuries: The Old Militia.
- "The Development of the Canadian Army (Part II), by Colonel C. P. Stacey, in *Canadian Army Journal*, May 1952. The Volunteer Militia, 1855-1902.
- "A Study of German Defeat in Two World Wars," by B. T. Wilson, in *Army Quarterly*, April 1952.

## VII. Weapons

- "Submarines of the Confederate Navy," by Carvel Hall Blair, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1952.
- "Cruisers in the U. S. Navy," by Frank E. Duddy, Jr., in the *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1952.
- "A New Look at the Atomic Bomb," by John Frederick Charles Fuller, in *Ordnance*, September-October 1952.
- "Ammunition Expenditure in Korea" by Mark S. Watson in *Ordnance*, Washington, September-October 1952.
- "Flint Loads to Percussion Rifle" by Jac Weller in *Ordnance*, Washington, November-December 1952.
- "West Point's Museum," by Herb Glass, in *American Rifleman*, December 1952.
- "Materiel of the First American Light Artillery, 1808-1809," by Col. Harry C. Harter, Jr., in *Military Collector and Historian*, September 1952.
- "Evolution of the Ground Support Aeroplane," by Alexander Johnson, in *Army Quarterly*, January 1952.
- "Rappahannock Forge: Its History and Products," by Robert L. Miller and Harold L. Peterson, in *Military Collector and Historian*, December 1952.
- "The Ten Ages of the Tank," by Richard A. Ogorkienicz, in *Armor*, May-June 1952.
- "Development of Warships Since 1900," by R. Oliver-Bellasis, in *Military Review*, January 1952.
- "Body Armor in the American Civil War," by Harold L. Peterson, in *Military Collector and Historian*, June 1952.
- "Ship Technology and the Defeat of the Armada," by C. M. Robinett in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1952.
- "Naval Aviation, an Evolution of Naval Gunfire," by William H. Standley, in *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1952.



---

★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★   ★

## HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE\*

---

### MILITARY HISTORY AT THE AHA MEETING

At this year's annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 28-30, 1952, military history was given more time and attention than has been customary. Three sessions, about ten percent of the total, were devoted to military subjects.

The first session, dealing with problems with respect to the writing of Air Force history, consisted of two analytical papers relating to the Second World War. One paper, by Robert F. Futrell, a contributor to *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, presented the controversial evidence available as to the role of the air arm at the time of Pearl Harbor. The second paper, by means of analysing a specific bombing attack, that on the factory concentration at Peenemunde, Germany, showed how contradictory and fragmentary the evidence is on the results of strategic bombing.

The second session was concerned with non-combatant activities during the Civil War. Bell I. Wiley presented a paper on chaplains in that conflict, while John P. Dyer offered data on Northern relief efforts in behalf of Savannah during the period of Sherman's occupation of the city. The third session on military history was presented by the American Military Institute and is detailed more at length in the succeeding item.

### AMI-AHA JOINT MEETING

The annual joint meeting of the American Military Institute and American Historical Association was held at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington on December 30, 1952. The session, arranged by the Institute's program committee, concerned "The Role of the Re-

serves in the Military Services and in American Life." The chairman of the program committee, Dr. Henry M. Dater, presided, and the following read papers: Colonel Arthur Roth, USA, Rear Admiral K. M. McManus, USN, Colonel W. V. Stickney, USMC, Major General R. S. Copsey, USAF, and Rear Admiral I. M. McQuiston, USNR, Vice Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Commentary on the papers was provided by Dr. J. K. Mahon.

The historical background was contained largely in the papers of Colonel Roth and Admiral McManus who dealt with Army and Navy experiences, respectively. Colonel Stickney and General Copsey emphasized the importance of the reserves in meeting the Korean emergency and the subsequent expansion of the armed forces. Admiral McQuiston explained the post-war efforts to obtain a uniform policy and to create a vigorous program based on the continuing introduction of new men into the reserves. This, he pointed out, would be in the interest of the Services and of the veterans who formed so large a part of the current reserve and should not in fairness be expected to serve again except in a general emergency. These were among the considerations that went into the Reserve Forces Act of 1952. Dr. Mahon related the papers of the representatives of the Military Departments and the Department of Defense to general trends in American history.

No count of attendance was taken, but the room was filled to capacity. Anyone who heard the speakers could not but come away with a new appreciation of the importance of the reserves and their place in the existing

---

\*Publication date April 1953.



military system. It is to be hoped that the session will stimulate further investigation of personnel policy, for such studies deal with the problem of how the United States is to maintain the armed forces necessary to a world power and at the same time retain its basically democratic society.

#### MONTHLY BIBLIOGRAPHY OF UNIT HISTORIES

The New York Public Library has taken the lead in assembling a bibliography of the unit histories of World War II. The originator of this project is C. E. Dornbusch, Special Assistant in Government Documents at the library. As of 21 December 1952, Mr. Dornbusch has added a service for students of war. On that date he issued the first monthly list of unit histories. This list contains histories of the action of units in Korea as well as any other published histories of regiments, divisions, and the like. It will be of use to many people, and so will those which follow it each month. A copy may be obtained by writing to Mr. Dornbusch at the New York Public Library.

#### KOREAN UNIT HISTORIES

Our indefatigable correspondent, C. E. Dornbusch, writes the following:

"The Veteran of the USS Antietam CV 36 can not only relive his Korean experiences in picture and text but can also hear the voice of the commander in his farewell message and those of his buddies singing the Antietam Blue and Gray, the Ship's song. His cruise book, Photo-narrative of the Aircraft Carrier USS Antietam (CV-36) in Action against the Communist Aggressors in North Korea, September 8, 1951-May 2, 1952 includes a phonodisc. This innovation in unit histories might well be developed for what G.I. would not like to hear again a stirring message from his first sergeant or

hortatory words from the platoon sergeant.

"Seven ships have published cruise books of their actions in Korean waters. They are the Antietam GV 36, Badoeng Strait CVE 116, Manchester CL 83, Philippine Sea CV 47, Rochester CA 144, and Sicily CV 118. The printers, stateside firms, have realized the grimness of war for these cruisebooks are superb in their photography and layout. Padding with travel pictures is largely absent. The practice is not to print rosters but photographs of the Divisions with personnel identified. Cruisebooks are reported to have been published by Bon Homme Richard CV 31, Essex CV 9, Henrico APA 45, Princeton CV 37, and Tarawa CV 40. These volumes have not yet come to the collection of The New York Public Library.

"The Army unit histories are collectors' items. Printed by Japanese firms, the publications are well written, illustrated often in color, and documented with military maps. Battleground Korea, the Story of the 25th Infantry Division is a volume of 368 unnumbered pages with illustrations and seventeen maps. The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951, by Lieutenant Clark C. Munroe, a volume of 227 pages, has colored illustrations and end papers by Captain Byron Smith and Private First Class Robert C. James. Other units that have published their combat narratives are the 7th infantry division and the 72d tank battalion. Histories for the 3d and 24th infantry divisions are scheduled for early publication. A dozen more unit volumes are in various stages of completeness. The 45th infantry division has repeated its World War II practice by publishing Thunderbird Review in the United States.

"Reflecting the international character of the Korean war, there are British histories. A fine popular account profusely illustrated is Eric Linklater's *Our Men in Korea*. The account of the Argylls is told by George Ian



Malcolm. Unlike our cruise books, H.M.S. "Theseus Goes East" is principally text. The epic stand of the Gloucesters has been told by our own Ely Kahn. This superb piece of war reporting originally published in the New Yorker has been reprinted by the British."

#### HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II FOR 1953

An abundant fare for students of the second World War is scheduled to be published during 1953. To begin with, Volume VIII of *The History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* by Samuel Eliot Morison will be published by Little, Brown and Company early in the year. The title is *New Guinea and the Marianas, 1944*. Also expected in the next few months is Volume V of the *Army Air Forces in World War II* by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate. It concludes the story in the Pacific and is entitled *From Matterhorn to Nagasaki*.

Five volumes in the series *The United States Army in World War II* will be issued during 1953. Although not given in the order in which they will appear, these are:

Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*  
Erna Risch, *The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply and Services*

Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China*

Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1940-1941*

Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*

The Marine Corps volumes expected during the year were enumerated in Number 2 of this volume (XVI).

#### PAPERS OF GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD

The Library of Congress recently announced that the personal papers of the late General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold, pioneer

flyer and World War II commander of the Army Air Forces, have been presented to the Library by his widow, Mrs. Eleanor P. Arnold, of Sonoma, California. In making the donation Mrs. Arnold stated her hope that when these papers of the Nation's only five-star air general eventually become available they will "constitute a valuable contribution to American history."

Among the more than 15,000 items are diaries, albums of photographs, scrapbooks of newspaper clippings, manuscripts of speeches, statements, articles, and books, as well as extensive files of correspondence, some of it with such persons as President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry L. Hopkins, Gen. George C. Marshall, and other American and Allied leaders. The papers date from Arnold's entering West Point in 1903 to his death in January 1950.

For 25 years, access to the papers, which will be known as the H. H. Arnold Collection, may be obtained by scholars and other qualified writers only through the permission of Mrs. Arnold or her children.

The Arnold papers are considered by the Library to be an invaluable addition to its collections of aeronautical manuscripts, to which the papers of Wilbur and Orville Wright, Gen. Billy Mitchell, and Gen. Carl Spaatz have also been added in recent years.

#### CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE

The Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia is maintaining a remarkably entertaining program this winter. On 4 October a highly instructive tour was made of the entire Antietam campaign territory, ending with an outdoor lecture at the beautiful battlefield park. A fortnight later, 14 October, General Baehr gave an illustrated talk on the role of the Federal and Confederate artilleries at the Battle of Gettysburg. Both events were previously reported in *Military Affairs* (XVI, 1 and 3).



Then on 18 November, Admiral John B. Heffernan, USN Ret., on active duty as Director of Naval History, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, gave an interesting account on the subject of "The Blockade and the Cotton Embargo." Admiral Heffernan, a Trustee of the American Military Institute, was skipper of the battleship *U.S.S. Tennessee* at Leyte Gulf. The Admiral showed that Jefferson Davis and his cabinet overestimated the importance of "King Cotton" as a means of inducing intervention on the part of Britain and France. In fact, in the early days of the war the Davis Government actually placed an embargo on the shipment of cotton abroad, thus helping the Lincoln Administration in the execution of the declared blockade—a blockade which, because of the paucity of available naval vessels in the first year, was hardly effective in either a physical or a legal sense. Great Britain, on the other hand, tipped off her real intention to maintain a hands-off attitude by not denouncing the blockade as illegal in accordance with the international law of the period.

The December meeting, held on the 3d, featured the first Round Table debate, a panel-directed discussion of ten leading questions on the Civil War. For example, the questions included the following: "Was the effort to capture Richmond the proper main strategic objective for the North?; Was Lee's Gettysburg campaign good or bad strategy?; Were Mosby and his men really outlaws?" Colonel Sidney Morgan's Program Committee spent weeks of careful preparation for this panel debate, and it turned out to be an extraordinary success.

#### MILITARY HISTORY INDOCTRINATION

A great many students of the morale of fighting men believe that pride in regiment, or other organization, is one of the finest builders of esprit among soldiers. It follows logically that military history has great value as a morale-stimulant. This is the supposition upon which the program, recently initiated by the Army, is built. That program is designed to acquaint soldiers with the history and traditions of American arms, and particularly with the backgrounds of their own regiments, divisions, etc.

The high command is requiring all commanders, down to company level, to present the histories of their organizations to their men by all the means available to them. For the majority, this will require research in order to put together even the most elementary sort of history. Every unit, however, can use the symbols of its past which are always close at hand. Among these symbols are campaign streamers, carried on the regimental colors, the heraldic devices on the distinctive insignia which the men wear, and any regimental customs that may have survived to commemorate a great event in the unit's history.

Staff elements of the Army have the duty of supplementing the means which units can use to tell their men about the past. They will do this by sending out useful general data, preparing motion pictures that dramatize our military history, permitting the preparation of paintings and displaying relics that make the past vivid. To aid the new soldier, a chapter on the history and traditions of the Army, prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, appears, for the first time, in the *Soldier's Guide* which has just been issued.